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  • Section 3(2) of The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred
  • Sections 3, 8 and 14 of The National Security Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3(2) of The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred
  • Sections 3, 8 and 14 of The National Security Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner detenu, Jitendra alias Jeetu Misra, challenged a detention order dated 2-9-2002 issued by the District Magistrate, Barabanki, detaining him under Section 3(2) of The National Security Act. The detention order and grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on 4-9-2002. The petitioner contended that he was not informed of the time limit within which he could make a representation against the detention, which he argued violated his constitutional rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the failure to communicate to the petitioner detenu the time limit for making a representation to the detaining authority vitiates the detention order under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India?
  2. Whether the right of the detenu to make a representation to the detaining authority is only available until the approval of the detention order by the State Government, and if so, whether this limitation was properly communicated?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner was not apprised of the time limit within which he could make a representation to the detaining authority.
  • This failure deprived him of his right to make a representation, rendering the detention order violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
  • The Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Santosh Shankar Acharya establishes that the detenu’s right to representation exists only until the detention order is approved by the State Government, and this must be communicated in the grounds of detention.
  • Since the grounds of detention did not communicate this limitation, the detention order is vitiated.

Opposite Parties’ Arguments

  • The petitioner did make a representation to the detaining authority on 20-9-2002, demonstrating his awareness of the right to representation.
  • Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim prejudice on the basis that he was not informed of the time limit for making such representation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, (2000) 7 SCC 463 The detenu’s right to make a representation to the detaining authority exists only until the detention order is approved by the State Government; failure to communicate this right and its time limit vitiates the detention order under Article 22(5). The court relied on this precedent to hold that since the detention order in the instant case was approved on 11-9-2002, the petitioner’s representation made after that date was ineffective, and the grounds of detention failed to communicate the limited time frame, leading to vitiation of the detention order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the petitioner's claim that he was not informed of the time limit to make a representation against the detention order. It referred to the Supreme Court ruling in State of Maharashtra v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, which clarified that the right to representation to the detaining authority is only available until the detention order is approved by the State Government. In this case, the detention order was approved on 11-9-2002, but the petitioner made a representation on 20-9-2002, after the approval date.

The court found that the grounds of detention did not communicate this crucial time limit to the petitioner, which is essential for the effective exercise of the right guaranteed under Article 22(5). This omission constituted a violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right to be informed of the grounds of detention "as soon as may be." The court emphasized that any ambiguity or lacunae in preventive detention matters must be resolved in favor of the detenu.

Consequently, the court concluded that the detention order was legally flawed and violative of constitutional safeguards.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed and the impugned detention order dated 2-9-2002 is quashed.

The petitioner-detenu Jitendra alias Jeetu Misra is directed to be released forthwith unless he is wanted in some other case. This decision directly affects the parties by invalidating the detention order on procedural grounds related to communication of rights under Article 22(5). The court did not set any new precedent beyond reaffirming the application of existing constitutional principles and Supreme Court authority.

    Jitendra v. Dist. Magistrate

    Vishnu Sahai, J.:— Through this writ petition preferred under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner detenu Jitendra alias Jeetu Misra has impugned the detention order dated 2-9-2002, passed by Mr. R.S Verma, District Magistrate, Barabanki (opposite party No. 1) detaining him under Section 3(2) of The National Security Act.

    2. The detention order, along with the grounds of detention, which are also dated 2-9-2002, was served on the petitioner detenu on 4-9-2002 and their true copies have been annexed as Annexure 1 and 2 respectively to this writ petition. The prejudicial activities of the petitioner detenu impelling the 1st opposite party (the District Magistrate, Barabanki) to issue the impugned detention order against him are contained in the grounds of detention (Annexure No. 2). Since, in our view, a reference to them is not necessary for the adjudication of the pleadings contained in para 16 of the petition and those contained in ground F and I of para 26 thereof, on which alone this writ petition deserves to succeed, we are not adverting to them.

    3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

    4. The substance of averments contained in paragraph 16 of the petition and grounds F & I of para 26 thereof is that since the petitioner detenu was not apprised the time limit, in which he could make a representation to the detaining authority, he was deprived of his right, to make a representation to him and the impugned detention order is rendered violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

    5. Mr. Pawan Kumar Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner detenu strenuously urged that since the Supreme Court in the oftquoted case of State of Maharashtra (Appellants) v. Santosh Shankar Acharya (Respondent), (2000) 41 All Cri C 704 : ((2000) 7 SCC 463 : AIR 2000 SC 2504), while dealing with a detention order under Section 3(2) of The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the “M.P.D.A”) after construing the provisions contained in Sections 3, 8 and 14 of the said Act, which are analogous to those contained in Sections 3, 8 and 14 of The National Security Act has held that till a detention order is approved by the State Government, the detenu has a right to make a representation to the detaining authority and the failure to communicate to him the said right would vitiate the detention order as being violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India, it follows as a logical imperative that in the grounds of detention, the detenu should be communicated that his right to make a representation to the detaining authority was only available to him, till approval of the detention order by the State Government. Mr. Trivedi urged that in the case the same is not done, as is the case here, the impugned detention order would be vitiated, as being violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

    6. The averments contained in paragraph 16 of the petition have been replied to in para 15 of the return of Mr. R.S Verma (detaining authority). The detaining authority has averred therein that since the petitioner detenu did make a representation to him on 20-9-2002, he comprehended his right to make a representation to him and therefore, no prejudice was caused to him.

    7. Mr. S.K Singh, learned counsel for opposite parties Nos. 1, 2 and 4 strenously urged that since the petitioner-detenu comprehended his right to make a representation to detaining authority and did make a representation to the detaining authority on 20-9-2002, it hardly lies in his mouth to urge that since he was not apprised that the said right was only available to him till the approval of the detention order by the State Government he could not exercise his right.

    8. We have reflected over the rival submissions and are constrained to observe that we do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. S.K Singh, A.P.P In view of law laid down, in the Santosh Shankar Acharya (Supra), there is no quarrel with the proposition that the right of the detenu to make a representation to the detaining authority is only available to him till the approval of the detention order by the State Government. In the instant case, a perusal of paragraph 4 of the return of Mr. M. Tripathi, Deputy Jailor, District Jail, Gonda, shows that the detention order was approved, by the State Government on 11-9-2002.

    9. Since the impugned detention order was approved by the State Government on 11-9-2002, in our judgment, the circumstance that the petitioner-detenu made a representation to the detaining authority on 20-9-2002 would not save the detention order from being vitiated. It may be that since the period, wherein the detenu could make a representation to the detaining authority had not been communicated to him, in the grounds of detention, he was labouring under the belief that his right to make a representation to the detaining authority was available to him till the last date of the life of detention order and therefore, on 20-9-2002, he made a representation to the detaining authority. It is well settled that in a preventive detention matter the benefit of any lacunae/obscurity/ambiguity would enure to the detenu.

    10. There is another reason as to why in our judgment, the impugned detention order would be vitiated. Since the detenu's right to make a representation to the detaining authority was only available to him till the approval of the detention order by the Government, it follows as logical imperative that the detaining authority should have communicated to the detenu in the grounds of detention the time limit, in which, he could make a representation to him i.e till the approval of the detention order by the State Government.

    11. We make no bones in observing that a partial communication of a right (in the grounds of detention) of the type in the instant case, wherein the time limit for making a representation is of essence and is not communicated in the grounds of detention would vitiate the first fundamental right guaranteed to the detenu under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of lndia, namely, of being communicated, as soon as may be, the grounds of detention.

    12. In the circumstances, in our view, the impugned detention order is vitiated in law, being violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the result, we allow this writ petition, quash the impugned detention order dated 2-9-2002; and direct that petitioner-detenu Jitendra alias Jeetu Misra be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case.

    13. Petition allowed.

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    Jitendra v. Dist. Magistrate
    (Sep 1, 2003)