Desai, J.:— This is an appeal from the decision of the Single Judge in a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 1995 of 1984. The Single Judge made the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) and aggrieved second respondent to the petition has thereafter preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts have been set out in the detailed order of the Single Judge and need not be repeated here. We will only briefly deal with the law point which is: whether the Registrar of Trade Unions had power to revoke the cancellation of registration of the second respondent-union which cancellation took place on 10 August 1983.
3. The cancellation was on account of contravention of the provisions of S. 28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, by failing to send an annual return. The needful in the matter of the return was carried out by the union by next year and on 17 August 1984, the Registrar was informed that the needful was done and he should, therefore, withdraw the cancellation letter. On 18 August 1984, the Registrar revoked or purported to withdraw the cancellation which was communicated to the second respondent-union by the Registrar's letter, dated 18 August 1984. The short point is whether in law the Registrar is vested with any such power.
4. Returns art required to be submitted in accordance with the provisions contained in S. 28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Chapter II of the said Act contains the provisions for registration of trade unions as also for cancellation. We are concerned with S. 10 (b) read with S. 12 of the said Act. Technically it would appear that the Registrar had acted in conformity with the provisions of the aforesaid sections in directing cancellation. It would also appear, as a matter of fact, that the union concerned had not received the notices drawing its attention to the technical lapses, but this was principally as a result of the failure of the union to give notice of change of address in the official manner as prescribed by S. 12. Again, it would appear that as a matter of fact, the Registrar's office was aware of the change of address.
5. The case before us is a case where there was a default committed by the union in carrying out its statutory obligations and where despite notice sent at the duly registered office, the union had failed to comply with the requisition made by the Registrar. In the circumstances, as provided by the statutory provision, the registration of the trade union was cancelled as it was liable to be cancelled. We do not find in the statutory provisions any provision for revocation or withdrawal of such cancellation. Instead, there is a statutory right of appeal against the order of cancellation conferred under S. 11 of the said Act. The short question to be considered is whether if the default is subsequently complied with, the Registrar by reason of the said fact has any inherent authority or power to revoke or review his earlier order of cancellation or withdraw the same? In the absence of any statutory provision in this behalf, the answer must be clearly in the negative and the only remedy of the union, strictly speaking, is either to go in appeal from the order of cancellation or apply for reregistration. We are not called upon to consider the question whether in the appellate jurisdiction the appellate body can take into account events subsequent to the original order of cancellation.
6. On the question which directly arises in the appeal and the one which directly arose in the petition, we are in full agreement with the Single Judge. We have been told at the Bar that this sort of cancellation or withdrawal or revocation of earlier orders of deregistration is being repeatedly done: by the Registrar's Office as a matter of course. Wrong or illegal course of conduct followed for a long time does not make what is illegal or improper legal or proper. What is being done may be desirable as a matter of policy, but then the Registrar's Office or the trade unions must seek an amendment of the statutory provision conferring such power expressly on the Registrar. Unless there is a specific conferment of such statutory power of revocation or withdrawal of the cancellation of registration, there cannot be a withdrawal or revocation of the initial order of deregistration in the manner in which the Registrar has acted in the instant case. This must not be taken to imply that we are necessarily of the opinion that there is no case in which the order cannot be cancelled or revoked. What we have held is that the order of cancellation of the registration cannot be withdrawn or revoked merely because the original requisition is subsequently complied with or the default rectified after the order of cancellation. However, we can have cases where an order of cancellation of the registration is made by the Registrar in breach of the statutory provision (e.g, without giving the mandatory notice or opportunity), but this is not the case before us. Where an order has been made in this manner, is it necessary for the union to go in appeal to have the order reversed or to move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction? Can it not call upon the Registrar pointing out the illegality of the procedure adopted and ask the Registrar to withdraw the order as being patently contrary to the legal provisions? This, however, is not what has happened in the instant case and we are not called upon to opine whether or not such limited power of withdrawal is possessed by the Registrar. If there is a patent illegal course of conduct adopted by the Registrar's Office, then perhaps the Registrar may have the limited power of withdrawing the order of cancellation. However, any observations we have made on this aspect are necessarily obiter as this point does not directly arise for decision in the appeal as also in the original writ petition.
7. Apart from the patent illegality of the procedure adopted by the Registrar's Office, there may be cases like the present case in which by letters, dated 9 August 1984 and 13 August 1984, the Registrar's attention has been drawn not to any illegality or procedural irregularity on the part of his office but factual non-receipt of the requisition by the concerned union. The Registrar has not acted on these two letters but on a very limited footing that he was entitled to revoke or withdraw the order of cancellation of registration on account of subsequent compliance. That position is clearly contrary to the statutory provisions and we agree with the learned Single Judge that the Registrar's action is clearly illegal.
8. As a matter of fact, as, far as the contentions of the union in the two letters of the union are concerned, our attention has been drawn to the observation made by the Registrar in Para. 5 of his affidavit in reply, dated 20 December 1985. He has categorically stated therein that the first respondent was not aware of the new address of the union. We refrain from expressing any further opinion as to whether or not this is correct since the Registrar has not taken any decision or action on the union's request on the said plea but on a totally different footing, viz., he could revoke or withdraw the cancellation of registration because the union had subsequently submitted the returns. This power of locus poenitentiae the Registrar does not possess in law. The Single Judge has correctly held the Registrar's action to be improper. We do not wish to express any opinion one way or the other on the point whether the Registrar has power to revoke or withdraw the cancellation of registration if he is convinced that as a matter of law, there has been procedural irregularity on the part of his office or as a matter of fact, the union has not received the requisitions.
9. Since even the latter position is not free from doubt and since we have chosen not to express any final opinion on the legal position and since whatever we express would be obiter, it seems to us desirable that remedial action be taken by the Legislature either by amendment of the Act or by making necessary provision in the rules (if the latter course is legally permissible) to confer a limited power on the Registrar to obviate the aggrieved party from moving any further either by way of appeal or by way of writ jurisdiction. Ordinarily, if any such amendment is made, time limit should be prescribed for moving the Registrar within which the Registrar should act, as conferment of power of locus poenitentiae without any discipline as to time limit may not be proper or advisables.
10. Subject to these observations, the appeal is ordered to stand dismissed, but the parties are directed to bear their respective costs.
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