Patel, J.:— [His Lordship after stating the facts, proceeded]. The principles regarding the nature and burden of proof in all such cases where adultery is alleged against one of the spouses by the other spouse are well settled. The parties are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The plaintiff claims relief under s. 13(1) on the ground of husband's adultery. Under s. 23 the Court can grant relief only if it is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and other conditions are fulfilled and not otherwise. A similar question arose in a different form in Sushila Mahcndra v. Mahendra Manilal . 1958 61 Bom. L.R 431. before a Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member, under s. 12(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. We reviewed the case law and held that the petitioner in such a case must prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in other words that “satisfied” read with the words “and not otherwise” mean satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. In White v. White . [1958] S.C.R 1410. while considering similar provisions of the Indian Divorce Act where similar words in ss. 14 and 7 are used, the Supreme Court, following the case of Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones . [1951] A.C 391., held that (p. 1421)
“…the standard of proof in divorce cases would therefore be such that if the judge is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the commission of the matrimonial offence he would be satisfied within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act…the terms of s. 14 makes it plain, that when the Court is to be satisfied on the evidence in respect of matrimonial offences the guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and it is on that principle that the Courts in India, would act…”
2. The reason of such a strict rule is not far to seek. A finding as to adultery or some such matrimonial offence has got very serious consequences inasmuch as it affects the status of a party and it is on grounds of public policy that such a strict rule of proof is required in all such cases.
3. This, however, cannot and does not necessarily mean that the Court expects direct evidence by way of photographs or of eye-witnesses who have seen actual adultery or that it requires the employment of detectives peeping through keyholes and deposing about adulterous intercourse. The burden is no more than in a criminal case where the consequences to an accused are equally serious. It only means that there must be evidence, either oral or circumstantial in nature, from which the Court can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged offence is made out. In Woolf v. Woolf . [1931] P. 134., the Master of the Rolls said (p. 143):
“… The petitioner is under no obligation to show adulterous inclination generally on the part of the respondent. In my opinion, if evidence is given in good faith which under all but the most unusual circumstances is clear evidence of adultery, it is the duty of the Court to act upon it, unless the King's Proctor can bring forward cogent evidence to rebut the obvious presumption.
In Loveden v. Loveden . 1810 2 Hagg. Cons. 1, 2., Sir William Scott said that it was not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery, for ‘if it were otherwise, there is not one case in a hundred in which that proof would be attainable: it is very rarely indeed that the parties are surprised in the direct act of adultery. In every case almost the act is inferred from circumstances that lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion; and unless this were the case and unless this were so held, no protection whatever could be given to marital rights’.”
4. The Court must have regard to the usual reluctance of neighbours to get involved in giving evidence in such cases and consider more the quality rather than quantity of evidence.
5. A case must be judged having due regard to the social conditions and the manner in which parties are accustomed to live. It is not necessary in every case, therefore, where cases of ordinary middle class come before the Court to require evidence that the respondents were sleeping in one room by themselves. If there is evidence enough to show that they had reasonable opportunities of having sexual intercourse in the conditions of life in which they live for days together then the Court may be justified in raising an inference of adultery.
[His Lordship after considering the evidence in the case, proceeded].
6. The learned Judge has refused to accept the case of the petitioner on the ground that in some parts her story is discrepant and in some parts she is uncorroborated. What the learned Judge has overlooked is the array of circumstances against the respondents to which he does not even seem to be alive. The circumstances which I have discussed above, when put together and weighed, must lead only to one and one inference and that is that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were and are living in adultery.
7. As stated by me in the beginning of the judgment, the burden of proof is no more than in a criminal case where the consequences are far worse. Even in a criminal case it is not the quantity but the quality of the evidence that is the governing factor and the Court does not hesitate, if it accepts the evidence, even if only oral to convict an accused. The circumstances, which I have narrated above, clearly indicate the guilt of both respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and there could be no reason to hold otherwise.
[The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.]
8. Decree set aside.