S.C Verma and S.K Jain, JJ.:— The present appeal under Section 47(b) of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 read with Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act has been filed against the order dated 15.7.99, passed by the Family Court, rejecting the objection filed under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the proceeding under Section 10 of the Act initiated by the mother of the minor child.
2. The facts of the case are that Smt. Nisha Malhotra filed an application under Section 10 of the Act for the custody of the minor child namely Km. Swati Malhotra, her daughter from the wed-lock with the deceased Deepak Malhotra, who died on 20.6.95 It has been alleged that the property situated at Staff House compound Mallital, Nainital belonged to the deceased and they were residing at Nainital. Till the time of death of Deepak Malhotra the minor child was with them at Nainital, but after the death of Deepak Malhotra they had to go to Delhi for performance of 13th Day of the last rites and at that time the minor child was detained by the grand-parents. The present application was filed in the year 1997, claiming the custody of the minor child. The proceedings remained pending for two years and the appellants despite service of the notice did not file any written statement. It was in July, 1999, that the appellant filed objection under Section 9 of the Act alleging that the proceedings initiated at Nainital are not maintainable. The case set up by the appellant was that after the birth of the child the minor was residing at Delhi with her grand parents and she was studying there in a school. In support of this allegation they have filed the progress report of the minor child at the Institution namely St. Anthony Girls Senior Secondary School, Paharganj, New Delhi of U.K.G for the year 1995-1996 and class 1-B for the year 1996-1997. An identity card for the year 1996-1997 has been placed on the record by the appellants. The birth certificate issued by the hospital where Km. Swati Malhotra was born and the certificate dated 6.1.92 issued by the Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narain hospital, Delhi has also been placed on record indicating that she was given triple antigent vaccination.
3. The Judge Family Court had rejected the objection of the appellant holding that after the death of Deepak Malhotra on 20.6.95 at B.D Pandey hospital, Nainital, his father and mother came to Nainital for performance of last rites and thereafter all family members returned to New Delhi alongwith the widow and minor child for performance of 13th day of the last rites. The minor was detained by the grand parents and she was not allowed to go with her mother thereafter. It appears that since then she had been detained and she had stayed at New Delhi. According to the learned Judge the plea of the appellants that the minor was studying at Delhi would not establish that the minor child was ordinarily residing at Delhi and not at Nainital. The minor child had stayed with her parents till death of her father, where the property of the father was situated at Staff House compound, Mallital, Nainital. Learned Judge has also held that this plea has been taken after two years of the pendency of the proceedings and the same is liable to be rejected.
4. Assailing the said finding the learned counsel for the appellants has alleged that the learned Judge has not considered the evidence of the school certificate and the progress report of the Institution to establish that the minor child was ordinarily residing at New Delhi and not at Nainital. It has also been alleged that at the time when the application was filed, the minor child was residing at New Delhi and as such the jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding would lie at New Delhi and not at Nainital.
5. Before we consider that above submissions of the learned counsel, we would also like to consider the issue of maintainability of the present appeal.
6. Section 47(b) of the Guardians and Wards Act provides as under:
“47. Orders applicable:— An appeal Shall lie to the High Court from an order made by a (***) Court.—
(a) …………………
(b) under Section 9, sub-section (3), returning an application; or
(c) …………………”
7. By the impugned order the learned Judge has rejected the objection filed under Section 9 of the Act and has not returned the application under Section 10 of the Act for presentation before appropriate court. Thus appeal would lie under Section 47(b) of the Act, only when the application under Section 10 of the Act is returned for presentation before the appropriate court under the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act.
8. Similarly provision of Section 19 of the Family Court Act would not apply in the present case, as the appeal does not lie against an interlocutory order. The impugned order rejecting the objection under Section 9 of the Act challenging the jurisdiction of the Court for entertaining the application under Section 10 of the Act would only be interlocutory order and not final order, deciding the dispute between the parties. Thus in our opinion, the present appeal is not maintainable both under Section 47(b) of the Act read with Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act.
9. Apart from the above reason even on merit we are of the opinion that the learned Judge has not committed any error of law in holding that the jurisdiction would lie at Nainital court for the present proceedings under Section 10 of the Act. The appellants have not been able to place nay material on record to establish that before the death of Deepak Malhotra the minor child did not stay with her parents at Nainital instead she stayed with her grand parents at New Delhi. The documents which have been placed on record are that of the years 1995-1996 and 1996-1997. It appears that after the death of Deepak Malhotra, the minor daughter was got admitted in a school at Delhi during the session 1995-1996 and 1996-1997. There is no material on record to establish that the minor child ordinarily resided with her grand parents prior to the death of the father.
10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that this evidence was not considered by the learned Judge would not be of much relevance as the evidence relied upon was not of the period prior to the death of the father of the minor child regarding her residence. The learned Judge has rightly ignored this evidence and has not discussed the same. Moreover, the appellants have not filed any written statement so far so as to place on record the relevant evidence in support of their defense. Even if the evidence was not considered by the learned Judge, it will not in any manner invalidate the order as the evidence did not lend any support to the appellants' case. We have seen the evidence, which has been placed on record alongwith the affidavit and we find that on the basis of said evidence, which shows that the residence of minor child after June, 1995 i.e after the death of her father, the case of the appellants would not improve in any manner to establish that the minor child ordinarily resided with her grand parents.
11. The application under Section 10 of the Act is with regard to the custody of the minor child as also with regard to the property situate at Nainital. The provision of Section 9(3) or the Act provides that if an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made at a district court other than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the court may return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other District Court having jurisdiction. Thus, in our opinion the learned Judge did not commit any error of law in returning the application under Section 10 of the Act for final disposal.
12. The other submission raised by the learned counsel for appellants is with regard to the residence of the minor child. We have to examine on the basis of the material on record, whether the minor child ordinarily resided at Nainital or at New Delhi. The minor child till the death of her father was in actual custody of her parents and was residing at Nainital. It was only after the death of her father that she came in constructive custody of her grand parents. It has also come on the record that after the death of her father the minor child was detained by the grand parents and she was not allowed to be taken back by her mother.
13. In support of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant reliance has been placed on the following decisions:
14. In the case of Shah Harichand v. Virbbal . AIR 1975 Guj 150. it has been held that:
“Section 25(1) uses the expression ‘the court’ which has been defined in Section 4(5)(a) to mean the District Court having jurisdiction to entertain an application under this Act for an order appointing or declaring a person to be a guardian. Under Section 9(1) if the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. Thus the legislature has statutorily defined the court for purpose of Section 25(1). Therefore, the legislative test of the court which has jurisdiction in this matter is the court where the minor ordinarily resides and not the court where the father resides and with whom the minor must be deemed to have been in constructive custody. The question as to where the minor ordinarily resides is a question of fact. In the instant case since the minor children had been residing with their mother at place A two years before their father applied for their custody, it is obvious that the place of their ordinary residence is A and not the place where the applicant father resides.
15. In the case of Jamuna Prasad v. Mst. Panna,2 it has been held that:
“The words “ordinarily resident” have a different meaning than “residence at the time of the application”. Both may be identical or may be different. That would depend on the facts of each particular case. To interpret the words “where the minor ordinarily resides” to mean “where the minor actually resides at the time of application”, may in some cases amount to rendering nugatory all the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act. It may be that persons who have absolutely no right may remove the minor forcibly and keep him at the distant place, when the application is made, where the minor was ordinarily residing, and objection may be taken that the application was not entertainable. The entire circumstances, the intention with which the minor had been removed, the person with whom the minor has been living and other relevant factors have to be taken into consideration.”
16. Where a minor girl who used to reside with her mother at Deoria in U.P was removed only recently to Shahabad in Bihar since the dispute about the property had arisen with the object of getting over the minor and her property. Held that it could not be said that minor ordinarily resided at Sahahabad.
17. In the case of Harihar Pd. Jaiswal v. Suresh Jaiswal,3 it has been held that:
“If the expression “place of ordinary residence” means the residence of his natural guardian, the very purpose of using the word “the residence of the minor” in Section 9 would be lost. It is not the place of ordinary residence of the natural guardian that gives the jurisdiction to the court under Section 9(1), but it is the place of ordinary residence of the minor and the Legislature has designedly used the word “where the minor ordinarily resides”. Hence the actual residence of the minor, having regard to the circumstances under which the minor happens to reside at the particular place must be taken into consideration in deciding the place where the minor ordinarily resides.
In the circumstances of the case it must be held that the minor has been living with her mother at Nagpur for some time and at Tumsar in Maharashtra State for some time. Hence the minor's ordinary place of residence can not be said to be Hyderabad merely because the father who is the natural guardian is residing at Hyderabad.”
18. The law laid down in the above cases which have been relied upon would not be of much avail to the appellants. The facts as stated above establish, that it was after the death of the father of the minor child that the child was taken away and detained by the grand parents at New Delhi and was not allowed to go back with her mother. It is also established that the minor resided with her parents prior to June 1995, till her father died. Hence the residence of the minor girl would be treated at Nainital and not at New Delhi. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
19. We further direct that the learned Judge, Family Court shall decide the matter expeditiously preferably within three months of furnishing a certified copy of this order before him.
20. Appeal Dismissed.
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