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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Nain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (on May 8, 1946) granted a lease (exh. 54) of an area measuring 115 feet × 125 feet out of survey No. 284/1 in Pachora, District Jalgaon, to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for constructing a cinema house. On December 31, 1948 defendants Nos. 1 and 2 assigned their leasehold rights to defendant No. 3, who constructed the cinema house and permitted defendants Nos. 4 and 5 to run it. On November 22, 1956 defendant No. 3 assigned the leasehold rights to defendants Nos. 4 and 5. Earlier (1955) the plaintiff had sued defendant No. 3 for arrears of rent; those arrears were later paid by defendant No. 3.

On June 9, 1958 the plaintiff sued defendants Nos. 1 to 3 for recovery of possession of the suit land, alleging that lease exh. 54 was invalid because it contravened s. 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, XXVIII of 1947 (the B.A.D.R. Act), and that the defendants were therefore in unauthorised possession. Defendants contended, inter alia, that the lease was not void and that the suit was barred by limitation. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were added on February 24, 1959 and raised similar contentions, including that the suit was time barred as regards them.

The trial Court decided the issues against the defendants and decreed the suit. Defendants Nos. 3 and 5 appealed to the District Court at Jalgaon, but the Assistant Judge dismissed that appeal with costs. Defendant No. 5 alone filed the present appeal to the court presiding in this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether s. 40 of the B.A.D.R. Act renders the lease (exh. 54) invalid as an "alienation of any property" where the lessor (the plaintiff) was a debtor in proceedings under the Act and all his debts were not discharged and the lease was made without the previous sanction of the Court.
  2. Whether the plaintiff, being a debtor (and not a creditor), could invoke s. 40 to avoid the lease or whether s. 40 was intended for the benefit of creditors only.
  3. Whether the expression "alienation" in s. 40 includes a lease (i.e., whether a lease constitutes an alienation within the meaning of that word in the B.A.D.R. Act).
  4. Whether the plaintiff's suit for possession was barred by the law of limitation (this issue was raised and considered by the court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant No. 5)

  • Section 40 of the B.A.D.R. Act was enacted for the benefit of the creditor and not for the debtor; the plaintiff was a debtor and therefore not entitled to avoid the lease on the footing of s. 40.
  • The lease was created by the plaintiff himself, and the plaintiff could not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
  • The lease (exh. 54) is not an "alienation of any property" within the meaning of "alienation" in s. 40 of the B.A.D.R. Act — i.e., a lease does not amount to an alienation under that Act.
  • The suit, at least as regards defendants Nos. 4 and 5, was time barred (limitation defence).

Respondent's / Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended that the lease was invalid as being in contravention of s. 40 of the B.A.D.R. Act (the plaintiff relied on s. 40 to assert that defendants were in unauthorised possession).
  • Mr. Limaye (for the plaintiff) argued that the word "alienation" in s. 40 was used synonymously with the word "transfer", implying that a lease would fall within s. 40.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayan v. Krishnaji, 1930 32 Bom. L.R. 1249; [1930] A.I.R. Bom. 534 Interpreting the word "alienate" and whether it excludes or includes a devise by will; discussion that "alienation" means making the property another man's or transferring property. The court relied on the case to show that "alienation" in some contexts has been taken to mean making property another's (i.e., transfer of ownership); used as support for the ordinary meaning that "alienation" imports transfer of ownership rather than mere transfer of enjoyment.
Haji Abdulla v. Secretary of State, 1911 13 Bom. L.R. 883 Whether a lease was an "alienation" within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code; the decision indicated a kowl (lease) was no more than a lease and did not come within the definition of "alienated" village in that Code. The court cited this authority to support the view that a lease may not constitute "alienation" as defined in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, thereby assisting the conclusion that "alienation" implies transfer of ownership and does not necessarily include a lease.
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 Statement about the proper method of ascertaining legislative intention: it should be derived from enacted words or by reasonable and necessary implication rather than speculative opinion about what the Legislature probably meant. The court quoted this authority to reject speculative reasoning about the Legislature's intention (specifically to reject the Assistant Judge's purposive speculation that s. 40 must include leases to keep debtor property intact) and to insist on interpretation grounded in enacted words and applicable definitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

  1. The court accepted the factual admissions: on May 8, 1946 the plaintiff was a debtor; he was a party to a proceeding under the B.A.D.R. Act; all his debts were not discharged; and the lease was executed without the previous sanction of the Court. These facts, if s. 40 applied to the lease, would render the transaction invalid under the literal terms of s. 40.
  2. The court closely examined the wording of s. 40, which declares that "no alienation of any property belonging to a debtor who is a party to any proceedings under this Act... made by him before all his debts are discharged shall be valid, except with the previous sanction of the Court." The court observed that the section does not explicitly state that an alienation is merely voidable at the instance of creditors; rather it declares such alienations invalid.
  3. The court then addressed the decisive interpretive question: whether a lease is an "alienation" within the meaning of that word used in s. 40. It noted that the B.A.D.R. Act does not define "alienation" but that s. 2(15) provides that words not defined in the Act have meanings assigned in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Bombay Land Revenue Code, as applicable.
  4. The court contrasted the nature of a lease (as described by s. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — a lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property, not a transfer of ownership) with the ordinary and legal meanings of "alienation" (which typically connote transfer of ownership). The court referred to the definitions and glosses in the Concise Oxford Dictionary and the Madras Law Journal Law Lexicon which treat "alienation" as importing transfer of title or ownership.
  5. The court considered statutory definitions in analogous enactments: the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, defines "alienated" as transferred wholly or partially to the ownership of any person; the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code used similar wording. The court treated those definitions as instructive because s. 2(15) of the B.A.D.R. Act makes such sources relevant where the Act is silent.
  6. The court relied on the Haji Abdulla decision (a Division Bench decision) which held that a kowl or lease was no more than a lease and did not fall within the Code's definition of alienation for purposes of that enactment. This authority supported the position that a lease does not necessarily amount to an "alienation" of the ownership of property.
  7. The court rejected the Assistant Judge's purposive rationale — that s. 40 must include leases in order to preserve debtor property for discharge of debts — as speculative reasoning about legislative intention. Quoting Salomon v. Salomon & Co., the court emphasized that legislative intention must be ascertained from the enacted words or by necessary implication rather than conjecture as to what the Legislature probably meant.
  8. The court also considered the plaintiff's counsel's submission that "alienation" was synonymous with "transfer". After analysis of statutory language, dictionary and legal definitions, and precedents, the court concluded that "alienation" in s. 40 of the B.A.D.R. Act means transfer of ownership (absolute conveyance) and does not include a lease (a transfer of the right to enjoy property while title remains with the lessor).
  9. On this basis the court held that the lease exh. 54 is not an "alienation" within the meaning of s. 40 and is therefore not invalid under the B.A.D.R. Act. Because the lease was valid, the plaintiff was not entitled to possession on the footing that the defendants were trespassers. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff's suit must fail.
  10. The opinion records that the court also considered the appellant's contention regarding limitation and states that, after considering that contention, the court reached its conclusion (the opinion does not provide detailed reasoning about the limitation point in the text excerpt).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED.

Consequences and immediate effects on the parties:

  • The decrees of the trial Court and of the lower appellate Court were set aside.
  • The plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession stands dismissed.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The court articulated an interpretive conclusion that, for the purposes of s. 40 of the B.A.D.R. Act, the word "alienation" denotes a transfer of ownership (an absolute conveyance) and does not include a lease (which transfers only a right of enjoyment). The opinion applies statutory definitions, dictionary and lexicon meanings, and prior authorities (including Haji Abdulla and Narayan v. Krishnaji) in support of that interpretation. The opinion itself does not elaborate further on broader policy consequences beyond the direct effect on these parties.

    Pitambar Govinda Bhavsar v. Abdul Gafar Abdul Rajak Deshmukh

    Nain, J.:— This is an appeal by the original defendant No. 5 against the appellate judgment dated December 31, 1962 of the learned Assistant Judge, Jalgaon. Respondents Nos. 1-A to 1-D are the heirs and legal representatives of the original plaintiff. Respondent No. 4 is the heir and legal representative of the original defendant No. 3. Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 5 are respectively defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4. They have not appeared.

    2. On May 8, 1946 the plaintiff granted a lease of an area admeasuring 115 feet × 125 feet out of survey No. 284/1 in Pachora, District Jalgaon, to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for constructing a cinema house thereon by lease deed exh. 54. On December 31, 1948 defendants Nos. 1 and 2 assigned their leasehold rights to defendant No. 3 who constructed a cinema house on the said land. He gave the cinema house to defendants Nos. 4 and 5 for running it. On November 22, 1956 defendant No. 3 assigned the leasehold rights to defendants Nos. 4 and 5. It appears, defendant No. 3 had not paid rent to the plaintiff. Therefore in 1955 the plaintiff filed against defendant No. 3 a suit for recovery of arrears of rent. Defendant No. 3 thereafter paid up the said arrears.

    3. On June 9, 1958 the plaintiff filed against defendants Nos. 1 to 3 the suit from which the present appeal arises in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chalisgaon, for recovery of possession of the suit land alleging that the lease exh. 54 was invalid being in contravention of s. 40 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, XXVIII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the B.A.D.R Act). The plaintiff contended that defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were therefore in unauthorised or illegal possession of the suit property and were liable to hand over possession to him. The defendants took several contentions, including one that the lease was not void. They also contended that the suit was barred by the law of limitation.

    4. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 were added as party defendants on February 24, 1959. They raised the same contentions as raised by defendants Nos. 1 to 3. They further contended that in any case so far as they were concerned, the suit was time barred.

    5. The trial Court decided the above issues against the defendants and decreed the suit. Defendants Nos. 3 and 5 appealed to the District Court at Jalgaon. In the said appeal the appellants took inter alia the same contentions that they had taken in the trial Court. The learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal dismissed the same with costs. Against the said decision, defendant No. 5 alone has filed the present appeal.

    6. The first contention taken before me by Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the appellant is that s. 40 of the B.A.D.R Act was enacted for the benefit of the creditor and not for the benefit of the debtor. The plaintiff was not a “creditor”, but was a “debtor”. The plaintiff was therefore not entitled to avoid the lease in respect of the suit land. He further contended that in any case the lease was created by the plaintiff and he could not take advantage of his own wrong.

    7. Section 40 of the B.A.D.R Act reads as under:

    “Notwithstanding any law or contract … no alienation of any property belonging to a debtor who is a party to any proceedings under this Act or an award registered under this Act, made by him before all his debts are discharged shall be valid, except with the previous sanction of the Court.”

    8. It is admitted by the parties that the plaintiff was on May 8, 1946 a debtor, that he was a party to a proceeding under the B.A.D.R Act, and that all his debts were not discharged. It is also admitted that the lease was not created with the previous sanction of the Court. In such circumstances, s. 40 clearly lays down that the “alienation of any property” shall be invalid. The section does not say that such alienation shall be voidable at the instance of the creditor. If it had so said, there would have been substance in the contention of Mr. Kotwal. The section makes the alienation invalid, whether any one wished to avoid it or not. Where the alienation is invalid or illegal, there is no question of taking advantage of one's own wrong. This contention must therefore be rejected.

    9. There is more substance in the next contention of the appellant. This contention is that the lease exh. 54 is not an “alienation of any property” within the meaning of that expression in s. 40 of the B.A.D.R Act. Unfortunately, the word “alienation” is not defined in the B.A.D.R Act. Section 28, however, refers to fraudulent “alienations or incumbrances” on the debtor's property. The use of the two words in the said section indicates that an “incumbrance” is not included in the word “alienation”. On the other hand, s. 53 provides that a debtor shall not “hypothecate or sell the standing crops.” The marginal note describes this hypothecation or sale by one word “alienation of standing crops” indicating that perhaps hypothecation would be covered by the word “alienation”. Marginal notes to the sections are, however, not to be referred to for the purpose of construction, unless they have been inserted with the assent of the Legislature. We have no evidence that in the case of the B.A.D.R Act, marginal notes have been inserted with the assent of the Legislature. We therefore find that we do not derive much help from the B.A.D.R Act itself in construing whether a lease is an “alienation”.

    10. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that “a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property”. It does not provide that a lease is a transfer of property. It merely provides that it is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines “transfer of property” as meaning an act by which a living person conveys property. In a lease there is no conveyance of property. There is no transfer of ownership. There is only a transfer of a right of enjoyment. The title remains in the lessor. We have therefore to see whether this transfer of right of enjoyment of property is an alienation.

    11. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1961 Ed., states that in law the meaning of the word “alien” is “transfer of ownership of”. The meaning of the word “alienate” is given as “transfer ownership of”. The meaning of the word “alienation” is given as “transference of ownership”. It would therefore appear that the ordinary literary meaning of the word “alienation” implies transfer of ownership, and not merely a transfer of a right of enjoyment.

    12. Law Lexicon published by the Madras Law Journal Office states that the word “alienation” is generally applied to absolute conveyances of immovable property. To use the word “alienation” is as much to say as to make a thing another man's or to alter or put the possession of lands or other things from one man to another. “Alienation” imports an actual transfer of title.

    13. In the case of Narayan v. Krishnaji . 1930 32 Bom. L.R 1249, S.C [1930] A.I.R Bom. 534. the question was whether a devise by will was included in the word “alienate” in the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874. Patkar, J. observed as follows (p. 1250):

    “The question, therefore, in the case is whether the word ‘alienate’ excludes a devise by will. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the word ‘alienate’ means to transfer by sale. It is conceded on behalf of the appellant that the watandar can make a gift of the watan property to a watandar of the same watan. If a watandar can alienate the property by gift inter vivos, he would presumably have the right to alienate by will in favour of a watandar of the same watan. The word ‘alienation’, according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I, p. 65, means ‘to make a thing another man's’. ‘Alienate’, according to Wharton's Law Lexicon, means ‘to transfer property’. Alienation would, therefore, include a devise by gift if the effect of it is to make the property another man's by means of a bequest.”

    14. The word “alienated” is defined by the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, s. 2(20) as meaning “transferred… wholly or partially to the ownership of any person.” The definition of that word in s. 2(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 is the same. In these enactments the word “alienation” would be transfer of ownership to another person. section 2(15) of the B.A.D.R Act provides that

    “Words and expressions used in this Act, but not defined, have the meanings assigned to them in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, as the case may be.”

    15. The word “alienation” or any of its grammatical variations is not used in the Code of Civil Procedure. We must therefore turn to the definition of that word in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. In the case of Haji Abdulla v. Secretary of State . 1911 13 Bom. L.R 883. the question whether a lease was an “alienation” within the meaning of that word in the Bombay Land Revenue Code arose before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Chandavarkar and Hayward, JJ. In the judgment of Chandavarkar, J. it is observed (p. 890):

    “Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that his kowl is no more than a lease, that Government parted with their rights as lessors in favour of the grantee as a lessee, and imposed upon him certain conditions. None of those conditions brings the contract within the definition of the term ‘alienated’ village, in cl. 19 of s. 3 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.”

    16. The learned Assistant Judge observes in his judgment that a lease is a transfer of some interest which the lessor has in the property and such transfer is bound to affect the property and the creditors are bound to run the risk of reducing their security. He goes on to observe that the very purpose of s. 40 to keep the property of the debtor intact and available for the purpose of discharging of debts would be nullified, unless a lease was interpreted as an “alienation”. I regret, I am unable to accept this reasoning. The learned Assistant Judge has strayed in the realm of speculation as to the intention of the Legislature. Lord Watson has said in the case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. : Salomon & Co. v. Salomon . [1897] A.C 22, at p. 38., that the

    “…‘Intention of the Legislature’ is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of Law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.”

    17. If the Legislature had intended to include a lease or any other transfer in the word “alienation”, nothing would have been simpler than to say so and to use the words “transfer, sale, mortgage or lease” or whatever the Legislature intended to prohibit. It is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature knew the literary meaning of the word “alienation”, as also its meaning in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, the definitions in which were being made applicable by s. 2(15) of the B.A.D.R Act.

    18. Mr. Limaye on behalf of the plaintiff made an attempt to argue that in s. 40 of the B.A.D.R Act the word “alienation” was used synonymously with the word “transfer”. In view, however, of what I have stated hereinabove, I cannot accept this contention. In my opinion, “alienation” means transfer of ownership of property to another person. The word applies to absolute conveyances of immovable property and imports an actual transfer of title. It does not include a lease. The lease exh. 54 therefore is not an “alienation” within the meaning of that word in s. 40 of the B.A.D.R Act and is not invalid. The lease being valid the plaintiff is not entitled to possession on the footing that the defendants are trespassers. This suit must, therefore, fail.

    19. [His Lordship after considering the appellant's contention regarding limitation, concluded.]

    20. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the decrees of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court are set aside.

    21. The suit of the plaintiff will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

    22. Appeal allowed.

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    Pitambar Govinda Bhavsar v. Abdul Gafar Abdul Rajak Deshmukh
    (Sep 24, 1970)