Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • A.A Adarkar, with Patharphekar and Messrs Crawford Bayley & Co., for petitioners.
  • P.N Bhagwati, with Messrs Amarchand & Mangaldas, for opponents.
Judges
  • Mr. M.C Chagla, C.J
  • Mr. Gajendragadkar, J.
Acts
  • provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22
  • s. 8(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948.
  • Limitation Act by its operative s. 3
  • s. 29(2) seems to be this. Section 3
  • s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • SCHEDULE LIMITATION ACT
  • 28, 1950. Sub-section (3) of s. 8
  • s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
  • s. 3 of the Limitation Act
  • s. 3 and s. 5. Section 3
  • Land Requisition Act
  • 28, 1951. Section 8(3)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • A.A Adarkar, with Patharphekar and Messrs Crawford Bayley & Co., for petitioners.
  • P.N Bhagwati, with Messrs Amarchand & Mangaldas, for opponents.
Judges
  • Mr. M.C Chagla, C.J
  • Mr. Gajendragadkar, J.
Acts
  • provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22
  • s. 8(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948.
  • Limitation Act by its operative s. 3
  • s. 29(2) seems to be this. Section 3
  • s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • SCHEDULE LIMITATION ACT
  • 28, 1950. Sub-section (3) of s. 8
  • s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
  • s. 3 of the Limitation Act
  • s. 3 and s. 5. Section 3
  • Land Requisition Act
  • 28, 1951. Section 8(3)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A special officer, acting under section 8(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, passed an order fixing compensation on 28 December 1950. Section 8(3) of that Act provides a right of appeal from the decision of the special officer to the High Court within 60 days. An appeal was presented to this Court on 28 February 1951, which was two days beyond the 60-day period. The petitioners sought condonation of the delay under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act on the ground of sufficient cause. The central procedural question was whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act (which allows courts to condone delay for sufficient cause) applies to an appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act when that Act prescribes a special period of limitation.
  2. How section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (which governs the interplay between the Limitation Act and special or local laws) should be interpreted in relation to a special law that prescribes a period of limitation that is not set out in the first schedule of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether section 5 applies "propriâ vigore" (of its own force) to periods of limitation prescribed by other statutes, or only to those periods prescribed by the Limitation Act itself — and, relatedly, whether section 5 can be invoked through section 3 where section 29(2) makes section 3 applicable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners applied for condonation of a two-day delay in filing the appeal under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, asserting that they had sufficient cause for the delay.

Arguments Advanced by Mr. Adarkar (for the opposite side)

  • Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only where the first schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes a period and a special law alters or modifies that period; because the Limitation Act does not prescribe a period for appeals from a special officer to the High Court, section 29(2) has no application to the Land Requisition Act in this instance.
  • The phrase "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" in section 29(2) should be limited to provisions that deal with computation of limitation periods; section 5 (which deals with condonation for sufficient cause) does not concern computation and hence should not apply.
  • Because section 3 of the Limitation Act imports the application of sections 4 to 25, and section 29(2) makes section 3 applicable to special laws, section 5 should be treated as applying to appeals under special laws by virtue of that incorporation.
  • Section 5 uses the phrase "the period of limitation prescribed therefor" without expressly referencing the first schedule; therefore, Mr. Adarkar argued that section 5 applies generally (propriâ vigore) to all laws that prescribe any period of limitation irrespective of whether the Limitation Act itself prescribes that period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Neelratan Ganguli v. Emperor Holds that section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply where a special law prescribed a very short period (seven days) for appeal; the court refused to apply section 5 to condone delay beyond that statutory period. Used as a persuasive example where a court rejected an argument for applying section 5 to a special statutory period; the present Court cited it to show that refusal to apply section 5 in such circumstances has judicial precedent.
Chheda Lal Jain v. Officer Commanding, Meerut Mittoor Moideen Hajee (In re) Referenced as an instance where a High Court took the view that section 5 did not apply to appeals under certain special laws prescribing limitation periods. Cited to demonstrate that other High Courts have taken a consistent view with the present Court's interpretation of section 29(2) and the non-applicability of section 5 to some special statutory periods.
Syed Hasan Imam v. Brahmdeo Sing Another High Court decision reflecting the same position on the inapplicability of section 5 to certain special statutory limitation periods. Cited to show that the construction adopted by the present Court aligns with decisions of other High Courts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and purposive analysis of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and its interaction with other provisions (notably sections 3, 4, 5, 9–18 and 22). The reasoning proceeded in steps:

  1. Interpretation of "different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule":
    • The Court rejected the narrow reading urged by Mr. Adarkar that section 29(2) applies only when the first schedule prescribes a period which a special law then alters. The Court held that a special law which prescribes a period omitted from the first schedule is nonetheless "different" from the Limitation Act for the purposes of section 29(2).
    • Thus, if the first schedule omits a period and a special law prescribes one, that special law prescribes a period "different" from the Limitation Act's treatment.
  2. Scope of the phrase "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation":
    • The Court concluded this phrase was broader than mere "computation"; it encompasses all provisions relevant to deciding whether an appeal is maintainable within the period — including section 5 (condonation) — unless excluded by the special law.
  3. Whether section 5 is made applicable by operation of section 3 and section 29(2):
    • The Court rejected the argument that section 5 should be treated as automatically applicable because section 3 imports the application of sections 4–25 generally. Two principal reasons were given:
      1. If section 3 alone made all sections applicable, the detailed specification in section 29(2)(a) (which expressly lists sections 4 and 9–18 and 22) would have been redundant. The Legislature deliberately listed those sections to be applied to special laws.
      2. Section 29(2)(b) expressly provides that the "remaining provisions" (i.e., those other than the ones listed) shall not apply, unless the special law provides for them. This indicates a legislative scheme limiting which provisions operate in relation to a special law.
  4. Whether section 5 applies proprio vigore to periods prescribed by other statutes:
    • The Court held that when a statute speaks of "the period of limitation prescribed therefor" it must ordinarily mean the period prescribed by that statute itself (i.e., the Limitation Act), unless Parliament expressly indicates otherwise.
    • Support for this approach was drawn from the fact that section 4 also speaks simply of "limitation prescribed," yet section 29(2) still had to specify that section 4 applied in specified circumstances — indicating that such sections do not apply automatically to other statutes unless Parliament so provides.
    • Consequently, unless the Legislature expressly makes section 5 applicable to a special law, section 5 does not govern an appeal under that special law where the Limitation Act does not itself prescribe the period.
  5. Reliance on precedent and policy considerations:
    • The Court acknowledged that this construction may produce hardship in individual cases (because the Court would have no power to condone delay under section 5), but observed that alleviation of such hardship is a matter for legislative change rather than judicial reinterpretation.
    • The decision was placed in the context of prior High Court decisions (including Neelratan Ganguli v. Emperor and the other cited cases) that had reached similar conclusions regarding the non-applicability of section 5 to certain special statutory limitation periods.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The Court held that the appeal was time-barred and that section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act does not apply to the appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act in the circumstances of this case; consequently the Court had no power to condone the two-day delay.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The appeal was declared out of time and the petitioners' application for condonation under section 5 was refused.
  • The Rule was discharged and the Court made no order as to costs (as recorded in the opinion: "Rule discharged. No order as to costs.").
  • The Court's construction aligns with prior High Court decisions cited in the opinion; the Court noted it was taking the same view as those High Courts rather than announcing a departure from existing authorities.

Disposition (as recorded in the opinion)

Rule discharged.

No order as to costs.

Source: Opinion excerpt attributed to Chagla, C.J., as provided.

Show full summary ...

    Canara Bank Limited, Bombay v. The Warden Insurance Company, Ltd., Bombay

    Chagla, C.J:—

    This civil application raises a very interesting question of the law of limitation. An order fixing the compensation was passed by a special officer under s. 8(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. This was done on December 28, 1950. Sub-section (3) of s. 8 provides that an appeal shall lie against the decision of that officer, and in this case the appeal lay to this Court. The appeal in fact was preferred on February 28, 1951. Section 8(3) provides that such appeal shall be made within a period of 60 days from the date of the decision. The appeal was out of time by two days. The petitioners applied that delay should be condoned under s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act as they had sufficient cause for the delay, and the question that arises for our determination is whether s. 5 applies to an appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act.

    What calls for our interpretation in the first instance is s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The section assumed its present form in 1922. Before that amendment there was considerable conflict between the different High Courts as to the true interpretation of this sub-section, and in order to resolve the conflict the Legislature amended the sub-section in 1922. As it stands now it provides:—

    “(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—

    (a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so for as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law……”

    The first question is whether the special law as embodied in the Land Requisition Act contains a period of limitation for the appeal provided therein which is different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule of the Limitation Act. The contention of Mr. Adarkar is that sub-s. (2) only applies when you find a period of limitation laid down in the first schedule and a special law alters or modifies that period, and inasmuch as the Limitation Act does not provide for a period of limitation in respect of an appeal from a special officer to the High Court, s. 29(2) has no application to this particular special law. In our opinion, that is not the correct interpretation to put upon the language used by the Legislature, viz. “a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule.” The period of limitation may be different under two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation fixed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act. It may also be different in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act. If the first schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act. We are conscious of the fact that the language used by the Legislature is perhaps not very happy, but we must put upon it a construction which will reconcile the various difficulties caused by the other sections of the limitation act and which will give effect to the object which obviously the Legislature had in mind, because if we were to give to s. 29(2) the meaning which Mr. Adarkar contends for, then the result would be that even s. 3 of the Limitation Act would not apply to this special law. The result would be that although an appeal may be barred by limitation, it would not be liable to be dismissed under s. 3. If possible we must try and avoid such a startling result and we are sure that the Legislature did not intend that such a result should come about by the language used by it. Therefore, in our opinion, it is clear that we have before us a special law which does prescribe a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule to the Limitation Act.

    The other contention of Mr. Adarkar is that s. 29(2) only applies to that limited class of sections in the Limitation Act which deal with the computation of the period of limitation, and inasmuch as s. 5 does not deal with computation of the period of limitation, s. 29(2) has no application. In our opinion the expression “for the purpose of determining any period of limitation” does not mean “computing the period of limitation.” In our opinion, every provision in the Limitation Act is intended for the purpose of determining the period of limitation. The Limitation Act by its operative s. 3 provides that every suit, appeal or application presented to the Court shall be dismissed unless it is filed within the period of limitation, and therefore the main thing that the Court has to consider is whether a suit or an application or an appeal is maintainable looking to the provisions of the Limitation Act, and in order to decide that not only has the Court to consider various sections like s. 4 and ss. 9 to 18 but also s. 5, because if a suit, appeal or application is out of time as provided by the first schedule, the Court has still to consider whether such suit, appeal or application should be allowed to be preferred by reason of s. 5. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no justification for giving to the expression “for the purpose of determining any period of limitation” the restricted meaning suggested by Mr. Adarkar.

    It is then contended that inasmuch as s. 3 imports the application of ss. 4 to 25, by reason of the fact that s. 3 is made applicable by s. 29(2), s. 5 should also be deemed to apply to an appeal preferred under the special law. In our opinion that contention is obviously untenable for two reasons. If that were the true position, then it was unnecessary to refer specifically to s. 4, ss. 9 to 18 and s. 22 in s. 29(2)(a). If these sections became applicable by reference to s. 3, then it was sufficient for the Legislature to have provided that s. 3 shall apply and excluded such of the sections from ss. 4 to 25 as the Legislature thought should apply in the case of a special law. But far from doing that the Legislature was at pains to point out which of those sections from ss. 4 to 25 should apply in the case of special laws. The second reason why this contention is untenable is that s. 29(2)(b) expressly provides that the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply, the remaining provisions being other than ss. 3, 4, 9 to 18 and 22 to which reference is made in the earlier part of the section. Therefore, the scheme of s. 29(2) seems to be this. Section 3 is made applicable to all special or local laws which prescribe a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application. Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 also apply unless the special or local law expressly excludes their application. Sections other than those just mentioned would not apply unless the special or local law expressly provided for their application. It is difficult to accept the contention that although s. 29(2)(b) expressly precluded the application of s. 5, we must hold that s. 5 is applicable by reference to s. 3.

    The final argument advanced by Mr. Adarkar is that s. 5 applies to all appeals propria vigore, and this argument is based upon the different language used by the Legislature in s. 3 and s. 5. Section 3 refers to “period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule”; s. 5 merely refers to “the period of limitation prescribed therefor”; and the argument advanced before us is that whereas s. 3 refers to the period of limitation which is to be found in the first schedule, s. 5 applies to all laws which prescribe any period of limitation, and therefore according to Mr. Adarkar without any reference being made in any special or local law s. 5 must of its own strength apply because the Legislature has made s. 5 applicable to all cases where periods of limitation are prescribed. In the first place, this argument runs counter to the ordinary canon of construction which one must apply in construing a statute. When a statute speaks of a period of limitation prescribed, it can only mean prescribed by that statute itself. If the intention of the Legislature was to refer to the period of limitation prescribed by other laws, the Legislature would have expressly so mentioned. It is true that in s. 3 there is an express mention of the first schedule to the Limitation Act. But the mere fact that there is no such express mention in s. 5 does not and cannot lead to the conclusion that the Legislature intended the limitation prescribed to be prescribed by any law other than the Limitation Act itself. The other reason why this argument cannot be accepted is that when we turn to s. 4, it also speaks of “limitation prescribed” and not “limitation prescribed by the first schedule,” and yet under s. 29 the Legislature had expressly to make s. 4 applicable when the period of limitation was prescribed by a special or local law. If Mr. Adarkar's contention were right, then s. 4 as much as s. 5 would apply proprio vigore and it was not necessary for the Legislature in s. 29 to state that s. 4 would apply under certain circumstances. Therefore, in our opinion, unless the Legislature expressly makes s. 5 applicable, s. 5 does not apply when no period of limitation for that appeal is prescribed in the limitation Act and a special period is prescribed by a special law. The intention of the Legislature obviously was that an appellant must prefer the appeal within the period denned in the statute, and if he fails to do so, the Court should have no power to condone the delay and admit the appeal under s. 5. We are conscious of the fact that this construction may lead in some cases to considerable hardship, but that is more a matter for the Legislature than for us. There are various statutes to which our attention is drawn where the Legislature has applied s. 5. On the other hand, there are statutes where s. 5 has not been applied, and this difference in different statutes clearly bears out what we have been suggesting, viz. that in some cases the Legislature wanted to bring about a strict adherence to the period of limitation prescribed by a particular statute and not to give discretion to the Court to enlarge that period under s. 5.

    No more startling result could have been brought about than what was in fact brought about in the case reported in Neelratan Ganguli v. Emperor. In that case under the Emergency Powers Ordinance No. II of 1932 the period of limitation was prescribed as seven days and it was contended before Rankin C.J and Pearson, J. that s. 5 should be applied in favour of the appellant who had preferred the appeal after the expiry of seven days, and with considerable hesitation that bench rejected that contention and held that s. 5 had no application, and the learned Chief Justice observed (p. 577):

    “…It is certainly somewhat alarming that limitation for so short a period as seven days should not be one over which the High Court in a proper case should have any power of control or dispensation but it is necessary to base our construction of the Ordinance and of the Limitation Act upon principle and it is not possible for us on the ground of hardship to give another meaning to the Ordinance.”

    The same view of the law has been taken by the other High Canara Courts. See Chheda Lal Jain v. Officer Commanding, Meerut Mittoor Moideen Hajee, In re and Syed Hasan Imam v. Brahmdeo Sing. Therefore, in giving the construction to s. 29 which we are giving we find that we are taking the same view which the other High Courts in India have taken.

    The result, therefore, is that we must hold that the appeal is out of time, that s. 5 does not apply, and therefore we have no power to condone the delay on the part of the petitioners. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.

    Rule discharged.
    M.W.P
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Canara Bank Limited, Bombay v. The Warden Insurance Company, Ltd., Bombay
    (Jan 14, 1952)