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  • Act, viz. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 33. Section 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act
  • BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT 1947
  • provisions of s. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.
  • ss. 46 and 47 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882,
  • PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT 1882
  • s. 27 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Section 37
  • s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882,
  • them.12. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Presidency Small Cause Courts (Amendment) Act, 1963
  • s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,
  • Act by the Bombay Amendment Act 44 of 1948.
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT 1887
  • provisions of the Bombay Rent Act.(2)
  • s. 48. Section 44
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Act, viz. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 33. Section 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act
  • BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT 1947
  • provisions of s. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.
  • ss. 46 and 47 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882,
  • PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT 1882
  • s. 27 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Section 37
  • s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882,
  • them.12. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Presidency Small Cause Courts (Amendment) Act, 1963
  • s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,
  • Act by the Bombay Amendment Act 44 of 1948.
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT 1887
  • provisions of the Bombay Rent Act.(2)
  • s. 48. Section 44
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A succinct narrative of the events and procedural steps, taken strictly from the opinion:

  • Respondent (original applicant in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay) filed an application under s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (Ejectment Application No. 1149.E of 1958) on 31 July 1958, alleging that he had granted a licence to the opponent-occupant, had withdrawn that licence, and that the occupant refused to vacate.
  • The appellant (opponent/occupant) appeared and defended the application, contending he was a sub-tenant and not a licensee. After trial the Court of Small Causes, by order dated 21 November 1960, held that the appellant was a sub-tenant (not a licensee) and dismissed the ejectment application. A revision filed by the respondent in the High Court was summarily dismissed.
  • In December 1960 the appellant filed RAN. No. 1722.SR of 1960 in the Court of Small Causes for fixing standard rent; that matter remained pending in appeal and was not further considered in this opinion.
  • Respondent then filed two civil suits: (i) First Civil Suit No. 389 of 1961 (filed 23 January 1961) for recovery of arrears of compensation/damages (Rs. 6,200.94), and (ii) Civil Suit No. 2020 of 1961 (filed 14 June 1961) for recovery of possession, again alleging the defendant was a licensee whose licence had been terminated.
  • The two suits were consolidated by consent and two preliminary issues were agreed to be heard without oral evidence: (1) whether the City Civil Court had jurisdiction in view of the Bombay Rent Act; and (2) whether the suits were barred by res judicata by virtue of the Court of Small Causes' decision in Ejectment Application No. 1149.E of 1958. The City Civil Court held it had jurisdiction and, on the second issue, dismissed both suits on the ground that the licence/sub-tenancy issue had already been decided by the Small Causes Court.
  • Respondent sought to file a consolidated appeal in forma pauperis but permission was refused; he paid court-fees only in respect of the claim in Civil Suit No. 2020/61. First Appeal No. 601 of 1968 was therefore treated as an appeal only against the judgment and decree in Civil Suit No. 2020/61. A learned single Judge of this Court allowed that appeal (following the judgment in Ramchandra v. Janardan), holding the earlier Small Causes decision was not a final order and remanded Civil Suit No. 2020/61 for trial.
  • The appellant (original occupant) filed the present Letters Patent Appeal. In this appeal the main question identified is whether the City Civil Court suit is barred by res judicata or principles analogous to res judicata because of the earlier Small Causes decision. The appellant additionally raised a point (not argued before the single Judge) that because the respondent did not appeal against Civil Suit No. 389/61 (one of the two consolidated suits), that decree has become final and thus operates as a bar to the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent's suit in the City Civil Court is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (or principles analogous thereto) because the Court of Small Causes had earlier decided, in an ejectment application under s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, that the occupant was a sub-tenant (i.e., whether the subject-matter/issue of licence versus sub-tenancy was finally decided).
  2. Whether, by reason of the respondent having appealed only against one of two consolidated suits (paying court-fees and pursuing appeal only in respect of Civil Suit No. 2020/61) while not appealing Civil Suit No. 389/61 (which thus stands unappealed), the final decree in the unappealed suit operates as res judicata and consequently bars the continuance of the appeal and/or the subject suit.
  3. The question of jurisdiction under the Bombay Rent Act was an agreed preliminary issue but that conclusion (City Civil Court had jurisdiction) was not contested on this appeal; the appeal therefore proceeded chiefly on the res judicata questions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as summarised from the opinion)

  • The prior decision of the Court of Small Causes (in the s. 41 application) decided the very question whether the occupant was licensee or sub-tenant; that decision was final with respect to that issue and therefore the respondent cannot re-agitate the same question in the City Civil Court (res judicata).
  • Section 49 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (Chapter VII) provides that the suit in the High Court or City Civil Court must be a suit "for trying the title thereto" — the appellant argued that "title thereto" means title in the immovable property (ownership) and not the narrower question of the contractual licence; therefore a subsequent suit based merely on the alleged subsisting licence is not permissible to re-agitate the point decided by the Small Causes Court.
  • By reason of the respondent's conduct in appealing only one of the two consolidated suits, the decree in the unappealed suit (Civil Suit No. 389/61) has become final and should, it was argued, operate as a bar under res judicata to the continuation of the appeal arising from the consolidated judgment.

Respondent's / Amicus Arguments (as summarised from the opinion)

  • Counsel (and the learned single Judge, following Ramchandra v. Janardan) emphasised that Chapter VII offers a summary remedy under s. 41 et seq., and the order under s. 43 (summary eviction) is expressly made subject to the right of the occupant or applicant to file a substantive suit (see ss. 46–49). Thus the decision in the Small Causes application is not intended by the statutory scheme to be final and conclusive on all rights; a substantive suit may be filed to try title to possession.
  • Where the judgment (as opposed to only a decree) is successfully challenged on appeal, res judicata cannot be held to have operated because the judgment itself is not final; the respondent relied on authority holding that it is the decision/judgment which creates res judicata, not merely the decree.
  • When suits are tried together and a common judgment is appealed, the appeal challenges the judgment (the decision), and therefore a decree in one sister suit becoming final does not necessarily create res judicata as to the principal question if the common judgment is under challenge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramchandra v. Janardan, 1967 70 Bom. L.R. 376 Held that an order under Chapter VII (s. 43) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act was not a final order and a subsequent regular suit could be filed to decide title; treated Chapter VII remedy as different from a substantive suit. The learned single Judge followed this decision and the present Court agreed with its core conclusion (that ss. 46 & 47 preserve the right to bring a subsequent suit). The Court relied on Ramchandra to support the view that Chapter VII decisions are not intended to be final.
Dattatraya Krishna Jangam v. Jairam Ganesh Gore, 1964 66 Bom. L.R. 645 (Full Bench) Observed that a suit under ss. 47/49 may be to establish a right to possession (or other title) and that a suit to establish other titles may be filed in High Court or City Civil Court. The Court cited this Full Bench decision as supportive of the view that the "title" contemplated by s. 49 can include right to possession; used as supportive authority for permitting a civil suit to litigate right to possession despite Chapter VII proceedings.
Hari v. Dhondi, 1905 8 Bom. L.R. 96 (Division Bench) Statement that possession is prima facie proof of ownership; value of possession as foundation for title to claim possession. The opinion quoted this authority to support the proposition that a right to retain possession can constitute a title and thus may be the basis of a suit under ss. 47/49.
Gulabchand v. State of Gujarat, 1964 67 Bom. L.R. 673 (S.C.) Illustrates that a summary decision (e.g., in writ proceedings decided on affidavits) can in some circumstances give rise to res judicata in subsequent litigation. The Court acknowledged this authority to note that the summary nature of the earlier remedy is not by itself conclusive against res judicata; but the Court proceeded to distinguish Chapter VII on statutory grounds.
Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli, [1927] A.I.R. Lah. 289 (Full Bench) Held that res judicata arises from a judgment/decision and not from a 'decree' alone; "the determining factor is not the decree but the decision of the matter in controversy." The Court cited and accepted the principle that res judicata depends on the final decision/judgment; used this rule in addressing whether an unappealed decree in a sister suit barred further proceedings when a common judgment was under appeal.
Narhari v. Shanker, [1953] A.I.R. S.C. 419 Supreme Court approval of the Mt. Lachhmi principle that the estoppel is by judgment (decision) and not by decree. The Court relied on Narhari to reinforce that the appeal against the common judgment leaves the principal decision in jeopardy and therefore an unappealed decree in a sister suit does not automatically create res judicata as to the contested decision.
Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt), [1966] A.I.R. S.C. 1332 Supreme Court kept open the question whether, when two suits tried together are disposed of by a common judgment, an appeal against only one decree bars challenge to the other; the Court did not decide the point. The opinion records that the Supreme Court left the matter open; the present Court noted this and considered other authority (including Full Bench decisions) to resolve the point for the present facts.
Jai Narain v. Bulaqi Das, [1969] A.I.R. All. 504 (Full Bench) Full Bench conclusion aligning with the view that it is the decision (judgment) and not the decree which creates res judicata; analyzed conflicts among High Courts on combined suits and appeals. The present Court expressed respectful agreement with the Allahabad Full Bench view and relied on its reasoning to hold that the appealed common judgment prevents the unappealed decree in a sister suit from operating as res judicata on the principal question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's step-by-step legal analysis, presented as the opinion itself develops it:

  1. Statutory scheme and distinctions:
    • The Court examined the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (as it stood before the 1963 amendment) and divided the Act conceptually into two parts: (a) sections dealing with suits (ss. 1–40, with s. 18 conferring jurisdiction subject to exclusions in s. 19) and (b) Chapter VII (ss. 41–49) providing a separate, summary remedy by application for recovery of possession where annual rackrent value falls within limits and possession is as tenant or with permission.
    • Section 37 (in Chapter VI) makes decrees/orders in suits final and conclusive (save as otherwise provided). Chapter VII is an exception to the ordinary jurisdictional scheme: although suits for recovery of immovable property are ordinarily excluded under s. 19, Chapter VII provides a summary remedy (an application under s. 41) for recovery of possession where tenancy has been terminated or permission withdrawn.
  2. Nature of Chapter VII remedy:
    • Chapter VII's procedure (ss. 41–49) contemplates a speedy and summary inquiry and does not provide a statutory appeal from the order under s. 43. However, ss. 46–49 expressly preserve a substantive remedy: (a) s. 46 introduces the concept of deemed trespass and (b) s. 47 permits the occupant, on furnishing bond and sureties, to stay the summary proceedings by instituting a suit in the High Court/City Civil Court for compensation for trespass; if the occupant succeeds, the decree supersedes any s. 43 order. (c) s. 49 provides that recovery under Chapter VII shall be no bar to institution of a suit in High Court or City Civil Court "for trying the title thereto."
    • The Court construed "title thereto" in s. 49 to include a title to retain or maintain possession (a right to possession) and not to be confined strictly to title in the immovable property (ownership). Thus an occupant may properly found a substantive suit on the subsisting contract (for example, that a licence subsists) to vindicate his right to possession.
  3. Res judicata and finality:
    • The doctrine of res judicata (s. 11 CPC) requires, inter alia, that the matter in the previous proceeding must have been "heard and finally decided" by a competent court. The Court emphasised the mutuality principle: estoppel by record is mutual—both parties must be bound by the earlier decision in the same way.
    • Because Chapter VII expressly contemplates the possibility of a substantive suit and provides that any decree in such suit shall supersede the s. 43 order, the Court concluded that the orders under s. 43 were not intended by the statutory scheme to be finally conclusive on all rights of the parties. Consequently, one of the necessary ingredients for res judicata (a previous matter "finally decided") is absent in relation to s. 43 orders.
    • The Court therefore concluded that the decision of the Court of Small Causes under Chapter VII (s. 41 et seq.) was not intended to be final and conclusive in the sense required for res judicata; accordingly the City Civil Court trial on title to possession was not barred by res judicata arising from the Small Causes order.
  4. Combined suits / appeal only from one decree — which binds?
    • The Court addressed whether an appeal filed only in respect of one of two consolidated suits (where both were disposed of by a common judgment) could be barred because the other sister suit's decree was not appealed and had become final. The Court examined conflicting High Court authority and relevant Supreme Court commentary.
    • Relying on precedents (notably Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli and its approval in Narhari v. Shanker), the Court reiterated the principle that res judicata is created by the judgment/decision and not merely by the decree; the judgment is the decisive document for estoppel. If the common judgment is itself under challenge by appeal, the principal decision is not final and hence the unappealed decree in a sister suit does not automatically operate to create res judicata as to the main question.
    • Applying that principle to the present facts, the Court held that because the respondent had appealed the common judgment (even though he had paid fees and limited the appeal procedurally to only one of the decrees), the common judgment was in jeopardy and therefore the failure to appeal the sister suit did not preclude the respondent from pursuing his appeal on the principal question.
  5. Overall disposition of the res judicata contentions:
    • The Court rejected the contention that the earlier Small Causes decision could operate as res judicata to bar the City Civil Court suit, because the statutory scheme of Chapter VII preserved the right to a substantive suit and thus the Small Causes order was not of the final character required for res judicata.
    • The additional contention based on the unappealed decree in Civil Suit No. 389/61 was also rejected because the common judgment (which governed both decrees) was successfully challenged on appeal; the Court relied on authorities holding that the judgment (not the decree) determines res judicata.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the order of the learned single Judge allowing the respondent's appeal and remanding Civil Suit No. 2020/61 for trial is confirmed. (As stated in the opinion: "the appeal fails and is dismissed. We, therefore, confirm the order of the learned single Judge that the suit in appeal must go back to the trial Court for further disposal according to law.")

Implications and direct effects (as expressly stated in the opinion):

  • The Court concluded that orders under Chapter VII (s. 43) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, as it stood prior to the 1963 amendment, were not intended by the statutory scheme to be finally conclusive for the purposes of res judicata; parties retain the right to bring substantive suits under ss. 46–49 to try title to possession or related rights.
  • Because Chapter VII preserves the right of either the occupant or applicant to bring a substantive suit, the principles of res judicata (requiring a prior matter to have been heard and finally decided) could not be invoked to bar the City Civil Court litigation on the basis of the earlier Small Causes order.
  • On the procedural point arising from consolidated suits decided by a common judgment: when the common judgment is itself under appeal, an unappealed decree in a sister suit does not necessarily create res judicata as to the principal contested decision; the judgment (decision) — not the decree alone — is the operative element for estoppel by record.
  • The suit in appeal (Civil Suit No. 2020/61) is to be remanded for trial; existing interim orders were confirmed by the Court (including an injunction restraining prosecution of the appeal in the Small Causes Court regarding standard rent until disposal of this Letters Patent Appeal), and the Court left certain directions (including the disposition of funds and security-related directions) to the City Civil Court to settle in the interest of justice.
  • No new binding expansion of res judicata doctrine beyond application to the statutory scheme discussed was declared; the Court applied existing principles to the facts and statutory context at hand and emphasized statutory interpretation of Chapter VII as determinative.

Disposition and Ancillary Orders (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The appeal is dismissed and the order of the learned single Judge allowing the respondent's appeal and remanding Civil Suit No. 2020/61 stands.
  • The injunction previously granted by this Court (restraining prosecution of the appeal in the Small Causes Court regarding standard rent) is confirmed until the suit before the City Civil Court is disposed of.
  • Directions given by the learned single Judge regarding withdrawal of Rs. 18,000 (with Rs. 9,000 to be withdrawn by the respondent on furnishing security) were left to the trial Court to consider; the present Court confirmed that approach and left final directions to the City Civil Court.
  • Costs in this Letters Patent Appeal are to be costs in the cause and will be in the discretion of the trial Court.

Note: This summary reproduces and organises only the facts, statutory analysis, arguments, precedents cited, reasoning and orders as stated in the provided opinion. No outside material or inference beyond the text of the opinion has been added.

    Mohandas Vishindas Chainani v. Hiranand Assumal

    Deshmukh, J.:— Only one point of law arises for our decision in this appeal. A few undisputed facts, which may be noted before the point of law is formulated, are these:

    2. The respondent in this Court is the original applicant in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay and a plaintiff in the City Civil Court. Respondent filed his application under s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, being Ejectment Application No. 1149.E of 1958 on July 31, 1958. He alleged that he had granted licence to the opponent-occupant and that licence was withdrawn but, in spite of a request to vacate, the occupant did not; and therefore the ejectment application. The appellant as the opponent or occupant appeared before the Court of Small Causes and filed defences. His main defence was that he was a subtenant of the portion which was separated and given in his exclusive possession. There could, therefore, be no question of withdrawing or terminating the licence. After holding the trial in that application, the Court of Small Causes came to the conclusion by its order dated November 21, 1960, that the present appellant was a sub-tenant, and not a licensee. Incidentally findings about the exclusive possession etc. were given. The result was that the ejectment application stood dismissed. The revision application filed by the respondent in the High Court was summarily dismissed.

    3. Against this background the respondent as plaintiff filed two separate civil suits. Before that in December 1960, the appellant who was already held to be a sub-tenant filed an application, being RAN. No. 1722.SR of 1960 some time in December 1960 in the Court of Small Causes for fixing standard rent. That matter is still pending in appeal and need not be considered while the other facts are being taken into account.

    4. On January 23, 1961, the respondent filed his First Civil Suit No. 389 of 1961 for recovery of arrears of compensation or damages amounting to Rs. 6200.94 Again on June 14, 1961 he filed Civil Suit No. 2020 of 1961 for recovery of possession. In this second suit he again alleged that the defendant-appellant was his licensee and that licence was terminated. He, therefore, wanted the licensee to withdraw himself and claimed a decree for possession and mandatory injunction in that behalf.

    5. These two suits, viz. one for compensation and the other for possession, were consolidated with the consent of the parties and were heard together. After the issues were framed, it appears that the parties agreed that only two issues be heard as preliminary issues. They were as follows:—

    (1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try and dispose of this suit in view of the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act.

    (2) Whether the suit is barred by res judicata by virtue of the decision of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay, in ejectment application No. 1149.E of 1958.

    6. The advocates on both the sides also agreed that in respect of these issues no oral evidence would be led by the parties. In these circumstances, the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court at Bombay heard the suit on the aforesaid two preliminary issues. He came to the conclusion on the first issue that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That conclusion is not being doubted in this appeal. On the second issue he came to the conclusion that the subject-matter before the Small Causes Court related to relationship of licensee and licensor between the defendant and the plaintiff and the same issue is being agitated again in the City Civil Court. In view of the decision of the Court of Small Causes it was not open to the plaintiff-respondent to reagitate the same question. In other words, the present suit of the plaintiff and his plea that the defendant was his licensee in occupation were barred by the principles of res judicata, if not, by the provisions of s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He, therefore, dismissed both the suits by a common judgment.

    7. Against the dismissal of both the suits, the respondent in this Court tried to file a consolidated appeal in forma pauperis. Permission was refused to file appeal in forma pauperis. He, therefore, paid Court-fees only in respect of the claim in Civil Suit No. 2020/61. His First Appeal No. 601 of 1968 was therefore treated as an appeal only against the judgment and decree of the Civil Suit No. 2020 of 1961. This First Appeal was heard by a learned single Judge of this Court.

    8. In respect of the sole question relating to res judicata argued before him, the learned Judge followed the earlier judgment of this Court in Ramchandra v. Janardan . 1967 70 Bom. L.R 376.. Following that judgment, he held that the subject-matter in earlier suit was different than the subject-matter in the subsequent suit and the issues were also not similar. He also held relying upon that judgment that the order of the Court of Small Causes passed under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and more particularly under s. 43, was not a final order but was an order which was subject to a regular suit being filed by the parties to get their title decided. Agreeing with the reported judgment referred to above, the learned Judge allowed the appeal and remanded the Civil Suit No. 2020/61 for being heard and disposed of according to law. Being aggrieved the original defendant occupant has filed this appeal. In view of the summary of facts given above, the only question that now survives for consideration is whether the present suit of the respondent-plaintiff is barred by the principles of res judicata or principles analogous to res judicata in view of the decision of the Court of Small Causes in Ejectment Application No. 1149.E of 1958.

    9. While filing the present appeal, the appellant has, however, taken another point which was not taken up before the learned single Judge in the First Appeal. A further bar of res judicata to the hearing of the appeal itself is now being pleaded. In the circumstances that developed because of the peculiar course this litigation has taken, the respondent-plaintiff failed in his attempt to challenge the decrees in both the suits in forma pauperis but could not succeed. Possibly his limited means did not permit him to pay Court-fees in respect of both the appeals and he made his choice and paid Court-fees only in respect of the appeal arising out of Civil Suit No. 2020/61.

    10. The other Civil Suit No. 389/61 is not subjected to an appeal. Shri Kripalani, learned counsel for the appellant, has obtained leave of this Court to take up this additional point of law regarding res judicata, as the decree in Civil Suit No. 389/61 has become final and operates as a bar to the hearing of the present appeal. Though this is an issue which did not arise in the suit as such, in view of the subsequent development of facts in this litigation and the specific permission obtained by the appellant by the order dated December 24, 1971, from this Court the second issue about res judicata will also have to be considered.

    11. Large number of authorities were cited before us which dealt with the general principles on which the doctrine of res judicata is based as also the field of operation of that doctrine. It is being conceded in this suit that s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not bodily apply because the earlier proceeding was not a suit but was an application under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. However, what is urged is that by the principles of res judicata or by the principles analogous to res judicata the trial and decision of the same issues in the subsequent suit will be barred. There is also no doubt that the operation of the principles of res judicata is not confined to the suit alone. It would therefore be permissible for the present appellant to raise the question of bar of res judicata and it will have to be decided only in view of the facts of the present litigation in relation to the law applicable to them.

    12. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The four requirements, therefore, are: That the matter in the previous suit and the subsequent suit must be more or less the same or must have been directly or substantially in issue in both these matters. The previous suit must be between the same parties which are parties to the subsequent litigation or the parties to the subsequent litigation must be litigating under the same title. The Court must be competent to try the subsequent suit in which such issues have been raised and in the earlier suit the parties must have been heard and the matter in issue must have been finally decided by that Court.

    13. In the light of these principles what is being argued before us is that what was in issue before the Court of Small Causes in the application under s. 41 was whether the present appellant was a licensee or a sub-tenant. It is not in doubt, that the same parties are parties to the litigation in the City Civil Court. The case of the appellant is that the present suit in which claim for possession is based upon the same contract of licence involves a matter which was substantially the same which was before the Court of Small Causes. The issues were the same, viz. whether the appellant-tenant was a licensee or a sub-tenant. It is also urged that the Court of Small Causes was competent to hear and decide the dispute that was raised before it in the ejectment application. That dispute was heard and finally decided by that Court. In the circumstances though the present suit may lie in the City Civil Court the trial of that issue is now barred. This submission undoubtedly pre-supposes that the subject-matter was the same or the issues raised were same and similarly the prior order of the Court of Small Causes being final, the same could not be reagitated in the City Civil Court.

    14. This appeal is principally filed to challenge the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ramchandra v. Janardan. Before we consider that decision or the correctness thereof, we propose to examine in the first instance the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, Chapter VII and the nature of the remedy provided by those provisions. If the scheme of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is taken into account as that Act stood before the exhaustive amendment of 1963, it would be apparent that it consists as if of two parts. Sections 1 to 40 seem to form one part and ss. 41 to 49 contained in Chapter VII seem to form the other. Sections 39 and 40 have been deleted from the Act by the Bombay Amendment Act 44 of 1948. If we look to the provisions of sections upto 38 it will be apparent that a remedy of suits is provided in respect of certain causes of action and a list of matters is included in s. 19 in respect of which the Court of Small Causes has to have no jurisdiction. Section 18 deals with the suit in which the Court of Small Causes has jurisdiction. Under that section, it is laid down that subject to the exceptions in s. 19, the Small Cause Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature when the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 3000. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) which follow thereafter in that section lay down the conditions under which this jurisdiction is to be exercised. If we look to the provisions of s. 19 which enumerates the suits in which that Court is not to have jurisdiction, it will be apparent from cls. (d) to (g) that no suit relating to immovable property is ordinarily within the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes. Purely money claim, falling within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court are triable by it but not a suit in which either recovery or other kind of right in relation to immovable property is involved. In our view the jurisdiction conferred on that Court in respect of matters covered by s. 18 is exclusive and the decisions of the Small Causes Court in the form of decrees or orders passed in suits are made final and conclusive. This is provided by s. 37 which is the first section in Chapter VI, which says save as otherwise provided by this Chapter or by any other enactment for the time being in force, every decree and order of the Small Cause Court in a suit shall be final and conclusive.

    15. Having thus provided for the types of suits which shall be entertained by that Court and having also provided that the decrees and orders in those suits shall be conclusive and final, the Legislature has added Chapter VII which is in the nature of an exception or proviso to s. 19. Thus suits relating to recovery of immovable property have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court under s. 19. A further exception has been carved out and one kind of matter relating to recovery of possession is made triable under Chapter VII. The remedy provided by this Chapter is not a suit but it is described by the Legislature as the summons against person occupying property without leave. The section itself describes the person who is entitled to make an application under this Chapter as an applicant and the person against whom recovery of possession is claimed as an occupant. If a person is in possession of any immovable property situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes and of which the annual value at a rackrent does not exceed Rs. 3000 and the possession of that person is either as tenant or with permission, the applicant is entitled to apply for recovery of possession on the ground that the tenancy has been terminated or the permission has been withdrawn. In other words, in cases where there is a relationship of landlord and tenant or licensee and licensor, the landlord or licensor is entitled to apply for a summons to recover possession after the tenancy is terminated or permission is withdrawn. The occupation of the occupant thus becomes an occupation without leave. Against such a person a speedy and summary remedy by way of an application is permitted.

    16. Section 42 deals with service of summons upon the occupant. Under s. 43, which is the next section in order, it is provided that if the occupant does not appear at the time, appointed and show cause to the contrary the applicant shall, if the Small Clauses Court is satisfied that he is entitled to apply under s. 41, be entitled to an order addressed to a bailiff of the Court directing him to give possession of the property to the applicant on such day as the Court thinks fit to name in such order. An explanation has been added to this section which says that if the occupant proves that the tenancy was created or permission granted by virtue of a title which determined previous to the date of the application, he shall be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of this section. It is no more in doubt that this explanation is more illustrative of the ground in which causes could be shown and this is not the only ground on which valid cause will be accepted. The effect therefore is that the Court must be satisfied that the applicant has a right to claim possession and the occupant has not shown cause which is valid as a defence. In these circumstances immediate order of delivery of possession has to be addressed to the bailiff of the Court.

    17. Undoubtedly before such an order is passed a hearing takes place as the proceedings under this Chapter are also regulated by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. This is provided by s. 48. Section 44 is again a section which merely enables the bailiff to hand over possession and enacts a bar to proceedings against Judge or Officer of the Court against the orders passed or executed. Section 45 takes cognizance of some technical errors or defects in the procedure and says that if the applicant was entitled to possession then mere error in proceedings would not have the effect of deeming him to be a trespasser. However, the occupant will be entitled to sue him for compensation.

    18. Hereafter follow ss. 46 to 49 which enable the occupant to resort to certain remedies while the application is still pending or even after its disposal or execution. A concept of deeming trespass has been introduced in s. 46 which first declares that an applicant who has no right to apply for possession on the date he applied gets no protection, if he obtains possession of any property under this Chapter against a person who is aggrieved by the application and who is entitled to file a suit for damages for the act of trespass. Having introduced this concept of deeming trespasser, the occupant is given a right under s. 47 to obtain stay of the proceedings before the Court of Small Clauses by complying with the conditions mentioned in that section. If the occupant binds himself with two sureties in a bond for such amount as the Small Causes Court thinks reasonable having regard to the value of the property and the probable costs of the suit, which is described in the further provisions of that Chapter, to institute without delay a suit in the High Court or a City Civil Court for compensation for trespass and to pay all costs of such suit in case he does not prosecute it or in case judgment therein is given for the applicant, the Court of Small Causes is obliged to stay all such proceedings until that suit is disposed of. If the occupant is successful in that suit and obtains a decree against the applicant such decree shall supersede any order made under s. 43. We have already pointed out that s. 48 merely deals with the regulation of proceedings before the Small Causes Court.

    19. The next important section which completes the scheme of summary eviction is s. 49 which lays down that order for the recovery of possession of any immovable property under this Chapter shall be no bar to the institution of a suit in the High Court for trying the title thereto. We have thus under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act two distinct types of proceedings contemplated, viz. suits and applications. So far as the suits are concerned the decrees and orders passed by that Court are made final and conclusive. The suits which do not involve, any claim or right to possession of any immovable property, are entirely money claims upto the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. A section similar to s. 37 is not to be found in Chapter VII dealing with the remedy of recovery of possession of immovable property. On a plain reading of this provision there is no doubt that this is a summary remedy available where the main cause of action is the determination of tenancy or withdrawal of licence or permission. Prima facie, therefore, Chapter VII contemplates limited types of disputes. The inquiry is also summary and no appeal has been provided.

    20. We are conscious of the fact that the mere fact that a remedy is summary and no appeal is provided for, may not by itself be enough to show that the decision given by a particular Court or Tribunal could never have been intended to be final. When, however, a general scheme of remedies under an Act is being considered this would merely be a relevant factor to be borne in mind. We are dealing with the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, before its amendment in 1963 as the present litigation relates to the period before 1963. It is not being doubted that the occupant has a right to file a substantive suit and that right can be exercised by him either before an ejectment order has been passed while the application has been pending or even after the ejectment order has been made but possession has not been lost and also even after the loss of possession in pusruance of an order passed under s. 43.

    21. What kind of a suit the occupant can file may now be considered, in order to decide the nature of this remedy available to a landlord or a licensor. The two sections which must be borne in mind are ss. 47 and 49 and they are as follows:

    “47. Stay of proceedings on occupant giving security to bring suit against applicant.—Whenever on an application being made under section 41 the occupant binds himself, with two sureties, in a bond for such amount as the Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, having regard to the value of the property and the probable costs of the suit next hereinafter mentioned, to institute without delay a suit in the High Court or the City Civil Court against the applicant for compensation for trespass and to pay all the costs of such suit in case he does not prosecute the same or in case judgment therein is given for the applicant, the Small Cause Court shall stay the proceedings on such application until such suit is disposed of.

    If the occupant obtains a decree in any such suit against the applicant, such decree shall supersede the order (if any) made under section 43.

    Nothing contained in section 22 shall apply to suits under this section.

    49. Recovery of possession no bar to suit to try title.—Recovery of the possession of any immoveable property under this Chapter shall be no bar to the institution of a suit in the High Court or City Civil Court for trying the title thereto.”

    22. Shri Kripalani, learned counsel for the appellant, emphasises the last clause in s. 49 which says that the suit in the High Court or City Civil Court has got to be one for trying ‘title thereto’, and this expression means title to immovable property, the recovery of which has been claimed by the applicant or has been effected by him under the provisions of this Chapter.

    23. By way of amplification to his argument he says that if the parties go to trial before a Court of Small Causes on an issue whether the occupant is a licensee or a sub-tenant, as has been alleged in this case, and the Court holds that the occupant was a licensee, a suit contemplated by s. 49 would not permit the occupant to reagitate the same question. He will have to agitate and show some title to the immovable property itself which is superior to the right which is already adjudicated upon. In the same manner if an applicant wants to file a suit, he cannot allege again before the. City Civil Court that the occupant-defendant was his licensee and on that title alone he wants possession. If the decision of the Small Causes Court has gone against him he is precluded from reagitating that question. In the case of a licensee, as in the present case, after the conclusion of the trial before the Small Causes Court some other title to the immovable property could be the basis of a claim in the City Civil Court and not the same right to retain possession. We would try to examine how far such an argument can be logically accepted.

    24. Taking a simple case of a licensor claiming possession from a licensee after withdrawing that licence; a situation will arise that the occupant receives a summons. So far as the Bombay Amendment to s. 47 is concerned, it would be open to the occupant to offer to bind himself as provided by that section before he enters defences and then proceed to file a suit in the City Civil Court or the High Court as the case may be. Can the occupant not show in a suit of this type that his title to possession is the subsisting contract of licence and as such he is claiming damages against the applicant who has filed an application under s. 41 on the ground of deemed trespass? The applicant has merely alleged a licence which is terminated or withdrawn, which has been described as a cause of action for claiming the summons for possession. In a given case the occupant may have many other grounds to urge but if he argues that his only ground was that the licence under which he had the right to possess the property was a subsisting licence, we see no reason why such a suit could not be filed by him in the City Civil Court or the High Court, as the case may be.

    25. The language of s. 49 quoted above says that the recovery of possession of immovable property under this Chapter shall be no bar to the institution of a suit in the High Court or a City Civil Court as the case may be for proving the title thereto. We see no reason for assuming that the title which is contemplated by this section is title to immovable property or in immovable property. The main grievance which an occupant makes under this Chapter is that his possession is being taken away and he has a right to retain that possession and remedy under the Chapter reserved in the occupant is a remedy against the loss of possession. We are, therefore, of the view that the expression ‘title thereto’ under s. 49 refers to the title to retain possession or maintain possession against a deemed trespass of the applicant. Rights and titles to immovable property as also recovery thereof were taken out of the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes under s. 19. The title of s. 19 is important. It debars a suit in respect of matters enumerated in that section. It is therefore clear that a suit for immovable property was not at all provided by the Act. By way of an exception a summary remedy of an application alone was provided for the purpose of recovery of possession of immovable property under limited circumstances. The subject-matter of Chapter VII being recovery of possession, it would logically follow that the ‘title thereto’ contemplated by s. 49 would be the title to retention or recovery of possession if it is already lost to the occupant under the provisions of this Chapter. Moreover is it to be supposed that the suits filed before the order of eviction and after the order of eviction would be of different types? Sections 46 to 49 must be read together as presenting an integrated scheme of making a remedy available to an occupant by way of a regular suit. Before entering defences if a suit were to be filed in which the only title claimed is the subsisting licence and therefore the want of a right to claim possession in the applicant, we fail to see why the same ground could not be the subject-matter of adjudication in a suit by the occupant simply because an order of eviction has been passed or simply because he has lost possession in execution thereof. In order to clear the doubt that the remedy which the occupant can follow is not affected even though possession is lost, s. 49 has been enacted to make the position very clear. Even if possession has been recovered by the applicant, the concept of deemed trespass is still available to the occupant to establish his title to the possession of immovable property and get the order under s. 43 super-ceded by a decree of the appropriate Court.

    26. We get some support from the observations of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Dattatraya Krishna Jangam v. Jairam Ganesh Gore* . 1964 66 Bom. L.R 645, F.B. It is true that the Full Bench was principally concerned in that case in dealing with the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. They were called upon to consider whether a suit lies for declaration that the plaintiff is a tenant or sub-tenant of the defendant and for an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with or from obtaining an order for eviction of the plaintiff in the application made by the defendant under s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, or from executing the order for eviction obtained by him in such application. While considering the scheme of Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act it has been incidentally observed by the Full Bench as follows (p. 674):

    “…The title in respect of which a suit may be filed under s. 47 or 49 may be a title or a right to possession or a title in the nature of ownership. The claim to possession in a suit between a landlord and a tenant can only be adjudicated upon by the special Court under s. 28 and the suit in regard to it must be filed under s. 28 in the Small Cause Court. A suit to establish any other title may, however, be filed either in the High Court or in the City Civil Court.”

    27. It would therefore appear that in the context of finding out exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947 under ss. 28 and 29-A, the Full Bench observed as above while considering the scheme of the provisions of Chapter VII.

    28. Since a Court of exclusive jurisdiction was created under the Rent Act they point out in the above quotation that a suit to title can include a suit to right to possess or any other title and such a suit to establish that title can be filed in the High Court or a City Civil Court, We may point out that in Hari v. Dhondi . 1905 8 Bom. L.R 96., a Division Bench of this Court was considering the nature of title that a plaintiff need prove for succeeding in obtaining a decree for possession. While considering the value of possession as a foundation for title to claim possession, the Division Bench observed as follows (p. 98):

    “…possession is prima facie proof of ownership; it is so, because it is, …‘the sum of acts of ownership.’ This obviously applies both to prior and to present possession.”

    29. We are thus of the view that a right to retain possession would constitute the title of a person whose possession is being threatened by an applicant under s. 41. In our view, therefore, the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the remedy under Chapter VII is a summary remedy where only a limited dispute is contemplated. Whether before or after the order for eviction is passed the occupant at any rate has a right to approach a regular civil Court, whether it is High Court or a City Civil Court as the case may be for obtaining a decree against the applicant, as the provisions of s. 47 itself provide that decree shall supersede the order made under s. 43, if any. The remedy under Chapter VII at any rate so far as the occupant is concerned, is subject to the filing of a regular suit. It is not a final remedy against the occupant. For the reasons detailed above, we are not able to accept the argument of Shri Kripalani that when the application under s. 41 comes to termination, the decision of the Small Causes Court on the issue of licence is final and conclusive and could not be readjudicated before a civil Court. If that alone constitutes title there is no objection to reagitate the issue at least so far as the occupant is concerned. In our view therefore the decision of the Court of Small Causes under Chapter VII is not intended to be final at all under the scheme of the sections we have discussed above. A further question which, therefore, arises is whether if a remedy which is not final against the opponent can it act as a final remedy concluding the rights of the applicant at least in respect of some of the points he raises in that application?

    30. The defence of res judicata which has been raised in this case is based upon a prior judgment of the Court of Small Causes in the ejectment application. Admittedly, therefore, that is an estoppel by record. Normally therefore it follows that to the extent that certain disputed issues or points are decided by a Court in a judgment the conclusion would be binding on both the sides. In other words estoppel must be usually mutual. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn., Volume 15, para. 379, the view expressed is as follows:

    “The question of who may take advantage of an estoppel is governed by the rule that estoppels ought to be mutual. The only persons who can take advantage of an estoppel by record are those who, if the decision had been the other way, would have been bound by it, that is to say, in case of a judgment inter partes, the parties and their privies.”

    31. If the provisions of Chapter VII inspite of an order of possession in favour of the applicant admittedly do not create a bar to the filing of a substantive suit by the applicant for defending his title as provided by the scheme covered by ss. 46 to 49, will it be possible to say that this operation of res judicata will only favour the occupant against the applicant? In other words it will have to be decided by looking to the scheme of the provisions of Chapter VII and the nature of the remedy provided whether that remedy was such that the orders passed either for or against the parties to that application were intended to be final. If they were not, then it could not be said that either of the parties is finally bound by the result of that litigation. In our view, the operation of doctrine of res judicata being mutual or reciprocal it is obvious that the remedy under Chapter VII being a summary and speedy remedy was not supposed to dispose of the rights of the parties finally. If either of the parties so desired, a substantive suit was permitted and the order under s. 43, if any, was subjected to the final result of the litigation in the civil Court. This approach seems to gain support from the scheme of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act which provides two distinct and separate remedies in two distinct and separate parts of the Act as they were. We have already pointed out that the remedy of a suit in respect of certain matters covered by the provisions of the Act is made final by the provisions of s. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Though ordinarily disputes relating to the possession of immovable property were outside the purview of the Court of Small Causes, for a limited purpose of a speedy remedy by way of an exception, the Small Causes Court was authorised to deal with certain applications for possession. The placement of the remedy of recovery of possession in a separate Chapter which follows after s. 37, the nature of that remedy which is a speedy and summary remedy and the specific provisions of ss. 46 to 49 making the orders under s. 43 subject to a substantive suit satisfy us that the remedy of substantive suit based on title is available to both the applicant as well as the occupant. This is because the order under Chapter VII was never intended to be final. If this is to be the true meaning of the provisions of Chapter VII one of the important ingredients for construing a decision as res judicata under s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code or the principles analogous thereto is obviously missing in the present case. One of the requirements of the principles of res judicata is that the previous matter must have been heard and finally decided by a Court. Where the decision is simply not final, but is expressly subjected to the filing of a subsequent suit, it is not possible to say that the order under s. 43 in favour of the present appellant could ever operate as res judicata.

    32. The above conclusion to which we have arrived in respect of the nature of remedy in Chapter VII seems to get some support from the fact that the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, which is a comparable Act for providing certain remedies in the mofussil area does not contain any Chapter like Chapter VII. In other words recovery of immovable property which is initially and substantially taken away from the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is also taken away in the same manner from the jurisdiction of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by adding second schedule describing the suits excepted from its jurisdiction. Only money claims are, therefore, triable upto the pecuniary jurisdiction described by that Act, viz. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

    33. Section 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is similar to s. 27 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Section 37 mentions that save as otherwise provided by this Chapter (VI) or by any other enactment for the time being in force, every decree and order of the Small Causes Court in a suit shall be final and conclusive. The finality of the decrees or orders as contemplated by the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is similar and identical with the finality that is given to the decrees and orders passed in suits under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The exception made in the case of Presidency-towns by adding Chapter VII in the matter of recovery of possession of immovable property is not to be found in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The scheme of the two Acts in this manner seems to lend some support to our conclusion that only a part of the litigation before the Court of Small Causes was intended to result in final decrees and orders and the remaining part was not so intended to result in final orders.

    34. The learned counsel for the appellant Shri Kripalani cited number of judgments before us which dealt with two other topics. The first topic consisted of the question as to when one could say that the subject-matter before the prior Court was the same as before the subsequent suit and when it could be inferred that the same dispute arises which must be deemed to have been decided. The second part of this argument covered case law where issues which may not directly arise or may not have been framed in the suit but are decided as being necessary for the decision of the principal dispute may also constitute res judicata. We do not propose to examine that case law for the simple reason that even assuming that the question of licence as against the sub-tenancy was a common question before the Court of Small Causes as also the City Civil Court, since the decision itself is not intended to be final the common character of the questions does not seem to make any difference.

    35. However, there is some thing to say in favour of Shri Kamat's argument that the subject-matter of the dispute before the Court of Small Causes and the City Civil Court could not be said to be the same or identical. In fact he relied heavily upon the judgment of Mr. Justice Chandrachud, as he then was, in the case of Ramchandra v. Janardan. According to the learned Judge the remedy in Chapter VII by way of an application was essentially different from the remedy available to a party in a regular civil suit. That remedy was a speedy and summary remedy based upon the simple question contemplated by s. 41, viz. whether the alleged licence has been withdrawn or tenancy has been terminated. The Court was not concerned with the title of either of the parties but its decision was restricted to the simple question. In a subsequent suit based upon title the issue was whether the plaintiff has proved that there was a licence at all and whether on termination of that licence a right to recover possession has arisen in favour of the plaintiff. The learned single Judge concluded that the subject-matter before the earlier Court not being the same as before the subsequent Court, there could be no question of the operation of the principles of res judicata.

    36. Shri Kripalani argued that it is an error to say that the issue before the earlier Court was not the same as before the subsequent Court. The only question before the Small Causes Court was whether there is a licence in favour of the occupant which licence has been validly withdrawn. The only defence raised was that there was no licence but there was a sub-tenancy. While hearing the application that was the only point which was being considered by the Court of Small Causes and it held that the relationship created by the alleged contract was not of a licensor and a licensee. Mr. Kripalani posed a question, as to what is being now pleaded by the plaintiff-respondent in the City Civil Court? He is alleging that the defendant is his licensee under the same contract and that licence has been terminated by him. In other words, according to him, the cause of action in both the suits is identical, though the earlier was an application and the subsequent may be a regular civil suit. We think that there is considerable force in the point of view placed before us by Mr. Kamat as supported by the learned single Judge of this Court, particularly in view of our earlier decision that the issue of title permitted to be raised in a suit under s. 49 could cover a title based upon a right of possession to the property and need not be a title in the immovable property itself.

    37. Shri Kripalani also cited before us some cases to point out that the nature of the earlier remedy would not by itself be a matter of any significance. The writ petitions before the High Court are generally heard and disposed of on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties. It is therefore possible to describe them as matters disposed of summarily. Even then the Supreme Court held in Gulabchand v. State of Gujarat . 1964 67 Bom. L.R 673, S.C that the decision on an issue in a writ petition would constitute res judicata between the same parties in a subsequent litigation. Several other judgments to emphasise that point of view were cited before us. It is not possible to quarrel with the general proposition that the fact that the earlier remedy was a summary one may not itself be conclusive to hold that the decision therein could not constitute res judicata in a subsequent litigation.

    38. However, we are mainly disposing of this matter on the footing that the order passed under Chapter VII by a Small Causes Court was not intended to be final at all under the very scheme of that Chapter and as such the question and the nature of that remedy becomes subordinate. In other words we are in respectful agreement with the conclusion of Mr. Justice Chandrachud in Ramchandra's case that ss. 46 and 47 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882, as they stood before the Presidency Small Cause Courts (Amendment) Act, 1963 reserves the right for bringing a subsequent suit in favour of the unsuccessful occupant as also in favour of the unsuccessful applicant.

    39. We will now take into account the additional defence now raised before us on the principles of res judicata which has become available to the appellant because of a certain course of conduct of this litigation. We have already pointed out that before the learned single Judge of this Court, the respondent filed only one appeal against the decision in Civil Suit No. 2020/61 and did not file appeal against the decision in Civil Suit No. 389/61. Whether this creates a bar of res judicata against a continuance of the First Appeal No. 601/68?

    40. When two suits involving a common question of law and fact are combined by the consent of the parties or order of Court, and are heard together and disposed of by a common judgment, what should be the consequence if an appeal is filed against only one and not the other? This is a question on which various High Courts in this country are divided. When that question was tried to be argued before the Supreme Court in the case of Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt) . [1966] A.I.R S.C 1332., their Lordships kept the matter open by observing that question did not fall to be decided before them and therefore they did not propose to express any opinion as to which point of view is correct. The two views which are conflicting seem to be there. Whenever suits are combined like this and are disposed of by a common judgment, technically there is a disposal of two suits resulting in two different decrees. An appeal is undoubtedly provided against a decree. While appealing against a decree it is as a requirement of technical Rules that a copy of judgment also must be produced in order to point out the reasons on which the decree is based. However, so far as the principle of res judicata incorporated in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, it is based upon finality of the decision and not of the decree.

    41. A view has been taken by some of the High Courts that where one of the decrees becomes final, not having been appealed against, it operates as res judicata. The other point of view based upon the decision of the Punjab High Court of the year 1927 is that the decision and not the decree is the relevant matter to be considered for the purpose of res judicata. In Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli . [1927] A.I.R Lah. 289, F.B, it has been held:

    “…res judicata is either estoppel by verdict or estoppel by judgment (or record), and there is no such thing as estoppel by ‘decree’. …The determining factor is not the decree but the decision of the matter in controversy.”

    42. It has been further observed:

    “where two suits having a common issue are by consent of parties or by order of the court, tried together the evidence being written in one record and both suits disposed of by a single judgment, it cannot be said that there have been two distinct and independent trials.”

    43. Though the question, whether the disposal of two suits by a common judgment can operate as res judicata when appeal is filed only against one, is expressly kept open by the Supreme Court as already pointed out above, the principle laid down by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court seems to have been approved by the Supreme Court. In Narhari v. Shanker . [1953] A.I.R S.C 419. the decision reported in Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli was approved by the Supreme Court when their Lordships observed (p. 420):

    “…As has been observed by Tek Chand, J. in his learned judgment in—Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli, mentioned above, the determining factor is not the decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment.”

    44. This question was considered by the Full Bench consisting of five Judges of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jai Narain v. Bulaqi Das . [1969] A.I.R All. 504, F.B In the leading judgment, review has been taken of the judgments of almost all the High Courts where one or the other view has been expressed. We need not repeat the same discussion because we are respectfully in agreement with the view of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the principal question as to what should operate as res judicata.

    45. Since it is the decision which finally determines the rights of the parties that must operate as res judicata and not decrees which may at best decide the claims in certain suits for the time being, if the judgment itself is appealed against and is tried to be set aside, it is difficult to say that the disputed point between the parties has been heard and finally decided. In other words appeal against the common judgment puts the judgment as such in jeopardy and it does not become final. The decree in the sister suit may become final and to the extent it affects the rights of parties, the party concerned may lose his claim. However, on the principal question in the litigation involved which is still subjected to challange, it is the final decision which alone will bind the parties, for the purpose of the operation of principles of res judicata.

    46. That being so in the present case the respondent had challenged the common judgment in the two suits Nos. 389/61 and 2020/61, though the decree in Civil Suit No. 389/61 may not be now vulnerable, the common judgment delivered in those suits was successfully challenged by the respondent in his appeal before the learned single Judge. We do not think that not filing an appeal in the sister suit No. 389/61 precludes the respondent from pursuing his remedy in this appeal by the operation of principles of res judicata.

    47. This being our view on the two disputed questions of res judicata, the appeal fails and is dismissed. We, therefore, confirm the order of the learned single Judge that the suit in appeal must go back to the trial Court for further disposal according to law.

    48. The respondent in this case has appeared in person before the learned single Judge and also before us in the present appeal. We found that the question of law involved was complicated and an important one. We, therefore, requested Shri Kamat, to assist the Court as amicus curiae. We must note with thanks that his arguments were of substantial assistance.

    49. Shri Kripalani at this stage wanted us to issue some direction in the matter of disposal of Rs. 18,000 of which Rs. 9,000 are directed to be withdrawn by the respondent on furnishing security. He also brought to our notice the detailed directions given by the learned single Judge in para. 15 of his judgment contained on p. 13 of the print. He has ultimately left it to the City Civil Court to hear the parties and to pass such further orders as are necessary in the interest of justice. We think that was a proper direction to give and we also confirm that direction. No further order or additional direction seems to be necessary to guard the interest of both the parties. Shri Kripalani also brought to our notice another interim order passed by this Court dated July 24, 1972 by which the parties are restrained from prosecuting the appeal in the Small Causes Court regarding standard rent pending the dismissal of this Letters Patent Appeal. Since the suit itself is not yet heard on merits, we confirm that injunction and direct that till the disposal of the suit before the City Civil Court, the injunction still continues.

    50. The costs in this appeal will be costs in the cause and will be in the discretion of the trial Court.

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