AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • provisions of s. 35 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961.16.
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of s. 35 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • section 155 or sub-section (4) of section 186
  • provisions of s. 23(5A) of the W.T Act, 1957,
  • provisions of s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961,
  • provisions of s. 251 of the I.T Act, 1961,
  • provisions of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • provisions of s. 35(7) of the W.T Act
  • s. 23A(1) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • s. 23A of the Indian I.T Act, 1922.
  • s. 23 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • s. 30 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961.4.
  • s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961,
  • s. 154(1) of the I.T Act, 1961.
  • s. 154(7) of the I.T Act, 1961.
  • Sub-section (7) of s. 154
  • s. 23(5A) of the W.T Act,
  • FINANCE ACT 1951
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of s. 35 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961.16.
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of s. 35 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • section 155 or sub-section (4) of section 186
  • provisions of s. 23(5A) of the W.T Act, 1957,
  • provisions of s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961,
  • provisions of s. 251 of the I.T Act, 1961,
  • provisions of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • provisions of s. 35(7) of the W.T Act
  • s. 23A(1) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • s. 23A of the Indian I.T Act, 1922.
  • s. 23 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • s. 30 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922,
  • s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961.4.
  • s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961,
  • s. 154(1) of the I.T Act, 1961.
  • s. 154(7) of the I.T Act, 1961.
  • Sub-section (7) of s. 154
  • s. 23(5A) of the W.T Act,
  • FINANCE ACT 1951
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion — Chandurkar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

For the assessment year 1952-53 the Income-tax Officer (ITO) passed an assessment order dated 23 November 1956 determining the assessee's total income at Rs. 26,72,720 and granting a rebate (described in the opinion under the proviso to para. 3 of Part I of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1951). The rebate required, as a condition, that no order had been made under section 23A(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922; on 23 November 1956 there was no such order in respect of the assessee-company.

The assessee filed an appeal under section 30 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC), but limited the grounds of appeal to certain specified items (fine under textile control order, bonus, gratuity, tax for non-resident shareholders, legal expenses, conveyance, travelling and s.18A interest). The AAC disposed of the appeal on 10 January 1961 and allowed relief to the assessee of Rs. 5,94,379. The ITO gave effect to the AAC's directions by an order dated 10 March 1961, recomputing tax and continuing to allow a reduced rebate.

Subsequently, the ITO decided to proceed under section 23A(1) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, informed the assessee on 16 September 1964, and made an order under s.23A on 26 February 1965. Thereafter, on 8 March 1965 the ITO purported to rectify his order dated 10 March 1961 under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, withdrawing the rebate.

The assessee challenged the rectification before the AAC on limitation grounds: the assessee contended that the four-year limitation in section 154(7) should be computed from the original assessment order dated 23 November 1956, whereas the revenue treated the rectification as amendment of the consequential order of 10 March 1961. The AAC held that the 1956 order had merged in the 1961 order and reckoned limitation from 10 March 1961, dismissing the assessee's challenge. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal), which reversed the ITO's rectification and held that the rebate portion of the 1956 order had not merged into the AAC's order and that any rectification in respect of that part had to be made within four years from 23 November 1956; consequently the rectification of 8 March 1965 was time-barred and invalid.

The revenue referred the following question to this court under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order under section 154 of the Act passed by the Income-tax Officer on March 8, 1965, was valid?"

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ITO's rectification under section 154 dated 8 March 1965 was a valid exercise of power, i.e., whether the four-year limitation in section 154(7) should be computed from the original assessment order of 23 November 1956 or from the consequential order of 10 March 1961 (the latter being the order the ITO purported to amend).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (as presented)

  • Submitted by Mr. Joshi: once the AAC exercised appellate jurisdiction and passed its order (10 January 1961), the original ITO order of 23 November 1956 ceased to survive and merged in the AAC's order; the operative ITO order thereafter was the consequential order dated 10 March 1961 giving effect to the AAC's directions.
  • Therefore, the ITO's rectification of 8 March 1965 was an amendment of the 10 March 1961 order and was within the four-year period prescribed by section 154(7).

Assessee's Arguments (as presented)

  • The assessee challenged the rectification principally on limitation grounds: the four-year period in section 154(7) must be computed from the date of the original order sought to be amended — 23 November 1956 — because the part of the original order granting the rebate had not been the subject of appeal before the AAC and therefore had not merged in the AAC's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co., Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681 That the doctrine of merger is not of rigid and universal application; its applicability depends on the nature and scope of the appellate or revisional jurisdiction conferred by the relevant statute. The court relied on this Supreme Court statement to support the view that merger cannot be assumed automatically in tax assessment appeals and must be assessed with reference to the statutory appellate scheme.
Karsandas Bhagwandas Patel v. G.V. Shah, ITO, [1975] 98 ITR 255 (Gujarat High Court) That an ITO's assessment order merges in the AAC's order only insofar as the AAC has considered and decided specific items; parts not considered remain unaffected and retain independent existence. The court followed and invoked this decision in holding that the rebate portion of the 23 November 1956 order had not merged into the AAC's order and therefore remained open only to rectification within four years from the original date.
Poonjabhai Vanmalidas v. WTO, [1978] 114 ITR 38 (Gujarat High Court) Analogous principle under W.T. Act that only those parts of the subordinate order touched by the appellate order are superseded; where the appellate body has not dealt with a point, limitation for rectification runs from the date of the original order. The court cited this case as supportive and analogous authority showing that the merger principle is limited to points actually considered by the appellate authority.
J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Addl. CIT, [1976] 105 ITR 344 (Allahabad High Court) A contrary view: where an appeal is provided, the appellate authority's decision is the operative decision in law and, if it affirms or confirms the subordinate decision, that subordinate decision merges in the appellate order. The court noted this contrary authority but expressly declined to follow it, explaining why the distinction between parts of an assessment subject to appeal and parts not subject to appeal is legally significant in the tax assessment context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the statutory limitation for rectification in section 154(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961: an amendment under s.154 cannot be made after the expiry of four years from the date of the order sought to be amended. The critical issue was therefore the meaning of "the order sought to be amended" — whether it was the ITO's consequential order dated 10 March 1961 or the original assessment order dated 23 November 1956.

The revenue's contention rested on a broad application of the doctrine of merger: once an appellate authority (the AAC) disposes of an appeal, the original subordinate order merges into the appellate order so that any later amendment would be tied to the appellate/consequential order. The court rejected a universal application of merger, relying on the Supreme Court's statement in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills that merger is not rigid and depends on the nature and scope of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the statute.

The court closely examined the statutory appeal provisions then in force (Indian I.T. Act, 1922, s.30; the powers of AAC in s.31(3)). It observed that the AAC's powers are not limited to the typical confines of an appellate body because s.31(3) expressly enables the AAC to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul an assessment and to set aside and remand for fresh assessment, subject to safeguards (e.g., opportunity to show cause before enhancement). Nevertheless, the court emphasized that in practice an assessee often challenges only particular parts of an assessment; the AAC normally deals with the grievances raised and may choose to exercise the power to enhance; but if the AAC does not touch a particular part of the ITO's order, that part remains unaffected.

From that statutory scheme the court concluded that the doctrine of merger operates only in respect of those parts of an ITO's order which the AAC actually considered and decided. Where a part of the assessment order was not made the subject of appeal by the assessee and the AAC did not in fact deal with it, such part retains an independent existence and does not merge in the AAC's order.

The court also noted the separate, corresponding rectification powers given to each authority (s.35 of the 1922 Act; s.154 of the 1961 Act): each authority may rectify mistakes in the orders it has passed. Acceptance of a wholesale-merger theory would render the ITO's rectification power nugatory in cases where only part of an order was appealed. Therefore, on both a purposive and textual reading, rectification time-limits must be applied with reference to the particular part of the order being amended.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the rebate granted by the ITO in the 23 November 1956 order had not been the subject of the assessee's appeal to the AAC and had not been considered or touched by the AAC's order dated 10 January 1961. Consequently that portion of the ITO's 1956 order retained an independent existence and any rectification in respect of it had to be made within four years from 23 November 1956. The rectification dated 8 March 1965 therefore fell outside the four-year period and was invalid.

The court noted and distinguished a contrary decision of the Allahabad High Court (J.K. Synthetics), but expressly adopted the reasoning and authorities (including Gujarat High Court decisions) that support limited application of merger in tax-assessment appeals.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the referred question in the negative — the ITO's order under section 154 dated 8 March 1965 was not valid.

Immediate consequences:

  • The Tribunal was correct in setting aside the ITO's rectification order of 8 March 1965.
  • The revenue's rectification was held to be time-barred with respect to the rebate portion of the original assessment order of 23 November 1956.
  • The revenue was ordered to pay the costs of the reference.

Broader implications (as articulated by the court in this opinion):

  • The doctrine of merger does not apply universally to assessment orders under the Income-tax Acts. In the tax-assessment context, only those parts of an ITO's order that have been actually considered and decided by the AAC (or other appellate authority) merge into the appellate order.
  • Parts of an assessment order not appealed or not dealt with by the AAC retain an independent existence; limitation for rectification under section 154(7) runs from the date of the original order for such parts.
  • The court's reasoning constrains the circumstances in which a subsequent rectification by the ITO can legitimately be tied to a consequential order made after an appeal: rectification of aspects untouched by the appellate process must comply with the original limitation period applicable to the ITO's order.

Reference: This summary is based exclusively on the text of the opinion provided. No information beyond that text has been added or inferred.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City-Ii v. Sakseria Cotton Mills Ltd.

    Chandurkar, J.:— In the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1952-53, the ITO made an order on 23rd November, 1956, determining the total income of the assessee at Rs. 26,72,720. While computing the tax payable by the assessee, the ITO gave a rebate of Rs. 78,327 in accordance with cl. (i) of the proviso to para. 3 of Pt. I of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1951, which reads as follows:

    “Where the total income, as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amount, if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on 31st day of March, 1952, and no order has been made under subsection (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess.”

    2. In order to qualify for the rebate permitted to be given by the clause reproduced above, one of the conditions which was required to be satisfied by the assessee-company was that no order should have been made under s. 23A of the Indian I.T Act, 1922. In the case of the assessee, admittedly, even though the amount of dividends declared by the assessee was only Rs. 2,40,000, on 23rd November, 1956, there was no order made in respect of the assessee-company under s. 23A(1). The assessee having thus qualified for the rebate contemplated by cl. (???) of the proviso to para. 3 of Pt. I of the First Schedule of the Finance Act, 1951, the ITO found that the undistributable surplus after reducing the total income by 7 annas in a rupee and the amount of dividends declared as also the sums spent for charity was Rs. 12,53,405 on which rebate of Rs. 78,337 was given at the rate of one anna in the rupee. The assessee had filed an appeal before the AAC under s. 30 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, but the appeal was restricted only to certain matters which related to fine levied on the company under the textile control order, bonus, gratuity, income-tax paid for non-resident shareholders, legal expenses, conveyance, travelling and s. 18A interest. The AAC decided the appeal on 10th January, 1961, and gave relief to the assessee to the extent of Rs. 5,94,379. The ITO after giving effect to the order of the AAC recomputed the tax on income as reduced in appeal. Even while giving effect to the order of the AAC, the ITO allowed the rebate of one anna in a rupee though, as a result of the appellate order, the undistributed surplus came to Rs. 9,19,067. The rebate now worked out to Rs. 57,441.

    3. It appears that the ITO then decided to proceed against the assessee under s. 23A(1) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and on 16th September, 1964, informed the assessee by a letter that he was going to take action under s. 23A. In spite of the assessee objecting to the action proposed by the ITO, the ITO proceeded to make an order under s. 23A on 26th February, 1965. The object of the ITO in making an order under s. 23A was not, according to the ITO, to assess deemed dividends in the hands of the shareholders but to withdraw the rebate given to the assessee-company. Thereafter, on 8th March, 1965, the ITO proceeded to rectify his order dated 10th March, 1961. The rectification was purported to be made under s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961.

    4. The assessee challenged the action of the ITO withdrawing the rebate, by an appeal before the AAC mainly on the ground of limitation because, according to the assessee, the period of four years referred to in s. 154(7) has to be computed not from the second order of the ITO dated 10th March, 1961, but from the first order dated 23rd November, 1956. The AAC, however, took the view that the order of the ITO dated 23rd November, 1956, got merged in the order dated 10th March, 1961, and that the prescribed period of limitation of four years had to be reckoned from 10th March, 1961. The AAC having dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee the assessee carried a second appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that since the assessee had agitated the correctness of the order of the ITO only on certain points before the AAC and the AAC had not touched that part, of the order of the ITO by which the assessee was granted a rebate which was sought to be withdrawal, the ITO's order giving rebate of income-tax cannot be said to have merged with the order of the AAC. The Tribunal found that the ITO had not made any mistake in computing the tax while giving effect to the reductions ordered by the AAC and if he had made any mistakes, then only he could have rectified the order dated 10th March, 1961. The Tribunal took the view that if at all any mistake was committed when the original order of assessment was passed in 1956 when the ITO gave the rebate under the Finance Act, the right to rectify that mistake had lapsed after four years. In other words, the Tribunal had taken the view that the period of four years had to be computed from 23rd November, 1956, and consequently the rectification order made on 8th March, 1965, was made beyond limitation and was, therefore, not valid. The rectification order was, therefore, cancelled by the Appellate Tribunal.

    5. On this order of the Tribunal, the following question has been referred to this court under s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961, at the instance of the revenue:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order under section 154 of the Act passed by the Income-tax Officer on March 8, 1965, was valid?”

    6. Mr. Joshi on behalf of the revenue has contended that the order which was sought to be rectified by the ITO in the exercise of his jurisdition under s. 154 was the order dated 10th March, 1961, because, according to him, once the AAC had exercised his appellate jurisdiction, the first order of assessment dated 23rd November, 1956, has ceased to survive. That order, according to the learned counsel, had really merged in the order of the AAC dated 10th January, 1961.

    7. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. The power to rectify a mistake in an order of assessment or of refund or any other order passed by the ITO is given to the ITO by s. 154(1) of the I.T Act, 1961. This power is, however, circumscribed by the provisions of s. 154(7) of the Act and has to be exercised before the expiry of four years from the date of the order sought to be amended. Sub-section (7) of s. 154 reads as follows:

    “Save as otherwise provided in section 155 or sub-section (4) of section 186 no amendment under this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the date of the order sought to be amended.”

    8. The provisions of s. 155 or s. 186(4) are not relevant for the purposes of the present case. The question which arises is, from which date the period of four years referred to in sub-s. (7) of s. 154 has to be computed. Such computation has to be made under sub-s. (7) “from the date of the order sought to be amended”. According to the ITO, he was amending the order dated 10th March, 1961, while according to the assessee, the amendment was sought to be made of an order dated 23rd November, 1956. The argument on behalf of the revenue that the ITO while withdrawing the rebate was exercising his power of rectification in respect of the order dated 10th March, 1961, is based on the theory of merger because what is contended is that after the assessee had filed his appeal before the AAC, the order dated 23rd November, 1956, ceased to have any independent existence and that it had merged into the order of the AAC dated 10th January, 1961. The directions given by the AAC in his order dated 10th January, 1961, were given effect to by the order of the ITO dated 10th March, 1961. It is, therefore, contended that the only order of the ITO which can be said to be operative is the order dated 10th March, 1961, and consequently since the order of rectification has been passed on 8th March, 1965, it is passed within the prescribed period of four years from 10th March, 1961.

    9. The argument raised on behalf of the revenue necessitates a consideration of the basic question as to whether the theory of merger which contemplates the merger of an order of a subordinate authority into the order of a higher authority which may be exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction can be made wholly applicable in the case of orders governed by the provisions of the I.T Act. If it is possible to hold that the order dated 23rd November, 1956, had merged wholly in the order of the AAC, then obviously the rectification order made on 8th March, 1965, would be within the prescribed period of four years counted from 10th March, 1961, on which day the ITO passed his consequential order giving effect to the directions made by the AAC. But if the theory of merger does not apply fully to orders under the I.T Act and that part of the order which granted rebate to the assessee continued to be operative independently of the order of the AAC, then it would be difficult to accept the contention of the revenue that what was being rectified was the order dated 10th March, 1961, and not the order dated 23rd November, 1956.

    10. The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine which applies universally in all cases where the orders of a subordinate authority are subjected to appellate or revisional jurisdiction of higher authorities or Tribunals. Whether an order of a subordinate authority has merged partially or wholly into the orders of the superior appellate or revisional authority will have to be decided on the relevant provision dealing with the appellate jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction of the superior authority under the relevant enactment.

    11. Dealing with the doctrine of merger and its scope and applicability, the Supreme Court in State Of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co., Ltd. , [1967] 19 STC 144 : AIR 1967 SC 681, 683, has observed as follows:

    “But the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in an appeal or revision, there is a fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute. In our opinion, the application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction.”

    12. In order to decide whether an order passed by the ITO gets merged wholly into the order of the AAC passed in appeal against the order of the ITO, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provision dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the AAC. The order of the ITO in the instant case was made on 23rd November, 1956. We are, therefore, concerned with the provisions of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and the appeal filed by the assessee was under s. 30 of that act. An order of assessment made under s. 23 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, is made appealable under s. 30 of that act and the appeal is to be filed before the AAC. We are not concerned with the other provision of s. 30 which deal with the manner of and limitation for filing such an appeal. The powers of the AAC and the procedure which he is required to follow are given in s. 31. Subsection (3) of s. 31, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:

    “In disposing of an appeal the Appellate assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment,—

    (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or

    (b) set aside the assessment and dire??? the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further inquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assess ment and determine where necessary the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment,……

    Provided that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall not enhance an assessment or a penalty unless the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement……”

    13. The powers which the AAC exercises are not merely appellate powers which a normal appellate authority exercises because normally an appellate authority is called upon to deal with the grievance of the appellant which he makes in respect of the order passed by the subordinate authority. In addition to the general powers which an appellate authority possesses, that is, either confirming, modifying or setting aside an order which in the case of an assessment has been described as the power to confirm, reduce or annul the assessment, the AAC has also been given the power to enhance the assessment. This power to enhance the assessment is, however, made subject to the proviso that the appellant should be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. Thus, under sub-s. (3) of s. 31, apart from dealing with the grievance which has been made by an assessee against the order of the ITO, the AAC can go further and look into the correctness of the order of assessment made by the ITO and if the AAC is satisfied that there was a case for enhancing the assessment he can make an order enhancing the assessment. Thus, if the AAC is satisfied that the ITO has granted either excessive relief or the assessment of income and tax is in any way erroneous, he has the power to make an order enhancing the assessment while deciding the appeal filed by the assessee. In that sense, it is possible to say that the entire assessment proceedings are open before the AAC. It is common knowledge that while making an assessment and bringing the income of the assessee to tax, the ITO has to deal with several contentions made by the assessee for determining the taxable income and the tax payable having regard to the several provisions of the I.T Act. It is only in respect of claims with regard to which the ITO passes an order adverse to the assessee that the assessee goes in appeal to the AAC. If the assessee is satisfied with a part of the assessment order, he does not make that part a subject of appeal. It is thus open to the assessee to challenge only a part of the assessment order. When the AAC deals with the appeal, it is mainly that part of the order of the ITO which has been challenged by the assessee which is dealt with by the AAC. The exercise of his appellate jurisdiction is normally limited to the grievance made by the assessee unless of course the AAC chooses to exercise his power of enhancing the assessment. If the AAC disposes of the appeal and deals with the grievance made by the assessee and confirms the assessment, nothing more is required to be done further by the ITO after the order of the AAC. But if the AAC, while disposing of the appeal, reduces the assessment, then the ITO has to give effect to the directions of the AAC. These directions are restricted to the order made by the AAC because a part of the assessment has not been made the subject of appeal by the assessee. In a given case, if the AAC wishes to enhance the assessment, even though the assessee has not made any part of the assessment order the subject of appeal, in view of the special provisions in s. 31(3), it is permissible for him to interfere with that part of the order of the ITO. The scheme of the provisions of s. 31(3) is, however, clear that the assessee is entitled to challenge a part of the assessment order by which he feels aggrieved and where the AAC does not decide to scrutinise the remaining part or any other aspect of the assessment, which has not been made the subject of appeal, the AAC is not called upon to deal with that part of the assessment order. Only that part of the order of the ITO is, therefore, affected by the order of the AAC in respect of which the AAC has exercised his appellate jurisdiction which may consist of confirming, reducing, enhancing or annulling the assessment. If the AAC has not been called upon or has not actually dealt with any part of the assessment order made by the ITO, there is no question of that part of the order merging or being superseded by the order of the AAC. The effect of s. 31(3), therefore, appears to us, having regard to the provisions of the I.T Act, to be that only that part of the order of the ITO merges or stands superseded by the order of the AAC in respect of which the AAC has exercised his appellate jurisdiction. So far as the remaining part of the order of assessment is concerned, that continues to be unaffected by the decision of the AAC and it continues to have its independent existence unaffected by any decision of the AAC. The doctrine of merger, therefore, is not wholly applicable in the case of such orders made under the I.T Act.

    14. It is important to notice another aspect of the provisions relating to rectification of mistakes. The provisions of s. 35 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and the corresponding provisions of s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961, give a power of rectification to the Commissioner, the AAC and the ITO only in respect of the orders passed by them. The ITO can exercise his power of rectification in respect of the order made by him. The AAC can exercise the power of rectification only in respect of the orders made by him. When the statute has given powers of rectification to the ITO in respect of his own order, the position is that he is able to rectify his own order within the prescribed period if the whole of the order or a part of the order has not been subjected to appeal. If the theory of merger is accepted as being attracted wholly, the provision relating to rectification of mistake by the ITO in a case where even a part of the assessment order is made the subject of appeal is likely to become nugatory. It, therefore, clearly appears to us that the provisions of the I.T Act contemplate that in a case where an assessment is made the subject of an appeal, the assessment orders made by the ITO do not wholly merge with the orders of the appellate authority but that the merger would take place only in respect of that part of the order in respect of which the AAC has exercised his appellate jurisdiction.

    15. We are supported in the view which we have taken by a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Karsandas Bhagwandas Patel v. G.V Shah, ITO, [1975] 98 ITR 255. The Gujarat High Court has in that case taken the view that the order of assessment made by the ITO merges in the order of the AAC only in so far as it relates to items considered and decided by the AAC and that part of the order of assessment which relates to items not forming the subject-matter of the appellate order is left untouched and does not merge in the order of the AAC. This decision was followed by the same court later in Poonjabhai Vanmalidas v. WTO, [1978] 114 ITR 38. That was no doubt a case arising out of an assessment under the W.T Act. After referring to the provisions of s. 23(5A) of the W.T Act, 1957, the Division Bench has pointed out that while disposing of the appeal under s. 23(5A) of the W.T Act, the entire assessment is before the AAC and he has the power; if he chooses, to examine any particular decision of the ITO and to correct it if he finds it wrong, but there is no obligation on him to do so. It was pointed out that it is only that part of the order of assessment which consists of decisions reviewed by the AAC, that is, considered and examined by him irrespective of whether ultimately affirmed, modified or reversed that is superseded by the order of the AAC and it is only in respect of points which were touched by the AAC that it can be said that the AAC's order and the consequential order necessitated by the AAC's order will be the orders that can be subsequently considered for rectification proceeding from the date of those orders. It was expressly pointed out in that case that in so far as the AAC has not dealt with or touched the points which were originally decided by the WTO, it is the date of the original order of assessment by the WTO that will be the starting point for limitation for rectification thereof. It may be pointed out that the provisions of s. 35(7) of the W.T Act are analogous to the provisions of s. 35 of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, and s. 154 of the I.T Act, 1961.

    16. The is no doubt that a contrary view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in J.K Synthetics Ltd. v. Addl. CIT, [1976] 105 ITR 344, where a Division Bench of that court has taken the view, referring to the provisions of s. 251 of the I.T Act, 1961, that if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a Tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law that is effective and can be enforced even if the appellate decision has merely confirmed the decision of the Tribunal. Thus, if there is in law confirmation or affirmation of the decision, it merges in the appellate order. The learned judges of the Allahabad High Court have dissented from the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Karsandas Bhagwandas Patel v. G.V Shah, ITO, [1975] 98 ITR 255, and have declined to accept the distinction drawn by the Gujarat High Court between a part of the assessment order which is made the subject of appeal and the other part in respect of which the AAC has not exercised his jurisdiction. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court because, as already pointed out earlier, the distinction between a part of the assessment order not subjected to appeal and the part in respect of which the appellate jurisdiction has been exercised is an important distinction having regard to the fact that the ITO is called upon to decide several contentions of the assessee when he goes into the question of determining the taxable income of the assessee. We are, therefore, of the view that in so far as the grant of rebate to the assessee was concerned, the order of the ITO dated 23rd November, 1956, was not in any way affected by the order of the AAC dated 10th January, 1961. That part of the order of the ITO remained intact. It continued to have an independent existence. It had not merged with the order of the AAC. Any rectification made in respect of that part of the order was required to be made within four years from 23rd November, 1956. The limitation for exercising powers of rectification under s. 154 could not, therefore, commence from 10th March, 1961, when the ITO made an order which was restricted only to carrying out the directions given by the AAC. It is obvious, therefore, that the rectification order made on 8th March, 1965, was clearly beyond a period of four years provided by s. 154(7) of the I.T Act, 1961.

    17. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in setting aside the order of the ITO dated 8th March, 1965. In the view which we have taken, the question referred to us must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue to pay the costs of this reference.

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City-Ii v. Sakseria Cotton Mills Ltd.
    (Feb 27, 1979)