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  • sections 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code, 392 read with section 397, Indian Penal Code, 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code and 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act
  • sections 392/397, Indian Penal Code and section 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act
  • sections 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code and under section 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code.4.
  • sections 392/397, Indian Penal Code and section 37(1)(a) read with 135 of the Bombay Police Act,
  • Section 392, Indian Penal Code provides:28. Section 392, Indian Penal
  • sections 392/34 Indian Penal Code and 332/34, Indian Penal Code.23.
  • sections 392 read with 34 and 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 332, Indian Penal Code read with 34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 392/397 read with 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 396, Indian Penal Code, and section 397
  • provisions of section 397, Indian Penal Code
  • section 392 read with 397, Indian Penal Code.
  • contention.16. Section 397, Indian Penal Code
  • section 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code
  • sections 396, and 397, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 392/397, Indian Penal Code.22.
  • SECTION 377 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 392/34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 332/34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 397, Indian Penal Code
  • section 396, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 377, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 332, Indian Penal Code
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • sections 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code, 392 read with section 397, Indian Penal Code, 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code and 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act
  • sections 392/397, Indian Penal Code and section 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act
  • sections 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code and under section 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code.4.
  • sections 392/397, Indian Penal Code and section 37(1)(a) read with 135 of the Bombay Police Act,
  • Section 392, Indian Penal Code provides:28. Section 392, Indian Penal
  • sections 392/34 Indian Penal Code and 332/34, Indian Penal Code.23.
  • sections 392 read with 34 and 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 332, Indian Penal Code read with 34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 392/397 read with 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 396, Indian Penal Code, and section 397
  • provisions of section 397, Indian Penal Code
  • section 392 read with 397, Indian Penal Code.
  • contention.16. Section 397, Indian Penal Code
  • section 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code
  • sections 396, and 397, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 392/397, Indian Penal Code.22.
  • SECTION 377 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 392/34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 332/34, Indian Penal Code
  • section 397, Indian Penal Code
  • section 396, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 377, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 332, Indian Penal Code
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Vishnu Sahai, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two criminal appeals arising from the same set of facts relating to a robbery of a taxi driver, Mohammed Nazim Mohammed Hanif (PW 1), on the night of 19-11-1983. Four persons hired the taxi; during the journey violent threats were made with a knife and a kukri, the driver was robbed of cash (Rs.140), a wrist watch and the taxi was driven away. The informant lodged a complaint at Kherwadi police station the same evening. Police pursued and apprehended four persons from the taxi; the respondent was one of them. Three co-accused later absconded and the respondent was tried as the sole accused.

At trial, four charges were framed against the respondent: under sections 392 read with 34 IPC; 392 read with 397 IPC; 332 read with 34 IPC; and section 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. The respondent pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined eight witnesses and produced documentary evidence; the respondent did not call evidence. The trial court convicted the respondent under sections 392/34 IPC and 332/34 IPC, sentencing him to 3 months and 17 days rigorous imprisonment on each count (to run concurrently) and a fine of Rs.1,000 (i.d. 6 months R.I.) for the latter. The trial court acquitted the respondent on the counts under section 392/397 IPC and under the Bombay Police Act provision.

The State of Maharashtra filed two appeals: Criminal Appeal No.316/1987 challenging the acquittals (sections 392/397 IPC and Bombay Police Act counts), and Criminal Appeal No.317/1987 seeking enhancement of the sentences imposed under sections 392/34 IPC and 332/34 IPC. The High Court heard counsel for both parties and reserved judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondent under section 392 read with section 397, Indian Penal Code (i.e., whether the prosecution proved that the respondent personally "used any deadly weapon" or caused/attempted grievous hurt such that section 397 would apply to him).
  2. Whether the sentence imposed by the trial court under sections 392/34 IPC and 332/34 IPC was manifestly inadequate, thereby justifying interference and enhancement by the appellate court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (State of Maharashtra) Arguments

  • Learned Additional Public Prosecutor (Mr. Nalawade) argued that the trial judge erred in acquitting the respondent under section 392 read with 397 IPC because the evidence showed that some of the accused used deadly weapons (knife and kukri) during the robbery, and thus the special minimum sentence under section 397 should apply.
  • The State also sought enhancement of the sentence awarded under sections 392/34 IPC and 332/34 IPC.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the respondent (Ms. Shubhada Khot) did not challenge the correctness of the convictions on the two counts (392/34 and 332/34 IPC). For sentencing, she urged leniency: the incident occurred about 11½ years earlier, no overt act was specifically attributed to the respondent at trial, the respondent had already undergone the sentence of 3 months and 17 days, and there was no suggestion of prior criminal antecedents; she submitted that imposing a fine (rather than further imprisonment) would be appropriate if the court felt additional punishment necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wilson Chouriappa… appellant v. State… respondent (1995 Cri LJ 4042) — Division Bench including Vishnu Sahai, J. Held that liability under section 397 IPC is individual (i.e., section 397 applies only to the offender who personally uses a deadly weapon or causes/attempts grievous hurt) and not vicarious/conjoint. The court relied on the Division Bench's analysis to conclude that section 397 requires proof that the particular accused personally used a deadly weapon; applied this principle to find the prosecution had not proved that the respondent personally used a deadly weapon.
Shri Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration ((1975) 1 SCC 797; AIR 1975 SC 905) Affirmed that the term "offender" in section 397 is confined to the offender who uses any deadly weapon; use of a deadly weapon by one offender does not attract section 397 for another offender who did not use such a weapon. The court cited this Apex Court authority to support the view that individual, not collective, liability attaches under section 397, reinforcing the decision to uphold the acquittal under section 392/397 IPC in respect of the respondent.
Bedraj v. State of U.P (AIR 1955 SC 778) Principle that sentencing is primarily within the discretion of the trial court; appellate interference in enhancement of sentence is limited and requires very strong reasons disclosed on the face of the judgment. The court invoked this principle to frame the standard for interference on appeal: it should not enhance sentence unless the trial court's discretion was capriciously exercised or the sentence is grossly and manifestly inadequate.
Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 367) Held that there must be strong reasons to justify enhancement by an appellate court; it is not enough that the appellate court would have imposed a larger sentence itself. The court used this authority to emphasize the high threshold for allowing enhancement and to justify a careful exercise of appellate powers when increasing sentence.
Nar Singh v. State of U.P (AIR 1954 SC 457) Referenced as part of the line of authorities explaining appellate restraint in matters of sentence and the proper exercise of discretion. The court cited Nar Singh to bolster the proposition that interference in enhancement requires manifest inadequacy and proper grounds disclosed in the appellate judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court proceeded in two analytical strands, corresponding to the two appeals.

On the acquittal under section 392/397 IPC:

  1. The court examined the textual scope of section 397 IPC and the relevant authorities. It accepted the Division Bench analysis in Wilson Chouriappa (and the Apex Court decision in Shri Phool Kumar) that section 397 imposes individual liability — it applies only to the offender who personally "uses any deadly weapon" or causes/attempts grievous hurt; it is not a vicarious or conjoint provision like section 396 IPC.
  2. Given this legal position, the prosecution bore the burden of proving that the respondent personally used a deadly weapon during the course of the robbery.
  3. The court closely read the informant's evidence: the informant candidly admitted (in examination-in-chief) that he was in a state of tension and concerned for his life and safety and consequently could not visualize or identify who was pointing the knife and kukri at him.
  4. Because the informant could not identify which of the persons used the deadly weapons, the prosecution had not established that the respondent was the offender who used the deadly weapon. On that basis, the court concluded the respondent could not properly be convicted under section 397 IPC and therefore the trial court's acquittal on the section 392/397 count was to be confirmed.

On the appeal for enhancement of sentence (sections 392/34 and 332/34 IPC):

  1. The court accepted that conviction on sections 392/34 IPC and 332/34 IPC was correct; respondent's counsel did not challenge the convictions.
  2. Applying the established authorities on appellate interference in sentencing (Bedraj; Dalip Singh; Nar Singh), the court recognized that appellate enhancement is permissible only for very strong reasons, namely where the sentence below is capricious or manifestly inadequate.
  3. The court observed that the robbery here occurred on a highway between sunset and sunrise, which makes section 392 applicable with a statutory maximum of 14 years' imprisonment. The manner of the robbery — use of threats with deadly weapons and completion on a busy area — was described as "dare devil" and occurring in the heart of Bombay.
  4. The trial sentence of 3 months and 17 days R.I. under section 392/34 IPC was characterized by the High Court as "ridiculously and shockingly inadequate" in relation to the offence and the statutory scheme; hence, it warranted enhancement.
  5. However, the court weighed mitigating factual circumstances urged by defence counsel: the incident occurred about 11½ years earlier, no specific overt act was attributed to the respondent at trial, the respondent had already served the period of 3 months and 17 days, and there was no proof of criminal antecedents.
  6. Balancing the seriousness of the offence (calling for stronger punishment) against those mitigating factors and the lengthy lapse of time, the court decided not to send the respondent back to jail for an additional custodial term. Instead, the court imposed an enhanced monetary punishment: an additional fine of Rs.8,000 with default imprisonment for one year, in substitution for further custody. The court directed that the fine, if realised, be paid as compensation to the informant (PW 1) and that the fine be paid in the trial court within six months; if unpaid, default imprisonment of one year S.I. would follow.
  7. Regarding the sentence under section 332/34 IPC, the court explicitly stated that it did not consider that sentence manifestly inadequate and therefore saw no reason to interfere with it. (The eventual operative part of the judgment specifies the enhanced penalty and the method of its realisation and compensation.)

Holding and Implications

The court delivered the following dispositive rulings:

Criminal Appeal No. 316/1987 — DISMISSED. The appeal by the State against the trial court's acquittal of the respondent under sections 392/397 IPC and section 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act was dismissed; the acquittal on those counts is confirmed. The court's reasoning rested on the legal requirement that section 397 IPC applies only if the prosecution proves that the particular accused personally used a deadly weapon, and the prosecution failed to prove that fact in respect of the respondent.

Criminal Appeal No. 317/1987 — PARTLY ALLOWED. The appeal for enhancement of sentence was partly allowed. While the convictions under sections 392/34 IPC and 332/34 IPC were maintained, the court found the sentence under section 392/34 IPC to be manifestly inadequate and imposed an additional fine of Rs.8,000 (to be paid within six months), with default imprisonment of one year S.I. if the fine is not paid. The judgment directs that if the fine is realised, it shall be paid entirely as compensation to PW 1 (the informant), and the trial court shall inform him about this compensation. The sentence under section 332/34 IPC was not interfered with (the trial court's sentence on that count was left intact as not manifestly inadequate).

Implications: The immediate effects are (a) the respondent remains acquitted of the special allegation attracting section 397 IPC and the Bombay Police Act count; (b) the respondent's sentence has been modified by the imposition of a substantial fine and consequential default imprisonment related to the section 392/34 IPC conviction; and (c) the fine is directed to be paid as compensation to the victim. The court did not purport to lay down any novel legal precedent beyond applying established authorities on the interpretation of section 397 IPC and the principles governing appellate enhancement of sentences.

Order: C/C expedited. "Order accordingly."

    State Of Maharashtra v. Mahipal Singh Satyanarayan Singh .

    Vishnu Sahai, J.:— Since both these appeals arise out of same set of facts, we propose disposing them of by a common judgment.

    2. Criminal Appeal No. 316/1987 has been preferred by the State of Maharashtra against the acquittal of the respondent under sections 392/397, Indian Penal Code and section 37(1)(a) read with 135 of the Bombay Police Act, recorded vide the Judgment and order dated 19-12-1986 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay in Sessions case No. 258 of 1984. By that very Judgment, the trial Judge had convicted and sentenced the respondent in the manner stated hereinafter:—

    (i) Under section 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code to 3 months and 17 days R.I; and

    (ii) Under section 332, Indian Penal Code read with 34, Indian Penal Code to R.I for 3 months and 17 days and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- i.d R.I for 6 months.

    The substantive sentences of the respondent were directed to run concurrently.

    3. Criminal Appeal No. 317/1987 has been preferred by the State of Maharashtra for enhancement of sentence awarded to the respondent under sections 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code and under section 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code.

    4. The prosecution case in brief runs as under:—

    5. The informant Mohammed Nazim Mohammed Hanif PW 1 was a taxi driver, plying taxi bearing No. MRO 5040 belonging to one Ashok Wadhawa, on the terms that the latter was to be paid a daily sum of Rs. 60/- irrespective of the total earnings of the former.

    6. On 19-11-1983, at about 7.30 p.m Mohammed Nazim was plying his taxi at Ghatkopar and while his taxi was stationed at Garodia Nagar, four persons engaged the same and directed him to take it to Sion. On the taxi reaching Sion, they asked Mohammed Nazim to take it to Bandra. It is said that amongst the four persons, one was sitting on the front seat with the taxi driver and the remaining three on the rear seat. When the taxi reached Kherwadi signal on the Eastern Express Highway at Bandra(E) the person who was sitting in the front seat by the side of the taxi driver, took out a knife and after pointing out the same towards Mohammed Nazim asked him to hand over the valuables to him. It is said that the person who was sitting on the front seat, took away a cash amount of Rs. 140/- from the pocket of shirt of the taxi driver. One of the persons sitting on the rear side took out a kukri and pointed out the same at the taxi driver and threatened him to get down and another person sitting on the rear side pulled him out from the taxi and the third person removed the wrist watch and threatened him not to report the matter to the police. One of the four persons who sat on the driver's seat drove away the taxi towards Vakola side. This act of robbery is alleged to have been completed at about 8 p.m

    7. Immediately after being robbed, Mohammed Nazim PW 1 proceeded to Kherwadi police station and lodged his complaint pertaining to the robbery of his wrist watch, money and taxi on the point of knife and kukri. That complaint which is Exhibit 37 was lodged at 8.25 p.m the same day at Kherwadi police station. The complaint was recorded by one PSI Shenghai PW 8.

    8. Pursuant to the recording of complaint, PW 2 SI Avhad along with Mohammed Nazim, police constable Gavde PW 3 and police constable Tavade PW 4 left the police station in a police van, for the place of offence i.e Hussain Tekdi. On the way, they found that the taxi which had been robbed, was going ahead. A chase was given to the same and thereafter, it was brought to a halt. Four persons who came out from the taxi were apprehended; one of them being the respondent. It is said that while SI Avhad was trying to disarm one of the arrested persons, he was assaulted on his hand and neck by a knife. It is also alleged that from the respondent and others, some recoveries were made.

    9. The investigation was done in the usual manner by PW 8 PSI Shenghai. He went to the place of the incident and drew a spot panchanama. PW 7 Subhash Choudhary was one of the panchas of the said panchanama. PSI Shenghai recorded statements of Gavde PW 3, Tawade PW 4 and some other witnesses. The taxi which was seized from the place of the incident was released on execution of a bond in favour of the owner Ashok Wadhawa. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the respondent.

    10. It appears that prior to the commencement of the trial, the three co-accused persons who had participated in the incident along with the respondent absconded. It was in these circumstances, that the respondent was the sole accused who was put up for trial.

    11. In the trial court, charges on four counts namely under sections 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code, 392 read with section 397, Indian Penal Code, 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code and 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act were framed against the respondent. To the aforesaid charges, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

    12. In the trial court, eight witnesses were examined by the prosecution which also tendered some documentary evidence. In defence, no witness, was examined by the respondent.

    13. The trial Judge convicted the respondent under sections 392 read with 34 and 332 read with 34, Indian Penal Code but, acquitted him on the other two counts in respect of which the State of Maharashtra has filed an appeal against acquittal. As said earlier, the State of Maharashtra has also filed an appeal under section 377, Criminal Procedure Code for enhancement of the sentence of the respondent on both the counts.

    14. We have heard Mr. Nalawade learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Maharashtra and Ms. Shubhada Khot learned counsel for the respondent in both these appeals. We have also perused the depositions of the material witnesses, relevant exhibits and the impugned judgment. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter, we are of the opinion that Criminal Appeal No. 316/1987 preferred by the State of Maharashtra against acquittal of the respondent deserves to be dismissed but, Criminal Appeal No. 317/1987 preferred by it for enhancement of the sentence of the respondent deserves to be allowed.

    15. Mr. Nalawade learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State of Maharashtra vehemently contended that the learned Judge fell in error in acquitting the respondent under section 392 read with 397, Indian Penal Code. He urged that since the evidence in the instant case is that some of the accused who had participated in the incident along with the respondent used deadly weapons like knife and kukri, the respondent should have been convicted under section 392/397 read with 34, Indian Penal Code. We regret that we do not find any merit in the aforesaid contention.

    16. section 397, Indian Penal Code reads thus:

    “If, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.”

    17. Whether the liability under section 397, Indian Penal Code is a individual or conjoint one was considered by a Division Bench of this court in a recent judgment reported in 1995 Cri LJ 4042, Wilson Chouriappa… appellant v. State…. respondent, to which one of us (namely Vishnu Sahai, J.) was a party. In the aforesaid decision, after analysing the provisions of section 397, Indian Penal Code and also those of section 396, Indian Penal Code, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the liability under section 397, Indian Penal Code was an individual one and not a conjoint one. In that case, the Division Bench observed in paragraph 13 as thus:—

    ‘A perusal of section 397, Indian Penal Code would show that the aforesaid section would only have application if the evidence is that during the course of commission of robbery or dacoity, ‘the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person.’

    (emphasis supplied)

    Unlike section 396, Indian Penal Code, in which the principle of vicarious liability is explicit and which stipulates that if during the commission of dacoity, one or more of the persons committing dacoity commits murder then, all would be liable for identical punishment. section 397, Indian Penal Code contains the principle of individual liability. The words used in it are the offender (emphasis supplied). In other words, before section 397, Indian Penal Code, can have any application, prosecution has to establish as to who was that offender or accused person who during the course of commission of robbery or dacoity was armed with a deadly weapon or caused grievous hurt to any person or attempted to cause the death or grievous hurt to any person.

    A comparison of the language used in sections 396, and 397, Indian Penal Code, justifies this inference. Had the Legislature intended that the expression ‘the offender’ used in section 397 should include all such persons participating in the offence of robbery or dacoity then it could have used language similar to that contained in section 396, Indian Penal Code, and section 397 in place of its present text would instead have read as follows: If at the time of committing robbery or dacoity any person uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person every one of those persons participating in the commission of such robbery or dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment which shall not be less than seven years.

    The difference in the language used in sections 396 and 397, Indian Penal Code, in our opinion, leaves no room for doubt that the expression ‘the offender’ used in section 397 pertains to the actual offender or accused person who at the time of committing robbery or dacoity uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person and it does not include all such persons who participate in the commission of such robbery or dacoity.”

    18. It would also be pertinent to point out that the Apex Court in the decision reported in (1975) 1 SCC 797 : AIR 1975 SC 905, Shri Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration, has also taken the same view in paragraph five. The Apex Court observed thus:—

    “A difficulty arose in several High Courts as to the meaning of the word ‘uses’ in section 397. The term ‘offender’ in that section, as rightly held by several High Courts, is confined to the offender who uses any deadly weapon. The use of a deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery cannot attract section 397 for the imposition of the minimum punishment on another offender who had not used any deadly weapon.”

    19. It is in the backdrop of this legal position that we have to examine the question as to whether the prosecution has been able to establish that the respondent was one of the persons who used a deadly weapon during the commission of the robbery. In our view, the answer has to be in the negative. The informant in his examination-in-chief (para 5) of his statement in the trial court has frankly and candidly stated that since he was in a state of tension and was concerned with his life and safety, he could not visualise as to who was pointing out the knife and kukri, towards him. On the face of this evidence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved that the respondent used a deadly weapon during the robbery and consequently, he cannot be convicted under section 397, Indian Penal Code.

    20. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the above contention canvassed by Mr. Nalawade.

    21. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in confirming the order of the trial court acquitting the respondent under section 392/397, Indian Penal Code.

    22. This brings us to Criminal Appeal No. 317/1987 preferred by the State of Maharashtra for enhancement of the sentence of the respondent under sections 392/34 Indian Penal Code and 332/34, Indian Penal Code.

    23. We are alive to the fact that even in an appeal for enhancement of sentence, it is open to the respondent (accused) to argue for acquittal. Ms. Khot learned counsel for the respondent could not point out any infirmity in the conviction of the respondent on the aforesaid two counts. We have also gone through the evidence on record and the impugned judgment. We feel squarely satisfied that the trial court has rightly convicted the respondent on those two counts.

    24. The law pertaining to enhancement of sentence has been spelt out by the Apex Court in the decisions reported AIR 1955 SC 778, Bedraj v. State of U.P and AIR 1953 SC 367, Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab. In the aforesaid decisions, the Apex Court has held that the question of sentence is primarily a matter of discretion of the trial court and unless that discretion has been capriciously exercised and the sentence awarded by the court below is grossly and manifestly inadequate, the appellate court should not interfere.

    25. In AIR 1953 SC 367, supra; the Apex Court in paragraph 39 has observed that there must be strong reasons to entitle the appellate court to enhance the sentence and it is not enough that the appellate court feels that left to itself it would have awarded greater penalty.

    26. In AIR 1955 SC 778 supra, the Apex Court in paragraph 15 observed thus:—

    (15) “A question of sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment; see for example the observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 at pp. 367-368 (A) and — Nar Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1954 SC 457 at pp. 458-459 (B).

    In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called for when it is manifestly inadequate.”

    27. In the instant case, bearing in mind the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, we are strongly of the opinion that the sentence awarded to the respondent under section 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code is manifestly inadequate. Section 392, Indian Penal Code provides:

    28. Section 392, Indian Penal Code:

    “Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years.”

    29. There is no manner of doubt that in the instant case, robbery was committed on a highway between sunset and sunrise for which the maximum sentence is fourteen years.

    30. The dare devil manner in which the robbery has been committed by the respondent along with his associates in the heart of Bombay in our view, calls for a enhanced sentence. To us, the sentence of three months and 17 days R.I which has been imposed by the trial Judge under section 392 read with 34, Indian Penal Code is ridiculously and shockingly inadequate.

    31. Our first reaction was to enhance the jail sentence of the respondent. However, the learned counsel for the respondent urged that the incident had taken place nearly eleven and a half years ago, and since on the proved facts, no overt act in the incident has been attributed to the respondent, it would be far far too harsh to send him back to jail; more so, because he had already served out the period of 3 months and 17 days. The learned counsel for the respondent further urged that in case of jail sentence, some fine is imposed, she would have no objection. Ordinarily, in a robbery of the present type, we would not have acceded to, her contention but, the fact is that 11½ years have elapsed; on the own finding of the trial Judge, no overt act was attributed to the respondent, and there is nothing to indicate that the respondent has any criminal antecedents.

    32. Bearing all this in mind coupled with the fact that he has already been in jail for three months and 17 days, we feel that the ends of justice would be amply satisfied if the sentence of the respondent under section 392/34, Indian Penal Code is enhanced from a period of 3 months and 17 days R.I (the period already undergone by him) in a manner that an additional fine of Rs. 8000/- and one year in its default is imposed on the respondent.

    33. We, however, feel that the sentence awarded to the respondent under section 332/34, Indian Penal Code by the trial court cannot be stigmatised as manifestly inadequate warranting our interference in the exercise of the powers vested in us under section 377, Indian Penal Code. We should not lose sight of the fact that in addition to a jail sentence of 3 months, and 17 days R.I, a fine of Rs. 1000/- and 6 months in its default has been imposed on the respondent. Bearing in mind, that the maximum sentence under section 332, Indian Penal Code is three years R.I or fine or both, the sentence awarded by the trial court cannot be faulted as disproportionately inadequate.

    34. In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 316/1987 preferred by the State of Maharashtra against the acquittal of the respondent for offences under sections 392/397, Indian Penal Code and section 37(1)(a) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act is dismissed. Acquittal of the respondent on the aforesaid two counts is confirmed.

    35. Criminal Appeal No. 317/1987 preferred by the State of Maharashtra for enhancement of sentence of the respondent is partly allowed. Although, sentence of the respondent under section 332/34, Indian Penal Code, is enhanced and it is provided that in addition to the period of imprisonment of 3 months and 17 days, which the respondent has already undergone, the respondent shall further pay a fine of Rs. 8000/- within a period of six months from today. In the event of the respondent not paying the fine in the stipulated period, he shall undergo further imprisonment for a period of one year S.I The fine shall be paid in the trial court.

    36. In case the fine of Rs. 8000/- is realised, the whole of it shall be paid as compensation to PW 1 Mohammed Nazim Mohammed Hanif. The trial court shall inform him about this compensation.

    37. C/C expedited.

    Order accordingly.
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    State Of Maharashtra v. Mahipal Singh Satyanarayan Singh .
    (Mar 11, 1996)