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  • provisions of s. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act
  • s. 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act,
  • s. 32. Section 33
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  • provisions of s. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act
  • s. 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act,
  • s. 32. Section 33
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a judgment by Mr. Justice Bhagwati on a petition filed under the Indian Arbitration Act. The petitioners alleged that on January 30, 1948, the respondents gave oral instructions to purchase 500 bars of silver. On February 4, the petitioners sent a contract for signature to the respondents, which was delivered and allegedly acknowledged by the respondents' employee. On February 13, the petitioners sent a statement of account, which the respondents refused to accept and denied the existence of any contract. The petitioners sought a declaration that a valid contract existed between the parties and, since the contract contained an arbitration agreement, that all disputes should be referred to arbitration. The lower court held the petition maintainable and adjourned it to be disposed of on merits. This appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a petition under Section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act is maintainable to affirm the existence of an arbitration agreement, or whether it is only maintainable to challenge such an agreement.
  2. Whether the absence of a written submission signed by both parties affects the maintainability of the petition under the Arbitration Act.
  3. Whether the delivery and retention of a contract by the respondents amounts to acceptance and constitutes a written submission to arbitration under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The petitioners filed the petition under Section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act seeking relief not contemplated by that section, which only allows challenges to arbitration agreements, not affirmations.
  • Section 32 bars suits regarding the existence, effect, or validity of arbitration agreements; therefore, the petitioners cannot obtain any relief in court affirming the arbitration agreement.
  • There is no provision in the Act for affirming an arbitration agreement; hence, the petition is misconceived.
  • There was no written submission to arbitration because the respondents never signed or accepted the contract; mere delivery and retention do not amount to acceptance.
  • Reliance on the judgment in Shriram Hanutram v. Mohanlal & Co to argue that retention of a contract does not necessarily imply acceptance or a written submission.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contend that the petition is maintainable notwithstanding it not being strictly under Section 33, as Section 32 bars suits but does not bar all applications under the Arbitration Act.
  • The legislature could not have intended to remove all remedies for affirming arbitration agreements; Section 33 is only one example of applications under the Act.
  • The law does not require a submission to arbitration to be signed by both parties; acceptance may be oral or by conduct, such as retaining the contract.
  • The petitioners argue that the delivery and retention of the contract by respondents constitute acceptance and a written submission to arbitration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shriram Hanutram v. Mohanlal & Co Whether retention of a contract note by a party amounts to acceptance and written submission to arbitration. The Court interpreted the precedent as fact-specific, holding that mere delivery and retention may or may not constitute acceptance depending on circumstances; it does not automatically imply acceptance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the interplay between Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Section 32 bars substantive suits regarding arbitration agreements, while Section 33 expressly provides for applications challenging arbitration agreements. The respondents contended that Section 33 does not allow affirming arbitration agreements, thus the petition was not maintainable. The Court rejected this narrow interpretation, reasoning that the legislature could not have intended to deny all relief affirming arbitration agreements, especially since Section 32 bars suits but not all applications under the Act. Section 33 is only one specific application among potentially many. Therefore, the petition was maintainable, though not strictly under Section 33.

Regarding the absence of a written submission signed by both parties, the Court noted that the law requires a submission in writing but not necessarily signed by both parties. Acceptance may be oral or by conduct. The Court held that whether delivery and retention of the contract amounted to acceptance was a question of fact for trial. The petitioners failed to aver acceptance explicitly, which was a deficiency but not fatal; they were directed to amend the petition accordingly.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed and the order of Mr. Justice Bhagwati holding the petition maintainable and adjourning it to be heard on merits is confirmed.

The petitioners are directed to amend their petition to aver acceptance of the contract by the respondents. The respondents may file supplemental affidavits in reply. Costs were apportioned between the parties with the petitioners paying costs before the lower court and respondents paying half the costs of the appeal. No new precedent was established; the decision clarifies that applications affirming arbitration agreements are maintainable under the Arbitration Act despite Section 33’s express reference only to challenges, and that acceptance of arbitration agreements may be proved by conduct, not only by signed documents.

    Messrs M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. , (Original S) v. Messrs Vishwambharlal Ruiya S, (Original Petitioners).

    Chagla, C.J:—

    This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Bhagwati on a petition filed under the Indian Arbitration Act, holding that the petition was maintainable and adjourning it to Court for being disposed of on the merits. A few facts leading up to this petition may be stated. The petitioners' case was that on January 30, 1948, the respondents gave oral instructions for the purchase of 500 bars of silver. On February 4 the petitioners sent a contract to be signed by the respondents. The contract was delivered to the respondents and according to the petitioners an acknowledgment was obtained in the petitioners' peon book by an employee of the respondents. On February 13 the petitioners sent a statement of account to the respondents. The respondents refused to accept the statement of account and in the correspondence that followed the respondents denied that there was any contract between the petitioners and the respondents. The petitioners filed this petition for a declaration that there was a valid contract between the petitioners and the respondents, and as the contract contained an arbitration agreement, all disputes in connection with the contract were bound to be referred to arbitration.

    Now, the first contention urged by the respondents was that the petition was misconceived inasmuch as in para. 10 of the petition the petitioners expressly averred that the petition was filed under s. 33 and the relief that they sought was under that section, and the contention put forward was that this petition did not lie under the express provisions of s. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act enables a party to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, and what is urged is that this is not a petition challenging the existence of an arbitration agreement, but it is a petition seeking to affirm the existence of an arbitration agreement. According to Mr. Maneksha, who appears for the respondents, it is only when a party wants to challenge an arbitration agreement that he can come to Court for the necessary relief, but when he wishes to affirm the existence of an arbitration agreement, it is not open to him to take out a petition under the Indian Arbitration Act. It is important to note that under s. 32 of the Indian Arbitration Act, all suits are barred with regard to the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement, and Mr. Maneksha concedes that it would not be open to the petitioners to file a declaratory suit for a declaration that there is in existence an arbitration agreement. If such a suit was filed, the petitioners would be met with s. 32. Therefore, according to Mr. Maneksha, the petitioners cannot get any relief at all in any Court of law. It is true that they could file a substantive suit on their cause of action, viz. on the contract on which they rely in this petition. But their right to have the matters determined by arbitration would not receive proper recognition or relief from any Court of law, because in this case as the factum of the contract is denied the arbitrators have no jurisdiction to determine that question. It is only when the Court has determined that question in favour of the petitioners and has held that there was a contract that the arbitrators would have jurisdiction to proceed with the reference. Now, a Court of law would hesitate considerably before coming to the conclusion that a party has an undoubted right, and yet the Legislature has provided no relief in respect of that right. It is important to note that in England a declaratory suit with regard to an arbitration agreement would lie. In India, whatever the position was prior to the passing of the present Arbitration Act, it is clear that now such a suit would be barred under s. 32.

    Mr. Maneksha argues that inasmuch as s. 33 expressly provides for an Application for challenging an arbitration agreement and there is no provision for affirming or asserting an arbitration agreement, the Legislature has taken away such a right from a person who wishes to proceed with the arbitration on the strength of an arbitration agreement. Mr. Maneksha says that at best there may be a lacuna in the Act and it is not for a Court of law to make good such a lacuna. It is perfectly clear that when the Legislature enacted s. 32 and barred all suits with regard to the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement, the object of the Legislature was that all questions with regard to these matters should be dealt with under the Arbitration Act and not by substantive suits. That object is perfectly clear and patent from the terms of s. 32. It is therefore difficult to believe that having taken away the right of a party to proceed with a substantive suit, the Legislature also took away the right of a party to have the existence or the validity of an agreement determined by an application under the Arbitration Act. Mr. Maneksha is right that s. 33 would be superfluous or overlapping if the construction was put upon s. 32 that all questions with regard to the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement have to be determined by applications under the Arbitration Act and not by civil suits, and that the right to make those applications is implicit in the very terms of s. 32 itself. But it may be that for greater caution the Legislature has dealt with a particular kind of application which is mentioned in s. 33. It does not therefore follow that because a particular kind of application is mentioned in s. 33, therefore the Legislature has not provided in the Act itself for all kinds of applications that may be made under that Act and has taken away the right with regard to the making of the applications other than the specific application referred to in s. 33 of the Act. In my opinion, therefore, it is open to a party to make any application with regard to which a suit is barred under s. 32. Section 33 is merely one instance of such an application. The Legislature cannot conceivably deal with all possible applications that may arise with regard to which suits are barred under s. 32.

    Therefore, the learned Judge below was right in coming to the conclusion that the present petition was maintainable although not under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act.

    The other contention put forward by Mr. Maneksha is that there is no written submission and therefore the petition is misconceived. The position is that the petitioners are members of the Marwadi Chamber of Commerce and the respondents are not members. Therefore, prima facie, any rule of the Marwadi Chamber of Commerce with regard to arbitration would not bind the respondents. If the contract had been signed by the respondents, then there would be no difficulty, because the contract itself contains a term with regard to reference to arbitration. But in this case the position on the petition and the affidavit in reply is that a contract was delivered by the petitioners to the respondents and the respondents at the most retained it and did not return it to the petitioners. It is true that in para. 11 of the affidavit in reply the respondents have taken up the contention that there was no written submission. Now, our law does not require that a submission to arbitration must be signed by both the parties. The only requisite of the law is that there must be a submission in writing. If there is a submission clause in a contract, it is not necessary that contract must be signed by the other party before the other party can be bound by the submission clause; that party may accept the contract orally or he may accept it by writing. Therefore, if the petitioners are in a position to establish that this particular contract, which contains a submission clause, was accepted by the respondents, then there would be a written submission to arbitration within the meaning of the Arbitration Act.

    Mr. Maneksha has relied on a judgment of Mr. Justice Kania in Shriram Hanutram v. Mohanlal & Co. The learned Judge there was considering the question of staying a suit and the view that the learned Judge took was that it did not follow that merely because a contract was sent to the other party and the other party retained that contract that there was necessarily an acceptance of the contract. Mr. Maneksha wants to read this decision to mean that wherever a contract note is delivered and retained by the other party, it does not amount to acceptance, and that there would be no written submission within the meaning of the Arbitration Act. I do not read Mr. Justice Kania's judgment to mean that. It would depend upon the circumstances of each case whether the mere delivery of a contract note and the retention of that contract note by the other party does amount to acceptance or not. It is a pure question of fact which would have to be decided by the Court. But Mr. Maneksha is right to this extent that in this present case the petitioners have not averred, as they should have averred, that there was an acceptance of the contract by the respondents. The mere averment that the contract was delivered to the other side and retained by the other side is not per se tantamount to an averment that the contract was accepted by the other side, and although the respondents in the affidavit in reply expressly raised the issue that there was no written submission, still the petitioners did not file any affidavit in rejoinder pleading the acceptance of the contract, nor did they think fit to have the petition amended to make the necessary averment. But, in my opinion, this by itself is not sufficient to non suit the petitioner. Mr. Justice Bhagwati has ordered that the petition has got to be heard on its merits, and it would certainly be open to the respondents to urge that there was no written submission inasmuch as they never accepted the contract.

    I think, therefore, the fairest thing to do under the circumstances would be to direct the petitioners to amend the petition by averring that there was an acceptance of the contract by the respondents and that this particular issue would be tried along with other issues which would arise on the petition by the Court trying the petition. Mr. Maneksha is justified in urging that as the petition stands today it is liable to be dismissed because the necessary averment is not there. But that is a grievance which is very easily remedied by a proper order for costs, and we will hear Mr. Maneksha on the question of costs after this judgment is delivered.

    I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal and confirm the order made by Mr. Justice Bhagwati.

    Tendolkar, J.:—I agree.

    Per Curiam. Having heard counsel on the question of costs, we think that the fairest order to make would be to vary the order made by Mr. Justice Bhagwati with regard to the costs by directing that the petitioners should pay to the respondents the costs of the hearing of the petition before Mr. Justice Bhagwati, and with regard to the costs in the appeal we order that the respondents should pay to the appellants half the costs of the appeal.

    The petitioners to make the necessary amendment within two days. Petitioners to pay the costs of and incidental to the amendment. Liberty to the respondents to file any supplemental affidavit in reply to the amendment made by the petitioners to their petition within a week after the amendment. Petitioners also to pay the costs of any supplemental, affidavit filed by the respondents.

    Attorneys for appellants: Motichand & Devidas.

    Attorneys for respondents: Ambubhai & Divanji.

    Appeal dismissed.
    A.J.P
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