Deshpande, J.:— The original respondent No. 3 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Amravati in Claim Petition No. 18 of 1985 by this appeal challenges the decree passed jointly against it and the original respondent No. 1, Dr. Anand Ghongade and the original respondent No. 2, Messrs Saikrupa Bore-Wells in which the claimant Nos. 1 to 6 had laid claim, the award being jointly and severally against the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 for Rs. 4,05,000/- together with interest.

2. The deceased Devidas was a partner of firm Saikrupa Bore-Wells which owned jeep No. MXG 9675 which met with an accident at 2.30 a.m on 18.11.1984 while it was proceeding from Nagpur to Jamgaon near Warud. The jeep was at that time driven by Dr. Anand Ghongade and the deceased Devidas was one of the persons travelling in the jeep. The accident resulted in his death. The Tribunal held that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving by Dr. Anand Ghongade and that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 4,05,000/- and proportionate costs with interest as compensation. The appellant has not challenged the finding on this point. The only points which are being raised by the appellant are that there was no liability either statutory or under the contract of insurance on him to indemnify the claim made by the legal representatives of the deceased Devidas who was, by virtue of his being a partner of the firm, the owner of the vehicle. The Tribunal held that the claim could be made against the appellant on the grounds firstly that the policy of insurance was comprehensive and secondly Devidas was one of the passengers travelling in the jeep and the risk so far as pertained to him was covered by the special term of the contract of insurance under which the liability in respect of six passengers and the driver had been undertaken by the insurer by paying extra premium of Rs. 84.36 Before we proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant, we shall first deal with the two objections raised on behalf of the claimants before us, one being about the maintainability of the appeal in view of section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the other being about the interest of the partner Devidas whose individuality according to the submission of the learned counsel has to be regarded as separate and distinct from the character of the firm of which he was a partner though there is no dispute about the position that the jeep was owned by the partnership.

3. Reliance was placed for urging that the appeal is not maintainable on the provisions of section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. We may point out that the firm though made a party, did not appear and contest the claim before the Tribunal. Under section 110-C (2-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that: (i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made; or (ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer, who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. The appellant insurance company was a party before the Tribunal and under section 110-D of the Act, the insurance company being a person aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, had a right of appeal. According to the learned counsel for the claimants the nature of the defence is restricted by the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. But this overlooks the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 96 under which if, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entided to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgment. It is, therefore, clear that for the operation of sub-section (2) it is necessary that the sum should be payable under sub-section (1) and that is restricted to the liability covered by the policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95. It is, therefore, open to the insurer to urge that the claim which is made against the insurer is not covered either by the statutory liability imposed or section 95 or by the terms of the policy of insurance. Reliance was, however, placed on behalf of the claimants on the observations in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi, 1988 ACJ 962 (Rajasthan), but the decision there turned on the position that the Tribunal had merely permitted the insurance company to cross-examine the witnesses and so the case cannot be said to have come within the provisions of section 110-C(2-A) of the Act. On the other hand, the view that we are taking finds support in a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Shivanagouda, 1984 ACJ 786 (Karnataka), where the contention which was only in respect of the liability to indemnify the insured was allowed to be raised in appeal. We, therefore, hold that the appeal is maintainable.

4. With regard to the other point raised on behalf of the claimants, we find that there cannot be any dispute about the position of a partner of a firm. The firm comprised of only two partners, one being the deceased Devidas. Under section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, ‘partnership is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. In the Law of Partnership In India by Singh & Gupta, 3rd Edn., 1988, at page 239, it has been observed that all the partners are joint owners or co-owners of the entire partnership property and each partner is co-owner of the entire property. Therefore, it cannot be said that a partner who receives partnership property is entrusted with property or with dominion over property belonging to another person. Nor can it be said that a partner receiving partnership property is entrusted with his co-partner's share of that property. In Chhotelal Pyarelal v. Shikharchand, (1984) 4 SCC 343 : AIR 1984 SC 1570, the position of a firm is said to be that the firm is merely a compendious name for the partners constituting it and it is only by virtue of the provisions of Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code that a firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded eo nomine. We are not, therefore, impressed by the submission that when a claim is made under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the character of the person who meets with the accident becomes different. To accept the argument would mean that in law a firm is a legal entity which it is not. It is, therefore, clear that the position of Devidas who was a partner of the firm was the same as the owner of the vehicle because the firm owned the vehicle and the question will have to be approached for finding out whether the policy of insurance would cover the liability in respect of the owner of the vehicle.

5. According to Mr. R.K Thakur, the learned counsel for the appellant, the presumption that a comprehensive policy covered the liability also in respect of the owner of the vehicle, was not correct and this submission is borne out by National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 (SC), where it was laid down that even though it is not permissible to use a vehicle unless it is covered at least under an ‘Act only’ policy it is not obligatory for the owner of a vehicle to get it comprehensively insured. In case, however, it is got comprehensively insured a higher premium than for an ‘Act only’ policy is payable depending on the estimated value of the vehicle/Such insurance entitles the owner to claim reimbursement of the entire amount of loss or damage suffered up to the estimated value of the vehicle calculated according to the rules and regulations framed in this behalf. Comprehensive insurance of the vehicle and payment of higher premium on this score, however, do not mean that the limit of the liability with regard to third party risk becomes unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed under sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act. For this purpose a specific agreement has to be arrived at between the owner and the insurance company and separate premium has to be paid on the amount of liability undertaken by the insurance company in this behalf. Likewise, if risk of any other nature, for instance, with regard to the driver or passengers, etc., in excess of statutory liability, if any, is sought to be covered it has to be clearly specified in the policy and separate premium paid therefor. This is the requirement of the tariff regulations framed for the purpose. In the policy of insurance in the instant case in respect of the jeep car the sitting capacity including the driver was shown as 6 + 1 and insured's estimate of value including accessories was shown as Rs. 90,000/- with the endorsement ‘comprehensive’ appearing under these two columns. In the column of ‘premium’ additional premium was paid for six passengers that being Rs. 84.36 and for driver Rs. 8/-. The extra risk covered did not include the liability in respect of the owner of the vehicle and it will be only with reference to the legal liability created by sections 95 and 96 that the liability of the insurer would fall to be determined. Under section 95(1)(b)(i) which would cover the present case, it is provided that in order to comply with the provisions of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. ‘Third party’ under clause (d) of section 93 includes the Government and it is apparent that the owner of the vehicle who enters into the contract of insurance would not be a third party to the contract, his position being that of a contracting party. In our view, therefore, it will not be covered by the expression ‘any person’ or ‘third party’ appearing in clause (i). In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co., 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), it was pointed out (para 21):

“Sections 95(a) and 95(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act adopted the provisions of the English Road Traffic Act, 1960 and excluded the liability of the insurance company regarding the risk to the passengers. Section 95 provides that a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The plea that the words ‘third party’ are wide enough to cover all persons except the person and the insurer is negatived as the insurance cover is not available to the passengers is made clear by the proviso to sub-section which provides that a policy shall not be required:

“(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises.’

Therefore, it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. As under section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured, the plea of the counsel for the insurance company will have to be accepted and the insurance company held not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act.”

6. Following this decision a Division Bench of this court in Sharda Prasad Singh v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 1984 ACJ 240 (Bombay), pointed out that the ‘Act liability’ is the minimum liability, but there is nothing in the Act which can prohibit the insurance company from expanding limits of its liability by a contract of insurance. Evidently by paying extra premium the liability has not been extended in the present case so as to include the risk to the owner and the liability in respect of the owner would not be covered by the third party risk which the insurer is bound to take under the statute or the policy of insurance which the firm had taken in respect of this vehicle.

7. Even on general principles it is difficult to entertain the contention that the liability in respect of the tortfeasor himself would be covered by the insurance company and that the tortfeasor under the contract of indemnity could ask the insurer in the event of his rashness or negligence to pay compensation to him or under the law of Torts. We, therefore, find it difficult to sustain the claim made by the claimants as against the insurer as it is clear to us that the insurer had not taken the liability for the death of or bodily injury to the owner either under the statutory provisions or under the contract of insurance.

8. The counsel agreed that no fault liability in respect of even Devidas has been discharged by the insurer by paying Rs. 15,000/-. Therefore, even if the owner were to come within the description of ‘passenger’ as covered by the policy, no extra amount would have been required to be paid by the insurer to the claimants. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the award made by the Tribunal so far as it relates to the appellant. In the circumstances of the case, we make no orders as to the costs of the appeal.

9. Appeal allowed.