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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 41 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959,
  • section 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act
  • section 28(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act
  • SECTION 35 INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • Act 16 of 1963 and after amendment section 14(4)
  • section 35 of the Income-fax Act
  • Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953,
  • Section 14, sub-section (4),
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 41 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959,
  • section 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act
  • section 28(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act
  • SECTION 35 INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • Act 16 of 1963 and after amendment section 14(4)
  • section 35 of the Income-fax Act
  • Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953,
  • Section 14, sub-section (4),
Smart Summary

Summary of Judicial Opinion — Kuppuswamy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a firm running a hotel that challenged a notice dated 12 September 1963 by way of a writ petition for prohibition. For the year 1959–60 the petitioner had been assessed to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 79,900. A watch placed on the premises by tax staff recorded sales on four days which produced an average daily sale of Rs. 535 (the four recorded daily sales totaling Rs. 2,142.25). Using this average and multiplying by 313 working days, the assessing authority computed an annual turnover of Rs. 1,67,455 and concluded that Rs. 87,555 had escaped assessment; it proposed to assess that escaped turnover at 3%. The notice directed the dealer to file written objections by 24 September 1963 and warned that failure to appear would be treated as having no objections.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the use of a continuous or extended "watch" on the petitioner's business premises, and the use of the sales recorded during that watch as the basis for estimating annual turnover, rendered a notice under section 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act illegal.
  2. Whether section 14(4) of the Act, as amended by Act 16 of 1963 to permit determination "to the best of [the authority's] judgment" of escaped turnover, could be applied retrospectively to permit a "best judgment" assessment for the 1959–60 year (i.e., whether the amendment affected only procedure or affected substantive/vested rights and so could not be applied to completed assessments made before the amendment).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The authorities were not entitled to keep a continuous watch over the hotel premises; reliance on such a continuous watch to estimate escaped turnover is contrary to the statute (this contention was based on the decision in Lakshmana Rao & Sons v. Special Commercial Tax Officer).
  • Section 14(4) as it stood before amendment by Act 16 of 1963 did not empower the authorities to make a "best judgment" assessment; a notice which estimates the entire year's turnover from an average of sales observed on four watched days is therefore illegal.

Respondent / Government Pleader's Arguments

  • The amended section 14(4) (by Act 16 of 1963) expressly empowers the assessing authority to determine to the best of its judgment the turnover which escaped assessment (section 14(4)(a)).
  • Although the amendment was not expressly made retrospective, the Government Pleader contended that it merely affected procedure and therefore should be given retrospective effect so as to apply to the assessment for 1959–60.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lakshmana Rao & Sons v. Special Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada [1962] 13 S.T.C. 860 Held that section 28(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act does not authorise authorities to watch continually a hotel throughout the day for several days. Court accepted that authorities are not entitled to continuous watch as held in that case, but held that the mere fact of watching sales and taking those sales into account does not, by itself, vitiate a notice under section 14(4).
Annamalai Chettiar & Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Holds that an assessment order based on documents or account books seized under certain provisions (declared unconstitutional) is not thereby illegal; distinction between illegality of seizure and admissibility/utility of seized material as evidence. Court relied on the analogy that it is one thing to say search/seizure is illegal and another to say documents seized cannot be used as evidence; by analogy, watched sales may be used as a basis for issuing a notice of escapement.
The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ravuri Narasimloo [1965] 16 S.T.C. 54 In exercising power under section 14(4) (pre-amendment), the authorities cannot make a "best judgment assessment"; the subsection was confined to assessing turnover that was shown to have escaped assessment, not to making estimates by inference. Court held that the notice in the present case proceeded on a best-judgment computation of turnover (inference from four watched days) and therefore was illegal under the pre-amendment rule affirmed in this precedent.
Lakshminarayana Chetty v. Additional Income-tax Officer Section permitting rectification of an assessment affects vested rights and therefore cannot be construed as retrospective unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication makes it retrospective. Court invoked the principle that provisions which affect vested rights cannot be given retrospective effect; used to reject the argument that the 1963 amendment (which affects the quantum of tax) could be applied retrospectively.
Kundan Lal v. Income-tax Officer, B. Ward, Amritsar [1959] 37 I.T.R. 337 (cited via Supreme Court approval in Income-tax Officer, V Circle, Madras v. Habibullah) Supports the proposition that an amendment to a tax provision which affects vested rights (e.g., clause (5) of section 35 of the Income-tax Act enacted by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953) is not merely declaratory and cannot be treated as retrospective beyond express terms. Court cited this line of authority (including approval by the Supreme Court) to reinforce that statutory amendments affecting substantive tax liabilities are not to be applied retrospectively merely because they relate to assessment procedure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main analytical steps corresponding to the petitioner's two principal contentions.

  1. On the contention that continuous watching of premises and use of the observed sales rendering a notice illegal:
    • The court accepted the holding in Lakshmana Rao & Sons that authorities are not authorised to keep a continuous watch on a hotel throughout the day for several days. However, it drew a distinction between the illegality of continuous surveillance as a practice and the legal effect of using the observations from a watch for the statutory purpose of invoking section 14(4).
    • Relying by analogy on Annamalai Chettiar & Co., the court observed that an illegal search/seizure does not necessarily make unusable the material found; similarly, the fact that the sales were watched does not by itself vitiate a notice issued where there is escapement of turnover.
    • Therefore, the mere fact of watching and using results from that watch does not automatically render a section 14(4) notice invalid; the court held issuance of a notice on the ground of escapement where sales were watched is not per se illegal.
  2. On the contention that section 14(4) pre-amendment did not permit "best judgment" assessments and on whether the 1963 amendment could be applied retrospectively:
    • The court noted the earlier decision in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ravuri Narasimloo, which held that under the pre-amendment section 14(4) the authorities could not make a best-judgment assessment; their power was confined to assessing turnover that was shown to have escaped assessment.
    • The court then examined the statutory change made by Act 16 of 1963, which inserted an express power in section 14(4)(a) to "determine to the best of his judgment the turnover that has escaped assessment."
    • The Government Pleader argued the amendment affected procedure and so should be applied retrospectively; the court recalled the settled principle that statutes which affect vested rights (substantive rights) are not to be given retrospective effect, whereas those affecting mere procedure may be.
    • Applying that principle and the cited income-tax authorities (Lakshminarayana Chetty and Kundan Lal via the Supreme Court's approval), the court concluded that allowing the assessing authority to determine turnover "to the best of his judgment" changes the quantum of tax and thus affects substantive/vested rights. Consequently the amendment could not be treated as merely procedural and could not be applied retrospectively to the assessment year 1959–60.
    • Because the notice in the present case proceeded on the footing of a best-judgment computation (estimating the year's turnover by inference from sales on four watched days), it was illegal under the pre-amendment law as interpreted in Ravuri Narasimloo.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed.

Immediate consequences (direct effect on the parties):

  • The notice dated 12 September 1963 — which proposed to assess escaped turnover for 1959–60 by reference to a "best judgment" computation based on sales observed on four watched days — was held illegal under the law as it stood for the assessment year in question.
  • The petition was allowed with costs; the court awarded an advocate's fee of Rs. 100.

Broader implications: The court concluded that the 1963 amendment to section 14(4), which introduced an express best-judgment power, affects substantive rights (the quantum of tax) and therefore cannot be applied retrospectively to assessments completed before the amendment. The opinion does not purport to establish any new general doctrine beyond applying existing principles of non-retrospectivity to the amended provision.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Petition allowed." (Writ petition allowed with costs; advocate's fee Rs. 100.)

    Udipi Vasanta Vihar v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Guntur-1

    Kuppuswamy, J.:— The petitioner is a firm which is running a hotel. It has filed the above writ petition for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent from taking further proceedings in pursuance of a notice dated 12th September, 1963, which was issued in the following circumstances:

    For the year 1959-60 the petitioner was assessed to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 79,900. Subsequently by reason of a watch placed on the premises it was found that on four days the average sales per day worked out to Rs. 535. Based on this the dealer's turnover for the year works out to Rs. 535×313 days (excluding holidays) i.e, Rs. 1,67,455. Therefore a notice was issued on 12th September, 1963, in the following terms:—

    “In continuation of the reference cited above Messrs Udipi Vasanta Vihar, Brodipet, are informed that the sales in their business premises were watched by the special staff with following results:—

    Date of watch Sales found: 25-3-1960 Rs. 540.11 26-3-1960 509.98 27-3-1960 6.13.88 29-3-1960. 478.28 Total … 2,142.25

    The average sales per day at this rate works out to Rs. 535. Basing on this, the dealer's turnover per year works out to Rs. 535×313 = 1,67,455. The dealer was already assessed to tax for 1959-60 on a turnover of Rs. 79,900. Thus Rs. 87,555 has escaped. It is now proposed to assess the escaped turnover of Rs. 87,555 at 3 per cent.

    Messrs Udipi Vasanta Vihar are hereby directed to file their written objections, if any, to the proposed assessment before me on 24th September, 1963, and prove their objections, if any, by producing the relevant documents, if any. If they fail to appear as directed, it will be considered that they have no objections to file and orders will be passed on the basis of the material available on record. No further adjournment will be given.”

    2. The petitioner contends that these proceedings sought to be initiated under section 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act were illegal for two reasons. Firstly, it is contended that the authorities are not entitled to keep a continuous watch over the premises and any estimate of the escaped turnover based upon such a watch is, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the Act. Secondly, it is contended that section 14(4) as it stood before the amendment by Act 16 of 1963 did not enable the authorities to make a best judgment assessment in proceedings under section 14(4) of the Act. A notice in which the turnover for the whole year is estimated on the basis of certain average sales found to have taken place on watch for four days is therefore illegal. The first contention is based upon the decision in Lakshmana Rao & Sons v. Special Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada [1962] 13 S.T.C 860.. It was held therein that section 28(2) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act does not authorise the Sales Tax Authorities to watch continually a hotel and its business from the moment it starts early in the morning till the whole day for several days. In that case the petitioners applied for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ to be issued to the authorities to forbear from carrying on continuous supervision of the sales and supplies or other activities of the petitioners. From the mere fact that the authorities are not entitled to keep a continuous watch over the premises it does not follow that a notice issued under section 14(4) wherein the escaped turnover is sought to be assessed on the basis of such a watch is illegal. Under section 14(4) of the Act the authorities may issue a notice where the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax or has been under-assessed, or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate or the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate. So long as those conditions are satisfied the mere fact that the sales in the business premises were watched and those sales during the days when the watch was made are taken into account does not vitiate a notice. In Annamalai Chettiar & Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, it is held that:

    “An assessment order based on documents or account books seized under sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 41 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which had been declared unconstitutional, is not illegal.”

    3. It was pointed out that:

    “It was one thing to say that search and seizure of documents and account books is illegal and it is quite another to say that the documents so seized cannot legally be used as evidence.”

    4. On the same analogy, we hold that it is not illegal to issue a notice on the ground that there has been escapement of turnover and the sales were watched by the staff with certain results. The second ground of attack against the notice is that in the notice it is proposed to assess on a turnover which is arrived at after best judgment assessment, in that, the total turnover is computed by a process of inference from the total sales effected on four particular days and has no relation to the actual turnover suppressed. Section 14, sub-section (4), stood before its amendment in 1963 thus:

    “Where, for any reason, the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax, or has been underassessed or assessed at too low a rate, or where the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or has been levied at too low a rate, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the tax or the licence fee or registration fee relates, assess the tax payable on the turnover which has escaped assessment or levy the correct amount of licence fee or registration fee, after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such inquiry as he considers necessary. Such authority may also direct the dealer to pay in addition to the tax so assessed, a penalty not exceeding one and half times the amount of that tax, if the turnover had escaped assessment or had been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate by reason of its not being disclosed by the dealer.”

    5. Dealing with the powers under this section it was held in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ravuri Narasimloo [1965] 16 S.T.C 54., that in exercising the power under section 14(4) the authorities cannot make a “best judgment assessment”. It was pointed out that the Legislature had confined the powers of the department under that sub-section to assessing such turnover as is shown to have escaped assessment and has not extended it to estimates depending upon inferences to be drawn by the department with power to make a best judgment assessment.

    6. This section was amended by Act 16 of 1963 and after amendment section 14(4) stands as follows:

    “In any of the following events, namely, where the whole or any part of the turnover of a business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax, or has been under-assessed or assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate, or where the licence fee or registration fee has escaped levy or has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate; the assessing authority may, after Issuing a notice to the dealer, and after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary, by order, setting out the grounds therefor,—

    (a) determine to the best of his judgment the turnover that has escaped assessment and assess the turnover so determined;

    (b) assess the correct amount of tax payable on the turnover that has been under-assessed;

    (c) assess at the correct rate the turnover that has been assessed at a lower rate;

    (d) levy the licence fee after determining to the best of his judgment the turnover on which such fee is payable;

    (e) levy the registration fee that has escaped levy; or

    (f) levy the correct amount of licence fee or registration fee in a case where such fee has been levied at a rate lower than the correct rate.

    7. In addition to the tax assessed or fee levied under this sub-section, the assessing authority may also direct the dealer to pay a penalty as specified in sub-section (8).”

    8. Therefore, it is argued on behalf of the respondent under section 14(4)(a) the authority is empowered to determine to the best of judgment the turnover that escaped assessment.

    9. It is however argued on behalf of the petitioner that the amended section 14(4) has no retrospective effect so as to affect an assessment completed in 1962 long before the amendment with reference to the assessment year 1959-60. The Government Pleader, however, while admitting that the amendment has not been expressly or even by implication made retrospective, contends that it affects only procedure and hence will have to be given retrospective effect. It is well settled principle of law that a statute will not have any retrospective effect so as to affect vested rights, whereas the statutes affecting procedure have retrospective effect.

    10. The question for consideration is whether the amended section 14(4) in so far as it authorises the authority to determine the escaped turnover according to the best of its judgment is a provision merely affecting procedure. In our opinion, it is not one which affects procedure only. Under the previous section as interpreted by this Court in the decisions above referred to, the authority could only assess on the turnover which was found to have actually escaped assessment and could not determine an escaped turnover according to best judgment, whereas under the amended provision, the authority can determine to the best of its judgment the turnover which escaped assessment. In other words, the very quantum of the turnover is different according as section 14(4) without amendment is applied or section 14(4) after amendment is applied. Thus it affects substantive rights of the parties, viz., the tax payable by the assessee. It, cannot, therefore, be said that this section does not affect vested rights but is merely a matter of procedure.

    11. In Lakshminarayana Chetty v. Additional Income-tax Officer, dealing with section 35 of the Income-fax Act relating to rectification of an assessment, it was pointed out by a Bench of this Court that as it enabled the authorities to correct an assessment it clearly affects vested rights which have accrued to the assessee and hence the well settled rule of construction precluded the Court from construing the section as retrospective unless the Act expressly or by necessary implication makes it retrospective. In Income-tax Officer, V Circle, Madras v. Habibullah, this decision was approved by the Supreme Court where it was observed:

    “In our view, it was rightly held in Kundan Lal v. Income-tax Officer, B. Ward, Amritsar [1959] 37 I.T.R 337., following Lakshminarayana Chetty v. Additional Income-tax Officer, Nellore, that clause (5) of section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, which was enacted by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953, was not declaratory of pre-existing law, and as it clearly affected vested rights which had accrued to the assessee, must be deemed to have come into force from 1st April, 1952. It had no greater retrospective effect than was expressly granted to it.”

    12. We, therefore, see no substance in the contention of the learned Government Pleader that it affects only procedure and therefore can be given retrospective effect. Therefore the case is governed by section 14(4) as it stood before the amendment. As the notice proceeds upon the footing that the turnover will be assessed on the basis of best judgment computing the turnover by an inference based upon the sales on four days referred to in the notice, the notice is illegal by reason of the decision in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ravuri Narasimloo [1965] 16 S.T.C 54.. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.

    13. Petition allowed.

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    Udipi Vasanta Vihar v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Guntur-1
    (Jul 16, 1968)