1. By this writ petition filed under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is seeking to challenge the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Buldana on 14-3-1995 rejecting the application filed by the applicant for setting aside the ex parte award dated 1-3-1993.
2. On 5-4-1995 when the writ petition came up for motion hearing, Mr. Khapre, the learned counsel for petitioner prayed for time to study the matter whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a ‘Court subordinate’ under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the ‘CPC’) and if so, whether the writ petition filed by the petitioner could be entertained or not. On 17-7-1995 the notice before admission was issued to the respondents and in response thereto, Mr. A.S Jaiswal, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2.
3. According to Mr. Khapre, the learned counsel for petitioner, in exercise of the powers provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the State Government has framed the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and Rule 276 of the said Rules provides procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal while holding enquiries. Mr. Khapre submits that under Rule 276 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (for short, the ‘Rules of 1989’), there is no reference of section 115 of Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, even if the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is treated as Court subordinate to the High Court, in the absence of specific applicability of section 115 and section 141, Civil Procedure Code, no revision would lie before this Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Khapre submits that in the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (for short, the Appellate Side Rules, 1960’), procedure is prescribed pertaining to petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and under Rule 18 of Chapter XVII, particularly Items (3) and (34), the decrees and orders passed by any subordinate Court in any suit or proceeding including suits and proceedings under any special or local laws and the orders passed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, could be challenged in writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition could be entertained.
4. Though amongst various High Courts there was difference of opinion as to whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is persona designata or the Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115, Civil Procedure Code, but after the Apex Court in State Of Haryana v. Darshana Devi (Smt) & Others, (1979) 2 SCC 236 : AIR 1979 SC 855 observed that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has the trappings of the Civil Court, the later decisions of various High Courts are consistent that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, for all intents and purposes, is court subordinate to the High Court and has trappings of Civil Court and amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. I fully agree with that view that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a persona designata but a Court subordinate to the High Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code.
5. In Smt. Afsari Begum v. The Oriental Fire and General Co. Ltd., 1979 All LJ 1168, the Allahabad High Court has held as under:—
“It is, thus evident that the Claims Tribunal being a Civil Court was amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code because it was a Court subordinate to the High Court.”
6. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 Patna 49 while dealing with the question, whether the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court, thus, observed:—
“23. Apart from the principles noticed above, in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Smt. Darshana Devi, (1979) 2 SCC 236 : AIR 1979 SC 855 (supra) and Smt. Bhagwati Devi, 1989 Acc CJ 123 (supra) it must be held that the District Judge who functions as a Claims Tribunal is not only within the administrative control of the High Court but also subordinate to it under section 115 of the Code….”
7. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Darshan Singh v. Ghewarchand, AIR 1993 Raj 126 after surveying the number of decisions on the point and considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi (cited supra) and other above referred rulings, held that the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court and amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. The Rajasthan High Court while considering this question, referred to Rule 20 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1960, which read — “Rule 20. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases. The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V. V, Rules 9 to 10 and 15 to 30; Order IX, Order XII, Rules 3 to 10, Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21, Order XVII and Order XVIII, Rules 1 to 3” and found that whole of Order IX of Civil Procedure Code has been applied to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and as such, the application filed under Order IX, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code by the petitioner in that case was maintainable.
8. Rule 276 of the Rules of 1989 of which reference has been made by the learned counsel for petitioner, reads as under:—
“276. Procedure to be followed by Claims Tribunal in holding enquiries. — (1) The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, so far as may be, applied to the proceedings before every Claims Tribunal, namely:—
(a) sections 28, 79 and 82;
(b) in the First Schedule, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 (both inclusive) and 15 to 30 (both inclusive), Order VI, Rules, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17 and 18 and Order VII, Rule 10, Order VIII, Rules 2 to 6 (both inclusive), 9 and 10, Order IX, Order XI, Rules 12 to 13 (both inclusive), 17 to 21 (both inclusive) and 23, Order XIV, Rules 2 and 5, Order XVI, Order XVII, Order XVIII, Rules 1 to 34 (both inclusive) 10 to 12 (both inclusive) and 15 to 18 (both inclusive), Order XIX, Order XX, Rules 1 to 3 (both inclusive) 8, 11 and 20, Order XXI, Order XXII, Rules 1 to 7 (both inclusive) and 9, Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3 (both inclusive), Order XXIV Order XXVI, Rules 1 to 8 (both inclusive) and 15 to 18 (both inclusive), Order XXVII, XXVIII, Order XXIX, Order XXX, Rules 1, 3 to 8 (both inclusive) and Rule 10, Order XXXII, Rules and Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 3 to 5 (both inclusive). In so far as the Act and these Rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal.
9. A plain look at the said Rule 276 makes it clear that Order IX of Civil Procedure Code has been made applicable in the procedure to be followed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal while holding enquiries and it was for that reason that the present petitioner made an application for setting aside the ex parte award. The order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Order IX of Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte award and, therefore, be challenged by filing revision application under section 115, Civil Procedure Code and is clearly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal which has trappings of the Civil Court and is a Court subordinate to the High Court and if any order is passed by such Tribunal applying such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which have been made applicable under Rule 276 of the Rules of 1989, such order would be amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code subject of course to the making out a case for interference as contemplated under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. It is very difficult to appreciate the contention of Mr. Khapre that since section 115, Civil Procedure Code and section 141, Civil Procedure Code do not find mention in Rule 276, the order passed by the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is not revisable even if the Claims Tribunal is treated as Court subordinate to the High Court. Rule 276 of the Rules of 1989 only speaks of the procedure which the Claims Tribunal is required to follow and section 115, Civil Procedure Code is not a procedural matter relating to the Claims Tribunal, but is a power given to the High Court for exercising its revisional jurisdiction in considering the legality and correctness of the orders passed by the Courts subordinate to it. Similarly, section 141, Civil Procedure Code provides that the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suit could be followed as far as made applicable in all proceedings of civil jurisdiction and in Rule 276, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, have been specified and, therefore, there was no necessity of mentioning section 141, Civil Procedure Code, because Rule 276 of the Rules of 1989 is clear and specific in that regard.
10. So far as the Appellate Side Rules, 1960 and reference to Rule 18 of Chapter XVII by the learned counsel for petitioner is concerned, suffice it to observe that it only says that writ petitions arising out of the subjects mentioned from Items (1) to (39) shall be heard and decided by the Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. According to Item (3) of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules, as and when a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed against the decrees or orders passed by the Civil Court or under Item (39) the order passed under the Motor Vehicles Act is challenged, it is required to be heard by the Single Bench, but that does not mean that the party may be permitted to circumvent the provisions of section 115, Civil Procedure Code and allowed to file writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
11. The order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 14-3-1995 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte award is, therefore, clearly amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code and there is no exceptional or extraordinary reason to entertain this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed in limine.
13. At this stage, Mr. R.L Khapre, the learned counsel for petitioner submits that he may be permitted to challenge the order dated 14-3-1995 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Buldana by filing revision application under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. By this order I have only held that the writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 14-3-1995 does not deserve to be entertained in view of the specific remedy available to the petitioner under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Thus, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order dated 14-3-1995 by filing revision application under section 115, Civil Procedure Code subject to making out a case for condonation of delay. Order accordingly.
Writ petition dismissed.