1. Present petition has been filed with allegation that the opposite parties have violated the following direction given by this Court vide order dated 6-2-2002 in Company Misc. Application No. 4 of 1997:
“(3) In the matter of payment of salaries to the teaching and non-teaching staff of primary schools
2. It is reported that there are seven primary schools which were run by the company (in liquidation) out of these, three primary schools are at Churk Cement Factory, one at Gurma and tree at Dela Cement Factory and that there are in all about 62 teaching and non-teaching staff in these schools. These teachers, employees have not been paid their salary from 13-7-1998. U.P State Cement Corporation Ltd. (In liq.) was wholly owned and controlled by the State Government and that the company was a Government Company under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, which was wholly owned and controlled by the State Government, and was thus a instrumentality of the State.
3. The U.P Basic Education Act, 1972 provided for taking over the Primary Schools run by Local Bodies, to be managed by the Basic Education Board, for which grant comes under planned expenditure of the State of U.P Even after company has been wound up, and is under liquidation, the State Government which was running and managing the institutions avoid its obligation to take over the responsibility and to provide primary educational facilities as a mandate by Constitution of India. In facts and circumstances of the case and looking into the interest of the school going children of the area, which include the children of company workers, employees and other children of the area as well. Secretary of Education Basic. U.P is directed to consider the matter to take over these primary schools, under U.P Basic Education Board, and to provide financial aid to these schools. He shall consider the matter and issue necessary orders with intimation to the official liquidator without four weeks.
4. On behalf of opposite party No. 1 an affidavit of compliance has been filed. In paras 5 and 6 of the affidavit, it has been stated that in compliance to the order dated 6-2-2002, an order dated 12-2-2004 has been passed and the copy of the same was sent to official liquidator. The company of the order dated 12-2-2004 has been annexed as annexure No. 1. Order dated 12-2-2004 reads as follows:
(Vernacular matter omitted……Ed.)
5. In para 5 of the rejoinder affidavit, it has been stated that more than two years have been passed from passing of the judgment and order dated 6-2-2002 by this Hon'ble Court and during the entire period schools are running as before and applicants and other teachers have been discharging their duties as Principal and Head Master and teachers and educating the children but had not been paid even a single paisa for the work taken from them from 6-2-2002. It is further stated that the apology offered by the contesting opposite parties are a farce and is a pretension calculated to deceive and cheat this Court and to harm the children studying in the primary schools and the teachers, employees and other staff of the schools, who are discharging their duties in accordance with the directions of this Hon'ble Court. It is further stated that the order of compliance clearly shows that contesting opposite parties have no concern with the welfare of children and to their interest as well. It is also stated that the U.P Cement Corporation Limited is established by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under Section 617 of Companies Act, 1956, which is a Government company. As such U.P State Cement Corporation Limited even prior to its liquidation’ was a Government company and all the post of these were created by the State Government and without its prior sanction no post could be created. It is further stated that the alleged order of compliance stating that U.P Cement Corporation Limited has seven primary schools and none of them have even recognised by Basic Shiksha Parishad is untrue. A communication dated 21-11-1996, which was sent by Basic Education Officer, Sonebhadra to the Managing Director/Manager of the Schools Cement Cotton Mills, Churk, Sonebhadra clearly stating that the schools are recognised schools and the provisions of U.P Basic Education Act, 1972 are fully applicable to it and as such the suspension of the Head Master of the school without prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer, Sonebhadra is wholly invalid. A letter of the District Inspector of Schools, Sonebhadra dated 26-12-1992 has also referred, in which it is stated that the primary schools at Churk arid Gurma have been recognised by order dated 14-12-1956. This communication was sent to the Madhyamik Sangh, Sonebhadra. It has been further stated that the matter regarding the grant of recognition to primary schools situated at Churk and Gurma had come to the notice of this Court in various cases and this Court held that primary schools being run by U.P State Cement Corporation Limited. Churk and Gurma are recognised institutions. On the basis of the aforesaid averment, it is stated that the order dated 12-2-2004 is illegal and full of mala fide. It has also been submitted that the opposite party is playing subterfuge and therefore, committed contempt. In support of his submissions he relied upon the decisions, namely, (1970) 3 SCC 98 : AIR 1970 SC 1767 : (1999) 9 SCC 58 : (AIR 1998 SC 2862), 1998 (4) Supreme Today 417 : (1970 Cri LJ 1520), 2000 (1) JT (SC) 337 : (2000) 2 SCC 367 : (AIR 2000 SC 833), (1979) 2 SCC 491 : AIR 1979 SC 49 : (1978 Lab IC 1641), 1997 (1) AWC 2 : (1997 AIHC 1380), (1987) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1987 SC 294, (1998) 3 SCC 127 (sic) : AIR 1996 SC 205 (sic), 1990 AIR 144 : 1990 Lab IC 1025.
6. Learned standing counsel submitted that this Court cannot go into the merit of the case. He submitted that legality of the order cannot be examined by the Contempt Court and if the applicants are aggrieved by the order dated 12-2-2004 the same should be challenged before the appropriate Forum. In support of his contention he relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of J.S Parihar v. Ganpat Durggar, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 291 : (AIR 1997 SC 113) and in the case of Lalith Mathur v. L. Maheswara Rao, reported in (2000) 10 SCC 285.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, I am of the view that it is not open to the Contempt Court to examine the merit of the order passed by the opposite party. This Court can only consider whether the direction given in the order is complied with or not. In the present case, the Court has given the direction to the Secretary of the Basic Education, U.P to consider the matter to take over the primary schools under U.P Basic Education and to provide financial aid to these schools. This direction has been complied with by passing the order, which has been communicated. It may be that while giving the direction the intent of the Court appears to consider the matter looking into the interest of the school going children employees etc. and the alleged order may not be in the interest of the aforesaid persons which appears to have been passed in accordance to the Government policy. If the applicants feels that the order passed by the opposite party is not in accordance to the intent or desire of the Court or otherwise illegal and arbitrary, the same can only be challenged before the appropriate Forum. In various cases, Apex Court has held that the Contempt Court cannot go into the merit of the order. Various grounds raised by the learned counsel for the applicant to submit that the order is bad in law required consideration and adjudication, which can only be done by the appropriate Court and not by this Court. Cases cited by the learned counsel for the applicant referred above are not relevant to the issue involved and are distinguishable. In the case of J.S Parihar v. Ganpati Durggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291 : AIR 1997 SC 113, question was whether in contempt proceedings Court can direct to redraw the seniority list. Apex Court held as follows:
“The question is whether seniority list is one to review in the contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the willful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned single Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act.”
8. In the case of Lalith Mathur v. L. Maheswara Rao, reported in (2000) 10 SCC 285 the facts of the case was that L. Maheswara Rao was the employee of A.P State Cooperative Rice Federation which was wound up and he ceased to be an employee of that Federation. He filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking relief, inter alia, that his representation for absorption in alternative government service may be directed to be considered by the State Government. The writ petition was allowed and the direction was issued to the State Government to consider and dispose of the representation. Pursuant to that direction, the State Government considered the representation and rejected the claim for absorption in government service. The said employee, instead of challenging the representation in a fresh writ petition, filed contempt petition, in which he relied a judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 22230 of 1997 and batch decided on 15-10-1997 and the High Court too relying upon that decision disposed of the contempt petition with the direction to absorb the petitioner in any suitable post in any Government department or public undertaking within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Against the said order Special Leave Petition was filed. Apex Court allowed the Special Leave Petition and held as follows:
“The above will show that the High Court has directed the State Government to absorb the respondent against a suitable post either in the government department or in any public sector undertaking. This order, in our opinion, is wholly without jurisdiction and could not have been made in proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution.
The High Court in the writ petition had issued a direction for the consideration of the respondent's representation by the State Government. This direction was carried out by the State Government, which had considered and thereafter rejected on merits. Instead of challenging that order in a fresh writ petition under Article 226, the respondent took recourse to contempt proceedings, which did not lie as the order had already been complied with by the State Government which had considered the representation and rejected it or merits.
For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 10-8-1998 is set aside and the contempt petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. We, however, make it clear that it will be open to the respondent to challenge the order by which his representation was dismissed on merits, in such proceedings as he may be advised. There shall be no order as to costs.”
9. However, perusal of the order of the compliance shows that no valid reason has been given as to why the direction given by this Court in the order dated 6-2-2002 has not been considered within a reasonable time. There is no justification for delaying the matter for two years. Delay in the matter led various consequences. It is seen that delay in taking the decision or complying the order of the Court or inaction on the part of the Government official has become a part of their habit which are leading the serious consequences and multiplying the litigation which cannot be tolerated. In the circumstances. I propose to award the cost of Rs. 20,000/- against the opposite party No. 1.
10. In the result, present petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observation. Opposite party No. 1 will be subject to cost of Rs. 20,000/- payable to the official liquidator within two months, who is directed to use the said amount for the purpose of the said schools. In case if the amount is not paid, same shall be recovered as arrear of land revenue.
11. Order accordingly.

Comments