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  • provision of rule 7
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provision of rule 7
  • Rule 8 of Order 47

    Mallikarjunappa Kalyanshetti v. Rudrasetti Sangasetti Patil Mahagamkar

    1. In O.S 59/1 of 1953-1954 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Secunderabad Mallikarjunappa laid a claim for recovery of O.S Rs. 12657/- on foot of three documents dated 8th August 1950, which according to the plaintiff were hundies. Amongst others, one of the defences raised was that the suit documents were promissory notes payable otherwise than on demand and that inasmuch as they were not duly stamped, they were inadmissible in evidence on which no suit could lie. Of the seven issues adjusted in the case, the first issue was:

    “Are the suit documents promissory notes?

    Are they inadmissible in evidence?”

    2. This issue was taken up for decision on 4th October, 1954 and the Subordinate Judge gave the finding that the suit documents were promissory notes and being insufficiently stamped were admissible to the extent of half of the amount claimed. The defendants felt dissatisfied with the order and they filed a review application on 3rd November, 1954 praying that the said documents be held to be altogether inadmissible in evidence. On a notice being issued to the plaintiff, he demurred to the maintainability of the application on two grounds namely:—

    (1) the order sought to be reviewed was passed by Mr. Gunde Rao Havalkar and for the matter of that Mr. Shanker Pershad, the succeeding Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to review the order;

    (2) the order under review having been passed after discussing at length all aspects of the case, it could not be said that there was any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.

    3. In the alternative it was pleaded by the plaintiff that if for any reason the Court comes to the conclusion that it has jurisdiction to review the order, it may be held that the stamp duty paid was sufficient to render the suit documents even as promissory notes admissible for the full consideration shown therein.

    4. Mr. Shanker Pershad by his order dated 20th January 1955 overruled the objections raised by the plaintiff and ultimately held that the suit documents were inadmissible in evidence.

    5. It is against this order the plaintiff has filed one under Cl. (w) of O. 43, R. 1 C.P.C The learned advocate for the respondents raised the preliminary objection that as the requirement of R. 4 of O. 47 had been complied with, no appeal can lie in view of the provision of rule 7 of the same order. The objection has force and is supported by authority. In Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Official Assignee, Madras . A.I.R 1927 Mad. 641. (a Bench decision), it has been laid down that the provisions of O. 43, R. 1(w), C.P Code are to be read subject to the provisions of O. 47, and an order granting a review can be appealed against only on one of the grounds set out in O-47, R. 7. The same has been held to be the law in the erst, while State of Hyderabad vide Geddam Sita Ram Reddy v. Yerrasani Venkat Varada Reddy . A.I.R 1954 Hyd. 166., and Oudtala Venkat Narhari v. Oudtala Narsubai . A.I.R 1955 Hyd. 112. The learned advocate for the appellant did not challenge the soundness of these decisions. Relying on Vadilal v. Fulchand . I.L.R 30 Bom. 56. Pakkiri Muhammad Rowther v. L. Swaminatha Mudaliar . A.I.R 938 Mad. 573. and Kishenrao v. Raja Rameshwara Rao . 21 Dec. L.R 209. he, however, argued that there were three stages of review application. The first is the ex-parte stage when the court may either reject the application at once or may grant a rule asking the other side to show cause as to why the review should not be granted. In the second stage, the rule may either be admitted or rejected. If the rule is discharged, the case ends then and there; if on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached. The case is then heard on the merits and may result in the repetition of the former decree or order or in some variation of it. In either case, the whole matter having been reopened there is a fresh decree or order. The learned advocate contended that inasmuch as the Subordinate Judge had failed to pass an order in express words granting the application, he would be deemed to have infringed the provisions of R. 4 of O. 47 and therefore there would lie an appeal as provided by R. 7 thereof. It is no doubt true that the order making the rule absolute has not been passed, but one thing is clear that notice to the appellant had been served as prescribed by proviso (a) to R. 4. Therefore there could be no complaint of contravention of the provision of r. 4. Since notice of the review application was ordered to be issued by Mr. Gande Rao Harvalkar, his successor, Mr. Shanker Pershad was competent to dispose it as provided by O. 47, r. 2, G.P Code. No objection, therefore is open to the appellant on that score. Rule 8 of Order 47 prescribes that when an application for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the Court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the re-hearing as it thinks fit. What the Subordinate Judge did in this case was no more than that he passed a composite order of granting the review and forthwith rehearing the case. When the requirements of R. 2 are satisfied and the mandatory provisions of proviso (a) are complied with, mere omission to pass a formal order making the rule absolute would not attract the provisions of R. 7 for the simple reason that there was no contravention of clauses (a) & (b) of R. 7. We, therefore, hold that the appeal was not competent.

    6. The learned advocate for the appellant then contended that the appeal may be treated as revision. In para 6 of the grounds of appeal the appellant states that he reserves to himself the objections on the merits of the order. The merits cannot, therefore, be gone into. The only point that could be pressed and was pressed related to the irregularity in passing the order appealed against in a composite form. This cannot be said to be an illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no scope for treating the appeal as a revision.

    7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

    8. Having regard to the facts of this case, we make no order as to costs.

    K.S.R

    9. Appeal Dismissed.

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    Mallikarjunappa Kalyanshetti v. Rudrasetti Sangasetti Patil Mahagamkar
    (Mar 24, 1958)