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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were filed to quash criminal proceedings registered as CC No. 1095/96 and CC No. 17/97 before the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The petitioners in the respective petitions are accused designated A7 and A4; the 1st respondent is the complainant (a limited company engaged in telecommunications equipment manufacture), and the other respondents are co-accused.

In CC No. 1095/96 the complainant alleged that the accused company borrowed Rs. 37.78 lakhs as an inter-corporate deposit and that the company, represented by its Managing Director (A2), issued cheque No. 262804 dated 8-10-1996 for Rs. 4,646,380 which was presented on 28-10-1996 and dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. A debt voucher dated 13-11-1996, based on a memorandum dated 28-10-1996 from Union Bank of India (Sawkarpet, Madras), was issued; the complainant served a legal notice on 18-11-1996 and filed the complaint on 5-12-1996. Petitioners challenge proceedings in CC No. 1095/96 via Criminal Petition No. 3584/97.

In CC No. 17/97 the complainant alleged that the accused company borrowed Rs. 20,00,000 as an inter-corporate deposit and that the Managing Director issued cheque No. 262804 dated 15-10-1996 for Rs. 2,420,000 which was presented on 26-10-1996 and dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. A debt voucher dated 13-11-1996 based on the 28-10-1996 memorandum from Union Bank was issued; the complainant served a legal notice on 18-11-1996 and filed the complaint on 5-12-1996. Petitioners challenge proceedings in CC No. 17/97 via Criminal Petition No. 3585/97.

Because the parties and points involved are the same in both petitions, the Court disposed of them by a common order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings in CC No. 1095/96 and CC No. 17/97 are liable to be quashed as against the petitioners (A7 and A4) under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in view of the facts and the provisions of Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The 1st petitioner (A7) had ceased to be a director of the accused company with effect from 28-02-1995 and therefore cannot be prosecuted for debts of the company.
  • The complaints contain no allegations that the petitioners, as directors, participated in the management of the company at the time the cheques were issued; thus they cannot be held liable under Section 141/138.
  • The cheques were returned on 28-10-1996 but the complainant issued the demand notice only on 14-11-1996, which is beyond the 15-day period prescribed by proviso (b) of Section 138; hence proviso (b) was not complied with.
  • The demand notices sought amounts in excess of the cheque amounts (i.e., included interest), and therefore the notices were not in accordance with law under Section 138(c); lacking proper cause of action, no complaint can be made under Section 142(b).

Complainant's (Respondent No.1) Arguments

  • All accused participated in the day-to-day transactions of the accused company and the demand notices were served on all accused including the petitioners; except the accused company, none of the other accused replied to the notice.
  • The 1st petitioner never ceased to be a director, contrary to petitioners' claim.
  • The bank informed the complainant of the dishonour by issuing a debt voucher dated 13-11-1996 (based on the 28-10-1996 memorandum); the demand notice dated 14-11-1996 was therefore within the 15-day period and compliant with Section 138.
  • A demand for amount in excess of the cheque amount (interest claimed) is merely superfluous and does not invalidate the notice; it does not vitiate the notice's compliance with law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1997 Cri. LJ 3616 (2) : 1985 (2) ALT 518 Authority for the proposition that unless a complaint specifically alleges that directors/partners were in charge and responsible for management of the company/firm at the time of the alleged offence, they cannot be prosecuted under provisions analogous to Section 138. The Court relied on this principle to hold that because the complaints contained no averments that the petitioners were in charge and responsible for the company's affairs when the cheques were issued, the petitioners could not be prosecuted and the proceedings against them were liable to be quashed.
Gopa Devi Ojha v. Surjeet Pal, 1995 (11) CH. 37 Held (in that decision) that a demand notice which exceeds the cheque amount is not in accordance with law and invalidates the cause of action under proviso (c) of Section 138. The Court noted this decision as relied upon by the petitioners but expressly disagreed with it—holding that a demand for additional amounts (e.g., interest) is superfluous and does not invalidate the notice.
Sri Prasantha Aggarwal v. Sri S.K. Rai Regional Manager, Electronics and Trade Development Corporation, 1997 Cal. Crl. LR 104 Similar authority to the above: where the demand in the notice exceeded the cheque amount, the notice was held not in accordance with law and the complaint was quashed. The Court considered this decision but rejected its applicability, holding instead that excess monetary claims in the notice are superfluous and do not render the notice invalid under Section 138.
S. Venu v. N.C. Corporation, All India Criminal Reporter 1994 (2) Madras 644 Rule that if more than the cheque amount is claimed in the demand notice, that additional claim is superfluous and will not invalidate the notice. The Court relied on this decision to support its conclusion that the complainant's claim of interest in the demand notice does not invalidate the notice and thus does not defeat the cause of action under Section 138.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the legal framework by extracting and summarising the operative conditions of Section 138 (dishonour of cheque) and Section 142 (cognizance) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It identified the statutory pre-conditions: (a) presentation of cheque within six months or within validity period; (b) written demand within 15 days from receipt of information of dishonour; (c) drawer's failure to pay within 15 days of the notice; and (d) filing a complaint within one month from the date on which the cause of action arises under proviso (c).

The Court addressed each contention in turn:

  1. Resignation/Director status: The petitioners relied on a xerox copy of Form No. 32 (Companies Act) alleging resignation of A7 as director effective 28-02-1995. The Court found the document unreliable because it was unsigned and not attested as a true copy, and therefore rejected the contention that the petitioner had ceased to be director on that date.
  2. Liability of directors: The Court analysed Section 141 (liability when a company or firm commits an offence) and reiterated that prosecution of individuals requires specific averments that the person was "in charge and responsible" for the affairs and conduct of the company at the time of the alleged offence. The Court observed that both complaints lacked any allegations to that effect with regard to these petitioners (A7 and A4). The Court reasoned that mere directorship alone is not sufficient to fasten criminal liability where there is no pleading that the director was in charge of management; sleeping or non-participating directors may incur civil liability but not criminal liability without proper averments.
  3. Timeliness of demand notice: The petitioners contended the demand notice was issued beyond the 15-day period. The complainant asserted receipt of information of dishonour on 13-11-1996 (via debt voucher) and issuance of notice on 14-11-1996, thus within 15 days. The Court treated this as a factual dispute and held that such factual questions cannot be resolved in a Section 482 Cr.P.C. exercise; the Court must confine itself to the facts as alleged in the complaint, leaving the truth to be determined at trial.
  4. Excess amount claimed in demand notice: The petitioners relied on authorities that held notices demanding amounts in excess of the cheque amount to be invalid. The Court disagreed with those authorities (specifically referring to Gopa Devi Ojha and Sri Prasantha Aggarwal) and accepted the view of the Madras High Court in S. Venu v. N.C. Corporation: an incidental claim for additional amounts (e.g., interest) is superfluous and does not invalidate the demand notice; the drawer could have discharged the cheque amount alone. Accordingly, the Court found no merit in the contention that the notices were legally defective on that ground.

Weighing the analysis, the Court concluded that because the complaints did not contain specific averments that these petitioners were in charge and responsible for the company's affairs at the material time, the proceedings against these petitioners could not be sustained and were to be quashed. The Court made clear that this quashing was limited to the petitioners only and did not affect proceedings against the other accused.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were allowed and the criminal proceedings in CC No. 1095/96 and CC No. 17/97 were QUASHED as against the petitioners (A7 and A4). The cases against the other accused were permitted to proceed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The criminal proceedings in the two complaints stand quashed only insofar as they pertain to the petitioners; the prosecution may continue against the remaining accused.
  • On directors' liability: The Court reaffirmed that to prosecute directors for offences under Section 138 (read with Section 141), the complaint must specifically aver that those directors were in charge and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time; absent such averments, criminal prosecution of non-managing/sleeping directors is inappropriate.
  • On demand notices: The Court held (endorsing S. Venu) that an incidental claim for interest or other amounts in the demand notice in excess of the cheque amount is superfluous and does not invalidate the notice under Section 138. The Court explicitly disagreed with decisions which held otherwise.
  • Precedential effect: The order applies to the facts of these petitions. The opinion contrasts with some prior decisions but does not expressly state that it is laying down a binding new precedent beyond its reasoning and the result in these petitions.

Result: Both petitions allowed; proceedings quashed against petitioners only; remaining accused may be tried.

    G.L Modi And Another v. Xedd Finance & Investments Pvt., Ltd. And Others

    1. These two petitions have been filed under Section 482 Cr. PC to quash the proceedings in CC No. 1095/96 and CC No. 17/97 respectively on the file of V Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.

    2. The petitioners herein are A7 and A4 respectively in both the cases and the 1st respondent herein is the complainant and respondents 2 to 6 are the other accused in the said cases. As the parties are the same and the point involved in both the petitions is the same, these petitions are being disposed of by a common order.

    3. The 1st respondent herein is a Limited Company and it manufactures the equipments relating to Telecommunications and allied activities. The 1st respondent filed the complaint in CC No. 1095/96 against these petitioners and respondents 2 to 6 herein for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter called as Act). It is alleged in the complaint that during the course of business, the 1st accused company represented by other accused borrowed a sum of Rs. 37.78 lakhs as Inter Corporate Deposit from the complainant and in discharge of that debt together with interest thereon, the 1st accused company represented by A2 who is its Managing Director, issued the cheque bearing No. 262804, dated 8-10-1996 for Rs. 4646380 drawn on Union Bank of India, Sawkarpet branch, Madras. The complainant deposited the said cheque for realisation in its Banker, State Bank of Hyderabad, Industrial Finance, Branch, Panjagutta, on 28-10-96, but the said cheque was dishonoured due to “insufficiency of funds” in the account and the same was informed to the complainant by its Banker through the debt voucher dated 13-11-96 which was issued basing on the memorandum, dated 28-10-96 issued by the Union Bank of India, Sawkarpet, Madras. Thereafter, legal notice, dated 14-11-96 was issued to all the accused calling upon them to repay the outstanding amount of Rs. 46,46,380/- with interest at the rate of 26% per annum within 15 days of receipt of the said legal notice. The said notice was served on all the accused on 18-11-96. The 1st accused issued reply notice, dated 20-11-96 and the said reply notice was received by the Counsel for the complainant on 30-11-1996. Thereafter, the complaint has been filed on 5-12-96. The learned Magistrate took the case on file and issued the process for the appearance of the petitioners and other accused. The petition in Crl. P. No. 3584/97 has been filed to quash the proceedings in CC No. 1095/96 against the petitioners herein.

    4. The 1st respondent in Criminal Petition No. 3585/97 filed the complaint in CC No. 17/97 against the petitioners and respondents 2 to 7 for the offence under Section 138 of the Act alleging that the 1st accused, company represented by other accused, borrowed a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- as Inter Corporate Deposit from the complainant and in discharge of that debt, the 2nd accused representing the 1st accused-company issued the cheque bearing No. 262804, dated 15-10-1996 for a sum of Rs. 24,20,000/- towards the principal and interest drawn on Union Bank of India, Sawkarpet branch, Madras. The said cheque was presented by the complainant in its Bank i.e State Bank of Hyderabad, Industrial Finance, Panjagutta, Hyderabad on 26-10-96, but the said cheque was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in the account of the accused, and the same was informed to the complainant by its branch through debt voucher dated 13-11-96 which was based on the memorandum dated 28-10-96 issued by Union Bank of India, Sawkarpet branch, Madras. Thereafter, the complainant got a legal notice, dated 14-11-96 issued to all the accused calling upon them to repay the outstanding amount of Rs. 24,20,000/- with interest at the rate 24% per anum within 15 days of receipt of said legal notice. The said notice was served on all the accused on 18-11-96. The 1st accused alone issued a reply, dated 20-11-96 and the said reply was received by the complainant on 30-11-96. Thereafter, the complainant filed a case on 5-12-1996 and the same was taken on file by the Magistrate as CC No. 17/97 and issued process for appearance of all the accused. Challenging the said proceedings, the petitioners who are A7 and A4 respectively have come up with this petition No. 3585/97.

    5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners raised the following contentions:

    (1) The 1st petitioner who is A7 in both the cases, ceased to be a Director of the 1st accused company with effect from 28-2-1995 and as such, he is not liable to be prosecuted, for the amount due by the company-accused.

    (2) There are no allegations in the complaint that these petitioners as Directors of the accused-company were also participating in the management of the company at the time of the issuance of the cheque by the 2nd accused, as Managing Director of the accused-company.

    (3) That the cheques in both the cases were returned on 28-10-96 with endorsement of “Insufficiency of funds”, but the complainant issued the notice only on 14-11-96 which is beyond the period of 15 days prescribed under the proviso (b) of Section 138 of the Act.

    (4) In the notice of demand issued, the complainant claimed for more than the amount mentioned in the dishonoured cheque and as such, it is not in accordance with law and it does not give cause of action in terms of Section 138(c) of the Act and as there was no cause of action, no complaint can be made in accordance with Section 142(b) of the Act.

    6. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent-complainant submits that all the accused had been participating in the day-to-day transactions of the accused-company, that the demand notices issued on behalf of the complainant were served on all the accused including the petitioners. But, except the accused-company, none of the other accused including the petitioners gave any reply to the said demand notice, that the 1st petitioner never ceased to be Director of the Company as contended by him. It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, that the dishonour of the cheques was informed to the complainant on 13-11-96 only through debt voucher issued by its bank i.e, State Bank of Hyderabad, based on the memorandum, dated 28-10-96 issued by Union Bank of India, Sawkarpet branch, Madras to which the cheque was sent for realisation and the demand notice was issued on 14-11-96 itself and thus, there is proper compliance of the provision under Section 138 of the Act. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent further contends that if some more amount than the cheque amount is claimed in the demand notice, then that would be a superflous one and it will not invalidate the notice.

    7. The point that arise for consideration is whether the proceedings in CC No. 1095/96 and CC No. 17/97 are liable to be quashed as against these petitioners?

    8. For appreciation of the rival contentions of the Counsel, it is necessary to look into the Sections 138 and 142 of the Act.

    “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account:— Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

    Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

    (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

    (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

    (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee, or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

    Explanation:—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability”

    9. Section 142 reads as under:

    “142. Cognizance of offences:—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

    (a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee, or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

    (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138;

    (c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.”

    10. It is clear from the above provisions that to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act: (a) the cheque in question should have been presented to the bank within a period of six months of the date of its drawal and within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or holder in due course, of such cheque should have made a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days from the date of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque unpaid; (c) the drawer of such cheque should have failed to make the payment of the said amount to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice;

    (d) the complaint is made within one month from the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act.

    11. As regards the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the 1st petitioner who is A7 in both the cases, ceased to be a Director of the 1st accused-company with effect from 28-2-1995, the learned Counsel relied on a xerox copy of Form No. 32 of the Companies Act, 1956 relating to the particulars of appointment of Directors and Manager and the changes thereon wherein it is shown that Mr. G.L Modi is said to have resigned as Director with effect from 28-2-1995. But, this document cannot be relied upon for the reason that it has not been signed by anybody, nor it has been attested as true copy. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the said contention.

    12. As regards the second contention that there are no averments in the complaint that these petitioners as Directors of the accused-company were participating in the day-to-day management of the company at the time of the commission of the offence i.e, on the date of issuance of the cheques by the 2nd accused, it is not in dispute that the cheques in question in these cases were issued by the 2nd accused as Managing Director of the 1st accused-company. A reading of Section 141 of the Act discloses that if the offence under Section 138 of the Act is committed by a company or firm, every person who was incharge and responsible for the affairs and conduct of the business of the company or firm as the case may be, at the time when the alleged offence was committed is also liable for prosecution along with the company. But, there should be averments to the effect that such a person was incharge and responsible for the affairs and conduct of the business of the company or firm. As seen from the averments in both these complaints, there are no allegations to that effect. It is simply stated that the 1st accused-company represented by the accused 2 to 7 borrowed the amount as Inter Corporate Deposit from the complainant. Except this there are no other allegations in these complaints that these petitioners were also incharge or responsible for the management and affairs of the accused-company at the time of issuance of the cheques. It has been consistently held by this Court that unless there are allegations in the complaint filed for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act that the Directors or partners of a company or firm are also incharge and responsible for the management of the business of the company or firm, they are not liable to be prosecuted. Vide 1997 Cri. LJ 3616 (2) : 1985 (2) ALT 518.

    13. In the instant case, admittedly the cheques were issued by the Managing Director of the 1st accused-company and in both the complaints, there are no specific allegations that these petitioners were incharge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of alleged commission of offence. It is common knowledge that in a company or firm there may be sleeping partners or Directors who are admitted for the benefits only and they are not taken any interest or participate in the day-to-day business of the firm or company and they cannot be made liable for the offences committed by the Managing Partner or Managing Director. There may be civil liability on their part, but they should not be presented for criminal offences. Hence, the proceedings against these petitioners are liable to be quashed.

    14. As regards the third contention, it is a question of fact whether the complainant had the knowledge about the dishonour of the cheques on 28-10-96 as contended by the petitioners or on 13-11-96 as alleged by the complainant. It is well settled that the questions of fects cannot be decided in a proceedings under Section 482 Cr. PC. In proceedings under Section 482 Cr. PC. this Court has to confine to the facts as alleged in the complaint by the prosecution. Truth or otherwise of the allegations made by the prosecution has to be determined only by the trial Court after full trial. Hence, I do not find any force in this contention.

    15. As regards the fourth contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as seen from the averments in the complaint, it seems that the complainant made a demand in his demand notices for the repayment of the outstanding amount due under the cheques together with interest at the rate of 24% per annum within 15 days of the receipt of the legal notice. Simply because, the complainant demanded for interest on the outstanding amount due under the cheques in the demand notices, it cannot be said that the notices are illegal or not in conformity with law. There is no ambiguity with regard to the amounts claimed in the said notices. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision in Gopa Devi Ojha v. Surjeet Pal, 1995 (11) CH. 37, and the case in Sri Prasantha Aggarwal v. Sri S.K Rai Regional Manager, Electronics and Trade Development Corporation, 1997 Cal. Crl. LR 104. In those cases, filed under Section 138 of the Act, the complainant while issuing the demand notice in compliance of the proviso of Section 138 of the Act demanded for the cheque amount besides interest on the cheque amount. Under those circumstances, it has been held in those decisions that as the demand in the demand notice exceeded the amount due under the cheque it is not in accordance with law and the consequent non-payment cannot give rise to cause of action in terms of proviso (c) of Section 138 of the Act and since, there was no cause of action, no complaint can be made in accordance with Section 142(b) of the Act, and consequently, the complaint was quashed. I am unable to agree with the said observations in those decisions. When there is a specific demand in the demand notice for the payment of the dishonoured cheque amount together with interest thereon, it cannot be said that notice is (sic ‘not’) in conformity with the proviso (b) of Section 138 of the Act and it does not invalidate (sic ‘invalidates’) the notice. The amount claimed towards interest would be a superflous one and the drawer of the cheque could have complied with the demand for the cheque amount alone by paying the same and refusing to pay the amount towards interest claimed in the notice. I am fortified in my opinion by the decision of Madras High Court in S. Venu v. N.C Corporation, reported in All India Criminal Reporter 1994 (2) Madras 644, wherein it is held that if some more amount than the cheque amount is claimed in the notice, that would be a superflous and it will not validate the notice. Therefore, this contention of the petitioners also fails. While discussing supra, the second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it is held by me that the petitioners who are Directors of the 1st accused-company are not liable for prosecution for the reason that there are no allegations in the complaints that these petitioners were incharge of the management of accused-company on the date of the issuance of the cheques. Hence, the proceedings initiated against these petitioners in CC No. 1095/96 and in CC No. 17/97 are liable to quashed. Accordingly, they are quashed against these petitioners only. The cases against the other accused could be proceeded with.

    16. In the result, both the petitioners are allowed.

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    G.L Modi And Another v. Xedd Finance & Investments Pvt., Ltd. And Others
    (Dec 22, 1997)