Deshpande, J.:— [His Lordship, after dealing with points not material to this report, proceeded.] The principal contention of Mr. Dwivedee is that the amount of Rs. 15,000, admitted to have been received by the widow, towards the life insurance policy is liable to be deducted from the above amount of Rs. 55,200. This, according to him, is the pecuniary advantage received by the claimants by reason of the death in terms of the ratio of Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami . [1962] A.I.R S.C 1.. It is nobody's case that it was an accident policy entitling the claimants to such amount, on the death of the deceased only in such an accident, and the amount could not have been received by them had the death been due to otherwise, than such an accident. We express no opinion if this could have made any difference as there is no unanimity in the decided cases as to the liability of even such amounts to deduction from compensation. Judicial opinion is also sharply divided on the question whether life policy amount can be said to have come to the claimants by reason of the death of the deceased to justify its deduction from the amount of compensation payable to the claimants towards their pecuniary loss. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Zaveri, the learned advocate for the respondents, to a few judgments, of High Court of Gujarat in L.I.C of India v. Legal representatives of deceased Naranbhai Munjabhai . [1973] A.C.J 226.. High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Sood and Company v. Surjit Kaur . [1973] A.C.J 414., as also Delhi High Court in Bhagwanti Devi v. Ish Kumar . [1975] A.C.J 56., and several other judgments of same High Courts which do support his contention that amounts so received are not liable to be deducted as the same cannot be said to have come to the claimants by reason of the death of the deceased. Mr. Dwivedee, on the other hand, drew our attention to the judgments reported in Union of India v. S. Ghosh . [1973] A.I.R Pat. 129., Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim . [1974] A.I.R M.P 181., Sabita Pati v. Rameshwar Singh . [1973] A.C.J 319., and Automobiles Transport v. Dewalal . [1977] A.I.R Raj. 121., and a few other judgments of the same Courts taking the contrary view. We may at once observe that Patna High Court supports deduction only of such policy amounts as are subscribed to accident contingency and not other policy amounts. It rather supports Mr. Zaveri's contention and not that of Mr. Dwivedee. Mr. Zaveri also drew our attention to some other judgments of Delhi High Court, including in the case of Orissa Transport Co. Ltd. v. Sibananda Pattanaik . [1976] A.C.J 497., which justify deduction only of a portion and not of the entire policy amounts. The answer turns really on whether such policy amount can be said to be “pecuniary advantages” that came to the claimants “by reasons of the death of the deceased”? That such amounts amount to pecuniary advantage admits of little doubt. Controversy really centers round if it comes to the dependents “by reason of death”. Reading of the decided cases only go to show how this very question can arise under variety of circumstances, giving rise to different considerations, pregnant with equally different legal implication, and it is by no means easy to lay down any inflexible rule as to which pecuniary benefit can be said to have been received “by reason of the death”. It is pertinent to note that in the absence of any provision to the contrary, such policy amounts form part of the estate of the deceased and come to his heirs or dependents by way of inheritance, unless it is sought to be disposed of by the deceased otherwise. Nominee mentioned therein is not necessarily the beneficiary but invariably happens to be merely an authorised collector thereof for the benefit of all heirs. We are unable to see any difference between this amount, and any cither income yielding estate, that comes to the dependents either by way of inheritance or pursuant to any will or settlement. The causal connection between receipt of such amounts and death is too apparent and both really stand on the same footing legally. Donations by the charitable trusts, or provisions for such dependent by some public spirited institutions, or gifts or contributions by relatives or sympathisers, of course stand on different footing and are clearly distinguishable, and can never be treated as advantages or benefits or having received by reason of the death of the bread winner, though the death may furnish an occasion for such receipts. We are ourselves unable to see how and why the policy amount or other amounts from income yielding assets, such as bank balance, or interests thereon, or on fixed deposits, or dividends from shares and securities, left or settled by the deceased on the dependents, cannot be said to have come to the claimants by “reason of the death” of the deceased and why it should not be balanced against the pecuniary losses caused by the death of the bread winner in terms of Gobald Motor Service's case. The Supreme Court has been at pains in the above quoted passage to indicate how source of such pecuniary advantage is irrelevant, by words “from whatever sources”. It should not be forgotten that these essentially are compensatory and not punitive damages.
2. It will be of interest in this context to note that in England the insurance policy amount was considered to be such pecuniary advantage coming to the dependants by reason of the death, of the deceased, and was liable to be deducted under the common law from the amount of compensation payable under Fatal Accidents Act of 1846. This situation was reversed firstly by Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act of 1908 and improved further for the benefit of the claimants by Law Reforms (Personal Injuries) Act of 1948 and altered drastically by the Fatal Accidents Act of 1959 ensuring that various kinds of insurance and pensionary benefits are not excluded from the compensation payable by the tort feasors. Claims for such compensation in India, as discussed earlier, are still determined mainly by reference to principles underlying the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, analogous to English Act of 1846, and the decided cases thereunder prior to 1908 enactments contemplate reducing the amount of compensation by such insurance amounts if received by the dependants. In the absence of any statutory provisions analogous to the above referred to English enactments of 1908, 1948 and 1959, it should be difficult to find any basis or trace any rationale not to deduct such life policy amounts when on the face of it, these amount to pecuniary advantages and are received by the dependants by reason of the death of the bread winner victim. While holding to the contrary, the High Courts of Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana and Delhi appear to have treated the receipt of such amounts as collateral benefits, coming to the dependants not so much by reason of the death of the deceased, as by reason of the contract that the deceased had entered into with the Life Insurance Company. With respect, this view and the reasoning in support thereof is open to grave doubt. The learned Judges have mainly relied on the Bradburn v. G.W Rail. Co. . [1874-80] All E.R Rep. 195., and Parry v. Cleaver . [1969] 1 All E.R 555.. As noted by Sen, J. in the case of Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim (para. 30, p. 189) in both these cases, injured persons had claimed damages for their own injuries, resulting into their physical disabilities, and the learned Judges and noble Lords were not called upon to deal with the claims of the dependants of the deceased, killed in any fatal accident. Policy amounts were received by the injured claimants, in these cases, as a result of arrangements or contracts, made by them with their employers or insurers, to meet some such specific contingencies to their ownselves.
3. These amounts obviously stood on different footing from the life policy amounts payable to his dependants on the death of the insured. Principles governing award of damages in these two events cannot be identical. Amongst other distinguishing features, there was a risk of benefit of the premiums being lost to the insured in Bradburn's case, if no accident causing injuries had occurred, while entire life policy amount is refundable to the insured on maturity, in some cases with interest or dividend, if death does not take place during the prescribed number of years. The Courts in both these cases found, and with respect rightly, that benefits receivable by the injured claimants, from the arrangements of their own creation cannot be allowed to go to the wrong doers and set off against the compensation payable by them. No question of benefits of the amounts saved and contributed by the deceased and consequentially inherited or received by the dependants by reason of death of any one could arise in any one of these cases.
4. Now, Lord Reid, in the Parry's case based his view on the public policy reflected in the above referred to 1959 enactment, and extended the same to the pensionary benefits in dispute not specially covered by the Act. Judgment of Bramwell B., on the other hand, in the firstly named Bradburn's case itself refers to the distinction between claim for injuries by the injured and the claims of the dependants for fatal injuries caused to the deceased. Indicating how under the Fatal Accidents Act, Lord Campbell laid down, for the first time, the rule in Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Co. . 1858 3 H. & N. 211., for taking into account whatever comes in possession of family of the deceased, the learned Judge observed “But that has no bearing on the case of a person suing upon his common law right for injuries caused to him by the defendants' negligence”. Curiously enough this passage does not find place in the reprint i.e Bradburn v. G.W Rail. Co. ([1874-80] All E.R Rep. 195). Text of this paragraph in original report, i.e Bradburn v. Great Western Railway Co. . 1874 10 Ex. 1., is slightly different in details, though not in purport and substance. In the case of Union of India v. S. Ghosh, the division Bench quoted the entire paragraph including this passage at page 136 from the original report presumably in support of its view that policy subscribed specially to meet accidents contingencies stand on different footing from the policies on life generally, and the amount of the former, and not of the latter is so deductible, which point is not relevant in this case. We have ourselves verified the correctness of the passage. With respect, the learned Judges of the above High Courts seem to have lost sight of this distinction emphasised in Bradburn's case itself.
5. As indicated earlier, in some cases, the Delhi High Court as also Orissa High Court have found justification for deducting some portion of such policy amounts. This view is based on the assumption that the claimants could have the benefit of the policy amount even if the deceased had died otherwise than in the accident, or would have shared the benefit thereof had the policy matured during his life time. Death in fatal accident only accelerates its receipt by the dependants, according to this view, and interest chargeable for the estimated accelerated years alone represents the deductible portion of such benefit. This approach is adopted in some cases even to other liquid assets receipt of which as owner is merely assumed to have been accelerated, which, according to this approach is receivable and enjoyable by the dependants in either case, even without such death. In the case of Amarjit Kaur v. Vanguard Ins. Co. Ltd. . [1969] A.C.J 286.. Deshpande, J. of the Delhi High Court justified deduction of only some portion of the policy amount on this ground. In support of his view the learned Judge relied on Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Jennings . 1888 13 A.C 800.,
6. It is true that liquid assets possessed and owned by the deceased in, certain cases, are open to the enjoyment of all such dependants during life time of the deceased and they can claim certainty of inheriting or receiving it otherwise in the ordinary course. Accidental death in such cases can be said to have only accelerated the process of their ownership. Pecuniary benefit to the dependants is bound to be far lesser than in cases where such certainty of enjoyment, actual receipt, in any manner whatsoever, is absent or slender. Cases of the former type are bound to be far and few. The amount of the life policy standing in the name of the deceased is exposed to more uncertainties in majority of the cases, there being no guarantee even of continuation thereof. In the Privy Council case of Jennings, the deceased had subscribed to the policy expressly for the benefit of the wife and the wife was bound to receive the benefits thereof irrespective of death of the husband and of the accident. This forms the basis of the ratio of the case. This cannot be true of all the policies. No inflexible rule, therefore, can be laid down in this behalf as is suggested by the Delhi High Court. The question of discount on account of accelerated receipt of compensation in lump sum is being separately dealt with. Such amount ordinarily must be taken to have been received by reason of death and deducted from the compensation unless any specific case justifying deduction of lesser amount is made out. We have already shown how the word “just” in s. 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act does not justify ignoring such benefits.
7. Had the deceased not met with accident, policy amount would have gone to the husband on maturity, and there was no guarantee that the amount would have been spent for the benefits of the dependants, alone in this case. Deceased is no shown to have been possessed of any other property.
8. Instability and insecurity to which a driver's life is exposed, introduces high degree of uncertainty of the; dependents having been ever benefited.
9. Mr. Zaveri's contention that policy amount consists partly of the contribution made by the deceased and the excess over it payable thereunder. According to Mr. Zaveri, the accelerated value of the contribution made may be deducted at the most and not the excess which is the benefit of the contract and not of the death. Apart from the absence of any good reason, to so split the amount, we have already indicated how discount of the supposed acceleration of the saving depends on facts of each case and how the second part of the contention, adopted in Bradburn's case is distinguishable. With respect, we are unable to agree with the views of the learned Judges of the High Court on which reliance is placed by Mr. Zaveri. The amount of Rs. 15,000 is thus liable to be deducted. This brings down the amount to Rs. 40,200 (Rs. 55,200−15,000).
[The rest of the judgment is not material to the report.]
10. Appeal dismissed.