AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These are two cross petitions, one filed by the employer and the other by the employee, challenging the order dated 13-1-1996 of the Industrial Court, Nagpur. By that order the Industrial Court directed the petitioner in W.P. No. 2691/96 to withdraw an unfair labour practice (which it held had been committed by the petitioner) and to fix the complainant's pay in the time scale as per the provisions of Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956 with effect from 16-1-1987. The Industrial Court further directed that monetary benefits should be paid from the date of complaint (9-1-1992).

The respondent (workman) claimed to have worked as a sweeper in a permanent post since 1975 (over 17 years) and alleged denial of the time scale applicable to others doing identical work, asserting entitlement under the settlements of 1956 and 1963. The employer denied that the respondent was a workman in the relevant sense, contended the respondent worked part-time till 1985, that he had been on a waiting list and, after completing 180 days of service, had been granted a time scale under a Corporation resolution of 1978. The employer further contended that Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement stood cancelled by JCF Resolution No. 8856 dated 31-8-1978 and sought dismissal of the complaint.

The Industrial Court held that the complainant was entitled to the time scale under Clause 49 of the 1956 settlement from 16-1-1987. The petitions reached this Court; earlier, another Single Judge had referred the matter to a Division Bench because of conflicting single-judge decisions. The Division Bench pronounced its judgment on 21-10-1997, and this opinion addresses the present cross petitions in light of those determinations.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956 was effectively substituted or cancelled by Resolution No. 8856 dated 31-8-1978 (the 1978 resolution) and whether the Joint Committee (or other committee/resolution) could lawfully cancel or modify Clause 49.
  2. Whether the employer committed an unfair labour practice by denying the respondent the time scale and, if so, whether the Industrial Court's relief (time scale from 16-1-1987 and monetary benefits from 9-1-1992) was justified and within jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the respondent's complaint was barred by limitation because a time scale had been granted earlier (and whether the doctrine of continuing wrong under Section 23 of the Limitation Act applied).
  4. Whether the settlement of 1985 had the effect of rendering Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956 inapplicable to the employees (i.e., whether the 1985 settlement superseded Clause 49).

Arguments of the Parties

Employer's Arguments

  • Denied that the respondent was a "workman" in the relevant sense and asserted the respondent worked as a part-time sweeper until 1985.
  • Stated the respondent had been selected and kept on a waiting list due to lack of vacancies, and that on completing 180 days' service he was granted a time scale pursuant to a Corporation resolution of 1978.
  • Contended Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956 was cancelled by JCF Resolution No. 8856 dated 31-8-1978 (i.e., the 1978 resolution), and relied on that resolution as compliance with settlement obligations.
  • Argued the complaint should be dismissed as barred by limitation because any cause of action accrued when the (allegedly) incorrect time scale was granted and relief should have been sought within the statutory period; relied on Balkrishna Pujari v. Gyaneshwar Maharaj Sanstha and Section 23 of the Limitation Act concerning continuing wrong.
  • Contended that the 1985 settlement affected applicability of Clause 49 (an argument the Court addressed and rejected).

Workman's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • Claimed to have worked as a sweeper in a permanent post from 1975 until the date of complaint, with more than 17 years' service.
  • Alleged he was denied the rights to a time scale received by others doing identical work, asserting entitlement under the settlements of 1956 and 1963.
  • Claimed monetary benefits accruing from the date of complaint (9-1-1992).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balkrishna Pujari v. Gyaneshwar Maharaj Sanstha, AIR 1959 SC 798 Explains Section 23 of the Limitation Act: distinction between a "continuing wrong" (act which creates a continuing source of injury) and a completed wrongful act; Section 23 applies only to true continuing wrongs. The Court considered this authority in rejecting the employer's limitation argument: the Court explained that denial of proper pay/time scale constitutes a continuing denial of property (money is property), and acceptance of a wrong time scale does not necessarily oust the employee's right to correct payment; accordingly limitation did not bar the relief sought as the Industrial Court limited monetary benefits to the period within limitation.
Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 1240/87 (this Court) Held that the Joint Committee (as constituted under the Settlement of 1968) was competent to bring about modifications, alterations or changes in settled conditions of service only insofar as those changes pertained to non-financial matters. The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to determine that, although the Joint Committee could handle non-financial matters (per Settlement 1968 Clause 9 and its preamble), a pay-scale issue is a financial matter and therefore could not validly be decided by the Joint Committee in place of the Settlement's prescribed mechanism.
Writ Petition No. 426/82 (Single Judge) Held that the Joint Committee cannot modify, alter or change settled conditions of service of employees and that cancellation of Item No. 49 was beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Joint Committee (rejected employer's contention that changes were within Joint Committee powers under later settlements). The opinion records this Single Judge decision as a contrasting view that had led to referral; the Court considered the reasoning but ultimately relied on the Division Bench's more specific construction limiting Joint Committee power to non-financial matters.
Writ Petition Nos. 255 and others (Single Judge) Concerned the appointment of a Competent Authority and whether the committee could amend the settlement; the Single Judge found that the employer had powers under service regulations to designate officers and that there had been consultation with union representatives; issue was limited to change of competent authority. The opinion records this case as addressing a different (limited) issue — the change of competent authority — and distinguishes it from the present dispute about Clause 49 and pay-scale entitlement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds along the following lines, based exclusively on the material in the opinion:

  1. Scope of Joint Committee's Power: The Court examined prior decisions and the text of the Settlement of 1968 (notably Clause 9 and the preamble). The Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1240/87 had held that the Joint Committee could make modifications to the settlement only in respect of non-financial matters. The Court emphasized that the Settlement of 1968 divided demands into financial demands (four major items) and other demands to be dealt with by the Joint Committee; thus the Joint Committee's jurisdiction was confined to non-financial issues arising under that settlement.
  2. Application to Clause 49 (time-scale): Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956 provided that employees completing 180 days' continuous service would be brought on the time scale of pay. The Court reasoned that a demand pertaining to pay scale is a financial matter. Consequently, even assuming the Joint Committee could have considered the issue, a pay-scale issue could not lawfully be decided by the Joint Committee under the scope established by the 1968 settlement and the Division Bench decision. This reasoning led the Court to reject the employer's contention that Clause 49 had been effectively cancelled by the Joint Committee or by later resolutions insofar as they purported to alter the financial entitlement.
  3. Resolution No. 8856 (1978) and its effect: The Court considered the text of Resolution No. 8856 (which states that Clause 49 shall stand cancelled and creates an "ephemeral" time scale prospectively from 31-7-1978). The Court, however, relied on the legal distinction between financial and non-financial matters (as framed by the earlier Division Bench) to conclude that the Joint Committee could not validly cancel a financial entitlement like Clause 49.
  4. Limitation/Continuing Wrong Argument: The employer argued that any cause of action accrued when the (allegedly incorrect) time scale was granted, and thus the complaint was time-barred. The Court analyzed the doctrine of "continuing wrong" as explained in Balkrishna Pujari (Section 23 of the Limitation Act). It distinguished between a completed wrongful act (where injury is complete at the date of the act) and a continuing wrong (an act that creates a continuing source of injury). The Court observed that denial of proper pay/time scale results in ongoing deprivation of money (property) and thus can constitute a continuing wrong; acceptance of a wrong time scale by the workman does not necessarily oust the right to correct payment. On this basis the Court rejected the limitation argument and noted that the Industrial Court had, in any event, limited monetary relief to begin from the date of complaint (thus keeping relief within a period of limitation in practical effect).
  5. Effect of the 1985 Settlement: The employer contended the 1985 settlement made Clause 49 inapplicable. The Court rejected this contention on the threshold, observing that Clause 49 (time scale after 180 days) and the 1985 provisions concerning regularisation are distinct and serve different purposes; the opinion concludes they are separate provisions and one does not automatically supersede the other.
  6. Jurisdictional Basis and Relief: The Court found that the Industrial Court's order granting relief was made within its jurisdiction under Section 30 of the MRTU & Pulp Act. Considering the above legal points, the Court found no error apparent on the face of the record or lack of jurisdiction in the Industrial Court's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Rule discharged. The Court held that the impugned order of the Industrial Court (which directed withdrawal of the unfair labour practice finding and directed fixation of pay under Clause 49 of the Settlement of 1956 from 16-1-1987, with monetary benefits from 9-1-1992) did not suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record and was within the Industrial Court's jurisdiction under Section 30 of the MRTU & Pulp Act. Accordingly, the rule challenging the Industrial Court's order was discharged.

Insofar as Writ Petition No. 1521/97 (filed by the workman) was concerned, the Court held that the Industrial Court's grant of relief was within jurisdiction in terms of Section 30 of the MRTU & Pulp Act, and the writ petition insofar as it was limited to the issue of relief was rejected.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The Industrial Court's order (as specified above) stands; the employer's challenge has been dismissed.
  • The workman's petition limited to the issue of relief was rejected (because the Industrial Court's relief was within its jurisdiction).
  • No costs were ordered by this Court in the circumstances of the case.

Broader Implications

The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying prior decisions: it applies the Division Bench's construction that the Joint Committee's competence (under the Settlement of 1968) extends only to non-financial matters, and on that basis holds pay-scale issues cannot be validly determined by the Joint Committee. The Court rejected limitation and settlement-supersession arguments on the particular facts; the opinion does not purport to establish a broader new precedent beyond these conclusions.

Order: Rule discharged; Writ Petition No. 1521/97 (limited to relief) rejected; no order as to costs. Order accordingly.

    Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation And Another v. Durgadas Ramlal Rane .

    1. Rule. By consent rule heard forthwith. These are two cross petitions, one filed by the employer and the other by the employee against the order dated 13-1-1996 passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur. By the said order, Industrial Court has directed the petitioner in W.P No. 2691/96 to withdraw unfair labour practice which he has held, has been committed by the petitioner and to fix pay of the complainant in the time scale as per the provisions of Clause 49 of Settlement of 1956 with effect from 16-1-1987. It is further pointed out that the monetary benefits should be paid from the date of complaint i.e from 9-1-1992.

    2. The short facts of the case may now be set out. It was the case of the respondent that he was working as sweeper in a permanent post with the Corporation. It was his further case that he was working in the same post from 1975 till the date of complaint and has rendered more than 17 years of service. It was his contention that he was being denied rights of getting the time scale like other persons who are doing identical work. It was further contended that though he was entitled to a time scale pursuant to the settlement of 1956 and 1963, he has been denied the same.

    3. The petitioner-employer filed their reply and denied the contentions raised by the workman. It was denied that the respondent was workman. It was further submitted that the respondent was working as part time sweeper till 1985. It was further pointed out that the workman was selected by the Selection Committee for the post of sweeper. The respondent was kept on waiting list as there were no vacancies at Bhandara Division. It is further pointed out that on completing 180 days service, he has been granted a time scale in terms of resolution of the Corporation passed in the year 1978. It is further pointed out that clause 49 of settlement of 1956 stands cancelled vide JCF Resolution 88856 dated 31-8-1978. For the aforesaid reasons, it was contended that the complaint should be rejected.

    4. The Industrial Court, Nagpur by impugned order has held that the complainant was entitled to time scale in terms of clause 49 of settlement of 1956 and ought to have been given time scale from 16-1-1987, when he completed 180 days of continuous service.

    5. The principal contention before this Court is whether clause 49 of settlement of 1956 has been substituted by resolution of Joint Committee constituted in terms of subsequent settlement and which resolution was passed in the year 1978. An ephemeral time scale was created by the said resolution applicable to a workman on his completion of 180 days of continuous service. It is, therefore, contended that there has been no unfair labour practice committed on the part of the employer.

    6. These petitions had come up earlier but were kept pending as another learned Single Judge of this Court has found that there were two conflicting judgments of two single judges and accordingly had referred the matter to the Division Bench. The Division Bench has now pronounced the judgment today on 21-10-1997.

    7. The learned Single Judge who referred the matter to the Division Bench was of the opinion that there was a conflict of judgments in view of the judgment dated 1, 2, 3-3-1982 passed in Writ Petition Nos. 255 and others and the judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 426/82.

    8. In Writ Petition No. 255 and others, from the perusal of the judgment what was in issue was matter pertaining to the appointment of a Competent Authority. The Corporation in terms of service regulation had appointed a competent authority. On account of large number of workmen involved totaling over 70,000, Corporation found that it was not possible to keep the same competent authority and, therefore, had desired to change the same in respect of some establishment. The said was done according to the Corporation after consultation with Committee constituted under the settlement. The learned Single Judge while answering the question as to whether the committee could amend the settlement first and foremost found that there were service regulations which conferred power on the employer to designate the officers. Consequently on merits, it found that in fact there was consultation with the representatives of the union. It was in these circumstances that the said judgment was pronounced. As can be seen the issue was limited to the question as to whether competent authority could be changed.

    9. The next judgment, which was noted by the learned Single Judge which made a reference was in W.P No. 426/82. The learned Single Judge was faced with the issue as to whether the joint committee could alter, modify or change the terms of settlement. Considering the issue, learned Single Judge held that the joint committee cannot modify, alter or change settled conditions of service of employees and no right can accrue to the petitioner Corporation to unilaterally cancel item No. 49 in the absence of any consensus on the point in the meeting held for the purpose. It, therefore, rejected the contention made on behalf of the employer that changes brought about were in exercise of powers conferred on the Joint Committee by subsequent settlement of 1969. It held that cancellation of item 49 was beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Joint Committee. Item 49 reads as under:—

    “All employees working for 180 days including weekly offs and other holidays continuously will be brought on the time scale of pay and will get all the benefits available to time scale workers. Any absence on account of authorised leave will not be treated break for the above purpose and will not also count for service.”

    10. Resolution No. 78 bearing No. 8856 reads as under:—

    “(i) the present clause 49 of the settlement dated 25-4-1956 shall stand cancelled.

    (ii) the persons in the employment on daily wages as on 31-8-1978 and those who may be employed on daily wages thereafter, shall if they have already completed or will complete an aggregate service of 180 days in any one financial year commencing from 1-4-1973 should hereafter be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay as from 31-7-1978 or thereafter. This provision is not operative with retrospective effect but will have only prospective effect from 31-7-1978.”

    11. The Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1240/87 has answered the said reference referred by Deshpande, J. The two points which are: (i) whether Joint Committee can bring about alterations, modifications or changes in settlement in the conditions of service of the employees; (ii) whether the period of 180 days fixed by 1956 settlement could not have been extended by the Joint Committee, which has been constituted after that resolution was passed in pursuance of the settlement of 1956, 1961 and 1968.

    12. Herein we are not concerned with the second issue but only to the first issue. In respect of the first issue, Division Bench has answered the issue holding that the Joint Committee was competent to bring about modifications, alterations or changes in the settled conditions of service of employees in so far as changes, alterations or modifications pertain to non-financial matters.

    13. In answering that the Joint Committee can make modifications to the settlement, Division Bench relied on the settlement of 1968. It is relevant for the purpose of discussion to refer to the relevant provisions of Settlement of 1968. Clause 9 of the said settlement reads as under:—

    “9. Reconstitution of Joint Committee.— In view of the new situation created on account of the recognition of four unions at the State Level, it was found necessary to revise the constitution of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee now consist of four representatives of the Corporation and representatives of the four recognised unions as indicated below:—

    1. M.S.T Workers' Federation —8 members 2. Maharashtra S.T Mazdoor Sabha —8 members 3. Provincial Rashtriya Motor Kamgar Union, Nagpur —1 member 4. Motor Kamgar Panchayat, Amraoti —1 member

    The meeting of the Joint Committee should be held once every month provided there is agenda. The Vice Chairman of the Corporation should be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Secretary should be a worker. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee should be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and/or Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reason or any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall, however, before deciding such issues give an opportunity to the representatives of all the four recognised Unions (one each) to be heard.

    This arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangements concerning the constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee.”

    14. It will also be important to refer to preamble to the settlement as extracted in the judgment of Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1240/87:

    “During the deliberations of the third meeting of the Negotiating Committee held on 6th/7th/8th March, 1968, it was unanimously decided that in view of the inordinate delay which lengthy discussion on all 64 demands viz. (1) revision of scales of pay, (2) linking of Dearness allowance with the cost of living Index, (3) increase in existing allowances and grant of new allowances, and (4) arbitration in disputes related to bonus calculations. It was further decided that the remaining demands be dealt with by the Joint Committee already set up and functioning.”

    15. From the reading of preamble and clause 9 of the settlement it is clear that unions had raised various demands on the employer. As there were altogether 64 demands, it was seen that it would take a long time and as such there should be a package deal covering four major demands; which are mentioned above.

    16. It is thus clear from the reading of preamble and clause 9 that for the first time instead of merely referring disputes pertaining to the implementation of settlement, the parties agreed that the demands raised in the year 1968 would be divided into two categories. The financial demand which were decided and the remaining demands to be referred to the Joint Committee. It is in that context that the Division Bench has held that the Joint Committee had jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to non-financial matters. There could be no escape from this conclusion as in the settlement itself it was provided that matters not covered by Settlement of 1968, would be decided by the Joint Committee. Subsequent to this settlement, there have been other settlements. In subsequent settlements, a clause like clause 9 is absent. We need not refer further to said issues.

    17. On consideration of the above, therefore, it is clear that when Division Bench referred to the power of Joint Committee to settle non-financial matters it refers specifically to the settlement of 1968, which left all the demands excepting those four referred to above to the decision of Joint Committee. In the context of that, demand pertaining to pay scale is definitely a demand pertaining to financial matter and even assuming that Joint Committee could have gone into this issue, clearly this was a demand pertaining to financial matter, it could not have been decided by the Joint Committee.

    18. It was contended on behalf of Corporation that in term of resolution of 1978, time scale had been given to the respondent and as such they have complied with the settlement. It is further contended that therefore, even if the wrong time scale has been given cause of action would be within 90 days of granting time scale. Here the complaint has been filed much later and consequently complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. Counsel relied on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Balkrishna Pujari v. Gyaneshwar Maharaj Sanstha reported in AIR 1959 SC 798. In the said case one of the contention was that there are provisions in the limitation Act, which would apply in a suit for declaration of hereditary rights as Pujari and an injunction against trustee of Institution. Second point which is relied upon is to what is continuing wrong. Reference was made to section 23 of Limitation Act. The Apex Court observed as under:—

    “Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrong that section 23 can be invoked. Where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of section 23 in such a case.”

    19. This observation of the Apex Court is itself self-explanatory. It is only when wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster resulting injury to the right is complete. In the instant case, can it be said that by giving a time scale in the year 1986 contrary to clause 49 of the settlement of 1956 wrongful act if any complained of amounts to any ouster. It is now well settled that in respect of denial of payment of salary or wages or proper time scale resulting in lower pay would amount to denial of property as money includes property. No person can be deprived of property as envisaged under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India without due authority of law. Therefore, deprivation can only be by authority of law. By giving wrong time scale and because workman accepted the said time scale would not mean that the workman's right to payment has been ousted by acceptance of wrong time scale and as such the act is complete. In such case what is barred is relief and not the remedy. In the instant case, the Court itself after considering the matter in terms of powers conferred on it under section 30 of mrtu & pulp act has restricted monetary benefit from the date of complaint, though it has directed it to be applicable three years from the date of complaint i.e within a period of limitation itself. Therefore, the said submission of the learned counsel has no force and accordingly has to be rejected.

    20. It has also been contended that pursuant to the settlement of 1985, clause 49 of Settlement of 1956 ceases to apply to the employees. That argument has to be rejected on the threshold. Clause 49 of Settlement of 1956 speaks about giving a time scale to the workmen on completion of 180 days. The settlement of 1985 on the other hand provides for regularisation in service of such workmen. The said two clauses are therefore, distinct.

    21. For the aforesaid reasons, it cannot be said that the order of Industrial Court suffers from any error of law apparent on the face of record and/or is without jurisdiction and consequently rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.

    22. In so far as Writ Petition No. 1521/97 filed by the workman is concerned, the order of the Industrial Court granting relief was within its jurisdiction in terms of section 30 of mrtu and pulp act and hence petition being limited to the issue of relief is rejected.

    Order accordingly.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation And Another v. Durgadas Ramlal Rane .
    (Oct 21, 1997)