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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as an operator by the respondent for about seven years. She went on leave from 10 to 16 August 1971 due to pregnancy and delivered twins on 19 August 1971; both infants died soon after, resulting in prolonged illness. Her services were terminated by the respondent on 2 October 1971 on the ground that she had overstayed her leave. The petitioner explained her illness in response to a show-cause notice and asserted attempts to get the leave extended, but she did not testify at the Labour Court trial. The respondent defended the termination on the basis that overstaying leave caused automatic termination (or voluntary abandonment of employment). When efforts to secure reinstatement failed, the dispute was referred to the Labour Court on 21 January 1973. The Labour Court accepted the respondent's case and rejected the petitioner's claim on 24 September 1973. The petitioner challenged the Labour Court's order by filing the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned her services or lost her lien on the appointment by overstaying her leave, thereby justifying termination.
  2. Whether the Labour Court was correct to apply certified standing orders (or to assume a statutory fiction of abandonment) that would result in automatic termination for overstaying leave.
  3. How Clause 13(4) of the model standing orders, which makes a workman "liable to lose his lien" if he overstays leave, is to be interpreted — whether it creates an automatic loss of employment or allows for discretion where valid grounds (such as continuous illness) exist.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • The Labour Court's finding that the petitioner voluntarily abandoned her services is perverse.
  • The petitioner was continuously ill from the leave period (10–16 August 1971) through her attempts to report for duty in November 1971; she delivered twins on 19 August 1971 and both died soon after, which led to prolonged illness.
  • Medical certificates dated 8 August 1971 and 14 September 1971 were sent to and received by the respondent; these averments and the genuineness of the certificates were not disputed in the respondent's written statement.
  • The petitioner sent letters and medical certificates (including one on 14 September 1971) and promptly explained her position in response to the show-cause notice dated 23 September 1971, which militates against any inference of intention to abandon the job.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented)

  • The petitioner overstayed leave and by doing so became liable to lose her lien on the appointment; such overstaying resulted in automatic termination (or amounted to voluntary abandonment).
  • Counsel for the respondent (Sri Shetye) relied on earlier authority (including Buckingham and Carnatic Company v. Venkatiah and Ch. & P. Employers' Association v. A.T. Zambre) to argue that standing orders raise a statutory fiction of abandonment on overstaying leave and therefore defeat the petitioner's claim.
  • Reliance was also placed on N.E. Industries v. Hanuman and other cases said to support automatic loss of employment where leave is overstayed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Buckingham and Carnatic Company v. Venkatiah [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1272] Standing order in that case provided a fiction that an employee who absented himself for eight consecutive working days had "left the company's service without notice thereby terminating his contract of service." The Court held reliance on this authority misplaced because the standing order there created an automatic fiction which does not exist in the model standing orders applicable to the petitioner.
Ch. & P. Employers' Association v. A.T. Zambre [A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 274] Standing order there contemplated a fiction that a worker failing to report for work for one month or more (or even a fortnight after expiry of leave) "voluntarily abandoned his services." The Court found this case inapplicable because the model standing orders governing the petitioner did not contain any provision creating such a fiction of automatic abandonment.
N.E. Industries v. Hanuman [A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 33] Relied upon by respondent to support a doctrine of loss of job on overstaying leave. The Court distinguished this authority on the basis that, unlike the model clause here, that case dealt with a provision that (in effect) produced a loss of lien; here Clause 13(4) only makes a workman "liable to lose his lien" and thus does not mandate automatic termination.
State v. Amru Tulsi Ram [A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 55] Interpretation of the word "liable" as carrying an element of discretion and not permitting arbitrary exercise. The Court invoked this principle to interpret "liable to lose his lien" in Clause 13(4) as containing an element of discretion and requiring consideration of context and circumstances (e.g., continuous illness).
Velvet Dyeing and Finishing Co. v. Abdul Aziz [Special Civil Application No. 2466 of 1972] (Unreported) Support for liberal construction of relevant standing order clauses where workmen had valid grounds for overstaying. The Court treated this unreported decision as supportive of the view that relevant standing-order clauses should be liberally construed to protect workmen who have valid grounds for late reporting.
Investa Machine Tools & Engineering Co., Ltd. v. R.M. Kulkarni [Special Civil Application No. 1855 of 1962] (Unreported) Support for liberally construing standing orders in favour of workmen when valid grounds exist for overstaying leave. The Court relied on this unreported judgment as additional authority reinforcing the conclusion that valid and unavoidable causes (such as continuous illness) can avoid the liability to lose the lien.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the undisputed factual averments and the relevant standing order clause. Key steps in the Court's analysis were:

  1. Assessment of factual record and evidentiary gaps:
    • The petitioner did not enter the witness box, and the Labour Court treated this failure as significant; the Court acknowledged that failure to give oral evidence weakens the petitioner's case on disputed points.
    • Nevertheless, several material averments were undisputed: the petitioner was pregnant, gave birth on 19 August 1971, both children died, she was continuously ill from August into November 1971, and she had sent medical certificates dated 8 August 1971 and 14 September 1971 which the respondent received. These matters were not controverted in the respondent's written statement.
  2. On the legal effect of overstaying leave under the applicable standing orders:
    • The Labour Court had relied on the respondent's certified standing orders (Clause 13) in its reasoning. The Court noted that those particular standing orders were certified only on 13 May 1973 — after the events of August–November 1971 — and therefore the model standing orders governed the petitioner's conditions of service for the period in question.
    • The relevant provision in the model standing orders (sub-clause (4) of Clause 13) states: "A workman remaining absent beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, shall be liable to lose his lien on his appointment unless he returns within eight days of the expiry of the sanctioned leave and explains to the satisfaction of the authority..."
  3. Interpretation of the phrase "liable to lose his lien":
    • The Court emphasized that this clause does not create an automatic legal fiction of abandonment (unlike the standing orders in Buckingham & Carnatic and Ch. & P. cases) but only renders the workman "liable" to lose the lien.
    • Relying on the dictionary meaning and the State v. Amru Tulsi Ram authority, the Court held that "liable" carries an element of discretion and its precise import depends on context and the object of the rule. Standing orders are designed to protect workmen from arbitrary action and should be liberally construed to that end.
    • The clause's own proviso — permitting avoidance of loss of lien by returning within eight days and explaining the delay — demonstrates that the effect is defeasible, not inevitable.
  4. Application of principle to the petitioner's facts:
    • The Court reasoned that continuous illness is precisely the sort of valid and unavoidable ground that can avoid the liability to lose the lien. The petitioner had undisputed medical evidence of illness and had communicated with the respondent; these facts rebut the inference of voluntary abandonment.
    • Therefore, the petitioner should not be held to have lost her lien merely because she could not resume duty immediately after leave or within eight days; the overstaying was attributable to continuous illness rather than any intention to abandon employment.
  5. On precedents relied upon by the respondent:
    • The Court found the respondent's reliance on authorities that involved standing orders creating a statutory fiction of abandonment to be misplaced because the model standing orders applicable here did not create such a fiction.
    • Moreover, the Court noted that in the cases relied upon by the respondent the workmen's pleas of illness were not accepted on facts; thus those cases did not address the effect of a valid ground for overstaying.
    • The Court referenced two unreported decisions of this Court which had liberally construed similar clauses and found them supportive of the petitioner’s position.
  6. Conclusion from analysis:
    • The Labour Court failed to appreciate the importance of undisputed averments (continuous illness and receipt of medical certificates) and improperly treated overstaying as resulting in automatic loss of employment. The provision in the model standing orders allows for discretion and valid grounds (such as continuous illness) to avoid loss of lien.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the respondent's termination of the petitioner's services for overstaying leave was not justified on the facts and must be set aside. In the words of the opinion, the termination of the petitioner's services is wrong and the order must be held as null and void.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Court's decision invalidates the termination imposed on the petitioner by the respondent; the Labour Court's reliance on an automatic forfeiture of lien in these circumstances was misplaced because the relevant model standing order only made the workman "liable to lose his lien" and not inevitably so.
  • Legal/interpretive implication: The opinion interprets Clause 13(4) of the model standing orders to mean that overstaying sanctioned leave renders a workman "liable" to lose the lien but does not produce automatic termination in every case. The existence of valid and unavoidable grounds (for example, continuous illness) can avoid that liability. The Court emphasized that standing orders should be liberally construed to protect workmen from arbitrary consequences where valid grounds exist.
  • Scope: The Court distinguished earlier authorities that produced automatic fictions of abandonment on their particular facts and standing-order wording; those authorities were held inapplicable where the model standing orders (applicable here) do not contain similar automatic provisions.

Note: Portions of the original judgment were omitted as not material to the excerpted report.

    Kashibai Sachidanand v. Hindustan Pencils (Private), Ltd.

    Deshpande, J.:— The petitioner was employed as an operator with the respondent, where she served for about seven years. She went on leave from 10 to 16 August 1971 as she was pregnant. Delivery appears to have taken place on 19 August 1971. She gave birth to twins, one of which was born dead, and the other died soon. This resulted in her prolonged illness. She does not appear to have recovered from this illness when her services were terminated on 2 October 1971, by the respondent on the ground of her overstaying the leave, though she pleaded illness in her explanation to the show-cause notice and tried to explain her failure to get the leave extended. When all her efforts to join the work and get reinstated through the union failed, the dispute was referred to the Labour Court on 21 January 1973. Her claim was resisted by the respondent on the ground that her overstaying the leave resulted in automatic termination of her services and by not getting the leave extended, she had voluntarily abandoned the job. No oral evidence was led at the trial. The Labour Court accepted the case of the respondent and rejected her claim on 24 September 1973. Legality of this order is challenged in this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution.

    2. Dr. Kulkarni contends that finding of the Labour Court that the petitioner abandoned her services voluntarily is perverse. It is indeed difficult to meet the force of that contention. Failure of the petitioner to enter the witness box appears to have weighed very much with the Labour Court. There can be no question that such failure must result in rejection of the disputed part of her case. But the petitioner's averments that she was pregnant, and had delivered twins on 19 August 1971 and both the twins died and she was continuously ill from 1® August 1971 to the date of her reporting for duty, and was under medical treatment and certificates to that effect, dated 8 August 1971 and 14 September 1971 were sent by her and received by the respondent, were never disputed. The dispute centered round whether the applications for extension of leave were made and whether medical certificates were sent in time and whether she was sought to be victimized at all The Labour Court his obviously failed to grasp the importance of these averments and implications of their remaining undisputed.

    3. Now, if the petitioner was continuously ill from 10 August 1971 till she reported for joining duty in November 1971 to the respondent, the question of the petitioner having abandoned the job voluntarily ordinarily should not and cannot obviously arise. Her conduct in sending letters and medical certificates on 14 September 1971 and prompt explanation on 24 September 1971 to show-cause notice dated 23 September 1971, strongly militate against her having ever intended to give up the job or abandon the services. We have already indicated that the fact of her continuous illness as also the genuineness of the medical certificates tendered by her to the respondent, though not in time, is not disputed in the written-statement filed by the respondent and thus could not be disputed in the course of hearing of this matter before us by Sri Shetye. Whatever the effect and consequences of her failure to apply for extension of leave and to send the medical certificates in time, her absence from duty and overstaying the leave, shall have to be attributed to her undoubted continuous illness and not to any intention of abandoning the services or the job. In the face of these facts, any inference of the petitioner having abandoned the services shall have to be ignored as being patently perverse.

    4. Sri Shetye, however, contends that the question of drawing any inference from the mere cotinuous illness of the petitioner cannot arise in cases where, as here, the relevant standing order in terms raised a statutory fiction of the worker like the petitioner having abandoned the services voluntarily on overstaying the leave. Strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Buckingham and Carnatic Company v. Venkatiah [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1272] and the judgment of this Court in the case of Ch. & P. Employers' Association v. A.T Zambre [A.I.R 1969 Bom. 274]. In our opinion, the reliance on both these judgments is misplaced. The relevant standing order 8(ii) in Buckingham and Carnatic Company else (vide supra) in terms provided for a fiction of the employees having

    “left the company's service without notice thereby terminating his contract of service”

    in the event of any employee having absented himself for eight consecutive working days, while corresponding standing order 19 in Ch. & P. Employees' Association case (vide supra) also contemplated a fiction of the employee having

    “voluntarily abandoned his services”

    in the event of any worker failing to report for work for one month or more without prior permission or even a fortnight of the expiration of leave originally granted or subsequently extended. We do not find any such provision in the relevant standing orders governing conditions of service of the workmen of the respondent concern. Sri Shefye drew our attention to Cl. 13 of the certified standing orders which were relied on by the Labour Court without objection. It is, however, not disputed that these standing orders were certified on 13 May 1973 long after the present controversy arose during the period from August to November 1971 and the petitioner's services were terminated. Provisions of the model standing orders would, therefore, govern the petitioner's conditions of service. The relevant clause of Sub-cl. (4) of Cl. 13 of the model standing orders is to the following effect:

    “A workman remaining absent beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, shall be liable to lose his lien on his appointment unless he returns within eight days of the expiry of the sanctioned leave and explains to the satisfaction of the authority granting leave his inability to resume his duty immediately on the expiry of his leave.”

    The rest of the clause deals with the consequences of losing the lien and is irrelevant. Unlike the standing orders in the two above-mentioned cases, this clause does not create any legal fiction as such of the workmen having abandoned or left the services.

    5. Far from creating any such fiction, the above clause rather militates against any assumption of automatic-termination of service. Under this clause overstaying the leave period results only in “liability to lose the lien” and not, in “the loss of lien” itself as appears to have been the case in N.E Industries v. Hanuman [A.I.R 1968 S.C 33] on which also reliance was placed by Sri Shetye. The word “liable” does not necessarily convey the sense of any inevitable or unavoidable consequence every time. According to the dictionary meaning the word also conveys the sense of being

    “answerable for, subject or amenable to tax or penalty, under obligation to do, exposed or open to.”

    As held in State v. Amru Tulsi Ram [A.I.R 1957 Punj 55] the word carries with it an element of discretion which does not admit of being exercised arbitrarily. The precise import of the word must necessarily depend on the context and the entire setting and the governing object of the clause or the statute or the rule in which the word finds place. The standing orders are intended to protect workmen from the arbitrary and high handed treatment of the employers and at the same time to ensure their regular attendance and prevent dislocation of the work Such provisions are required to be liberally construed in the light of the objects. Moreover, use of the word “shall” or “may” is never decisive in determining the mandatory character or nature of any clause or provision. The very fact that liability to lose the lien on overstaying the leave is made defeasible by returning to work within eight days and by explaining the delay itself militates against any absolute liability having been intended under this clause. It is not difficult to conceive of manifold vicissitudes and contingencies in human life beyond the control of the workman which may render overstaying of the leave inevitable even beyond eight days. Rule-makers could not have contemplated the loss of lien on the job of the workman whose overstaying the leave beyond eight days may result from dislocation of communications or the detention of the workman by the Government for no fault of his. This is only one of the many illustrative contingencies which enables avoiding of the liability of overstaying the leave. Continuous illness furnishes yet another illustration of the valid ground to avoid the liability to which overstaying is likely to expose any workman. It is difficult to believe that authors of the standing orders could have intended to furnish overstaying the sick leave as an excuse to terminate the services even when sickness prevented the worker from going to work. Existence of a valid ground thus avoids the loss of lien. This appears to us to be implicit in the scheme of the clause itself. Thus the failure of the workman to report on duty after the expiry of the originally granted leave or his failure even to report within eight days of such expiry makes the workman only “liable to lose his lien on his appointment” and exposes him to the possibility of the loss of the job. This by itself cannot result in his loss of the job or appointment. He would not ???ose the job if he has valid and unavoidable cause for such late reporting. This appears to us to be the true construction of Cl. 13(4) of the model standing orders.

    6. Looked at from this point of view, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner lost her lien on the appointment merely because she could not join the duty immediately after the expiry of her leave on 17 August 1971 or within eight days therefrom. The assumption that overstaying the leave itself, in the absence of any thing more results in automatic of services is wholly unwarranted. As long as the failure to join the duty is attributable to some valid ground or the other, the petitioner cannot be said to have lost her lien on the appointment within the meaning of this clause. The petitioner's continuous illnes did furnish valid explanations. Termination of???er services thus is wrong and the order must be held as null and void. We find it difficult to accept the contention of Sri Shetye to the contrary and uphold the order passed by the Labour Court. The Labour Court obviously was misled into assuming that certified standing orders were applicable to the case before him, though the standing orders were not certified till about the time when the trial commenced before the Labour Court. The-Labour Court's assumption that the petitioner was liable to lose her lien on the job merely because of her failure to report on 17 August 1971, or her failure to apply for the extension of the leave is unwarranted.

    7. It is necessary to add that the ratio of the three cases cited by Sri Shetye is inapplicable to the facts of the case for one more reason. In all these cases, it was found as fact that workman concerned did not have any valid ground to overstay. The pleas of the workmen therein about illness were not accepted as true, on facts. The question of the effect of the existence of the valid ground for overstaying on the statutory fiction did not fall for consideration at all in these cases. On the contrary effect of such valid ground fell directly for consideration in two unreported judgments of this Court, namely, the judgment in Velvet Dyeing and Finishing Co. v. Abdul Aziz [Special Civil Application No. 2466 of 1972, dated 20 June 1973 decided by Vaiclya and Dudhia JJ., (Unrepd.)] and judgment in Investa Machine Tools and Engineering Co., Ltd. v. R.M Kulkarni [Special Civil Application No. 1855 of 1962, decided by Tambe and Palekar JJ., on 12 January 1963, (Unrep.)]. Relevant clauses of the standing orders have been liberally construed therein. We are fortified in our view by the observations made therein.

    [Rest of the judgment not being material to this Report has been omitted.]

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    Kashibai Sachidanand v. Hindustan Pencils (Private), Ltd.
    (Feb 5, 1974)