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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • SECTION 112 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules
  • II, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950.2.
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 114 and order 47 C.P.C10.
  • Order XLVII, Rule 7 C.P.C
  • Order XLV, Rule 2 C.P.C
  • Order XII, Rule 3
  • Section 4 C.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 112 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules
  • II, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950.2.
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 114 and order 47 C.P.C10.
  • Order XLVII, Rule 7 C.P.C
  • Order XLV, Rule 2 C.P.C
  • Order XII, Rule 3
  • Section 4 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Opinion delivered by Chandra Reddy, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The deities of Sri Audinarayanaswamy and Anjaneyasami Temples of Donepudi, represented by their Executive Officer N. Mohana Rao (the petitioner), obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgment of this Court in A.S. No. 591 of 1952. The petitioner was required to furnish security and deposit money for preparation of books for use of the Supreme Court before 18-12-1959. The petitioner did not furnish the security or make the deposit by 4-5-1960, nor did he apply for an extension of time. Consequently, this Court cancelled the certificate it had granted on 6-11-1959.

After cancellation, the petitioner filed C.M.P. No. 4713 of 1960 seeking review of that cancellation order and explaining the circumstances that prevented compliance. At the hearing, counsel for the respondents objected that a review was incompetent because the impugned order had been made under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules (i.e., under the Supreme Court's own rules, not under the Civil Procedure Code). In response, the petitioner filed an alternative petition (S.R. No. 39553 of 1960) for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, together with an application (C.M.P. No. 1971 of 1960) to condone delay in presenting that petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 4th March 1960 (the cancellation of the certificate) could be reviewed.
  2. If review is not permissible, whether a fresh petition for leave to appeal under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • When the review petition was heard, respondents' counsel objected that review was incompetent because the cancellation order was made under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules and not under any provision of the Civil Procedure Code; thus the Civil Procedure Code review mechanisms do not apply.

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by the learned Advocate General)

  • Cancellation of the certificate under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules does not prevent the petitioner from filing another petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court; nothing in the rules precludes the High Court from receiving a fresh application.
  • Even after revocation of the certificate, the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code is not entirely excluded and therefore the petitioner should be able to invoke Order XLV, C.P.C. to file a fresh petition for leave.
  • Consequently, the cancellation should leave the petitioner in the position he occupied before the first petition under Order XLV, C.P.C. was filed, which, the Advocate General contended, justified acceptance of a fresh petition.
  • To support the contention that cancellation should be treated as though no petition had been presented, the Advocate General relied on authorities such as Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal and Sachindra Nath Roy v. Moharaj Bahadur Singh.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Aldi v. Sh. Mohd. Saheed, A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 43 Support for the proposition that review was not competent where the relevant order was made under the Supreme Court Rules. The Court regarded this authority as supporting its view that a review petition was not competent; the Advocate General conceded this point in the face of the authority.
Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (Privy Council) Principle concerning the effect of dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution after leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council under Article 182 of the Limitation Act — specifically whether such dismissal left the party "in the same position as if he had not appealed at all" for purposes of Article 182(2). The Court explained that the Privy Council's remarks were context-specific to Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act and dismissal for non-prosecution; the Court held that the principle cannot be generalized to invalidate or "wipe out" proceedings culminating in cancellation under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules.
Sachindra Nath Roy v. Moharaj Bahadur Singh, I.L.R. XLIX Cal. 203 P.C. Reiteration of the principle stated in Abdul Majid regarding the limited effect of dismissal for want of prosecution. The Court observed that this pronouncement merely reiterated the Privy Council's limited rule and did not assist the petitioner in arguing that cancellation of the certificate should be treated as if no petition had been presented.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying the text of the Supreme Court Rules and the Civil Procedure Code provisions cited in the opinion:

  1. Characterisation of the impugned order: The Court noted that the cancellation order was made under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules (a rule which authorises the High Court to cancel a certificate where an appellant fails to furnish security or make required deposit). Because the order was made under the Supreme Court Rules, the Court treated it as governed by those Rules rather than by the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Reviewability: The Court held that such an order is not capable of being reviewed because there is nothing in the Supreme Court Rules permitting review of that order by the High Court. The Court emphasized that Order XXXIII of the Supreme Court Rules vests the power of review only in the Supreme Court itself, and the High Court is not given such power by the Rules.
  3. Inapplicability of Civil Procedure Code remedies: The Court explained that the party could not fall back on provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (such as Section 114 or Order XLVII — which provide review/similar remedies under the CPC) because Section 112 (as quoted in the opinion) preserves the Supreme Court's powers and its rules for presentation and conduct of appeals. The Court also relied on Section 4, C.P.C., to show that where there is a special law (here, the Supreme Court Rules under Article 136), the Code does not displace that special law.
  4. Jurisdictional allocation under the Rules: The Court underlined that once leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been granted, the further stages are governed by the Supreme Court Rules (except in relation to matters specifically mentioned in Order XLV, C.P.C.), and the High Court is largely divested of jurisdiction to deal with appeal-related matters except as those Rules permit. Because the Supreme Court Rules do not permit the High Court to entertain a second application for leave under those provisions, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to receive a fresh petition under Order XLV, C.P.C.
  5. Consideration of the Advocate General's arguments: The Court considered the Advocate General's contention that cancellation left the petitioner "in the position as though no petition had been presented" and that therefore a fresh Order XLV petition could be filed. The Court examined the Privy Council authorities relied upon (Abdul Majid and Sachindra Nath Roy) and found that those cases were materially distinguishable and limited to the context of Article 182 of the Limitation Act and dismissal for non-prosecution; accordingly, they did not support treating the cancellation under Order XII, Rule 3 as if no proceedings had been initiated.
  6. Successive applications under Order XLV, C.P.C.: The Court further held that, even if the Civil Procedure Code could be invoked, Order XLV of the Code does not contemplate successive applications for leave to appeal and no section or order point was shown to justify filing a second such petition. The Court concluded that a second petition was inadmissible under Order XLV, Rule 2 of the C.P.C.
  7. On condonation of delay: Because the Court concluded it had no jurisdiction to entertain any second application, it found it unnecessary to consider whether there were circumstances that would justify condonation of delay in filing.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: BOTH PETITIONS ARE DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Court dismissed the petition for review of the cancellation order on the ground that the cancellation was made under the Supreme Court Rules, which do not permit review by the High Court.
  • The Court also dismissed the application seeking leave to file a fresh petition under Order XLV, C.P.C., holding that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a second petition and that Order XLV does not contemplate successive applications for leave to appeal.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion confines its conclusions to the specific allocation of jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Rules and the Civil Procedure Code as described; the judgment does not purport to establish any new rule beyond this application and does not discuss broader policy consequences beyond the parties' immediate positions.

Additional procedural note: The Court recorded assistance of Sri P. Ramaohandra Reddy (Government Pleader) as amicus curiae. Final brief form of decision: "Petitions dismissed."

    The Dieties Of Sri Audinarayana Swamy And Anjenayaswami Temples Of Donepudi Reptd. By The Executive Officer N. Mohanarao Petitioner v. R. Hanumacharyulu And Others

    The Order of the Court was delivered by

    Chandra Reddy, C.J

    The question we are called upon to decide in these two petitions is as to the effect of cancellation of a certafioate under order II, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950.

    2. The deities of Sri Audinarayanaswamy and Anjaneyasami Temples of Donepudi represented by the Executive officer, N. Mohana Rao, the petitioner in these petitions, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this court in A.S No. 591 of 1952. The petitioner had to furnish security and deposit the money required for preparation of books for the use of the Supreme Court before 18-12-1959. As he failed to do either till 4-5-1960 nor had he applied for extension of time, this Court cancelled the certificate granted on 6-11-1959. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner filed C.M.P No. 4713 of 1960 for reviewing that order setting out the circumstances that prevented him from furnishing security and to make the necessary deposit.

    3. When this petition came on for hearing, an objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that a review petition was incompetent, as the order sought to be reviewed was made under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules and not under any of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Seeing the force of this contention the petitioner preferred another petition (S.R No. 39553 of 1960) for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court With an application (C.M.P No. 1971 of 1960) to condone the delay in presenting it.

    4. The two points that call for determination here are (i), whether the order dated 4th March 1960 could be reviewed and, if that could not be done, (ii) whether a fresh petition under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is maintainable.

    5. The first point could be easily disposed of. It does not present any difficulty in it is remembered that the order in question is passed under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules. That rule recites:

    “Where an appellant, having obtained a certificate from the High Court, fails to furnish the security or make the deposit required, that Court may, on its own motion or on application in that behalf made by the respondent, cancel the certificate and may give such directions as to the costs of the appeal and the security entered into by the appellant as it shall think fit or make such further or other order as the justice of the case required.

    6. Such an order is not capable of being reviewed for the reason that there is nothing in the Supreme Court Rules which permits such a course. Nor can recourse be had to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as the order in question was not made under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code but was made under the Supreme Court Rules. In such a situation, no resort could be had either to Section 114 or Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 112 of the Civil Procedure Code says:

    ‘Nothing contained in this Code shall be deemed—

    (a) to affect the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 or any other provisions of the Constitution, or

    (b) to interfere with any rules made by the Supreme Court, and for the time being in force, for the presentation of appeals to that Court or their conduct before that court.

    7. By virtue of this Section, it is not permissible to fall back upon the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code when an order was made under the Supreme Court Rules.

    8. The same result is reached by reading Section 4 C.P.C which is in these words:

    “(1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure presented by or under any other law for the time being in force.”

    9. Indisputably, the relevant rule is the special law enacted by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. That being the position, the Supreme Court Rules take precedence over Section 114 and order 47 C.P.C

    10. This view of ours gains support from Abdul Aldi v. Sh. Mohd. Saheed . A.I.R 1951 Punjab 43.. In such a situation, the learned Advocate General conceded and rightly, in our opinion, that the petition for review was not competent.

    11. This leads us to the question whether a fresh application for leave could be entertained. The argument presented by the learned Advocate General in this behalf is this. Cancellation of the certiffoate under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules does not debar the petitioner from firing another petition for leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court as there is nothing in the rules to preclude the High Court from receiving another application. Notwithstanding the revocation of the certificate, under the Supreme Court rules the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code is not excluded. Lastly the consequence of an order passed under Order XII, Rule 3 is to relegate the petitioner to the position which he occupied before the presentation of the application under order XLV C.P.C and as such there is no impediment to the petitioner invoicing: a fresh Order 45, Civil Procedure Code.

    12. To deal with the first point, we feel that when once leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court has been granted, the further stages of the appeal are governed by the Supreme Court Rules except in relation to matters specifically mentioned in Order XLV C.P.C Thereafter, the High Court is divested of jurisdiction to deal with anything connected with the appeal except as provided Order XLV. If so, we have to see whether the Supreme Court Rule empower the High Court to entertain another application. There is no rule which confers such an authority on the High Court. Order XXXIII of the Supreme Court Rules vests power of review only in the Supreme Court, while Order XLV of these Rules clothes that Court with inherent jurisdiction. No such power is extended to the High Court under the Supreme Court Rules. The learned Advocate General contends that is not decisive of the matter and that so long as there is nothing which prevents the High Court from taking on file another petition, it would be open to the Court to entertain a second petition. We do not think that we can assent to this proposition. Unless such power is specifically conferred, the High Court will have no jurisdiction to receive another petition under Order XLV. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court cannot exercise the function which is specifically allotted to the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Rules.

    13. We have next to consider whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure-Code could be called in aid to enable the petitioner to maintain another application under order XLV, C.P.C We do not think that the petitioner could follow that Course having regard to the fact that the order was passed under order XII, Supreme Court Rules. That being so such an order cannot be nullified by invoking the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

    14. Even if the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be invoked, we do not see how it makes any material difference, for, we are not shown any section or order of the Civil Procedure Code which entitles a party to file a second petition under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code. That order does not contemplate successive applications. We think that there is nothing in the Code which warrants the concluslou that a second application could be filed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

    15. We now turn to the last contention of the learned Advocate General, namely, that consequent upon the cancellation of the certificate the position is as though no petition at all has been presented by his client. To substantiate this proposition, the learned Advocate General calls in aid Abdul Majid v. Jawaher lal and Sachindra Nath Roy v. Moharaj Bahadur Singh . I.L.R XLIX Cal. 203 P.C.. Though this argument appears to be quite plausible, we find it difficult to accede to it for reasons which will be mentioned presently.

    16. Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal, not does improve the position of the petitioner in any way. There, the Privy Council was dealing with the impact of an order dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution after obtaining leave to prefer an appeal to His Majesty in Council on Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The question to be answered by their Lordships of the Privy Council was whether the period of limitation could be commuted from the date of the order of dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution for purposes of Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships ruled that the dismissal was inefficacious to save limitation under Article 182(2). It is in that context that their Lordships remarked that the decree-holder was in the same position as if he had not appealed at all. It is as an universal rule that their Lordships laid down that the dismissal of an appeal to His Majesty in Council for non-prosecution should involve the thought that no proceedings were initiated at all under Order XLV C.P.C The Statement of law there should be confined to the particular situation arising under Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act, the controversy being whether there was an effective appeal for the purpose of that rule. Therefore, the rule stated does not impinge upon a point arising under Order XII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules. Acceptance of this contention would involve the overlooking of the provisions culminating in the cancellation of the certificate. There is no Rule of law which would warrant the assumption that all proceedings culminating in the cancellation of the certificate have been wiped out. We do not think that cancellation of the certificate could have the result that is attributed to it.

    17. Their Lordships of the Privy Council reiterated the principle embodied in Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal in Sachindra Nath Roy v. Maheraj Bahadru Singh. These two pronouncements of the Privy Council do not render much assistance to the petitioner. Hence, we are driven to the conclusion that a second petition is inadmissible under Order XLV, Rule 2 C.P.C That being so, it in not necessary for us to consider whether there are circumstances which justify the condonation of the delay in the filing of this petition. It may be that the petitioner had good reasons for not satisfying the requirements of Order XLVII, Rule 7 C.P.C in time but that is not the point here. Since we have no jurisdiction to entertain any application we have no option but to dismiss it. In the result, both the petitions are dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs. We are obliged to Sri P. Ramaohandra Reddy, (Government Pleader) who gave us assistance as amicus curiae.

    Petitions dismissed.

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