The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Vuyyuru Veera Venkateswaramma And Two Others S, Andhra Pradesh High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Counsel for Petitioner: Sri Naresh Byrapaneni Counsel for Respondents: Sri K.S.R. Hemanth Kumar

> HEAD NOTE:

? CITATIONS:

1. 2005 (6) SCC 172 = 2005 ACJ 1323

2. 2013 ACJ -1

3. 2006 (2) SCC 641

4. See APMV Rules

5. 2001 (5) SCC 175 = 2001 ACJ 827 (SC)

6. (2004) 5 SCC 385 : AIR 2004 SC 2107

7. 2010 (4) ALD 531 (DB)

8. 2011 (8) Scale-240

9. (2012) 2 SCC 356

10. 1977 ACJ 118 (SC)

11. 1987 ACJ 561 (SC)

12. 1996 ACJ 555 (SC)

13. 2014 (1) SCC 680

14. 2014 (1) SCC 680

15. 2011 (10) SCC 509

16. 2002 (7) SCC 456.

17. 2001 (2) SCC 9 = AIR 2001 SC 485

18. 2007 ACJ 821

19. 2007 ACJ 818

20. 2005 ACJ 1

21. 2007 ACJ 1284

22. 2006 ACJ 1441

23. 2008 ACJ 1441

24. 2009 ACJ 998

25. 2007 ACJ 721

26. 2008 ACJ 733

27. 2008 ACJ 776.

28. 2009 ACJ 2020

29. 2009 ACJ 2003

30. 2013 ACJ 199

31. 2007 (6) SCC 657.

HONBLE Dr. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO M.A.C.M.A.No.1548 of 2007 AND CROSS OBJECTIONS (SR).No. 50000 of 2007 COMMON JUDGMENT :

The 2nd respondent-insurer (among the two respondents including the owner of Bajaj Chetak Scooter bearing No.AP 16 J

665), preferred the appeal, impugning the award, dated 26.03.2007, of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Special Sessions Judge- cum-X Additional District Judge, Krishna, at Machilipatnam (for short, the Tribunal) in M.V.O.P.No.59 of 2003, granting Rs.3,06,400/- with interest at 5% per annum in the claim filed under the Sections 163A later amended to 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the Act) by the three claimants, who are no other than the wife and major sons of the deceased Durga Rao, no other than the rider of the bike of the 1st respondent supra.

2. The contentions of the learned counsel for the insurer in support of grounds of appeal are that the award of the Tribunal is unjust, Tribunal gravely erred in not dismissing the claim filed under Section 140 and 166 of the Act in ignorance of the fact that the accident occurred due to negligence of the deceased in riding the bike by stepping into the shoes of the original owner of the bike-1st respondent and there is no any personal accident claim in the Act Policy and the quantum of compensation arrived is also excessive and unreasonable and hence to exonerate the insurer from the liability.

3. The reply arguments of the counsel for the respondents in support of their cross objections filed are with contentions that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is utterly low and multiplier method not properly adopted from the age of the deceased, hence to enhance the compensation as prayed for before the Tribunal and also the rate of interest from 5% per annum to 12% per annum or at such reasonable rate.

4. Perused the material on record.

5. The parties are being referred as arrayed before the Tribunal.

6. Now the points that arise for consideration in the appeal and cross objections are

1. Whether the award of the Tribunal is unsustainable either under Section 140 or 163-A or 166 of the M.V.Act and whether the insurer is not liable to pay any compensation?

2. To what result?

POINT No.1:

7. The manner of accident set out and proved before the Tribunal clearly speaks that the deceased was riding the scooter bearing No.AP 16 J 665 supra of the 1st respondent to the claim petition by taken from him for the ride to say he is stepping into the shoes of the owner and while proceeding in riding the bike, there was opposite coming un-noticed vehicle, that dashed to say practically hit and run case for the opposite coming vehicle, which dashed the deceased and his bike not noticed, much less, traced. The claim petition is maintained as referred supra under Section 140 and 163-A of the Act and again amended to section 166 from 163-a by retaining the Section 140 of the Act. As per the contention of the insurer, the very claim petition is not maintainable once the deceased was stepping into the shoes of the owner-1st respondent in taking the vehicle of the 1st respondent and while riding met with accident as the vehicle is insured for the third policy risk only by Act Policy and not even the standard package policy, much less any premium paid for the claim of the rider of the bike as personal accident claim and thereby the Tribunal went wrong for not even policy covered the risk in fastening the liability on the insurer for the death of the deceased not third party.

8. Before discussing the further facts, it is necessary to state the scope of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 59 of 1988, amended by Act, 54 of 1994 and further amended by Act, 39 of 2001. The Act contains 14 chapters and 2 schedules with rules and notifications, Central Rules and State Rules including of the A.P.M.V.Rules, 1989; of which the chapters 10 to 12 are mainly relevant for purpose of adjudicating the lis. It is needless to say, the chapters 10 to 12 are not only inter-related but also interlinked.

8.(a). For example-In Chapter XII- Section 165, speaks-constitution of claims Tribunal, Sections 167 with non-obstante clause r/w 143 of Chapter X of the Act speak on the option to proceed under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 or under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, irrespective of what is contained in the WC Act, for workman injured or died in the course of employment and where negligence of driver if deceased or injured need not even be gone into but for to show the accident occurred while in use of the vehicle and in the course of employment for the statutory liability of Act policy as per Sections 147&149 of the Act, in so far as the driver and for public carriage-conductor or ticket collector (Section 147(1) proviso(i) a, b (c-leave about representative of goods in a goods carriage)) unless shown for claim of more to Act liability, if policy is comprehensive(Section 147(1) proviso(ii) - vide National Insurance Company Vs. Prembhai Patel and another Sanjeev Kumar Samrat Vs. National Insurance Company & National Insurance Company Vs. Mastan and another .

8.(b). The claim before the Tribunal needless to say is either final claim under Section 166 (of Chapter XII) with interim measure under section 140 or final claim under Section 163-A (chapter XI) or interim measure under section 161(chapter xi) as the case maybe.

8.(c). Once a claim is made under Section 140 (chapter X) for interim compensation, final claim under Section 163-A (chapter XI) wont lie, but for under Section 166 (of chapter XII). Further in a claim under Section 166, claim under Section 140 can also be made; but in a claim under section 163a, claim under section 140 cannot be made. The claims either under Chapter XI or under Chapter XII shall be by third parties and not owner of vehicle or person permitted by owner. Whether claim under Chapter X- under Section 140 can be made by owner of vehicle or person permitted by owner for injuries and by his legal representatives in case of his death is a matter in dispute to decide, more particularly from the overriding effect given to the chapter X with non- obstanti clause in Section 144 of notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force.

8.(d). The claim for hit and run cases (of Chapter XI) covered by Section 161 also says provisions of section 166 shall apply to make such applications. It speaks from Section 165 that there is no bar to make application for hit and run cases before the Tribunal, but for to say from reading of Section 163 of formulation of the special scheme by the Central Government with the authority who has to adjudicate such claims for recommending and granting reasonable compensation, which need not confine to the sums fixed in Section 161. There are certain an expression on either side in saying (i) it gives concurrent jurisdiction on one side also from reading of Section 168 with speaks subject to Section 162 and not of Section 163 or Section 161 & (ii) it gives no jurisdiction on other side from the Section 163 as a special provision to prevail (known as solatium scheme,1989) even not provided with non-obstante clause of specific exclusion. However, a close perusal of the Sections 161 with 162 and also Section 163 by keeping together shows that Sections 161 and 163 each deals with different type; to say Section 161 deals with fixed sum of Rs.25,000/- for death and Rs.12,500/- for grievous hurt injuries, whereas Section 163 deals with the solatium scheme,1989 under which there is no rider to recommend only of Rs.25,000/- for death and Rs.12,500/- for grievous hurt injuries; for the enquiry officer (Revenue Sub-divisional Officer or Tahsildar as the case may be) can recommend more than that in Form III read with Clause 21 of the scheme. When Section 161(3) is intended to immediate relief (like in Section 140 in a claim under Section 166(1)) before the Tribunal and such grant by claim petition is not a bar for recommending and awarding final compensation on application made as per the solatium scheme of 1989 by the authorities after given deduction of any amount awarded and paid under Section 161 of the Act-vide observations of this Court in MACMA No.148 of 2009 & MACMA No. 2072 of 2011.

8.(e). As it also speaks like in Section 140, for claim under Section 161 or application under section 163 as per section 162, amount recovered to be adjusted/refunded in the event of final claim for compensation filed and allowed under Section 163-A or 166 of the Act.

8.(f). Further Sections 146-159 of Chapter XI speak compulsory insurance coverage and statutory and contractual liability of insurer to indemnify the insured for third party risk, once policy covers the risk irrespective of breach of policy terms and conditions, save those are not fundamental a breach, insolvency of insured (section 154) and its consequences, death of insured is not a bar to survival of cause of action (section 155). Likewise sections 165-175 are also the general provisions with some of which applicable respectively to Chapter X and XI.

9. Chapter XII of the Act:

9.(a). Section 168 of the Act reads as under:

1.On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:

Provided that where such applicant makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.

2.The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.

3.When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.

9.(b). Sections 169 and 176 speak of the summary procedure and as per C.P.C. (subject to rules made under Section 176 or 164 of the Act) and powers of the Claims Tribunal in inquiry under Section 168 (supra) and Section 170 speaks of the power of the Tribunal in directing for impleading of insurer with right to contest, where in the course of enquiry the claims tribunal has satisfied that there is a collision between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, in directing.

9.(c). Sections 165 and 175 speak for constitution of claims tribunals by State Government and bar of civil Court jurisdiction therefrom, for adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles including under Sections 140 and 163-A or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

9.(d). Section 166(1) speaks application for compensation arising out of the accident in the nature specified in Section 165(1) that-an application for compensation may be made- (a) by a person who sustained injuries or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the them on behalf of all or for the benefit of all legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of Section 166 speaks of jurisdiction of the tribunal where accident occurred or where the claimant/s reside/s or carries on business or where the defendant resides and in such form with such particulars prescribed. It speaks in the application under Section 166, the interim compensation claim can even included as a separate para before verification of contents and signature of claimant/s. Section 166(4) speaks that the claims tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Section 158(6) as an application for compensation under this Act.

9.(e). Sections 171 & 172 speak powers of Tribunal to award interest on compensation and compensation costs. Section 173 speaks right of appeal (to read with Section 170 for Insurer and with Order 41 CPC as per the settled expressions). Section 174 speaks for recovery of the compensation awarded (needless to say it can be executed as a civil court decree and drawing of a decree from the award is a must). The provisions supra are incorporated in chapter XII of the Act.

10. Chapter XI of the Act under the title insurance of motor vehicles against third parties:

10.(a). Section 163-A incorporated by the Amended Act, 54 of 1994 speaks as a special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis speaks that:

1.Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the second schedule, to legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

The explanation speaks permanent disability shall have the same meaning and extend as in Workmens Compensation Act, 8/1923;

2.In any claim for compensation under Section(1), the Claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

3.The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living, by notification in the official gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule-(kishan Gopal Vs Lala-2014(1)SCC-244).

10.(b). Section 163(b) speaks that where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Section 140 and under Section 163-A, he shall file the claim under either of sub-sections and not under both.

10.(c). Sections 161 to 163, provisions relating to hit and run motor accident cases as referred supra, no way require repetition.

11. Now, coming back to the relevant provision-Section 140 of the Act under the heading liability without fault in certain cases out of Sections 142 to 144 of the chapter-X.

Section 140(1): Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub- section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty - five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that Sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees.

(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

(4) A claim for compensation under sub- section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2), regarding the death or bodily injury to any person for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for the relief he is liable to pay compensation and any other law for the time being in force.

Provided that, the amount of such compensation shall be given under any other law shall be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this Section or under Section 163-A.

12. In this Section 140(5) given with overriding affect to Section 140(2) and the expression used is negative of the fact that the owner of the vehicle would be additionally liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force subject, however, to the condition has been laid in the proviso appended thereto, that the amount of such compensation to be given under any other law should be reduced from the amount of compensation payable there under or under Section 163A. Having regard to the fact that no procedure for refund or adjustment of compensation (like in) Section 140 and 161 from the amount of compensation payable under the award on the basis of fault liability under Section 166 of the Act (as expressly been provided for) has been provided for in relation to the proceedings under Section 163A of the Act, it must be held that the scheme of the provisions under Section 163A and 166 are distinct and separate.

13. Where in Chapter XI, Section 158(6) is also by the Amended Act,54/1994 incorporated of the information regarding accident involving the death or bodily injury recorded or report contemplated by a police officer in charge of a police station. Sub-section (1) is also incorporated, which speaks report received by the tribunal to take as a claim petition. It is also to say in this context that the report to receive as the claim for compensation by the tribunal is under what provision as to under Section 140 or 163A or 166 concerned, it is by virtue of incorporation of section 166(4) by the amended act that, the tribunal shall treat the report as an application for compensation under this Act and not specifically under Section 166 it is only to take as is appropriate, to say even it is hit and run case even under Sections 161 and otherwise either under Section 163A or under 166 if any also under Section 140 as it appears there from, though there is no direct authoritative expression in this regard-including from-Jai Prakash Vs. NIC-2010 ACJ 455 & Rajesh Vs. Ranbir Singh-2013 ACJ 1403.

14. From the above provisions of the Act, Section 140 is incorporated in Chapter X, Section 163A is incorporated in Chapter XI and Section 166 is incorporated in Chapter XII. It is further necessary to mention that among these chapters X to XII of the provisions supra, the wording of Section 140(3) is with self same wording of section 163-a(2), however, there is no similar wording of Section 140(4) in Section 163-A to take away right of defence specifically like in Section 140(4). It is to say, in a claim filed under Section 140 or 163A, the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish the death or permanent disablement relating to the claim were due to wrongful act, neglect or default of owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or any other person. A close reading of this provision speaks the claimants are not required to plead or prove negligence of the deceased or injured as well as negligence of the person owned the vehicle against whom the claim is made or in case of more than one vehicle involved of negligence of any one of them or composite or contributory negligence as the case may be of the vehicles drivers or other person.

15. So far as the claim under Sections 140 and 163A is concerned, it is as stated supra clearly provided by Sections 163-B & 141 that claim can be filed under these sections by any person to mean under either of the sections and not under both. It clearly provides that, though a person who filed application under Section 140 is entitled to file an independent application under Section 166 with claim therein or simultaneously or later subject to these provisions as the case may be; once application filed under Section 140, another application under Section 163-A is not maintainable. To say, in so arranging the sections within the respective chapters are to achieve the respective purposes and there from so far as claim under Section 163A concerned, there is no requirement and proof of fault even not an interim measure.

16. Similarly, from reading of Section 168 r/w 166 of the Act, Section 168(1) speaks the claim under Section 166 in determining subject to provisions of section 162 in the award, the amount of compensation appears it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them as the case may be. It indicates the determination specifically including to the extent of liability in claim under Section 166 on fault liability from pleading and proof. Whereas such rider is not there for Section 140 and 163A from what is stated supra in Section 163A(2) and 140(3). A close reading of these provisions in the three chapters (leave about sections 167 r/w 163A or 166) the compensation that can be claimed under Workmens Compensation Act for death or bodily injury under that Act, anything contained in that Act the claimants are entitled to compensation may claim such compensation under either of these two Acts but not under both indicate that even the claim under Section 140 is an interim measure with a right to entertain an efficacious claim under fault liability later under Section 166 as a final measure; whereas the claim under Section 140 even an interim measure as supra again the claim under Section 163A wont lie but for if at all under Section 166. Whereas, a claim under Section 163-A as a final measure with no proof of fault once made no claim again can be made under Section 166. It appears from said arrangement also of Section 140 is incorporated in Chapter X-of totally no fault liability-on proof of accident while vehicle in use, where as Section 163A is incorporated in Chapter XI-of semi fault liability-on proof of accident while vehicle in use claimant is entitled to compensation, however it does not prohibit the respondent to raise plea of negligence or fault of injured/deceased or his or his vehicle driver contributory or composite negligence for no similar prohibitory clause in section 163a similar to section 140(4) and needless to say Section 166 is incorporated in Chapter XII-of totally fault liability from said combined reading of the three provisions of the three chapters in Juxtaposition, more in particular noticing the difference between section 140(3&4) with section 163a(2) detailed supra.

17. In this regard, if two applications are filed under both the provisions, one under Section 163A and other under Section 166, both cannot be, being final measure proceedings one under proof of fault and the other without proof of fault respectively cannot be proceeded with simultaneously but for the claimant to opt before commencement of enquiry as per the expression of the Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Hansrajbhai V. Kodala . It is to say both being final remedies cannot be simultaneously proceeded but to opt by claimants only one of the two to proceed. It was also confirmed by the three judges bench expression of the Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda at page 405 para 57. Subsequent to the above, it was held by the Division Bench of this Court in Bhupathi Prameela Vs Supt. Of Police, Vizayanagaram that since the M.V.Act provisions to claim compensation by victims of accidents from the object of the Act meant to benefit the claimants being the social legislation and even both Section 163A and Section 166 quoted in the claim application, for technicalities wont come in the way to render substantial justice between the parties, the Court can take the application as filed under Section 166 which is beneficial to the claimants.

18. In fact, but for to say from the above as to sections 163-A and 166 are both independent and meant for getting relief by invoking anyone of these. As the claim is undisputedly filed under section 163A and accordingly proceeded by the tribunal and also the appeal against which filed under section 173 of the Act r/w Order 41 C.P.C. from the provisions of C.P.C. are applicable even to the appeals under M.V.Act as per the settled law of the Apex Court including from the latest expression in this regard in Ranjana Prakash V. Divisional Manager .

19. Now it is to be seen whether section 163A is on fault liability or not from section 166 is undisputedly on fault liability specifically to plead and prove. Even Section 163A speaks the claimants need not plead and prove the fault or wrongful act, the general principles under the law of torts giving a right to the other party that is the driver, owner and insurer against whom the claim is made to plead and prove any wrongful act or negligent act of the deceased/injured or the vehicle in which deceased/injured was travelling or the opposite vehicle driver concerned, in establishing self negligence of deceased/injured or composite negligence or contributory negligence of the drivers of both vehicles respectively. It is because to say or to decide section 163-A is with any element of fault liability need not be decided solely based Section 163-A enables the claimant to maintain a claim without pleading or proving negligent act or wrongful act. It is also to be taken into consideration to say on fault liability or tort from the opposite parties right under the general law of torts from the general principles to attract the claim on the grounds of self negligence of the deceased/injured or composite negligence of both the vehicles if involved or the claimants/injured and the other persons or contributory negligence of drivers of both vehicles if involved. A combined reading of these provisions in these three chapters supra communicate that such defence not being made available so far as section 140 of the Act under chapter X concerned as it is only an interim measure and such right to oppose the claim on merits is available in a efficacious claim to be made under Section 166. So the opposite parties right so to plead and prove apart from the claimant`s duty to plead and prove the wrongful act or negligent act required by law and remedy available there. In so far as Section 163-A of the Act concerned, if that right is to be taken away, there will be no remedy to the opposite party contestants to the claim even there is negligence or wrongful act on the part of the injured/deceased in respect of the claim or the vehicle in which he was travelling or the opposite vehicle concerned. It is thus to say though under Section 140 that right is impliedly taken away, so far as section 163A concerned that right is impliedly provided. It is also for the reason that all these provisions are incorporated in three different chapters and section 140 is a first ladder from which there is a right to step up to the second ladder whereas section 163-A is only a single step ladder and as such under Section 166 the duty to plead and prove wrongful or negligent act on the claimants and to defend in this regard by the owner/insurer respondents to the claim automatically there, not there under Section 163-A for the claimants for no duty to plead or prove, like in section 140 for an interim measure that is not taken away in Section 163A so far as the defence concerned for the reasons that section 140 and section 163-A respectively used the same wording in sub-sections (3) and (2) of the sections respectively one is an interim measure and the other is a final measure and as such so far as section 163-A is concerned it is though not on absolute fault liability, not on absolute no fault liability. As the opposite parties right is impliedly inherent from the general law of torts to defend and prove the wrongful act or negligent act in seeking non-liability or contributory negligence or composite negligence as the case may be, for not taken away statutorily by the wording of Section 163-A of the Act, like in Section 140 of the Act where by its wording it is taken away statutorily. This conclusion no doubt lends support from the recent two judge bench expression of the Apex Court in National Insurance Corporation Ltd., Vs. Sinitha -wherein it was held by referring to the earlier two judge bench expression of the Apex Court in Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (supra) and in answering in affirmative on the aspect of claim for compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act can be defeated either by the owner or by the insurance company by pleading and establishing that the accident in question was based on the contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. It was observed that Section 140(3) and Section 163A(2) both are pari-materia provisions and there is no provision corresponding to Section 140(4) in Section 163A and thereby the claim for compensation under Section 163A held is fault based liability from the contributory negligence or fault negligence of deceased/claimant or disabled victim in causing the accident compensation may be reduced on such proof. However, the onus to prove contributory negligence remain on the defence in opposing the claim under Section 163A i.e. the owner and insurer can defend the claim and the Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (supra) did not decide that determination of compensation under Section 163A is based on no fault liability principle. The claim for compensation raised in Section 163-A need not be based on pleadings or proof of claimants showing absence of contributory negligence, but for onus to proof of contributory or composite or total negligence of injured/deceased or of his traveling vehicle driver; lies on the shoulders of the owner or insurer, opposing and defending the claim to so establish in discharge of the burden lies on them. It was observed for the conclusion that where claim cannot be defeated on account of contributory negligence then such provision would fall under no fault liability principle. It is thereby as per Section 140(4), both claim and defence are precluded from raising any ground of fault and whereas Section 163-A is an independent provision with non-obstinate clause having over riding effect over all other provisions of the Act. It is also a rationale behind it, in saying as fault liability principle from where large compensation amount involved or compensation amount is likely to be high, it is legitimate that insurance company is not fastened with liability when offending vehicle suffered fault (wrongful act, neglect or doubtful) under alleged act. In Minu B.Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayar , it was held that the right to receive compensation can be only against a person who is found to compensate due to the failure to perform a legal obligation. The general law applicable is the common law and law of torts. After the expression, the MV Act,1939 was amended by Act, 47 of 1982 incorporating Section 92-A with the concept of payment of compensation without proof of fault or negligence of owner or driver of the vehicle by the claimant/s. Therefrom, in Gujarat State Road Transport Corp. Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai it was held that Section 92-A is incorporated as a clear departure from the usual common law principle of claimant/s to prove negligence of owner or driver of the vehicle to claim compensation against them. In fact in same line to Section 92-A of the Act,1939, in the new Act,1988, Section 163-A was incorporated by the amended by Act, 54 of 1994, besides no fault liability interim measure provided by Section 140 and equally by Section 161 in the Act,1988. In K.Nandakumar Vs. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corp. Ltd., it was held that payment of compensation on no fault basis cannot be rejected even if the person making the claim was responsible for such permanent disablement. It is to say, K.Nandakumar supra is under no fault liability interim measure provided by Section 140 of the Act,1988. It is later in Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (supra) it was held referring to Section163-A of the Act on its scope that, the non- obsentee clause in Section163-A in computation of compensation under structured formula, simply excluded determination of compensation on the principle of fault liability under Sections 166 &168. The said provision does not permit a person to place a premium upon his own fault and make the insurer pay for the same. The expression was in point of view of the victim. It no way speaks in direct terms that, negligence of the victim cannot be decided by allowing the insurer and owner being the opposite parties to the claim to defend and to fix any contributory negligence on the deceased. However, it is important to notice that after Hansrajbhai and before Sinitha, where correctness of the law laid down in Hansrajbhai under Section 163A came for consideration on reference made, was answered by the three judge bench expression in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) in the affirmative. While so answering, it was held that though both Sections 166 and 163A are final proceedings, under Section 166 on fault liability, the duty is on the claimants to plead and prove wrongful or negligent act of opposite party to get higher compensation, whereas under Section 163A on no fault liability, there is no duty on the claimants to plead and prove wrongful or negligent act of opposite party to get compensation under the structured formula. It did not specifically even say the opposite parties right to defend in this regard by the owner/insurer respondents to the claim of negligence or fault or contribution on the injured/deceased or their vehicle driver, available under Section 166 is not there and taken away under Section 163-A. Even for so holding it was not specifically considered referring to the Section 140(3) and Section 163A(2) of both are pari-materia provisions and there is no provision corresponding to Section 140(4) in Section 163-A and thereby the claim for compensation under Section 163-A held is fault based liability from the contributory negligence or fault negligence of deceased/claimant or disabled victim in causing the accident compensation may be reduced on such proof, that was in fact referred and answered in Sinitha supra. But for that, both the expression in Sinitha and in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) confirmed law laid down in Hansrajbhai (supra). In fact on this aspect that Deepal Girishbhai Soni was not referred in Sinitha while holding Section 163A is founded on fault liability principle, correctness of the law in Sinitha was referred to a larger bench in United India Insurance Company Vs Sunil Kumar and it is pending.

20. In fact in Deepal Girishbhai Soni, it was observed in paras 39 to 42 that-

Section 163A was introduced in the Act by way of a social security scheme. It is a code by itself. Section 140 of the Act dealt with interim compensation but by inserting Section 163-A, the Parliament intended to provide for making of an award consisting of a pre- determined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident. The Amendment was, thus, a deviation from the common law liability under the Law of Torts and was also in derogation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Act and the Rules framed by the State in no uncertain terms suggest that a new device was sought to be evolved so as to grant a quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within the specified category. The heirs of the deceased or the victim in terms of the said provisions were assured of a speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the claimants under Section 166 of the Act.

21. Thus, from a combined reading of the provisions (supra) with reference to the law as laid down in Sinitha, confirming Hansrajbhai V. Kodala including with reference to Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) that for the efficacious and as final relief under Section 163-A that can be maintained even negligence is on the part of the victim/claimant for there is no need of proof required much less plea, but for proof of accident while the vehicle in use, as a deviation from general and common law principle of burden on the claimant to plead and prove negligence of the other side and with no fault of victim/claimant; however, it no way speaks from said combined reading in juxtaposition of these provisions that opposite parties are prohibited from taking defence plea and prove any negligence of victim/complainant or their vehicle driver for non- liability or proportionate liability, as maintainability of claim is one thing proved or not proved or disproved as contemplated by the general principles and as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act is other thing. Leave apart, even in case of negligence of the victim once claim is maintainable under Section 163-A to plead and prove, there is no duty on the claimant/s and they can ignore their negligence and maintain a claim, but for the controversy as to does it take away the opposite partys right to plead and prove under the common law but for such deviation is only to the extent of exempting the complainant from duty to plead and prove to avail quick relief- there is in this regard a reference made in-UIIC Vs. Sunil Kumar and the same is pending before the larger bench of the Apex Court. The reference pending is also on correctness of UIIC Vs. Shila Datta under Section 170 of the MVAct, on rights of Insurer as appellant in view of conflict with NIC Vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi.

22. From the above, so far as scope of Section 140 interim measure under no fault liability concerned, there is no any reference pending and the law is clear from K. Nandakumar supra of claimants entitled to no fault liability compensation even there is fault of claimant- injured or deceased and later expression in Smt. Kaushnuma Begum Vs.NIAC .

23. However, in this case the claimants are not third parties to the vehicle owner for the reason of the deceased rider of the vehicle taken the vehicle from the owner and when permitted while riding met with death and the other vehicle is a lorry or the like which hit and run untraced and as such the claim against other untraced vehicle can be under hit and run and the present claim is not such. Such claim is left open to make.

24. In this regard, the law on this subject is the following from the expressions of the Apex Court- Even owner cum driver cannot claim compensation against insurer for no policy risk coverage by the Act policy under Section 147 but for to paid driver, for no Personnel accident claim coverage, apart from claim under the MV Act won`t lie but for civil court or Consumer Forum and same is also the position for owner riding bike or allowed another to ride the bike- who step in to the shows of owner and not third parties thereby and same is also the position for or for own vehicle damage and even for pillion rider of bike or even for company employee or other person allowed to travel as inmate in the company car or other private passenger vehicle covered by only Act policy and not of standard package policy as per IRDA Regulations of 2009 dated 16.11.2009:

1). NIAC Vs. Meerabai ; 2). OIC Vs. Jhuna Shaha ; 3). Dhanraj Vs. NIAC ; 4). OIC Vs. Meena Variyal ; 5). UIIC Vs. Tilak Singh (bike pillion rider); 6). OIC Vs. Rajanidevi (direct case on death of owner and another person going on bike); 7). NIC Vs. Sadanand Mukhi ; 8). NIC Vs. Lakshmi Narayan Dhut ; 9). OIC Vs. Prithvi Raj ;

10). Prem Kumari Vs. Prahlad Dev ; 11). Ningamma Vs. UIIC (direct case on death of barrower of bike); 12). Rajarani Vs. OIC ; 13). NIC Vs. Balakrishna ;

25. No doubt, the decisions and the principle involved therein as discussed supra are under Section 163-A or Section 166 claims and not interim claim under Section 140 of the Act. For that the authority is Yallwwa Vs. NIC -which says policy coverage and vehicle involvement is to be shown and Insurer is entitled to raise the same for being made liable even to the interim claim under Section 140 of the Act and the tribunal decision against interim claim under Section 140 of the Act is also appealable as if a final claim with same analogy. Here there is admittedly policy issued by the Insurer of the bike, but not covered personnel accident claim to make the Insurer liable. However, Section 140 of the Act prevails over other provisions as stated by Section 143&144 as discussed supra. The tribunal allowed the claim and whatever amount paid and allowed by the Courts so far can be made unrecoverable, but for enabling the Insurer to take back any amount lying in deposit by cheque petition and to seek for adjusting the amount to the claim to be made by the claimants under Section 163 of the Act against the untraced vehicle that dashed deceased and the claimants and deceased are third parties to the hit and run away vehicle by permitting the claimants to move such claim under Section 163 of the Act before the authority concerned within one month from date of receipt of this appeal judgment.

26. In the result, the cross objections are dismissed and the appeal of the Insurer is partly allowed while holding that the (appellant) insurer of the bike owner-Insured permitted the deceased to ride is not liable to indemnify the insured to the claim of claimants from the policy covers the risk to third parties and not with personnel accident coverage or for rider of bike; however subject to condition that whatever amount paid/deposited by the Insurer and allowed by the Courts so far, the Insurer cannot recover from claimants, but for enabling the Insurer to take back any amount lying in deposit by cheque petition and to seek for adjusting the amount so far paid, in the claim to be made by the claimants under Section 163 of the Act against the untraced vehicle that dashed deceased and the claimants and deceased are third parties to the hit and run away vehicle by permitting the claimants to move such claim of hit and run under Section 163 of the Act before the authority concerned within one month from date of receipt of this appeal judgment. There is no order as to costs of the appeal.

____________________________ Dr. B. SIVA SANKARA RAO, J 6th November 2014

M.A.C.M.A No. 1548 of 2007,Cross Objections (SR). No. 50000 of 2007

The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Vuyyuru Veera Venkateswaramma And Two Others S

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Insurer's (Appellant's) Arguments

Claimants' (Respondents') Arguments / Cross Objections

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Vuyyuru Veera Venkateswaramma And Two Others S

Comments

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
2005 (6) SCC 172 = 2005 ACJ 1323	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2013 ACJ -1	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2006 (2) SCC 641	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2001 (5) SCC 175 = 2001 ACJ 827 (SC)	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
(2004) 5 SCC 385 : AIR 2004 SC 2107	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2010 (4) ALD 531 (DB)	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2011 (8) Scale-240	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
(2012) 2 SCC 356	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
1977 ACJ 118 (SC)	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
1987 ACJ 561 (SC)	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
1996 ACJ 555 (SC)	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2014 (1) SCC 680	This information was not available in the provided opinion (listed twice).	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2011 (10) SCC 509	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2002 (7) SCC 456	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2001 (2) SCC 9 = AIR 2001 SC 485	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2007 ACJ 821	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2007 ACJ 818	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2005 ACJ 1	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2007 ACJ 1284	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2006 ACJ 1441	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2008 ACJ 1441	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2009 ACJ 998	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2007 ACJ 721	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2008 ACJ 733	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2008 ACJ 776	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2009 ACJ 2020	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2009 ACJ 2003	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2013 ACJ 199	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
2007 (6) SCC 657	This information was not available in the provided opinion.	This information was not available in the provided opinion.
National Insurance Company Vs. Prembhai Patel	Referenced for principles relating to comprehensive policy coverage and Act policy scope (as cited in text).	Cited by the Court as part of illustrating interplay of policy coverage and statutory provisions; used to show context of liabilities when policy is comprehensive.
Sanjeev Kumar Samrat Vs. National Insurance Company	Referenced alongside other authorities to explain policy coverage and related principles.	Used as part of the survey of authorities on insurance coverage; exact application not specifically elaborated beyond citation.
National Insurance Company Vs. Mastan	Referenced alongside other authorities on policy coverage.	Cited in the course of discussing the statutory scheme; specific application not separately detailed in the opinion.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala	Held that Section 163A does not eliminate the insurer/owner's right to plead contributory negligence; informs that claim under 163A can be defeated on proof of contributory negligence.	The Court relied on this authority in analysing whether Section 163A is fault-based or no-fault in effect and in concluding that contributory negligence can be pleaded by defence under Section 163A.
Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.	Described Section 163A as a social security scheme and a code intended to provide a pre-determined sum without proof of negligence; distinguished from Section 166.	Cited to explain the legislative purpose of Section 163A and to show that 163A and 166 are independent remedies, while also being referred to in the debate whether 163A permits a defence based on negligence.
Ranjana Prakash V. Divisional Manager	Referenced for the application of CPC provisions (Order 41) to appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act (Section 173 read with Order 41 CPC).	Cited to support the proposition that appeals under the M.V. Act are governed by CPC procedures as per settled law.
Jai Prakash Vs. NIC	Referenced in relation to treatment of accident reports and claims (context: report taken as claim petition).	Cited as authority in the discussion regarding treating police reports as claim petitions for appropriate provisions (Section 166(4) incorporation).
Rajesh Vs. Ranbir Singh	Referenced together with Jai Prakash on the same topic (police report as claim application).	Cited to support the point that reports may be treated as applications/claims under the Act.
National Insurance Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sinitha	Held that Section 163A claims can be defeated by proof of contributory negligence; that Section 140(3) and 163A(2) are pari materia and absence of a counterpart to Section 140(4) in 163A means defence remains available.	The Court relied on Sinitha to conclude that Section 163A is not an absolute no-fault provision and that the defence may plead contributory negligence to reduce or defeat the claim under 163A.
Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayar	Citation used to support a proposition about the right to receive compensation being linked to failure to perform a legal obligation (general tort principle).	Cited in the discussion of how statutory no-fault schemes depart from common law tort principles; used as legal background.
Gujarat State Road Transport Corp. Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai	Held that Section 92-A (earlier Act) marked departure from the common law principle requiring proof of negligence to claim compensation.	Used to show the legislative shift towards no-fault compensation schemes and to contextualise Section 163A and Section 140.
K. Nandakumar Vs. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corp. Ltd.	Holds that payment of compensation on a no-fault basis cannot be rejected even if the claimant was responsible for the disablement (illustrative of Section 140 operation).	Cited to underline that under Section 140 (interim no-fault relief) claimants may get compensation notwithstanding their own fault.
Smt. Kaushnuma Begum Vs. NIAC	Referenced in relation to the scope of Section 140 (no-fault interim relief).	Used to support the view that Section 140 provides no-fault interim relief; specific application limited to illustrating settled law.
Yallwwa Vs. NIC	Authority indicating that policy coverage and vehicle involvement must be shown and that insurer can raise policy coverage as defence even to interim claims under Section 140.	Relied upon to observe that an insurer is entitled to raise non-coverage/ policy-limits issues even where Section 140 is invoked.
NIAC Vs. Meerabai; OIC Vs. Jhuna Shaha; Dhanraj Vs. NIAC; OIC Vs. Meena Variyal; UIIC Vs. Tilak Singh; OIC Vs. Rajanidevi; NIC Vs. Sadanand Mukhi; NIC Vs. Lakshmi Narayan Dhut; OIC Vs. Prithvi Raj; Prem Kumari Vs. Prahlad Dev; Ningamma Vs. UIIC; Rajarani Vs. OIC; NIC Vs. Balakrishna	Listed authorities addressing the position that an owner/driver or person allowed to ride (or pillion rider) may not have entitlement under an Act-only (third party) policy where personal accident coverage is absent; used as a body of authorities on coverage limitations.	The Court cited this group of authorities in support of the proposition that where policy is Act-only (third party) and there is no personal accident cover, the insurer is not liable to indemnify owner/driver or permitted rider for personal accident/death under that policy.
UIIC Vs. Sunil Kumar; UIIC Vs. Shila Datta; NIC Vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi	Referenced in relation to contested legal questions about insurer rights of appeal and interplay of Sections (including Section 170) and the extent of insurers' appellate rights under the MV Act.	Cited to note ongoing judicial debate and that some points were referred to larger benches (as recorded in the opinion).
United India Insurance Company Vs. Sunil Kumar	Specifically noted as a reference pending before a larger bench on the correctness of earlier rulings concerning Section 163A.	Recorded by the Court as part of the jurisprudential landscape; mentioned that this reference is pending and relevant to interpretation of Section 163A.