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citation codes
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  • s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, the act
  • s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Borough Act, 1925.
  • article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act or Article 96
  • s. 73(iv) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925,
  • s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925,
  • Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, the act
  • s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Borough Act, 1925.
  • article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act or Article 96
  • s. 73(iv) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925,
  • s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925,
  • Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the levy of octroi duty by the defendants on fuel oil or furnace oil. The court held that such oils did not fall within item 73 or any other item of Class III of Schedule A to the Octroi Rules and Bylaws, and therefore the defendants were not entitled to levy octroi duty on them. The plaintiffs had filed a suit claiming refund of amounts recovered by the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiffs were required to give notice under section 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, for claims arising after the notice given on May 2, 1947. The plaintiffs failed to give the required notice for an amended claim filed later, which was held to be a transgression of section 206.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether fuel oil or furnace oil falls within item 73 or any other item of Class III of Schedule A to the Octroi Rules and Bylaws, thereby justifying the levy of octroi duty by the defendants.
  2. Whether section 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, applies to the plaintiffs’ claim for refund of octroi duty levied on fuel oil or furnace oil.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs were obligated to give notice under section 206 of the Act before filing suit for refund of the amounts claimed.
  4. Whether the limitation period under Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to the plaintiffs’ claim, or whether the statutory notice requirement under section 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act governs the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, does not apply because the levy of octroi duty on fuel oil or furnace oil was illegal.
  • The act of the defendants in levying octroi duty was not done or purported to be done in pursuance of the Act, thus section 206’s notice requirement does not apply.
  • The plaintiffs’ claim should be governed by Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, which applies where monies have been received by defendants to the use of plaintiffs, allowing recovery within three years of the cause of action.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in City Municipality, Bhusawal v. Nusserwanji Hormusji, where a tax adjudged illegal was held not to require notice under section 206, supporting the proposition that illegal acts do not attract the notice requirement.
  • Cited decisions from Allahabad and Madras High Courts supported the distinction between illegal or ultra vires acts and acts purported to be done in pursuance of the Act, emphasizing that only the latter attract section 206 notice requirements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
City Municipality, Bhusawal v. Nusserwanji Hormusji Illegal levy does not constitute an act done or purported to be done in pursuance of the Act; thus, section 206 notice is not required. The court adopted the principle that illegal acts fall outside the scope of section 206, but distinguished the present case on the basis of the defendants’ semblance of authority.
Parvateppa Mallappa Hubli v. Hubli Municipality Distinction between ultra vires/illegal acts and acts purportedly done in pursuance of the Act. Supported the analysis of whether section 206 applies based on the nature of the act.
The Rajputana Malwa Railway Co-operative Stores, Ltd. v. The Ajmere Municipal Board Illegal acts are not acts done or purported to be done in pursuance of the Act. Reinforced the distinction between illegal acts and acts done under semblance of authority.
Municipal Council, Dindigul v. Bombay Co. Ltd. Prima facie illegal acts do not attract statutory notice requirements under section 206. Supported the argument that illegal acts lie outside the ambit of section 206.
Secretary of State for India v. Major Hughes; Corbett v. South Eastern and Chatham Railways Managing Committee; Koti Reddi v. Subbiah; Dhulia Municipality v. Mahomed Isak Legal distinction between ultra vires/illegal acts and wrongful acts purportedly done in pursuance of statute. Used to clarify the legal framework for determining applicability of section 206.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the defendants’ levy of octroi duty on fuel oil or furnace oil was an act done or purported to be done in pursuance of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. It acknowledged that while the defendants’ interpretation of “oils used for machinery” was incorrect, the levy was done under a semblance of authority granted by section 73(iv) of the Act and sanctioned Octroi Rules and By-laws. The court distinguished between acts that are illegal or ultra vires and acts that are wrongful but purportedly done under statutory authority. It held that the defendants’ act, though wrong in substance, was done with a vestige or semblance of authority and hence falls within the scope of section 206’s notice requirement. Consequently, the plaintiffs were required to give notice under section 206 for their claim beyond the amounts covered by the initial notice of May 2, 1947. The court thus upheld the requirement of statutory notice for claims arising after that date and disallowed the plaintiffs’ amended claim which failed to comply with this requirement.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed in part.

Cross objections were dismissed.

The court’s decision held that the levy of octroi duty on fuel oil or furnace oil, though ultimately found to be wrongful, was done under a semblance of statutory authority, thereby attracting the notice requirement under section 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. The plaintiffs were entitled to prosecute their claim for refund only to the extent covered by the notice given on May 2, 1947. Claims beyond that date, filed without requisite notice, were not sustainable. No new precedent was established beyond applying existing legal principles to the facts of the case.

    Jalgaon Borough Municipality v. Khandesh Spinning And Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.

    Bhagwati, J.:—

    [After stating the facts and holding that fuel oil or furnace oil did not come within item 73 or any other item of Class III of Schedule A to the Octroi Rules and Bylaws and that defendants were not entitled to levy any octroiduty on the oils, His Lordship further held that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to give a notice under s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, in regard to the claim which arose after the notice given on May 2, 1947, and that in so far as they had failed to do so and filed the suit with an amended claim, they had transgressed the provisions of s. 206. His Lordship then proceeded.]

    Mr. Banaji, however, contended that s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, did not apply to the facts of the present case. He contended that the levy of octroi duty on fuel oil or furnace oil by the defendants was illegal, and that, therefore, the act of the defendants in levying that octroi duty, could not be said to be anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act, and if it could not be said to be anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act, the operation of s. 206 of the Act was not attracted, it was not incumbent on the plaintiffs to give notice of the type to the defendants, that the plaintiffs' claim was governed by Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act which applied in all cases where monies had been received by the defendants to the use of the plaintiffs, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover all the monies which they claimed from the defendants, their claim in that behalf being well within three years of the date of the accrual of the cause of action. Mr. Banaji placed particular reliance on a decision of Mr. Justice Kania, as he then was, reported in City Municipality, Bhusawal v. Nusserwanji Hormusji. In that case, the plaintiffs had filed the suit against the defendant Municipality to recover inter alia a sum of Rs. 666-12-0 which represented the amount of certain taxes which had been adjudicated by the Court as an illegal levy. On such an adjudication, being made by the Court in another suit at the instance of one of the tax-payers, the plaintiffs had filed the suit, out of which the second appeal arose, to recover the amount an the ground that the tax had been illegally levied. The learned Judge had, before him, this judgment of the Court which had declared the tax as having been illegally levied. An argument had been advanced before him contending that, under s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, the act of the Municipality in imposing the tax was one purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act, and that, therefore, the claim in respect of that act should have been made within six months from the date of the act complained of. A decision of our High Court in Parvateppa Mallappa Hubli v. Hubli Municipality was cited in support of this proposition. But the learned Judge observed that, in his opinion, it was not necessary to decide that point. What the learned Judge apparently meant was that, in so far as the tax had been illegally levied, there was no question of considering whether the act which was complained of was done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act. An illegal act could certainly not have been “done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act.” It would be only a lawful act, or an act which was apparently lawful, which could have been “done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act.” An illegal act would certainly not fall within that category. The learned Judge, therefore, went on to consider whether the plaintiffs' suit before him was governed by Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act or Article 96 thereof, and came to the conclusion that it was governed by Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act. Mr. Banaji also drew our attention to two decisions of the Allahabad and the Madras High Courts, one reported in The Rajputana Malwa Railway Co-operative Stores, Ltd. v. The Ajmere Municipal Board and the other reported in Municipal Council, Dindigul v. Bombay Co. Ltd. in both these cases, a prima facie illegal act was certainly considered not within the category of acts “done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act.” The acts which would fall within the category of those “done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the Act” could only be those which were done under a vestige or semblance of authority, or with some show of a right. If an act was outrageous and extraordinary or could not be supported at all, not having been done with a vestige or semblance of authority, or some sort of a right invested in the party doing that act, it would certainly not be an act which is “done or purports to have been done in pursuance of the Act.” The distinction between the ultra vires and illegal acts, on the one hand, and those purporting to be done in pursuance of the Act, on the other, is quite well known. (Vide Secretary of State for India v. Major Hughes, Corbett v. South Eastern and Chatham Railways Managing Committee, Parvateppa Mallappa Hubli v. Hubli Municipality, Koti Reddi v. Subbiah and Dhulia Municipality v. Mahomed Isak The distinction is really between ultra vires and illegal acts, on the one hand, and wrongful acts, on the other—wrongful in the sense that they purport to have been done in pursuance of the Act; they are intended to seem to have been done in pursuance of the Act and are done with a vestige or semblance of authority, or sort of a right invested in the party doing those acts. If the defendants, therefore, not having the power to levy octroi duty at all, either wholly or in regard to some classes of goods, had purported to levy the same, it would certainly have been an act which was outrageous and extraordinary, with not a vestige or semblance of authority, or not even a shadow of a right. But we have in s. 73(iv) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, the power given to the defendants to impose octroi duty on articles and goods imported within their jurisdiction. We have also the various items of Class III of Schedule ‘A’ to the Octroi Rules and By-laws which have been framed by the defendants with the sanction of the Government, and we have Item No. 73 in that Class III of Schedule ‘A’ which comprises various articles including oils used for machinery. If the defendants, in the interpretation which they gave to the words “oils used for machinery”, did something which ultimately, on an adjudication in that behalf, the Court found to be wrongful, the act of the defendants in the matter of the levy of octroi duty on fuel oil or furnace oil, as they purported to do, could not be said to be illegal or outrageous and extraordinary, or done without having any vestige or semblance of authority, or without even a shadow of a right. It is no doubt true that their interpretation of the expression “oils used for machinery” was wrong. But they had, in so far as they had got the power and the authority to impose octroi duty on articles and goods imported within their jurisdiction, and had levied octroi duty on oils used for machinery comprised within Item No. 73 of Class III of Schedule ‘A’ to the Octroi Rules and By-laws which had been framed by them with the sanction of Government, a vestige or semblance of authority or a shadow of a right for doing so, though they had no real authority to do so, nor had the substance of the right for doing so. What they did, therefore, was not an act done in pursuance of the Act, but it was an act which they purported to do in pursuance of the Act. They intended to seem as if they were doing the act complained of in pursuance of the Act. Their action was, therefore, well within the terms of s. 206 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Borough Act, 1925. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to give notice of their claim for refund to the defendants. In so far as they gave the requisite notice under s. 206 of the Act to the defendants on May 2, 1947 they were well within their rights to prosecute their claim and institute the suit against the defendants for the refund of the amounts which the defendants had recovered from them up to July 31, 1947. This, however, could not be predicated of the plaintiffs' claim from the defendants for refund of the excess over the sum of Rs. 18,776-6-0. To the extent, therefore, that the plaintiffs claimed, in their amended plaint which they put on file on July 15, 1948, to recover the excess over this sum of Rs. 18,776-6-0, the plaintiffs' claim could not be sustained.

    [The rest of the judgment is not material to the report.]

    Appeal allowed in part.
    Cross objections dismissed:
    K.B.S
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    Comments

    Jalgaon Borough Municipality v. Khandesh Spinning And Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.
    (Jul 21, 1952)