1. Inasmuch as common questions of law and fact are involved and as all these Writ Petitions emanate from an order, dated 10-8-2001, in LG.A. No. 11 of 1998, on the file of the learned Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, for short, 'the Act', they can be disposed of together.
2. In this batch of writ petitions, the petitioners seek a Writ of Certiorari to quash the judgment of the Special Court-referred to hereinabove.
3. A concise statement of facts need be stated for brevity and better understanding of the matter thus:
The second respondent herein, which is known as Telaga Mahajana Sangham, Vijayawada, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The said society through its Secretary filed an application in LG.O.P. No. 138 of 1984 before the Special Tribunal, Krishna at Machilipatnam, against the writ petitioners and others. The land in dispute, which is an extent of 1.87 cents, was part of larger extent of 4.87 cents, of land which was originally belonged to Sri Venkateswara Swamy Devasthanam, situate at Brahmin street, Kothapata, Vijayawada. The said properly containing full of pits was a low lying area and was subjected to inundation and water stagnation. Since the property was of no use, the Devasthanam, proposed to sell the same. The Department of Endowments granted permission for its sale under a notification NO.A6/02003/76, dated 09-01-1978. Pursuant thereto a notification was published in Telugu daily newspaper inviting objections. Since no objections had been received, the land in dispute was sold under a registered sale deed, dated 22-3-1980, in favour of the society for a consideration of Rs. 2,15,050/-. Earlier there to, an agreement of sale, dated 26-02-1980, was executed, under which, possession was also delivered to the society. Out of the remaining extent of land, the Devasthanam sold an extent of Acs.2.00 of land in favour of Ramanama Sankeerthana Sangh and the balance Ac.1.00 was sold in favour of Kakani Building Society.
4. Long prior to the said sale, the Devasthanam filed O.A. No. 67 of 1970 before the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments, for declaration that the persons who were in occupation of the said land in dispute were encroachers. By an order, dated 18-01 -1971, the Deputy Commissioner declared them as encroachers. Proceedings were initiated under Section 76 (1) of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1966, before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Vijayawada, in M.P. No. 1181 of 1978 for eviction of the encroachers. The learned Magistrate by an order, dated 10-10-1979, ordered removal of the encroachers. The encroachers were changing theiroccupations from time to time. Thirty-One persons, who were in occupation of the entire extent of the land filed Writ Petition No. 1251 of 1976 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for quashing the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments, which eventually ended in dismissal on 02-04-1976. The respondents without any manner of right, title or interest, grabbed the property and some raised huts and some constructed houses thereon. The petitioner-society, which purchased the land for the purpose of constructing a Kalyana Mandapam for the use of general public, for starting technical institutions and for construction of buildings and hostels for that purpose, filed the application for eviction of the land grabbers.
5. Some of the respondents filed separate counters, some chose not to file any counters and some remained exparte. They generally denied the allegations aboutthe right, title and ownership of the Devasthanam. They pleaded that they were not parties to the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner and denied the allegation of grabbing the land. Their specific case was that some of the respondents having been in occupation of the disputed site from times immemorial by levelling the sites and by raising structures thereon after having incurred heavy expenditure perfected their title by means of adverse possession. The respondents further sought to assail the sale deed in favour of the society as invalid, having allegedly been executed in violation of the provisions of the Endowments Act and the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act. They even pleaded that the petitioner-society was not a real society. It was their further case that had the Endowments Department intimated them about the sale of the property, they would have purchased the property in dispute from the Department, as they had been in possession of the same since 1960 onwards. The property in dispute was declared as a slum area by the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. Owing to the fireaccident occurred in the year 1974 and the devastated cyclone in the year 1977, all the huts were damaged and the respondents were granted relief fund by the Vijayawada Muncipality. The possession and enjoyment of the disputed land by the respondents was acquiesced by the said Devasthanam by collecting ground rent.
6. The Special Tribunal, at the culmination of enquiry while holding that the respondents perfected their title by adverse possession and that the sale deed executed in favour of the applicant-society was not valid and the society itself was bogus one, eventually dismissed the application. The appeal preferred in LG.A. No. 11 of 1998 before the Special Court; under the impugned judgment, dated 10-8-2001, however was allowed. Inter alia in the judgment, the learned Special Court framed three points for determination as under:
(1) Whether the respondents established their plea of prescribing title by adverse possession?
(2) Whether the appellant-society is a bogus society?
(3) Whether the respondents are land grabbers within the meaning of the Act 12 of 1982?
7. On point No. 1, it was held that the respondents failed to prove the plea of adverse possession. On point No. 2 it was held that the sale deed in favour of the Society was true and valid and the society was not a bogus one. Finally all the respondents were held to be the land grabbers.
8. Sri Shareef Ahmed, learned Counsel appearing for some of the writ petitioners, seeks to contend that the applicant/society cannot maintain an application of this sort under the provisions of the Act.
9. Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Counsel appearing for some of the writ petitioners, seeks to contend that the act of land grabbing can only be in respect of any land whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf or any other private person, and since the lands belonging to a society are not covered by the Act, the application is not within the jurisdiction of the special tribunal. It is his next contention that at any rate the Special Tribunal or the Special Court cannot adjudicate the issue of title by means of adverse possession, since it falls within the domain of a civil Court.
10. Per contra, Sri B.V. Ram Mohan Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the Society, represents that the maintainability of the application by a society, having not been raised at any stage of the proceedings hitherto, cannot now be raised for the first time and that it is well within the competence of the Special Court to decide the issue of title by prescription. The learned Counsel further represents that the burden is upon the writ petitioners to prove their title by prescription, but they miserably failed to prove the same.
11. Having regard to the rival contentions, the points that arise for our determination are:
(1) Whether the second respondent society having been registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act could maintain an application either under Section 7-A or 8 of the Act?
(2) Whether the issue of title by prescription is within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal/Special Court?
(3) Whether the writ petitioners were not the land grabbers?
12. Before adverting to the points thus formulated hereinabove, it is expedient to state certain undisputed facts. Admittedly, the land in dispute admeasuring Ac.1.87cents was the land of Sri Venkateswara Swamy Devasthanam, Vijayawada. The second respondent is a society having been duly registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The Society purchased the said land by means of a registered sale deed, dated 22-03-1980, for a valid consideration of Rs. 2,15,050/- from the original owner. The writ petitioners have been in occupation of the land in dispute by constructing thereon permanent structures and erecting huts. It is their specific case that had the site been offered to them, they would have purchased the same from the said Devas thanam. Having regard to the above undisputed facts, obviously the prima facie title over the land in dispute is with the second respondent-society. Section 10 of the Act obviously casts the burden on the writ petitioners to show that they are not the land grabbers.
13. It may be mentioned at the outset that this Court is not sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Special Court. Having regard to the jurisdictional constraints, particularly in a writ of Certiorari, it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence to see the correctness or otherwise of the findings given by the learned Special Court, unlike an appellate Court. However it can reexamine the evidence to see whether any jurisdictional errors have been committed by the special Court by ignoring any material evidence which ought to have been considered or by considering any evidence which ought to have been ignored or any finding reached by it is not founded on any clear, relevant and admissible evidence. The Apex Court in State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao held thus.
30. True it is that remedy of the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the "decision" of the subordinate court, tribunal or authority but it is against the "decision-making process". In the "decision-making process", if the court, tribunal or authority deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining.
31. In the case of Surya Dev (3) while examining the nature and ambit of power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, the above-stated legal position has been recognised by observing thus: SCC p. 696, para 39
39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or rigid rules... At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge.
32. This Court has recognized the right of the High Court to interfere with orders of subordinate courts and tribunals where (1) there is an error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
33. No doubt, it was held that neither in exercise of the power of writ under Article 226norinsupervisoryjurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence. The power of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere where important evidence has been overlooked and the legal provisions involved are misinterpreted or misapplied has been recognized even in the case of Swam Singh (1) AIR 1976 SC 232 on which strong reliance was placed on behalf of the State. The relevant observations are: SCC p. 872, para 13
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law.
14. Keeping in view thus the limitations, we shall now proceed to consider the points raised on either side.
15. Points one and two formulated herein above for determination obviously pertain to the jurisdictional issues. Although one is not dependent upon the other for convenience sake they can be dealt together. A brief reconnaissance of the various provisions of the Act, which are germane in the context, is expedient to be made at the outset. The expressions land grabber'; land grabbing'; and land belonging to a private person' are sought to be defined under Clauses (d); (e); and (cc) of Section 2 and they read as under;
2 (d) "land grabber1 means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts, and also includes the successors in interest;
2 (e) "land grabbing" means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorized structures; and the term "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly", (Emphasis supplied) "2 (cc) 'land belonging to a private person' means any land belonging to -
(i) an evacuee;
(ii) a military personnel; or
(iii) any other private individual;
The value of the extent of which or the nature of the evil involved shall be of substantial nature or in the interest of justice required'.
16. A combined reading of these provisions makes it obvious that land grabbing means every act of grabbing any land, whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution, including wakf, or any other private person; meaning thereby, an evacuee; a military personnel, or any other private individual and the land grabber means a person or group of persons who commits the act of land grabbing or who abets the act of land grabbing by rendering financial aid for taking illegal possession of the lands without any lawful entitlement thereto and with a view to enter into the lands or to create illegal transactions or to construct unauthorized structures thereon. A glance at the expression 'land grabbing' enjoined under clause (e) of section 2 apparently shows that the act of land grabbing is in respect of the land belonging to the four categories of persons, namely, the Government, a local authority, religious or charitable institution, including wakf and a private person. The same expression has been used repeatedly on more than one occasion, as can be seen from the statement of objects and reasons; the preamble portion of the Act; and the definition clauses.
17. Under Section 1 Sub-section (3), the Act applies to all lands situate within the limits of urban agglomeration, as defined under Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Lane Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976, and in the Municipal areas. The Act also applies to other lands situate in such areas as the Government may notify specifically in regard thereto, as can be seen from sub-section (3-a) of section 1. From these two provisions it is obvious that the Act applies to all lands without there being any qualification, as in the case of clause (e) of section 2 of the Act. The definition of the expression 'person' as enjoined under Clause (g) of Section 2 is apt to be considered. It reads as under:
Section 2(g) "person" includes a group or body of persons, an association, or a religious or charitable institution or endowment, whether incorporated or not;
18. A perusal of the above excerpted provision shows that it is an inclusive definition. It includes group or body of persons, an association or a religious or charitable institution or endowment, whether incorporated or not. As can be seen from Section 7-A, the Special Tribunal shall have the power to try all cases not taken cognizance by the Special Court. Section 8 is an important provision in the Act, which deals with the procedural powers of the Special Court. Sub-section (1) thereof is germane in the context which reads as under:
8(1) The Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) it deems fit;
(Emphasis supplied)
19. It is obvious from a perusal of the above excerpted provision that the Special Court may either suo motu or on application made by any person take cognizance of and try every case arising out of an alleged act of land grabbing. The expression 'application made by any person' gains significance having regard to the controversy in these cases. Therefore, a combined reading of Sub-sections (3), (3-A) of Section 1; Clause (g) of Section 2, Sub-section (1) of Section 8, it may appear that the Act applies to all lands situate in urban agglomeration ormunicipality whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious orcharitable institution or individual person or group of persons or an association, while the act of land grabbing which entitles civil as well as criminal actions is confined only to the lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or any other private person; as can be seen from Section 2(e) of the Act. Ex.-facie it appears that there is a dichotomy or at any rate ambiguity in the provisions of the Act. Merely because the word 'person' has been used in Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act, which expression includes a body of persons or an association, when clause (e) of section 2 restricts the meaning of grabbing to the lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf or any other private person, it is not permissible to add words into the said definition so as to include persons other than the four categories enumerated inter alia in the said Section. Endeavour to make such an attempt, we are afraid, may amount to a judicial legislation. But then, is it permissible to construe both the provisions, namely, Section 2(e) and Section 2(g) read with Section 8(1) harmoniously so as to avoid any inconsistency and repugnancy, absurdity and anomaly.
20. A statute is to be construed according to the intent of it that makes it and the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the legislature - mens or sententia legis. The essence of the law lies in its spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it. Nevertheless in all ordinary cases the courts must be content to accept the litera legisas the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia legis. They must in general take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has said. Ita scriptum est is the first principle of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to or take from or modify the letter of the law, simply because they have reason to believe that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. Vide Salmond Jurisprudence. 12th - Edition, Pages 132 and 133.
21. When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words
"of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)"is the rule laid down in Heydon's case, which has now attained the status of a classic. The rule is also known as purposive construction or mischief rule.
22. The intention of legislature thus assimilates two aspects: In one aspect it carries the concept of meaning that is what the words mean and in another aspect it conveys the concept of purpose and object or the reasons permeate and pervade through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention that is the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meanings of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object, which apprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. The rule now firmly established is that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate, but proper to read that provision in its context. The context here means the statute as a whole, the previous statute of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. In Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and Ors. a constitution Bench of the Apex Court held thus:
While examining a particular statute for finding out the legislative intent, it is the attitude of the Judges in arriving at a solution by striking a balance between the letter and spirit of the statute without acknowledging that they have in any way supplemented the statute would be the proper criterion. The duty of the Judges is to expound and not to legislate. There is no doubt a marginal area in which the Courts mould or creatively interpret legislation and they are thus finishers, refiners and polishers of the legislation which come to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing. But a Judge is not entitled to add something more than what is there in the statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. A cardinal principle of construction of statutes that the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed.
Courts are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the guise of interpretation and they must avoid the activity of determining the meaning of a provision based on their own principle conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provisions to be interpreted is somehow fitted. Caution is all the more necessary in dealing with a legislative enactment to give effect to policies that are subject to bitter public and parliament controversy, for in controversial matters, there is room for difference of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable, it is parliament's opinion in these matters that is paramount.
When the question arises is the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is not only legitimate, but proper to read that provision in its context. The context means, the statute as a whole, the previous state of laws, other statutes in pari materia the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy
23. In view of the above discussion a peep into the background history of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, is expedient to be noticed. Having regard to the organized attempt on the part of certain lawless persons, either operating individually or in groups in order to grab, either by force or by deceit, the lands whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including wakf or any other private individuals in the State, more particularly, in urban areas, which was affecting adversely the public order, to curb such unlawful activities the Act was conceived. In order to avoid law's delays, both in civil and criminal courts, having regard to the expediency to deal civil as well as criminal actions by one and the same forum, so as to achieve the desired object of curbing the act of land grabbing, being resorted to by the mafia, more particularly in respect of urban lands, the State legislature deems it fit in its wisdom to remedy this menace by establishing a Special Tribunal at the District level and a Special Court at the State level, so as to eventually help the persons, who are not in a position to effectively defend their possession. This small piece of legislation contains 17 Sections with a schedule appended to the Act at the end. While Section 1 deals with the title, extent, application and commencement of the Act, Section 2 is an interpretation clause seeking to define various expressions used inter alia in the act. section 3 declares the act of land grabbing as an offence and Section 4 prohibits the said act and prescribes punishment for the same. Section 5 is yet another penal clause, which deals with other offences connected with the act of land grabbing. While Section 7 deals with the constitution of Special Courts, Section 7-A provides for the establishment of Special Tribunals. Section 8 deals with the procedure and powers of the Special Court and Section 9 seeks to confer on the Special Court the powers of civil Court as well as the Court of Sessions. Section 10 deals with the burden of proof. Section 11 confers power on the Special Court to try the offences notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 12 prohibits other criminal Courts from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under the Act, except with the previous sanction of the Special Tribunal. The persons acting under the Act shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code as per Section 13 and Section 14 extends protection to the persons acting in good faith. The Act has an overriding effect over other laws, as can be seen from Section 15. Section 17-A confers a power of review on the Special Court and as per Section 17-B, the schedule appended to the Act shall constitute the guidelines for the interpretation.
24. As discussed hereinabove the intention of the legislature can be gathered by reading the Act as a whole. However, as a measure of ex abundanti cautela the Act by incorporating Section 17-B mandates that the schedule appended to the Act shall constitute the guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of the Act.
25. The statement of objects and reasons reads thus:
It has come to the notice of the Government that there are organized attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups to grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf or any other private person.
26. It has been further mentioned in the said statement thus:
In urban areas due to pressure on land, prices have been constantly soaring high, and taking advantage of this phenomenon, unscrupulous and resourceful persons backed by wealth and following occupied without any semblance of right, vast extents of land belonging to the Government, Local authorities, Wakfs, and Charitable and Religious Endowments and evacuees and private persons. In several cases such illegal occupations were noticed in respect of lands, belonging to private individuals who are not in a position to effectively defend their possession. In many cases this is being done by organized groups loosely called "Mafia", a distinct class of economic offenders, operating in the cities of Andhra Pradesh. Unless all such cases of land grabbing are immediately detected and dealt sternly and swiftly by specially devised adjudicating forums the evil cannot subside and social injustice will continue to be perpetrated with impunity. If civil and criminal actions are dealt by two separate forums, the desired objective cannot be achieved due to procedural delays. In every case of land grabbing the person responsible is liable in tort and also for criminal action. To remedy this menace it is felt that a Special Court should be constituted with jurisdiction to determine both civil and criminal liabilities and also award sentences of imprisonment and fine in order to advance the cause of justice...
27. It is visibly clear from the above that the activity of land grabbing in urban areas is in respect of the lands belonging to Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowments, including a wakf, and private persons, who are not in a position to effectively defend their possession. When this intention of the legislature permeates and pervades clearly in the preamble portion of the Act; the statement of objects and reasons given in the schedule appended to the Act, and in the definition clause of Land Grabbing, merely because Section 8(1) reads that the Special Court can take cognizance, either suo motu or on an application filed by a person; which expression is defined under Section 2(g) as including a group of persons, or associations, it cannot be interpreted that the act of land grabbing is in respect of not only the lands belonging to the four categories of persons referred to inter alia in Section 2(e), but also the lands belonging to group of persons or associations, societies, companies etc. The act of land grabbing which alone gives jurisdiction to the special court is obviously in respect of the land belonging to the four categories as enumerated inter alia in Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. Futhermore, a purposive construction shall be made while seeking to interpret the statutory provisions.
28. Sri Shareef Ahmed, learned Counsel appearing for the some of the writ petitioners seeks to place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans in India . It was held in the said judgment that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is not a body corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act and therefore such a society is not a juristic person. That was a case where the respondent society was formed for protection of orphans in India and was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. One 'R' executed a Will bequeathing a part of his estate to an orphanage, being run by the respondent-society. When the executant died, the society applied for grant of letters of administration in pursuance of the said will under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act. The appellant resisted that application was not maintainable. Having regard to Sections 223 and 236 of the Indian Succession Act, which expressly prohibit grant of a probate or a letters of administration to any person who is a minor or of unsound mind, nor to any association of individuals, unless it is a company which specifies the conditions prescribed by rules to be made by notification in the official gazette in that behalf, it was held by the Apex Court that the respondent-society, which was formed for protection of orphans, cannot be considered a company or a juristic person. The above judgment, therefore, has no application to the facts in the instant case.
29. Having regard to the definition of the 'land grabber' and land grabbing' enjoined under Clauses (d) and (e) of Section 2, we are of the considered view that the act of land grabbing isconfined only to the lands, whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution and endowment or the land belonging to a private person, meaning thereby, an evacuee, a military personnel, or a private individual and the jurisdiction of the special court is attracted only when the act of land grabbing complained of pertains to the land belonging to those four categories of persons. For the above reasons, the application, filed by the respondent-society cannot be maintained before the Special Court. This does not mean that the society has no remedy, as a matter of that, the Special Tribunal/Special Court under the Act gets jurisdiction only when an act of land grabbing is committed in respect of the land belonging to the four categories of persons enumerated inter alia in clause (e) of section 2. In respect of any other civil dispute the civil Court continues to have jurisdiction.
30. Sri B.V. Ram Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents, contends that the issue of want of jurisdiction cannot at this stage be raised having not been raised at any stage of the proceedings hitherto. To buttress the said contention learned Counsel seeks to place reliance upon a judgment of this Court in K. Krishna v. The Special Court, Hyd. 1995 (1) APU 70. Obviously that Judgment does not pertain to inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal/Court. In respect of land belonging to private individuals, a rider has been added in Clause (cc) of Section 2 to the effect that only when the value or the extent of the land or the nature of the evil involved shall be of substantial nature or in the interest of justice required, it can squarely be brought within the purview of the definition of land grabbing, enjoined under Section 2(e) of the Act. It may be mentioned here that Special Tribunal is competent to take cognizance whenever any act of land grabbing is complained of in respect of a land belonging to a private individual but the value of the land or its extent must be of a substantial nature. Whether such land is of substantial nature or not is obviously a question of fact. What is sought to be contended before the Bench, in the judgment under reference was that it was not a case which could betaken cognizance by the Special Court since the value of the land in question was not of substantial nature. That is clearly not the point germane in the instant batch cases. Therefore, the judgment has no application to the facts in the instant case.
31. Learned Counsel further contends that in respect of another bit of land purchased from the aforesaid Devasthanam, when an application had been filed complaining land grabbing, before the Special Tribunal, Krishna at Machilipatnam, eventually the Tribunal allowed that application directing the respondents therein to vacate the land and that judgment of the Special Tribunal was confirmed by the Special Court in appeal and the writ petitions filed by the respondent in a batch like in the instant case, were eventually ended in dismissal. Therefore, in the case pertaining to the land adjacent to the land in dispute where in identical set of facts and circumstances already the matter has attained finality and therefore a view which is contra to the view that has already been taken by the Courts in the hierarchy is not permissible to be taken at this stage in the instant case. We are afraid we are not dealing this case on merits at this stage. The point germane is purely a question of law and touches the jurisdictional issue. Obviously, the applicant therein is neither a society nor an institution. Private individuals alleging the act of land grabbing approached the Special Tribunal. Therefore, the jurisdictional issue of maintainability of an application by a society before the Special Tribunal/Special Court has not clearly arisen in those cases. Therefore, the contention cannot be countenanced.
32. Apropos the jurisdiction of the Special Court, the Act not only deals with the rights of persons nay provides for a suitable remedy for redressal. The Act seeks to bring the civil as well as criminal remedies within the purview of one forum for expeditious disposal of the cases and to avoid law's delays, which are usual with the civil Courts notoriously for long periods. The Special Tribunal or Special Court are competent to try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of the land grabbed. Right of appeal is provided as against the decision of the Special Tribunal to the Special Court. However, finality is attached to the decision of the Special Court. Nevertheless, a right to review is conferred on the Special Court under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 is expedient to be considered in this context, which reads as under:
8 (2). Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Central Act 5 of 1980 [the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, Act 9 of 1972 any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act, [shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be tried in the Special Court] and the decision of Special Court shall be final.
33. A perusal of the above excerpted provision shows that the Special Court is competent to adjudicate the question of title, ownership, or lawful possession of any land alleged to have been grabbed and the matters pertaining to the act of land grabbing are triable by the Special Court. Having regard to the non-obstante clause used therein at the inception it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Special Court is exclusive. Under sub-section (8) of section 8, cases pending before any Court or authority immediately before the cqgjj32fitution of Special Court by means of operation of law stand automatically transferred to the Special Court. This further reinforces the above view. Under Section 15, the Act has overriding effect over the provisions of other Acts. The Act further delegates the rule making power to the Government to frame the necessary rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act. Rule 15 in particular deals with the procedure for taking possession of the land grabbed by the grabber. Thus, the Act is a self-contained code taking care of the right as well as the remedy.
34. Turning to the law on the point in Dhulabai v. State of M.P. . A constitution Bench of the Apex Court laid down certain indicia with reference to which the question as regards implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts can be discerned. In para 35 it is held thus:
Where the statute gives finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
35. In Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India . the Apex Court while following its judgment in Dhulabai's case (5 supra) in para 19 held thus:
Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred, if, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognized by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil court's jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions, the civil court's jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered in Dhullabhai case (5 supra)
36. In Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delh . a three judge bench of the Apex Court in para 23 held thus:
With the increase in the number of taxing statutes, welfare legislations and enactments to protect a class of citizens, a trend can be noticed that most of such legislations confer decision making powers on various authorities and they seek to limit or exclude court's power to review those decisions. The result is that the power of the court under Section 9 of the Code is being denuded and curtailed by such special enactments, in respect of liabilities created or rights conferred. This Court in the judgments referred to above has upheld the ouster of the jurisdiction of the court on examination of two questions - (1) whether the right or liability in respect whereof grievance has been made, had been created under an enactment and it did not relate to a pre-existing common law right? (2) Whether the machinery provided for redressal of the grievance in respect of infringement of such right or imposition of a liability under such enactment, was adequate and complete? The ouster of the jurisdiction of the court was upheld on the finding that the rights or liabilities in question had been created by the Act in question and remedy provided therein was adequate.
37. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India . a constitution bench of the Supreme Court considered its earlier judgment in Dhulabai's case (5 supra) and reiterated the same principles.
38. The legal position is thus obvious. Law presumes the continuity of jurisdiction of civil Courts, unless either expressly or by necessary implication it is taken away by any statute or special enactment. It is further obvious that the Tribunal/Special Court is a Court having all the trappings of a Civil Court. The Act from the above discussion clearly envisages the right as well as the remedy uno flatu on par with the civil Court. The jurisdiction of the Special Court is thus exclusive and it takes away impliedly the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Well when this is the clear position of law and when the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, is a self-contained code which deals with the right as well as remedies uno flatu and has the overriding effect over other laws and for the reasons hereinabove discussed it is obvious that jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal/Special Court, is exclusive and it ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of the alleged act of land grabbing. The Special Tribunal/Court under the Act is competent to decide and determine the questions as regards title, or right to, lawful possession of the land alleged to have been grabbed and those questions in respect of a land alleged to have been grabbed shall be tried by the Special Tribunal/Special Court alone whose decision is final, save and except the cases adjudicated by the special tribunal where the right of appeal is provided against its decision to the Special Court.
39. The position seems to be no more res integra. The Apex Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. . while dealing with the provisions of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, emphatically held that the Special Court is competent to try all the issues enjoined under the Act; obviously that of title, right to and possession over the land alleged to have been grabbed.
40. In State of A.P. v. P. V. Hanumantha Rao (1 supra) in para 28 the Apex Court held thus:
28. On examination of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1982 and in the light of its objects and reasons, it is apparent that in cases of alleged land-grabbing, exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Special Court. Jurisdiction of a civil court on such subject-matter stands ousted. The Special Court has been conferred powers of a civil court to examine all questions of title and possession with respect to the land alleged to have been grabbed. The findings of the Special Court are binding and conclusive on the parties and all others having interest in the land which is alleged to have been grabbed.
Again in para 35 it was held thus:
With the growing menace of land-grabbing, the Act of 1982 constitutes Special Courts and ousts jurisdiction of the regular civil courts in respect of land alleged to have been grabbed. Where the regular remedy provided by general law is ousted by special law, the provisions of the latter deserve to be construed strictly.
41. Nevertheless in a recent pronouncement of the Apex Court in N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act . a divergent view has been taken. It was held while parting with the matter thus:
The Special Court has no jurisdiction to decide questions relating to acquisition of title by adverse possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same would fall within the domain of the civil Courts.
42. While in the former two cases viz, Konda Lakshmana Bapuji's case (9 supra) and P. V. Hanumantha Rao's case (1 supra) the Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of the Act has eventually come to the conclusion that the Special Court is competent to try the issue of title, right to and possession over the land, in the latter case of N. Srinivasa Rao . the Court has neither considered its former two judgments nor the relevant provisions of the Act. Therefore the view expressed by the Apex Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji's case and P. V. Hanumantha Rao'scase (9 and 1 supra) shall have to be preferred qua its later view in N. Srinivasa Rao's case . In the event of any divergence between two judgments rendered by co-equal benches, the view, which stands to reason, shall have to be preferred over the other. We are reinforced in our above view by a full bench judgment of this Court in Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes , wherein in para 24 it was held thus:
Without making inroads into the settled principles governing the binding force of a decision of the Supreme Court either by virtue of its precedential value or the mandate of Article 141, we can safely evolve the principle that in a case of conflict arising from the decisions of coequal Benches of the Supreme Court, the High Court is free to disregard the decision which is based on an obvious mistake of fact or the one which purports to follow the ratio of an earlier decision though such ratio is found to be nonexistent. The High Court can legitimately decline to follow such decision and follow the earlier decision which is backed by reasoning-whether it is acceptable to the High Court or not, and which is free from any such apparent flaw.:
43. From the above it is obvious that the Special Tribunal/Special court is competent to try and determine the issue of title, right to, or possession of the land alleged to have been grabbed. The jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal/Special Court is attracted when once it is discernible from the application that there has been an act of land grabbing committed by the respondent therein. When once the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal/Court is attracted, the question as regards the title, right to, or possession of that land shall have to be decided only by it. Visualizing a situation where in the wake of an allegation of committing an act of land grabbing, which attracts the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal/Special Court and if the issue of title over such land shall have to be determined only by the Civil Court, a party shall have to approach the Special Court in respect of a part of the cause of action and the civil Court in respect of the other part. A party cannot be driven to approach the Special Court as well as the Civil Court simultaneously when he complains of grabbing of his land.
44. For the above reasons, we are of the considered view that the Special Court is competent to try and determine the issue of title over the land. Well when once the Special Court is competent to try and determine the question of title over the land, it is equally competent to determine that question when there is a plea of title by means of prescription. For the above reasons, the contention that the Special Court is not competent to try the question of title by means of adverse possession cannot be countenanced.
45. As regards the merits of the case, the finding of the Special Court that the respondents failed to prove the plea of adverse possession is impeccable and quite unassailable. It has not been shown before us that any jurisdictional error has been committed by the Special Court. Similarly, the contention that a general notice was issued by the applicant initially and that notice amounts to a quit notice and consequently the application cannot be maintained, cannot also be considered, having regard to the conclusions reached by us hereinabove; they are quite not relevant to deal with the same. It is not as though the parties are remediless. They can approach a competent civil Court for redressal of their grievances.
46. For the above reasons, the batch of writ petitions is allowed. Consequently, LG.O.P. No. 138 of 1984 filed on the file of the Special Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam, stands dismissed. However, there shall be no separate order as to costs.
47. This Writ Petitions having been set down for being mentioned this Monday the Twenty Eighth day of August, Two thousand and Six for seeking to reconsidering the order Dated 23-08-2006 and upon perusing the order of the court dated 23-08-2006 and upon hearing the arguments of the above said counsel.
The Court made the following.
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