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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged, under Article 227 of the Constitution, the institution of two Chapter Cases initiated by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panaji, on the basis of complaints lodged at Panaji Police Station by respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The parties involved are neighbours in Altinho, Panaji, who have had strained relations and exchanged police complaints and counter-complaints.

The first relevant complaint was filed on 5-6-1991 and led to Chapter Case No. 112/91. The petitioners were directed by the Magistrate (respondent No. 4) to execute a bond under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which they did. The second complaint was lodged on 7-4-1992 resulting in Chapter Case No. 98/92, in which the petitioners were again directed to execute a bond for maintaining peace. Both orders are the subject matter of the petition.

The petitioners applied to the Magistrate on 23-2-1992 to close the proceedings (relating to the first case), but by the time the petition was filed in this Court on 16-4-1992 no orders had been passed by the Magistrate on that application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether proceedings instituted under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code lapse automatically after six months unless the Magistrate, for special reasons recorded in writing, extends the inquiry under section 116(6).
  2. Whether the Magistrate erred in directing the petitioners to execute a bond in Chapter Case No. 98/92 without applying his mind, conducting the statutory inquiries, furnishing copies of orders/documents relied upon, and issuing a proper notice to show cause as required by sections 107 and 111 CrPC.
  3. Whether proceedings under sections 107–111 CrPC can be used to resolve private quarrels between neighbours (i.e., whether such proceedings are being misused as a vehicle for private vendetta when there is no danger to public tranquillity).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioners') Arguments — as advanced by Shri Nadkarni

  • The proceedings in Chapter Case No. 112/91 (instituted on 5-6-1991) had lapsed after six months and therefore could not be maintained, and the Magistrate ought to have closed the proceedings on the petitioners' application dated 23-2-1992.
  • The Magistrate in Chapter Case No. 98/92 directed the petitioners to execute a bond without independently applying his mind to the material in the police report; he ought to have conducted a preliminary inquiry rather than relying solely on the police report.
  • The petitioners were not supplied copies of the orders and documents on which the Magistrate relied when directing the execution of a bond; this deprived them of a fair opportunity and contravened principles of natural justice.
  • Proceedings under section 107 CrPC are preventive measures directed at protecting public peace and tranquillity, not a means to settle private disputes or private vendettas between individuals where there is no legitimate danger to public order.

Respondent's (State/Public Prosecutor) Arguments — as advanced by Shri Bhobe

  • Conceded that the law is clear that proceedings under section 107 CrPC cannot subsist beyond six months unless extended under sub‑section (6) of section 116 CrPC for special reasons recorded in writing.
  • Contended that if the proceedings had lapsed, there was no need for the Magistrate to pass any order declaring the lapse because lapsing operates automatically.
  • Attempted to justify the Magistrate's order to execute a bond by asserting that the Magistrate had held some preliminary inquiry (explaining the substance of allegations to the petitioners), implying this sufficed for the requirements of sections 107–111 CrPC.
  • Was unable to contradict the petitioners' assertion that copies of orders and relied documents had not been supplied to them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nasiru v. State of Haryana, 1978 Cri LJ 603 Interprets section 116 (sub‑section 6): an inquiry after the expiry of six months from its commencement stands automatically terminated, and the Magistrate cannot revive it; extension must be ordered before expiry for special reasons in writing. The Court relied on Nasiru to conclude that Chapter Case No. 112/91 (commenced 5-6-1991) had lapsed on expiry of six months because there was nothing on record showing a timely, written extension by the Magistrate.
Jayant D. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 1 Crimes 405 Holds that sections 107–110 CrPC cannot be used to satisfy private vendetta and that exercise of power on trivial quarrels without application of mind is a gross abuse of process. The Court invoked this authority to support the conclusion that proceedings under section 107 should not be used to settle private scores between neighbours and to emphasize that the Magistrate must apply his mind before ordering bonds under section 107.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two connected strands of reasoning—first addressing the lapse of the earlier proceedings (Chapter Case No. 112/91) and then examining the validity of the Magistrate's order in the later proceedings (Chapter Case No. 98/92).

1. Lapse of proceedings (Chapter Case No. 112/91):

  • The Court observed that sub‑section (6) of section 116 CrPC requires the inquiry under section 111 (into the truth of the information received) to be completed within six months of its commencement and that if not completed the proceedings stand terminated on expiry of that period unless, for special reasons recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.
  • There was nothing on the record to show that the Magistrate had, before the expiry of six months, recorded special reasons and extended the inquiry relating to the proceedings initiated on 5-6-1991.
  • Reliance was placed on Nasiru v. State of Haryana for the proposition that an inquiry after six months stands terminated and the Magistrate cannot revive it; the Court accepted this and held that the proceedings had lapsed.
  • The Court rejected the State's contention that no formal order was necessary because lapse operates automatically, finding that in the special circumstances (petitioners had applied to have proceedings declared lapsed) the Magistrate ought to have passed an appropriate order and his failure to do so was improper.

2. Validity of the Magistrate's order directing bond (Chapter Case No. 98/92 — Order dated 13-4-1992):

  • The Court analyzed sections 107, 111 and 116 CrPC together: section 107 permits directions where the Magistrate is satisfied there is danger of breach of peace; section 111 prescribes that when a Magistrate deems it necessary to require a person to show cause he shall make an order in writing setting forth the substance of the information received and particulars of the bond; section 116 contemplates the inquiry into the truth of the information.
  • The Court held that a Magistrate must apply his mind to the material placed by the police and must give the person against whom proceedings are instituted a written order and a notice to show cause before directing execution of a bond; the bond process is an independent facet of the inquiry and cannot be imposed summarily.
  • The State's assertion that a mere explanation of the substance of the complaint to the petitioners amounted to a sufficient preliminary inquiry was rejected: the Magistrate did not comply with statutory requirements (no written order setting out substance and bond particulars, no formal notice to show cause, no supply of documents relied upon) and hence the order directing bond execution demonstrated non‑application of mind.
  • The Court referred to the roznama entry of 13-4-1992, which recorded that the Magistrate had asked the petitioners to submit bond because they were seen arguing in court; the Court found this to be punitive and insufficient as a lawful exercise of powers under section 107.
  • The Court also observed that proceedings under section 107 are intended to prevent breaches of the public peace, not to resolve private quarrels that do not threaten public tranquillity, invoking Jayant D. Shah to underline that the sections cannot be used for private vendetta or trivial quarrels.
  • Because copies of the documents/orders relied upon were not supplied and the petitioners were not given a proper statutory opportunity to show cause, the Magistrate's order dated 13-4-1992 was held to be erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • The petition is allowed. The Court held that the proceedings in Chapter Case No. 112/91 have lapsed and are terminated.
  • With respect to Chapter Case No. 98/92, the Court quashed and set aside the Magistrate's Order dated 13th April, 1992 directing the petitioners to execute a bond.
  • The Court directed that the Magistrate may issue a fresh notice to the petitioners in the pending proceedings to show cause why a competent bond should not be executed to maintain peace and then pass appropriate orders on the basis of his judicious satisfaction.
  • The Rule was made absolute and the Court ordered no costs.

Implications:

Direct consequences for the parties: Chapter Case No. 112/91 is terminated for lapse; the specific order dated 13-4-1992 in Chapter Case No. 98/92 is quashed and the Magistrate is required to comply with statutory procedure (written order setting out substance of information, notice to show cause, supply of relied documents) before directing any bond.

Broader implications: The opinion reinforces established procedural limits in sections 107–116 CrPC (including the six‑month limit and the requirement of recorded reasons for extension) and emphasizes that preventive powers under section 107 cannot be used to settle private disputes or to impose bonds without statutory formalities and application of mind. The opinion does not announce any new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts before the Court.

Petition allowed.

    Christalin Costa (Smt.) And Others v. State Of Goa And Others

    1. The petitioners have filed this application under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the institution of two Chapter Cases against them by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panaji, at the instance of the Panaji Police Station wherein the petitioners were directed by the respondent No. 4 to execute bonds for keeping peace and good conduct under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code. It appears that the proceedings were initiated by the police against the petitioners on a complaint lodged by the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 at Panaji Police Station. The petitioners and respondents Nos. 1 and 3 are neighbours and are living in Altinho, Panaji. However their relations are quite strained and there are constant quarrels on account of which Police complaints and counter complaints have been lodged by both the parties. For the purpose of this petition the first complaint which is relevant is the one filed on 5-6-1991 pursuant to which Chapter Case No. 112/91 was initiated by the Panaji Police Station. Accordingly the petitioners were made to appear before the respondent No. 4 and a bond was directed to be executed by them by the Magistrate under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code which bond they actually executed before him.

    2. Thereafter one more complaint was lodged by the respondent No. 3 against the petitioners on 7-4-1992 consequent upon which fresh proceedings under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code were started against them. In this case also the petitioners were directed to execute a bond for maintaining peace. Both these orders are now the subject matter of this petition.

    3. Shri Nadkarni, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted before me that as far as the proceedings in Chapter Case No. 112/91 wherein they have executed a bond even assuming that the facts of the complaint lodged by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the police as well as in the report forwarded by the respondents Nos. 1 and 4 are correct the proceedings under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code are to be deemed as lapsed after a period of six months. Indeed the said proceedings having been instituted on 5-6-1991 it is obvious that the period of six months had already passed and as per the law no such proceedings could be maintained by the Magistrate. The learned counsel contended that the petitioners have made an application to respondent No. 4 on 23-2-1992 praying that the proceedings pending against them be closed, but in spite of that till the time of filing of this petition on 16-4-1992 no orders have been passed.

    4. Shri Bhobe, learned Public Prosecutor, has fairly conceded that the position of law is quite clear and for all purposes proceedings instituted under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code could not subsist beyond the period of six months, unless that period was extended in special circumstances in terms of Sub-section (6) of section 116 of Criminal Procedure Code. Shri Bhobe however urged that if the proceedings have lapsed there was no need for the Magistrate to say so because the lapsing of the proceedings should operate automatically in such cases.

    5. It is difficult to accept the proposition advanced by Shri Bhobe in this respect and on the contrary the contention of Shri Nadkarni that the proceedings have lapsed after six months and the Magistrate was supposed to pass an order closing the proceedings on his application dated 23-2-1992 appears to be sound. Sub-section (6) of section 116 is expressly clear that the inquiry under the aforesaid section as to the truth of information of facts which have given rise to the said inquiry under section 111 of Criminal Procedure Code shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs. In the instant case there is nothing on record to show that the Magistrate has in his wisdom thought it fit to extend the period of the inquiry which he was supposed to hold under section 116 of Criminal Procedure Code on the complaint lodged by the police before him consequent upon Chapter Case No. 112/91 was initiated against the petitioners on 5-6-1991. To be noted that this extension of time had to be directed by the Magistrate before the expiry of six months period and not after its expiry. Reliance was placed in this respect by Shri Nadkarni on the case of Nasiru v. State of Haryana, 1978 Cri LJ 603, wherein it was observed that a plain reading of section 116 goes to show that an inquiry after the expiry of a period of six months from the date of its commencement stands automatically terminated. Once the inquiry comes to an end, the Magistrate is not empowered to revive it. He, however, before termination of the inquiry can order otherwise for special reasons to be recorded in writing. In the instant case it is seen that the Magistrate not only failed to keep the inquiry alive by extending its period for valid reasons but also neglected in his duty to close the said inquiry as well as the proceedings in spite of the fact that the petitioners had moved an application before him to this effect on 23-2-1992. The submission of Shri Bhobe that no such orders appears to be necessary is to be rejected in the special circumstances of this case wherein the petitioners had approached the Magistrate to declare the proceedings as lapsed and closed.

    6. It was further submitted by Shri Nadkarni with regard to the second proceedings namely, the one instituted in Chapter Case No. 98/92 that the order of the Magistrate directing the petitioners straightway to execute a bond for maintaining peace on the basis of the report of respondent No. 1 is bad and illegal. It was urged by the learned counsel that the Magistrate was required to necessarily apply his mind on the subject matter of the report independently on what the police complaint had stated in the aforesaid report before initiating proceedings under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code. For this purpose, Shri Nadkarni argued, the Magistrate should have conducted some preliminary inquiry and merely because the police had placed some material before him the Magistrate was not required just on that material to initiate proceedings against the petitioners under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that after having initiated such proceedings the Magistrate was also supposed to give him copies of the orders and documents on the basis of which the order directing him to execute a bond was passed. The learned counsel submitted that no such documents or copies were supplied to the petitioners in respect of the complaint and the Chapter case initiated against them so far. Lastly the learned counsel has also made a grievance with regard to the very propriety of the order and the proceedings instituted by the Magistrate against the petitioners under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code. The learned counsel urged that proceedings under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code were meant to curb public nuisance and breach of peace and not certainly aimed at settling scores between private individuals when there is no danger or probability of disturbing public tranquillity.

    7. In my view all these submissions of Shri Nadkarni seem to be sound and deserve acceptance. As far as the last grievance is concerned a bare perusal of section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code read with section 111 shows that such proceedings are to be instituted only in respect of information received by the Magistrate if he is satisfied that there is any danger or likelihood of somebody committing breach of the peace and disturbing public tranquillity. Obviously when there are quarrels between two private individuals it appears that this situation is not contemplated by these legal provisions. Quarrels between individuals are not normally creating any problem of public order and at the most it may lead to a problem of law and order to be dealt with by the appropriate penal law. Proceedings under section 107 are always dealing with preventive measures to be taken by the Magistrates in order to pre-empt any possibility of breach of peace and disturbance of public tranquillity. In the case of Jayant D. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 1 Crimes 405, this Court has held that the provisions of sections 107 to 110 cannot be used or exercised for satisfying private vendetta of a querulous person and the exercise of powers by the Magistrate under the aforesaid sections on the basis of incidents involving trivial quarrels without application of mind would amount to gross abuse of the process of law.

    8. Similarly and with regard to the grievance made by Shri Nadkarni that no proceedings, copies of orders and documents were supplied to him by the Magistrate, Shri Bhobe learned Public Prosecutor was not able to say anything contrary to what was asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Being so I am satisfied that the grievance advanced in this respect by the petitioners appears to be genuine because once the proceedings were initiated the Magistrate was required to give to the petitioners whatever incriminating material had been relied by him to initiate proceedings against them under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code. The principles of natural justice and fairness would demand such action on the part of the Magistrate and his failure in discharging this duty should not be lightly viewed in the special circumstances wherein the impugned order directing the petitioners to execute a bond was passed by him. Now and with regard to the challenge thrown by Shri Nadkarni against directing the petitioners to execute a bond without an opportunity having been given to them to have a say on the matter section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code which deals with the security for keeping the peace requires that when a Magistrate receives information that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb public tranquillity etc. and the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may direct such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond. In its turn section 111 of Criminal Procedure Code refers to an order to be made and reads that when a Magistrate acting under section 107, deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such section, he shall make an order in writing setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties required. The harmonious construction of these two provisions clearly suggests that no order requiring any person against whom proceedings under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code have been instituted can be passed by the Magistrate to execute a bond for maintaining peace unless a notice is issued to him to show cause as to why he should not be ordered to execute such a bond and this notice is to be given to him only after an order in writing is made by the Magistrate setting forth the substance of the information and among others details of the bond to be executed by the said person. It follows therefore that the Magistrate is expected to apply his mind on the material placed before him by the police along with his report and on giving an opportunity to the opposite party to have a say on the question of executing a bond issue appropriate orders in this respect. The execution of the bond appears therefore to be an independent facet of the inquiry which the Magistrate is entitled to hold on the basis of the report forwarded to him by the police. Such inquiry as to the truth of the information forwarded to him in the report by the police is contemplated in section 116 of Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that its sub-section (3) provides that the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquillity or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, may direct the person against whom proceedings have been instituted under section 107 and an order under section 111 has been made to execute a bond. But this power of the Magistrate can be exercised by him only after the commencement and before the completion of the inquiry. We have already seen that such inquiry can start only after the Magistrate has made the order under section 111 of Criminal Procedure Code while acting under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code. Shri Bhobe has made a feeble attempt to justify the order of the Magistrate directing the petitioners to execute a bond by alleging that the Magistrate has held some preliminary inquiry on the matter by explaining to the petitioners the substance of the allegations or complaints made against them by the police. In my view this circumstance cannot dispense the Magistrate of complying with the provisions of the law and a mere fact that the substance of the complaint was explained to the petitioners could not amount by any stretch of imagination to issue to the petitioners a notice to show cause as to why a bond should not be executed by them to maintain peace. Shri Bhobe has placed before me the proceedings held by the Magistrate and has taken me through the reasons given by him to pass the order directing the petitioners to execute a bond. On going through the roznama of the proceedings dated 13-4-1992 it is seen that the Magistrate has recorded that on the parties having been produced before him by the police he found that there were counter charges against each other. Thereafter because the parties of opponents namely Alex S. D'Costa and others who are the petitioners were seen arguing in his Court he had asked them to submit bond to keep peace pending the inquiry. These reasons adduced by the Magistrate clearly reveal non-application of mind on his part on the matter of executing a bond and negativate the contention of Shri Bhobe that some inquiry was held by the Magistrate before such order was passed. The said records clearly point out that the order was issued in a most punitive manner and merely because the petitioners namely Alex D'Costa was seen arguing before him in the Court. Anyhow the law does not contemplate this type of bonds to be executed by parties appearing before him in proceedings under section 107 of Criminal Procedure Code and on this court alone the orders passed with this regard is to be held as wrong and without any basis either in facts or in law.

    9. In the result the petition is bound to succeed and is hereby allowed as per clause (a) of the prayer clause. The proceedings in Chapter Case No. 112/91 are held as lapsed and terminated. However, with regard to Chapter Case No. 98/92 only the Order dated 13th April, 1992 is quashed and set aside. The Magistrate may therefore issue a fresh notice to the petitioners in the proceedings pending before him to show cause as to why a competent bond should not be executed to maintain peace and pass appropriate orders on the basis of his judicious satisfaction. Rule made absolute in the above terms with no order as to costs.

    Petition allowed.
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    Comments

    Christalin Costa (Smt.) And Others v. State Of Goa And Others
    (Jul 7, 1992)