Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gajendragadkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was prosecuted before the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Bombay, for offences under S. 18(1) and S. 19(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rents Control Act (Bom. Act LVII of 1947). A charge under both sections was framed. The Magistrate found that, on the facts proved, the petitioner was guilty under S. 19(2), convicted him, sentenced him to simple imprisonment for one day and to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000, with a default term of six weeks' simple imprisonment. The petitioner appealed to the High Court, which summarily dismissed his appeal on 20 February 1950. The petitioner then applied to the High Court for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution that his case was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court should grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) that the petitioner's case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.
Whether, on the facts proved, the petitioner could be said to have committed the offence under S. 19(2) of the Bombay Act (i.e., the proper construction of "relinquishment" in S. 19).
Whether S. 4(1) of the Bombay Act applies to the premises in question and thus affects the petitioner's culpability under S. 19.
Whether it can be an offence to accept consideration for a relinquishment that is contrary to law (as distinct from a valid relinquishment).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Dalal)

Challenge to construction of S. 19(2): The petitioner contends that "relinquishment" necessarily means surrender in favour of the landlord, and since the prosecution alleges the tenancy was surrendered to a stranger, the accused did not "relinquish" the tenancy within the meaning of S. 19(2); therefore the offence under S. 19(2) was not proved.
Applicability of S. 4(1): The petitioner argued that S. 4(1) applied to the premises, which would prevent a finding of guilt under S. 19 even if relinquishment and consideration were proved.
Nature of consideration for illegal relinquishment: The petitioner suggested that while it may be illegal to accept consideration for a valid relinquishment, accepting consideration for a relinquishment that is contrary to law should not constitute an offence.

The opinion does not set out detailed adversary arguments from the prosecution or respondent; the court's account focuses on the petitioner's contentions and the court's analysis of them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Muhammad Nawaz v. Emperor, 44 Bom. L.R. 8; A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 132	Explains the Privy Council's approach: the Judicial Committee would only interfere in criminal matters where there has been infringement of essential principles of justice (e.g., denial of hearing, trial in absence, inability to call witnesses, corruption, want of jurisdiction). In short, intervention required showing substantial or grave injustice.	The court relied on this authority to illustrate the restrictive historical approach to criminal appeals and to support the proposition that a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c) should not be granted merely because a point of law is raised; something more—such as substantial injustice or great public importance—is required.
Iqbal Bahadur v. Ram Sree, 56 All. 277; A.I.R. 1934 All. 58	Holds that a mere substantial question of law arising between the parties is not sufficient under the clause equivalent to Art. 134(1)(c); the question must also be of great public importance.	The court treated this decision as authority for the proposition that Art. 134(1)(c) requires more than a mere substantial question of law and applied that standard in refusing the certificate.
Kaikhushroo v. C.P. Syndicate Ltd., 50 Bom. L.R. 744; A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 134	Discusses the meaning of "substantial question of law" in the context of an equivalent provision (S.110, Civil P.C.). It indicates that where the law is not well settled, there is doubt about the principle involved, or there is a conflict of decisions, a substantial question of law may arise meriting final adjudication by the highest court.	The court used this reasoning to emphasize that only in special circumstances—such as unsettled law or conflicting decisions—should a matter be certified for appeal to a higher court. The present case did not present such circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages, relying strictly on the materials in the opinion:

Characterization of jurisdiction under the Constitution: The court reviewed Arts. 132–136, explaining that Articles 132 and 133 confer appellate jurisdiction in certain civil and constitutional matters, Article 134 relates to criminal appeals, Article 135 preserves prior Federal Court jurisdiction, and Article 136 permits special leave. It emphasized that Art. 134(1) creates explicit criminal appellate routes in sub-clauses (a) and (b) (death-sentence related matters), while sub-clause (c) requires a certificate from the High Court that the case is fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.
Statutory construction and limitation: The court noted Art. 134(1)(c) is to be construed with the proviso and with Art. 134(2), which permits Parliament to extend Supreme Court criminal jurisdiction by law. The court concluded this framework shows the Supreme Court is not to be a general criminal appellate court for all cases.
Analogical interpretation: The court observed that sub-clause (c) of Art. 134 is identical to clause (c) of S.109, Civil P.C., and comparable to Art. 133(1)(c). It relied on judicial interpretation of those provisions (notably Iqbal Bahadur and Kaikhushroo) to extract the principles governing when a higher-court certificate is appropriate: the question must be more than a mere point of law—it must be of substantial public importance, present unsettled law, a conflict of authority, or involve considerations akin to substantial injustice identified by the Privy Council (Muhammad Nawaz).
Application to the facts of the case: The court noted the facts were undisputed and that the sole live issue for the petitioner was the construction of S. 19 of the Bombay Act. The High Court had already summarily dismissed the appeal and the court found no conflict of judicial decisions on the point. The court further observed that accepting the petitioner's construction would render S. 19 virtually nugatory.
Evaluation of the petitioner's subsidiary points: The court rejected Mr. Dalal's S.4(1) argument as having no substance because the premises plainly did not fall under S.4(1)'s protection. The court also rejected the contention that accepting consideration for an unlawful relinquishment could not be an offence; the court found that argument without substance as well.
Conclusion of analysis: Given that there was no substantial or novel question of law of great public importance, no conflict of precedent, no suggestion of substantial injustice in the sense required, and the High Court's prior summary dismissal, the court held that it would not be justified in granting a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Application dismissed.

Implications:

Direct effect: The petitioner will not receive a certificate under Article 134(1)(c); accordingly, his case is not certified as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds advanced.
Precedential effect: The court did not purport to lay down any new principle altering the scope of Art. 134(1)(c); instead, it applied established authorities and constitutional structure to hold that not every point of law justifies certification. The opinion emphasizes finality of High Court criminal appeals except in the limited categories and special circumstances described, but it does not announce a new rule beyond its application to the present facts.

Decision rendered by Gajendragadkar, J. — "The application, therefore, fails and must be dismissed." (Reported in the provided opinion.)

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W.H. King v. Emperor

Gajendragadkar, J.:— This is an application for a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was prosecuted in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate 19th Court, Bombay, for offences under S. 18(1) and S. 19(2), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rites Control Act (Bom. Act LVII [57] of 1947). At the trial a charge was framed against him under both the aforesaid sections. The learned Magistrate held that on the facts proved the petitioner was guilty of the offence under S. 19(2) of the said Act. He accordingly convicted him of the said offence and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a day and to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000. In default he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for six weeks. Against this order of conviction and sentence the petitioner preferred an appeal to this Court, but the said appeal was summarily dismissed on 20th February 1950. The petitioner now wants a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c) that his case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

2. The facts alleged against the accused are not disputed before us, but it is argued by Mr. Dalal that the question which he proposes to raise in his appeal before the Supreme Court is whether on the fasts proved the petitioner could be said to have committed the offence under S. 19(2). Mr. Dalal's argument is that his client cannot be said to have relinquished his tenancy in favour of the complainant, because the word ‘relinquishment’ must necessarily mean surrender of the tenancy in favour of the landlord; and since the prosecution case is that the tenancy was surrendered in favour of a stranger by the accused, he could not be said to have relinquished his tenancy and as such no offence under S. 19(2) can be said to have been proved in this case. Mr. Dalal contends that this is a matter of the construction of S. 19 of Bombay Act LVII [57] of 1947 and his case can therefore be certified to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Mr. Dalal has also mentioned that there are two other points which he seeks to raise in this appeal. He argues that S. 4(1) applies to the premises in question and as such he could not be said to be guilty under S. 19 even if it is held that he has relinquished his tenancy to the complainant after accepting consideration. There is no substance whatever in this point because it is clear that the premises in question do not fall under the protection of S. 4(1) of the Act. Mr. Dalal has also suggested that though it may be illegal to accept consideration for relinquishment validly made by the tenant, it would be no offence to accept such consideration for relinquishment which is contrary to law. We have no doubt that this argument also is without any substance. The question which, therefore, falls to be decided in this case is whether we would be justified in granting a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c) because a point is raised as to the construction S. 19 of Bombay Act LVII [57] of 1947. It is no doubt a question of law, and if a certificate could properly be granted under Art, 134(1)(c) if a point of law arises in the appeal, Mr. Dalal would clearly be entitled to such a certificate.

3. The appellate powers of the Supreme Court are dealt with in Arts. 132 to 136 of the Constitution of India. Article 132 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in civil, criminal or other proceedings where the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution itself. Article 133 deals with appeals in civil matters and it corresponds with Ss. 109 and 110, Civil P.C except for the enhancement of the amount of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 20,000. Article 134 relates to criminal matters. Article 135 saves the jurisdiction and powers which were being exercised by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, while Art. 136 gives jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in its discretion to grant special leave to appeal in cases decided by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. This last article confers wide appellate powers on the Supreme Court and in due course the Supreme Court may have to lay down the principles which it would apply in exercising its discretion under this articles. In the present cage we are concerned with Art. 134(1)(c) under which the petitioner claims a certificate from us.

4. It is well known that before the Constitution of India came into force the Privy Council and thereafter the Federal Court which exercised the jurisdiction of the Privy Council for some time were not Courts of criminal appeal. In fact it has been repeatedly pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the Privy Council was not a revising Court of criminal appeal and was not prepared or required to retry a criminal case. Viscount Simon L.C observed in Muhammad Nawaz v. Emperor, 44 Bom. L.R 8 : (A.I.R (28) 1941 P.C 132 : 42 Cr. L.J 1) that broadly speaking the Judicial Committee would only interfere where there has been an infringement of the essential principles of justice. For example, a conviction following a trial where it could be seriously contended that there was a refusal to hear the case of the accused, or where the trial took place in his absence, or where he was not allowed to call relevant witnesses. Similarly, if the tribunal was shown to have been corrupt, or not properly constituted, or incapable of understanding the proceedings because of the language in which the proceedings were conducted. Also, if the Court had no jurisdiction either to try the crime, or to pass the sentence. There can be no doubt that it was the well-settled practice of the Privy Council that in order to invoke their jurisdiction in criminal matters it was necessary to show that by a disregard of the forms of legal process or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial or grave injustice had been done. In other words, it had to be shown that something so irregular or so outrageous had happened as to shake the very basis of justice. It is, therefore, clear that before the Constitution of India came into force this appeal would not at all have been treated as fit to go before the Privy Council. But Mr. Dalal argues that the Constitution of India has made a change in this position and it is his case that the Supreme Court has been constituted into a Court of criminal appeal by Art. 134. We are unable to accept this contention. It is quite true that the Supreme Court has been constituted as a Court of criminal appeal in certain cases. Article 134 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death, or has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death. There can be no doubt that in regard to the two cases mentioned in sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (1) of Art. 134 the Supreme Court has been constituted as a Court of criminal appeal. Then we have sub-cl. (c) under which a case has to be certified as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The proviso to Art. 134(1) says that an appeal under sub-cl. (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under cl. (1) of Art. 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require. We are not aware that any provisions have been made so far by the Supreme Court under cl. (1) of Art. 145 and no conditions have been yet laid down by our High Court also in this behalf as contemplated by the proviso. We have, therefore, to construe sub-cl. (c) without reference to this proviso. Before doing so, however, it is material to refer to cl. (2) of Art. 134. This clause provides that Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court any further powers to entertain and hear appeals from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such law. This clause clearly shows that the Supreme Court is not intended to be invoked as a Court of criminal appeal in every criminal case. Its criminal appellate jurisdiction is at present confined to cases under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (1), and it may in future be extended to such other cases as the Parliament may by law decide. We have therefore to construe sub-cl. (c) bearing in mind all the material provisions contained in Art. 134 of the Constitution.

5. Now, cl. (c) of Art. 134 is identical with cl. (c) of S. 109, Civil P.C, which has been judicially interpreted on several occasions. It has been held that a mere substantial question of law arising between the parties is not sufficient for the purpose of this clause (vide Iqbal Bahadur v. Ram Sree, 56 ALL. 277 : (A.I.R (21) 1934 ALL. 58).) The question must also be of great public importance. This clause is also identical with sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) under Art. 133 of the Constitution. Article 133 deals with appeals in civil matters and in cases where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below, it provides that an appeal shall lie against such judgment, decree or final order if the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 20,000 both in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. It would be noticed that except for the variation made in the amount from Rs. 10,000 to 20,000 this article is substantially the same as S. 110, Civil P.C Recently this Court had occasion to consider the expression “substantial question of law” as used in S. 110, Civil P.C, in Kaikhushroo v. C.P Syndicate Ltd., 50 Bom. L.R 744 : (A.I.R (36) 1949 Bom. 134). It was observed in Kaikhushroo's case (50 Bom. L.R 744 : A.I.R (36) 1949 Bom. 134)) that it was by no means easy to determine what a substantial question of law is. But while interpreting this expression it may not be immaterial to remember that the Court of Appeal in the Bombay High Court is normally and ordinarily the final Court in the State of Bombay. It was pointed out that law favours a finality in litigation and it was only in the special circumstances laid down in the Code that a litigant was entitled to travel outside the Province and go to the highest Court in the realm, which then was the Federal Court. It was held in this case that where the question of law is not well-settled or where there is some doubt as to the principle of law involved or there is a conflict of judicial decisions, it may be that a substantial question of law can be said to arise which may require the final adjudication by the highest Court. What is true of civil matters is, in our opinion, still more true of criminal matters. Before the Constitution of India came into force the High Courts in the Provinces were intended to be the final Courts of Appeal in all criminal nutters. No doubt a change has been made by the Constitution of India; but we thick that the change is not as wide as Mr. Dalal contends. Except in cases falling under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of Art. 134(1) in all other criminal matters it seems to us that the Constitution of India intends that the High Courts in the respective States in the territory of India should normally and ordinarily be the final Courts of appeal. This fact must therefore be borne in mind in deciding the question as to whether a certificate of fitness should be given in a case like the one before us. We must of course have at least a substantial question of law; or considerations like those mentioned by Viscount Simon L.C, in Muhammad Nawaz v. Emperor (44 Bom. L.R 8 : A.I.R (28) 1941 P.C 132 : 43 Cr. L.J 1) should be shown to be present; or it should be a matter of great public importance. The mere fact that the petitioner raises a point which may be a point of law does not in our opinion justify his claim for a certificate under Art, 134(1)(c). A mere point of law would not be enough even under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. Sub-clause (c) under cl. (1) of Art. 133 would require not only a substantial question of law, but something more. If that is so, we do not think that in dealing with Art. 134 we would be justified in construing cl. (1)(c) more liberally in favour of the petitioner. As we have already mentioned there is no dispute about the facts in this case and there can be no dispute about these facts before the Supreme Court. The only question which the petitioner raises is as to the construction of a section of Bombay Act LVII[57] of 1947. It is not an Act passed by the Indian Legislature and on the construction of the particular section this Court felt no doubt whatever as is clear from the fact that the petitioner's appeal was summarily dismissed. There is no conflict of judicial decisions on the point raised by the petitioner, and in fact if the petitioner's point is accepted, the provisions of S. 19 of the Act would be virtually rendered nugatory. It is true that in a large number of criminal appeals before this Court points of law are raised; but we think it would obviously be contrary to the spirit and the letter of the provisions of Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution to take the view that in every cage where a point of law is raised the matter should be certified as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. We must, therefore, hold that this case is not a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

6. The application, therefore, fails and must foe dismissed.

V.R.B

Application dismissed.

W.H. King v. Emperor

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gajendragadkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Dalal)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

W.H. King v. Emperor

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