S.S Ahmad, C.J:— This contempt appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is directed against the judgment and order dated 26-9-1994 in contempt case No. 575 of 1993 by which the respondent herein was punished for having committed contempt of court by violating the decree passed in original suit. No. 209 of 1985 on the file of the II Additional Judge's Court, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
2. The Court, however, refused to restore possession of the land to the appellants on the ground that a Division Bench of this Court had, in writ appeal No. 15407 of 1992, already directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding possession of the land as obtaining on the date of that judgment. The appellants herein had filed original suit No. 209 of 1985 in the Court of the II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against (1) the State of Andhra Pradesh, (2) the Commissioner of Industries, Government of Andhra Pradesh and (3) the Regional Development Officer, Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh. The said suit was decreed on 15-4-1986 by declaring G.O.Ms No. 89, Industries, Commerce and Power (I.F Cell) Department, dated 18-2-1985 as illegal and arbitrary and further restraining the defendants from dispossessing or disturbing or in any way causing interference with the enjoyment of the property by the plaintiffs viz., the appellants herein.
3. An appeal against the aforesaid decree was preferred in C.C.C.A No. 118 of 1986 in which interim order was not granted. In the meantime, the Government issued show cause notice on 3-12-1992 to the appellants for terminating their leases and after hearing them G.O.Ms No. 223, Industries, Commerce and Power (I.F Cell) Department, dated 11-6-1993 was passed by which the leases of the appellants in respect of plot Nos. 14/1 and 24/2 situated at Azamabad industrial area, Hyderabad were terminated and the possession of the land was resumed by the Government. By that time, A.P Act XV of 1992 had come into force. Questioning the validity of A.P Act XV of 1992, a number of petitions including Writ Petition No. 12180 of 1994 and batch as also Writ Appeal Nos. 741 and 800 of 1993 were filed which were ultimately dismissed on 18-8-1994 and the validity of A.P Act XV of 1992 has been upheld.
4. Since the possession of the appellants was disturbed in spite of the decree passed by the trial Court in the original suit referred to above and in spite of the fact that interim order was not granted by this Court in the appeal preferred against the decree in the said original suit, the appellants filed a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for action being taken against the respondent and other officers of the Government for having committed contempt of court in dispossessing the appellants from the plots of land referred to above.
5. The contempt case was duly registered and notices were issued to the respondents herein as also to the other officers of the Government. The learned single Judge by his judgment and order dated 23-9-1994 held the respondent herein who is the Secretary, Industries Department, as guilty of contempt. But, the second respondent in the contempt case was discharged as he was not a party to the suit. The learned single Judge passed the following operative order:
“The 1st respondent, Secretary, Industries Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, is a party to suit in O.S No. 209 of 1985. Therefore, he is guilty of contempt. Since the 2nd respondent is not a party to the said suit, he is discharged from the contempt. Therefore the 1st respondent-Secretary, Industries Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, is directed to appear on Monday i.e, 26-9-1994 at 10.30 A.M in this Court to receive the punishment.
Sri C.P Sarathy, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since the petitioners were dispossessed in violation of the decree of the Civil Court, they should be put back in possession of the property. But the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment referred to above, has directed the parties to apply to the Government under Sec. 4 of the Act and pending disposal of the application ordered to maintain status quo as on the date of the judgment regarding possession of the land. Since the Government is in possession of the land as on the date of the judgment, by virtue of this direction the status quo has to be maintained, I am unable to accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners for redelivery of the land.
Post the case on 26-9-1994 for appearance of 1st Respondent.”
6. A perusal of the above operative portion of the judgment indicates that the learned single Judge refused to order restoration of possession to the appellants on the ground that the Division Bench while disposing of writ petitions and writ appeals relating to the validity of A.P Act No. XV of 1992 had directed that status quo as regards possession on the date of the judgment shall be maintained by the parties. The appellants, therefore, have come up in appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
7. Learned Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the contemnor, has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the appeal. This Contempt Appeal has been filed by the informers namely, the appellants before us, who had moved the Court with a contempt petition for action being taken against the respondents. It is contended by the learned Advocate-General that a Contempt Appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is maintainable only at the instance of the person punished for contempt and not by any other person including the informers. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provides as under:
““19. Appeals:— (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt —
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that—
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail: and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt.
(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).
(4) An appeal under Sub-section (1) shall be filed —
(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days;
(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days,
from the date of the order appealed against.””
8. A perusal or this Section would indicate that an appeal would lie as of right against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The provisions of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, have since been interpreted by the Supreme Court in D.N Taneja v. Bhajan Lal (1) (1988) 3 SCC 26. In paragraph 12 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as under:
“Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration. In this connection, it may be noticed that there was no right of appeal under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It is for the first time that under Section 19(1) of the Act, a right of appeal has been provided for. A Contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor. Any person who moves the machinery of the Court for contempt only brings to the notice of the Court certain facts constituting contempt of Court. After furnishing such information he may still assist the Court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only two parties, namely, the Court and the contemnor. It may be one of the reasons which weighed with the legislature in not conferring any right of appeal on the petitioner for contempt. The aggrieved party under Section 19(1) can only be the contemnor who has been punished for contempt of Court”.
9. This decision has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in T. Vasantha Lakshmi v. Principal, A.P.S.W.R School (2) 1992 (2) A.P.L.J 77, of which one of us (Justice B. Subhashan Reddy) was a party and it was laid down therein as under:
“Thus an appeal shall lie as of right only from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. An appeal thus lies only when (a) the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised and (b) the contemnor is punished. No appeal is provided against any order or decision which does not punish for contempt. Appeal does not lie when the High Court refuses to take action in contempt i.e, refuses to exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 19 does not provide an appeal where either contempt action is not initiated or where the contemnor is discharged after notice. In other words, there is no appeal against discharge or acquittal. Appeal lies only against conviction.”
10. Another Division Bench of this Court in S. Sammaiah v. A.P.S.E.B (3) 1994 (2) A.P.L.J 264 (HC) : 1994 (2) A.L.T 729 has followed the above decision and has laid down that an appeal lies only where punishment is imposed for contempt. It also laid down that an applicant who files an application for action being taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is not an aggrieved party and therefore an appeal at his instance is not maintainable.
11. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decisions of this Court and we are also of the view that an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, lies only against the order of punishment and an informer or a person who moves the court for action being taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against another person, is not a person aggrieved and an appeal at his instance is not maintainable.
12. Sri C.P Sarathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, referred to a decision of this Court in Kanedena Veeraiah v. Narra Venkateshwarlu (4) 1985 (2) A.P.L.J 193, and contended that an appeal at the instance of the person who had moved the court for action being taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, would be maintainable.
13. This decision lays down that the High Court has inherent power to direct restoration of possession in contempt proceedings, but in view of the Supreme Court decision in D.N Taneja's case (Supra), we cannot read this decision as an authority for the proposition that an appeal at the instance of the informer is maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. This decision is, therefore, of no avail to Sri. C.P Sarathy.
14. Sri C.P Sarathy also referred to an English decision in Lenton v. Tregoning (5) 1960, Vol. 1 All E.L.R 717 and contended that an appeal would lie even at the instance of the person applying to the Court for action being taken against a person accused of having committed contempt of Court.
15. In this decision, no provision akin to the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was considered. Sri C.P Sarathy also referred to Haisbury's Laws of England (4th Edition, 9th Volume, paragraph 107, page 65) with regard to the right of appeal and referred to the following passage:
“Right of Appeal. Formerly, the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction and power to hear and determine an appeal from an order of the High Court, or a Judge thereof, on an application for leave to issue attachment or for committal, but no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order for attachment or committal in a case of criminal contempt.
The Administration of Justice Act, 1960 provides a uniform procedure for appeal from any order or decision of a Court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of Court, including criminal contempt. An appeal lies in any case at the instance of the defendant and, in the case of an application for committal or attachment, at the instance of the applicant.”
16. The last but one sentence of the para extracted above refers to the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. Section 13(2) of that Act indicates that an applicant would have the right of appeal in respect of an application for committal or attachment while the defendant may appeal in any other case. This passage is not applicable to the law of contempt as practised here as Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, gives right of appeal only to a person punished for contempt and to no other person.
17. In view of the above we are in agreement with the learned Advocate-General that the present appeal is not maintainable and the preliminary objection raised by him is upheld.
18. In the result, the Contempt Appeal is dismissed at the admission stage.