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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 33(3) of the old Ceiling Act.8. Section 33(3),
  • section 21 of the Old Ceiling Act. Sub-section (3) of section 33
  • sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act.
  • provisions of section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act.
  • Holdings) Act, 1961 (for short the Old Ceiling Act).2.
  • rules 23, 23A and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 33
  • rules 23 and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC.
  • section 33(1) of the Old Ceiling Act,
  • section 10(1) of the Old Ceiling Act
  • rule 23-A in Order XLI of the CPC
  • section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act,
  • section 12 of the Old Ceiling Act
  • section 34 of the Old Ceiling Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 33
  • provisions of section 33(3)
  • Order XLI, Rule 33 CPC,
  • Rent Control Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 33(3) of the old Ceiling Act.8. Section 33(3),
  • section 21 of the Old Ceiling Act. Sub-section (3) of section 33
  • sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act.
  • provisions of section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act.
  • Holdings) Act, 1961 (for short the Old Ceiling Act).2.
  • rules 23, 23A and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 33
  • rules 23 and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC.
  • section 33(1) of the Old Ceiling Act,
  • section 10(1) of the Old Ceiling Act
  • rule 23-A in Order XLI of the CPC
  • section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act,
  • section 12 of the Old Ceiling Act
  • section 34 of the Old Ceiling Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 33
  • provisions of section 33(3)
  • Order XLI, Rule 33 CPC,
  • Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dhabe, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition arises from proceedings under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 ("the Old Ceiling Act"). The relevant factual and procedural history as set out in the opinion is:

  • Petitioner No.1 (a surplus holder) filed a return under section 12 of the Old Ceiling Act showing total holding as 221.71 acres.
  • The Assistant Collector, by original order dated 15-11-1970/6-12-1970, held that petitioner No.1's holding was 246.40 acres. After determining the pot-kharab land as 651 acres and allowing six family members to retain 174 acres, the Assistant Collector declared 37,03 acres as surplus (ceiling area for village Paloti being 108 acres).
  • Petitioner No.1 appealed to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT). The MRT set aside the Assistant Collector's order and remanded the proceedings to the trial authority for fresh decision on merits in light of its judgment. The State did not file any appeal or cross-objection against the Assistant Collector's order.
  • On remand the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) determined total holding as 221.25 acres, allowed the family to retain 126 acres, and declared 95.25 acres surplus. Petitioner No.1 and other family members appealed against the SDO's order to the MRT, which maintained the SDO's decision.
  • The petitioners then filed the instant writ petition in this Court challenging the MRT's remand (original remand) and the subsequent affirmance of the SDO's determination, as well as contesting findings on partition and pot-kharab land.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) has power to remand proceedings in an appeal under section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act.
  2. Whether, in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection by the State, the MRT had jurisdiction to make an unqualified remand for a fresh decision by the trial Court (i.e., whether a remand could be made to reopen matters to the State's detriment when the State had filed no appeal or cross-objection).
  3. On the merits, whether an alleged oral partition said to have been effected on 15-12-1957 was established and thereby avoids the operation of section 10(1) of the Old Ceiling Act.
  4. On the merits, whether the lands claimed as pot-kharab were properly found to be non-pot-kharab (i.e., whether the SDO's and MRT's findings on pot-kharab land were sustainable given the exclusion by MRT of the Naib Tahsildar's report and the evidence led by the petitioners).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The MRT lacks power to order a remand in an appeal under section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act because the appellate powers of the MRT are codified in section 34; thus, except for powers explicitly set out in section 34, the MRT cannot exercise additional powers such as remand.
  • In the absence of any appeal or cross-objection by the State, the MRT could not pass an order making an unqualified remand for a fresh decision by the trial Court; petitioners relied on prior decisions to support the proposition that a tribunal should not make an order adverse to a party that has not filed a cross-objection.
  • Reliance was placed on a number of authorities and canons of construction, specifically: Bhagwan Sonaji v. State of Maharashtra (1979 Mh. L.J. 476) (decision on provisions of the Old Ceiling Act), Raghu Nath v. Ramesh Duggal (A.I.R. 1980 P. & H. 188) (interpretation of appellate power under the Rent Control Act), and various cases cited for canons of construction (Wasudeo v. State, R.K. Parikh v. Uma Verma, Ram Ran v. State of Bihar).
  • On partition: Petitioners contended that an oral partition occurred on 15-12-1957 evidenced by a list of shares and delivery of possession; they called witnesses including Dr. Gholap and Patwari Wadgu to support the 1957 partition date.
  • On pot-kharab: Petitioners relied upon a report of the Naib Tahsildar (per the MRT's initial consideration) to establish pot-kharab land; they argued that the Naib Tahsildar's report should be accepted or that the SDO erred in relying solely on khasra entries after remand.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any contrary or detailed affirmative legal arguments advanced by the State in opposition; rather, the Court relies on statutory interpretation and precedents to dispose of the petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwan Sonaji v. State of Maharashtra, 1979 Mh. L.J. 476 Interpreted the Old Ceiling Act; addressed whether a power analogous to Order XLI, Rule 33 CPC could be exercised by the MRT in absence of a State appeal. The Court distinguished that decision: Bhagwan decided a different question (whether relief could be granted to the State in the absence of an appeal by the State). The present Court held that Bhagwan does not bar invoking sub-section (3) of section 33 to justify remand when the appeal is by the surplus holder.
Raghu Nath v. Ramesh Duggal, A.I.R. 1980 P. & H. 188 Concerned the power of the appellate Court under the Rent Control Act of Punjab (relied upon by petitioners by analogy). The Court held this Punjab judgment has no bearing on the specific provisions of the Old Ceiling Act and thus does not assist the petitioners on the point at issue.
Wasudeo v. State, A.I.R. 1976 Bom. 94 Invoked as authority on canons of construction (general interpretive principles). The Court found the canons and the cited authorities invoked by petitioners to be irrelevant to the construction of sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act in this case.
R.K. Parikh…Petitioner v. Smt. Uma Verma…, A.I.R. 1979 Delhi 17 Invoked for canons of construction (general interpretive principles). The Court concluded the authority had no relevance in construing subsection (3) of section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act for purposes of deciding whether remand power exists.
Ram Ran v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 NOC 29 Pat. Invoked as a case concerning canons of construction. The Court treated this as not relevant to the specific statutory construction issue under section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act.
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Chandra, (1986) 3 SCC 349 (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1192) Principle: if the surplus holder does not object to an order of remand and thereby waives his right to object, he cannot later challenge the remand after the trial Court decides the matter. The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to hold that petitioners, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court after remand and not objecting to remand at the material time, could not now challenge the remand; this reasoning also supported rejection of the petitioners' contention on MRT's power to remand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two broad steps: statutory interpretation of appellate powers under the Old Ceiling Act, and factual review on merits regarding partition and pot-kharab land.

Statutory interpretation and remand power:

  1. The Court examined section 33(1) (appeals to the MRT against orders of the Collector) and section 33(3) which provides that, in deciding an appeal under section 33(1), the MRT shall exercise all the powers which a Court has and follow the same procedure as a Civil Court in deciding appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
  2. The Court noted that section 34 of the Old Ceiling Act enumerates powers the MRT may exercise (confirm, modify, rescind, amend declarations/awards), but held that section 34 is declaratory—these appellate powers are inherent in appellate jurisdiction and would exist even without the specific provision.
  3. Relying on the embedded cross-reference to the CPC in section 33(3), the Court held that the appellate powers and procedures of Order XLI of the CPC apply to MRT appeals; consequently rules concerning remand (Order XLI rules 23, 23A and 25 CPC) are available to the MRT.
  4. The Court reasoned that a power of remand is an inherent adjunct of appellate jurisdiction, necessary to do justice where a retrial is required on issues that the appellate tribunal deems fit for fair disposal. The Court emphasized that the Old Ceiling Act is social legislation and should be construed to further its object; conferring remand power upon the MRT furthers effective appellate adjudication under the Act.
  5. The Court distinguished Bhagwan Sonaji (and other authorities relied on by the petitioners) on the ground that Bhagwan addressed whether relief could be granted to the State in the absence of a State appeal; here the remand was ordered in the appeal brought by the surplus holder, and sub-section (3) of section 33 can be invoked to support remand.
  6. The Court held the Punjab authority cited had no bearing on the specific provisions of the Old Ceiling Act, and that the canons of construction authorities relied upon were not relevant to construing section 33(3).
  7. The Court further relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Chandra to the effect that if the surplus holder does not object to remand and submits to the trial Court, he cannot later challenge the remand after the trial Court's decision; this doctrine of submission/waiver supported refusal of the petitioners' challenge to the remand.

Merits — partition and pot-kharab:

  1. Partition: The petitioners alleged an oral partition on 15-12-1957. The courts below found no credible evidence of a 1957 partition and instead treated partition, if any, as recorded on 7-1-1962 in revenue records. The courts below held that a partition recorded on 7-1-1962 would fall within the prohibited period under section 10(1) of the Old Ceiling Act.
  2. The Court reviewed the evidence relied on by petitioners: (a) Dr. Gholap's testimony did not show he examined petitioner No.1 around the alleged 1957 partition date nor that petitioner No.1 was a regular patient; (b) Patwari Wadgu admitted he had not certified the partition until 1962 and gave no explanation for the absence of certification earlier. The lower courts' rejection of this evidence was upheld as not perverse.
  3. The Court observed that alleged oral partition is best evidenced by entries in revenue records showing dates when co-owners were put in separate possession; absent such contemporaneous evidence, the petitioners' oral partition claim was not established.
  4. Pot-kharab: The MRT, on its earlier remand order, had held that the Naib Tahsildar's report allowing 6.51 acres was not itself admissible as conclusive evidence; consequently petitioners were required to lead independent evidence to establish pot-kharab land. They failed to do so. On remand the SDO examined khasra entries for the survey numbers and determined pot-kharab land; the MRT affirmed the SDO's findings on appeal.
  5. The Court concluded the findings on pot-kharab made by the SDO (and affirmed by the MRT) were not illegal or perverse and declined to interfere in writ jurisdiction given the absence of adequate evidence from petitioners after the Naib Tahsildar's report was excluded from consideration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.

Other direct consequences explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The MRT's remand to the trial Court was held to be within the MRT's powers under section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act and the incorporated procedures/powers of Order XLI CPC; petitioners cannot now challenge the remand having submitted to the trial Court.
  • The lower authorities' findings on the question of partition and on the issue of pot-kharab land were held not to be perverse or illegal and were not interfered with by this Court.

Broader implications:

The opinion interprets section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act as incorporating the powers and procedures of Order XLI CPC (including remand powers) and treats section 34 as declaratory; the Court’s conclusion reinforces the availability of remand as an inherent appellate power in MRT appeals. The opinion does not purport to lay down or announce any sweeping new legal principle beyond its statutory construction and application to the facts; the direct effect is dismissal of the petition and affirmation of the tribunal and SDO findings in this case.

Petition dismissed.

    Vithalrao v. State Of Maharashtra

    Dhabe, J.:— This is a writ petition arising out of the proceedings under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (for short “the Old Ceiling Act”).

    2. The petitioner No. 1, the surplus holder, filed a return under section 12 of the Old Ceiling Act showing his total holding as 221.71 acres. The learned Assistant Collector, held by his original order dated 15-11-1970/6-12-1970 that the holding of the petitioner No. 1 was 246.40 acres. After determining the potkharab land as 651 acres and after allowing the members of the family of the petitioner No. 1 who were six in number to retain 174 acres of land, the Assistant Collector declared 37,03 acres as surplus land holding to the petitioner No. 1, the ceiling area for the village Paloti being 108 acres. The petitioner No. 1 challenged the aforesaid order of the Assistant Collector by filing an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short, “the MRT”). The learned MRT found that the findings rendered by the learned Assistant Collector in regard to the partition, the potkharab land and other findings referred to by him were not in accordance with law and were not proper on the basts of the material on record. The learned MRT, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the Assistant Collector and remanded the proceedings to him for a fresh decision on merits according to law in the light of its judgment. It may be stated here that the State did not prefer any appeal or cross-objection against the aforesaid order of the Assistant Collector.

    3. After remand, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer (for short “the SDO”) determined the total holding of the petitioner No. 1 as 221.25 acres. He allowed the family members of the petitioner No. 1 to retain 126 acres of land and declared 95.25 acres as surplus land belonging to the petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 and the other members of his family, i.e the other petitioners in this petition, preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order of the learned SDO. The learned MRT, however, maintained the aforesaid order of the learned SDO. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petition in this Court.

    4. The first question which is raised on behalf of the petitioners in this writ petition is that there is no power to the learned MRT to order the remand of the proceedings in an appeal before it under section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act. The second question which is raised on behalf of the petitioner is that in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection being preferred by the State, the learned MRT had no jurisdiction to pass any order making an unqualified remand for a fresh decision by the learned trial Court. Both these questions can be conveniently dealt with together.

    5. As regards the power of the learned MRT to pass an order of remand in appeal, the submission on behalf of the petitioners is that the powers of the learned MRT in appeal are codified in section 34 of the Old Ceiling Act and, therefore, except the powers which are conferred under section 34 the MRT cannot exercise any other power in appeal in support of his submission the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of 1(Bhagwan Sonaji v. State of Maharashtra), 1979 Mh. L.J 476 which is a decision upon the provisions of the old ceiling act itself. He has also relied upon the decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of 2(Raghu Nath v. Ramesh Duggal), A.I.R 1980 P. & H. 188 regarding the power of the appellate Court under the Rent Control Act of the State of Punjab. He has further invoked certain canons of construction relying upon the decisions in the following cases 3(Wasudeo v. State), A.I.R 1976 Bom. 94; 4(R.K Parikh…Petitioner v. Smt. Uma Verma…) A.I.R 1979 Delhi 17 and 5(Ram Ran v. State of Bihar), A.I.R 1979 NOC 29 Pat.

    6. In considering the above submission made on behalf of the petitioners it must be seen that section 33(1) provides for an appeal to the MRT against the order of the Collector under section 21 of the Old Ceiling Act. sub-section (3) of section 33 provides that in deciding an appeal provided for under section 33(1) the MRT shall exercise all the powers which a Court has and follow the same procedure which a Court follows in dec ding the appeals from a decree or an order under the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “CFC”). It is thus clear that sub-section (3) of section 33 provides for the powers as well as the procedure to be followed by the MRT in deciding an appeal. Section 34 provides that the MRT in deciding an appeal under section 33 may confirm, modify or rescind the decision or award or can amend the declaration or award, as the case may be.

    7. It is clear from section 34 that it provides for the substantive powers to be exercised in appeal by the learned MRT. In my view, section 34 is merely declaratory and even in its absence, the Appellate Court can and has to exercise the powers given to it in the said section as such powers are inherent in the appellate jurisdiction itself. A power of remand is also, in my view, an inherent power in every appellate Court and Tribunal which is necessary to do justice to the lis before the appellate Court and to deal with all the questions raised before it effectively. In particular it may be seen that when the order of the trial Court is liable to be set aside and a re-trial is necessary in the interest of justice upon certain issues which the learned appellate Court thinks fit and proper for fair disposal of the case a power of remand to the trial Court must be available to it. It is pertinent to see that prior to insertion of rule 23-A in Order XLI of the CPC there was a settled view that the appellate Court had an inherent power to remand the proceedings to the trial Court in the interest of justice in cases which did not fall within the scope of rules 23 and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC. In this view of the matter itself the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that there is no power of remand to the learned MRT in an appeal preferred under section 33(1) of the Old Ceiling Act, is liable to be rejected. However, in my view such a power is explicitly conferred in view of the provisions of section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act.

    8. Section 33(3), as already pointed out, enables the learned MRT in deciding the appeals preferred before it under section 33(1) to exercise alt the powers to which a Court has and follow the same procedure which the Court follows in deciding the appeals against a decree or an order under the CPC. The relevant provisions of order xli of the cpc dealing with the appellate powers and procedure thus stand incorporated in the Old Ceiling Act for the purpose of appeals under section 33(1) thereof. A power of remand dealt with under rules 23, 23A and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC will, therefore, be available to the learned MRT in view of the provisions of section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act. In construing the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 33 it must be borne in mind that the Old Ceiling Act is a piece of social Legislation and the construction which should be put upon its provisions should be such which would further the object of the said enactment. A power of remand, as already pointed out, is a necessary adjunct of the power to decide an appeal properly and effectively and thus to do justice to the lis before the appellate Court. It is with this object that the MRT is armed with the powers which an appellate Court has under the CPC i.e under Order XLI of the CPC. The explicit power of remand therefore, can thus be spelt out from the provisions of section 33(3) of the Old Ceiling Act.

    9. Turning now to the cases relied upon on behalf of the petitioner, it may be seen that in the case of Bhagwan v. State, cited supra, this Court was concerned with the question whether in the absence of an appeal being filed on behalf of the State a power analogous to Order XLI, Rule 33 CPC, can be exercised by the MRT. After referring to the scheme of the Old Ceiling Act this Court held that since it is open to the State also to file an appeal under section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act, it cannot be held that such a power can be spelt out from sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act. In taking the above view this Court in the aforesaid case relied upon its previous decisions in which it was held that in the absence of a cross objection it was not open to the tribunal to pass an order which is adverse to the appellant before it. In my view, the question which was decided in the aforesaid case was entirely different. The question was whether in an appeal preferred by the surplus holder, relief can be given to the State which has not preferred any appeal. Here in the instant case the power is to be exercised in the appeal preferred by the surplus holder itself. In my view the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 33 can be invoked for the purpose of exercise of the power of remand by the M.R.T It may be seen that not only the procedure but the powers of the Court under the CPC are also conferred upon the MRT under section 33(3) which must in my view, be given full effect so that the appellate power can be exercised effectively by the MRT to do justice between the parties.

    10. The Punjab judgment which the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon interpretes the provision regarding the remand itself and has, no bearing on the question raised in this petition under the specific provisions of the old ceiling act. As regards the canon of construction the cases relied upon on behalf of the petitioners for the said purpose have no relevance in construing sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Old Ceiling Act. The contention on behalf of the petitioners that there is no power of remand to the MRT cannot, therefore, be accepted.

    11. The other question which is raised and which has to be considered along with the above question is whether in the absence of any appeal or cross objection being filed by the State a remand can be made in favour of the State in the sense that the whole case could be reopened before the learned MRT. In my view the above question is in terms answered by the Supreme Court in the case of 6 (State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Chandra), (1986) 3 SCC 349 : A.I.R 1986 S.C 1192. The Supreme Court has held in the above case that if the surplus holder does not object to the order of remand and thus waives his right to object to the same it is not open to him to challenge the said order of remand after the decision is rendered by the trial Court in regard thereto. It may be seen that in the aforesaid case before the Supreme Court also no cross examination was filed on behalf of the State questioning or assailing any findings made by the trial Court against it. In view of the above judgment of the Supreme Court it is not open to the petitioner to raise now the above contention which thus deserves to be rejected. I may observe that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the above judgment would equally apply to the first question raised on behalf of the petitioners viz., whether the learned MRT has power to remand the proceedings to the trial Court because after the order of remand the petitioners have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court. Both the above contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, cannot be accepted.

    12. On merits two questions are canvassed before me. The first question is about the partition which, according to the petitioners, is effected in 1957 and the second question is about pot kharab land. As regards the partition the case of the petitioners is that the partition was effected orally on 15-12-1957 by preparing a list of shares of each of the parties to the partition and by giving possession of the share of such as per the same. In support of the above case of partition, the petitioner No. 1 inter alia examined Dr. Gholap, an Assistant Medical Officer at General Hospital, Wardha and also one Patwari by name Wadgu it is however not in dispute that the alleged partition was recorded in the revenue records on 7-1-1962. The learned Courts below held that no such partition was effected on 15-12-1957 as alleged on behalf of the petitioners and if at all the said partition was effected on 7-1-1962 as per the shares shown in the revenue records. The learned Courts below merely held that if the partition was effected on 7-1-1962 it was hit by section 10(1) of the Old Ceiling Act being within the prohibited period thereunder.

    13. The learned Courts below have considered the evidence of Dr. Gholap who was examined on behalf of the petitioners to show that the petitioner No. 1 was suffering from T.B and that the said partition was, therefore, effected as per the advise of the doctor. The learned Courts below have found that the evidence of the doctor does not show that the petitioner No. 1 was examined by him on or about the tine of the alleged partition in 1957, and that it does not show that the petitioner No. 1 was his regular patient and that he was always visiting him. The learned Courts below have also found that the story of partition itself did not appear to be genuine as the alleged partition was between the husband, wife and the minor sons aged 5 and 1 respectively. They held that even after the death of the petitioner No. 1 the said persons would have inherited his property and, therefore, there was no need to partition the property on the ground that the petitioner No. 1 was suffering from T.B

    14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has, however, strongly relied upon the evidence of Patwari Wadgu, who stated that he was the Patwari in Paloti from 1955 to 1959 and that the list of shares made in the partition in 1957 were shown to him of which he had taken a note. He, however, admitted that till 1959 the said partition was not certified. The learned Courts below rightly observed that the evidence of the witness is not worthy of credence because in the first place there is no evidence that any intimation was given by the petitioners for taking note of the aforesaid alleged oral partition in 1957 which cannot betaken note on suo motu since admittedly it is not by a registered document. It the said partition was noted by the aforesaid Patwari in 1957 itself he has not explained why it was no certified upto 7-1-1962 or at any rate till 1959 till which time even according to him he was working as a Patwari in the village Paloti. The above evidence was therefore rightly discarded by the learned Courts below. The finding rendered by the learned ceiling authorities about the partition cannot be said to be perverse and cannot be interfered within the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In fact when an oral partition is alleged to be effected it can best be evidenced only by the entries in the revenue record which would show the dates on which each member or co-owner was put in separate possession of his share. It is only from the evidence of possession and separate enjoyment of share of each of the co-shares that the oral partition can be proved. No interference is therefore, called for in the finding of the learned ceiling authority as on the question of partition raised in the instant case.

    15. The next question which is raised on behalf of the petitioners is about the pot-kharab land. As regards, the question of pot-kharab land the learned MRT while originally ramanding the case held that the report of the Naib Tahsildar allowing 6.51 acres of land was not in itself an evidence. The said report, therefore, could not have been relied upon by the learned SDO after the proceedings were remanded to him. It was thus necessary for the petitioners to lead independent evidence in regard to the pot-kharab land which they failed to do. The learned SDO therefore, after remand determined the pot-kharab land after perusing the Khasra entries in respect of the field survey numbers in question in the instant ceiling case. The said finding rendered by him which is affirmed in appeal thus cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. If the petitioners claimed any pot kharab land it was necessary for them to lead appropriate evidence to prove the same particularly when the report of the Naib Tahsildar was excluded from consideration by the learned MRT in its remand order. The finding in regard to pot-kharab land, cannot therefore, be interfered with.

    16. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, however, there would be no order as to costs.

    Petition dismissed.
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    Comments

    Vithalrao v. State Of Maharashtra
    (Jan 19, 1987)