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  • circumstances.11. Section 101 of Indian Evidence Act
  • provisions of Ss. 102, 103 and 106 of Evidence Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • circumstances.11. Section 101 of Indian Evidence Act
  • provisions of Ss. 102, 103 and 106 of Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed by Canara Bank challenging an order dated 28 November 1996 and an award dated 4 April 1997 passed by respondent 2 (Labour Court). The dispute arose from an incident involving Lakhan Singh, a loan account holder at Canara Bank's Hathras Branch, who deposited Rs. 35,000 with Sri S.K. Verma, a clerk at the branch, on 31 August 1987. Verma failed to credit the amount to Lakhan Singh's loan account for several months. Lakhan Singh filed a complaint on 21 April 1988, leading to disciplinary proceedings against Verma. The enquiry officer found Verma guilty and recommended stoppage of four increments cumulatively as punishment. The disciplinary authority accepted this, but the Labour Court subsequently absolved Verma of misconduct and set aside the punishment, prompting the Bank to file this writ petition seeking quashing of the Labour Court's order and award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court erred in absolving the delinquent employee, Sri S.K. Verma, of misconduct despite evidence indicating failure to credit loan instalment amount?
  2. Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment awarded by the Bank, a financial institution?
  3. Whether the imposition of stoppage of increments with cumulative effect is a valid penalty within the powers of the employer?
  4. What is the correct standard and burden of proof applicable in departmental enquiries as opposed to criminal trials?
  5. Whether the findings of the Labour Court were perverse, unsupported by evidence, and based on a misconception of law?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments (Canara Bank)

  • Sri Verma received the loan instalment and issued a receipt but failed to credit the amount to Lakhan Singh's account.
  • The burden of proof lay on Sri Verma to prove his innocence and to produce Lakhan Singh as a witness.
  • The Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Bank’s disciplinary punishment, which is essential for maintaining the Bank’s reputation.
  • There was an error apparent on the face of the Labour Court’s record; its findings were based on no evidence and the approach to burden of proof was erroneous.
  • Reliance on precedent that departmental enquiries require proof on a preponderance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Respondent’s Arguments (Sri S.K. Verma)

  • Verma requested the Branch Manager to deposit the amount, but the Manager did not allow deposit after 2 P.M.
  • Lakhan Singh withdrew his complaint and did not appear before the enquiry officer, thus Verma should not be punished.
  • The Labour Court’s findings of fact should not be interfered with by this Court in writ jurisdiction.
  • There is no provision under the service rules for stoppage of increments with cumulative effect as a major penalty.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Uday Singh [1997 (4) L.L.N 77] Standard of proof in departmental enquiry is preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond doubt. Supported the principle that departmental enquiries have a different standard of proof than criminal trials.
Delta Engineering Company (Private), Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [1998 (2) L.L.N 493] Burden of proof initially lies on the workman to prove absence of misconduct when challenging termination. Reinforced the burden of proof shifting to the delinquent employee to prove innocence.
Airtech (Private), Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1984) 49 F.L.R 38] Burden of proof principles in labour disputes. Used to support the burden of proof allocation in departmental enquiries.
V.K Raj Industries v. Labour Court [1981 (2) L.L.N 498] Burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings. Applied to emphasize the responsibility on the workman to prove innocence.
Meritec India, Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [C.M.W.P No. 51 of 1993] Burden of proof and departmental enquiry standards. Supported the allocation of burden of proof and standards in departmental enquiries.
S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : A.I.R 1994 S.C 853] Fraud by misrepresentation on Court is null and void. Relied upon by respondent’s counsel but court found it inapplicable to the facts.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kamla Devi [(1996) 8 SCC 285 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 1733] Abuse of process of law may attract exemplary costs. Referenced but found not applicable to the case facts.
Chief General Manager, State Bank of India v. B.C Verma [(1994) 1 UPLBEC 290] Writ Court does not sit in appeal over Labour Court award. Not applicable where Labour Court’s findings were perverse and unsupported by evidence.
Scooter India, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Lucknow [1989 (1) L.L.N 303] Limits of writ jurisdiction over Labour Court awards. Not applicable on facts where Labour Court erred in law and fact.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the facts that Lakhan Singh deposited Rs. 35,000 with Sri Verma, who issued a receipt but failed to credit the amount to the loan account. The complaint was initially filed but later withdrawn under circumstances suggesting possible coercion or influence, given both parties were from the same village. The Court found the explanation for withdrawal unnatural and concocted. It emphasized that if Verma received the amount and issued a receipt, it was his duty to credit it.

The Court rejected the respondent’s contention that the Labour Court’s jurisdiction to interfere with the Bank’s disciplinary action was barred, stating that certiorari can be issued if the Labour Court’s decision is unreasonable or perverse. The Labour Court’s finding was deemed unsupported by evidence and based on a misconception of the burden and standard of proof applicable in departmental enquiries.

The Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies on the delinquent employee to prove innocence once charged, relying on the Indian Evidence Act (Sections 101, 102, 103, and 106). The Labour Court’s conclusion that the enquiry officer’s findings were perverse was itself baseless and founded on a misconception of law.

The Court further held that the employer has the authority to impose penalties, including stoppage of increments with cumulative effect, as a major penalty, rejecting arguments to the contrary as illogical.

In sum, the Court found the Labour Court’s order and award to be perverse, baseless, and suffering from error of law on the face of the record, warranting quashing.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 28 November 1996 and award dated 4 April 1997 are quashed.

The direct effect is that the disciplinary punishment imposed by Canara Bank on Sri S.K. Verma is upheld. No costs were ordered. The Court did not set any new precedent but applied established principles regarding burden and standard of proof in departmental enquiries and the scope of writ jurisdiction over Labour Court awards.

    Canara Bank, Lucknow v. Union Of India

    1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally on merits with the consent of parties under the rules of the Court.

    2. This writ petition is moved by the petitioner Canara Bank praying that the impugned order, dated 28 November, 1996, and award, dated 4 April, 1997 (Annexures 13 and 15 respectively to the writ petition), passed by respondent 2 be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other suitable order, direction or writ which this Court may deem fit and proper may be issued.

    3. The brief facts which has led to filing of this writ petition are as follows:

    One Lakhan Singh was having a loan account under D.I.R No. 11 of 1986 at New Mandi, Hathras Branch of Canara Bank. On 31 August, 1987 he went to the said branch for depositing a loan instalment amounting to Rs. 35,000. He handed over the said money to Sri S.K Verma, respondent 3 who was posted as clerk in the said branch. Sri Verma did not deposit the said amount in the account of Sri Lakhan Singh for months together. On 21 April, 1988 Sri Lakhan Singh reported the matter to the Branch Manager by filing a complaint, upon which disciplinary proceeding was initiated against Sri Verma. The enquiry officer found him guilty of misconduct and recommended stoppage of four increments by way of punishment. The disciplinary authority accepted the report and stopped four increments with cumulative effect. Matter was then referred to Labour Court. The Labour Court by impugned award absolved Sri Verma from the charge of misconduct and punishment. Hence this petition.

    4. Sri Rakesh Tewari, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that Sri Verma received the amount from Sri Lakhan Singh and issued a counter-foil in token of receipt of the said amount but did not credit the same in the loan account of Sri Lakhan Singh. Sri Tewari further submitted that the burden was upon Sri Verma to prove that he was not guilty of misconduct and therefore, it was for him to produce Sri Lakhan Singh. Sri Tewari also submitted that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in the punishment awarded by the bank as it is a financial institution and the reputation of the bank depends upon the conduct of its employees. Sri Tewari also submitted that there is error apparent on the face of the record of Labour Court and the findings of the Labour Court are based on no evidence and entire approach of the Labour Court on the question of burden of proof is erroneous as it failed to appreciate as to who will fail if no evidence is produced. Naturally it is the delinquent official who will fail in case he does not prove that he is not guilty.

    5. Sri Saxena, learned counsel for respondent 3, submitted that Sri Verma asked the Branch Manager to deposit the amount but the Manager did not permit the deposit of amount after 2 P.M and Lakhan Singh withdrew his complaint and did not appear before the enquiry officer, therefore, he is not liable to be punished. Sri Saxena further submitted that infact there is no scope for interference with the findings of fact reached by the Labour Court and there is no provision for imposing punishment of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect.

    6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties it appears that on 21 April, 1988 a complaint was filed by Lakhan Singh regarding not deposit of the loan amount and in support of the allegations a photostat copy of original receipt issued by respondent 3 was also filed Later on the complaint was withdrawn vide letter, dated 23 April, 1988, by Lakhan Singh stating therein that Sri Verma respondent 3 was resident of his village and he was working on that date on the cash counter. The money was deposited with him and he issued the receipt duly sealed Sri Verma had told him to come next day regarding deposit of the amount and the account was closed by that time. Lakhan Singh has further stated that he forgot to deposit the money next day and lodged the complaint under misconception. The explanation furnished by Lakhan Singh does not seem to be natural and believable and the same appears to be concocted one. Lakhan Singh and Verma both are residents of the same village. When Lakhan Singh lodged the complaint against Sri Verma, Sri Verma must have approached him and the possibility of complaint having been withdrawn under pressure or influence cannot be ruled out. If the account was closed by that time Sri Verma should not have issued the receipt and if he had issued the receipt and received the amount, it was his bounden duty to have credited the amount in the loan account of Lakhan Singh. Thus, the conduct of Sri Verma does not appear to be for from doubt.

    7. As regards the argument of Sri Saxena, learned counsel for respondent 3, that in writ jurisdiction this Court does not sit in appeal and the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised as appellate jurisdiction, suffice it to say that it is well settled principle that writ of certiorari can be issued if the view taken by the Labour Court is unreasonable and the Labour Court has arrived at such a conclusion to which a reasonable man cannot arrive at. In the instant case the view taken by the Labour Court is not based on evidence and is not supported by reasons. This aspect will be discussed in detail later on.

    8. So far as the argument of Sri Saxena that there is no provision under the service rules sunder Chap. II, regulation 4 for stoppage of increments with cumulative effect as it is a major penalty, is concerned, no doubt it is a major penalty but it is well within the powers and authority of the employer to impose minor or major penalty depending upon the gravity of the guilt established. It is strange to submit that the employer can dismiss or remove its employees for misconduct but cannot stop increments with cumulative effect. This argument therefore, cannot be accepted.

    9. Sri Rakesh Tewari, learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance on Apex Court decision in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Uday Singh [1997 (4) L.L.N 77], wherein it is ruled that the standard of proof in criminal trial and departmental enquiry is different and the technical rules of evidence and proof beyond doubt are not applicable to departmental enquiry. It has also been ruled that preponderance of probabilities and conclusions drawn as a reasonable man from the evidence on record are sufficient for the purpose of departmental enquiry.

    10. Sri Tewari further placed reliance on the leading case of Delta Engineering Company (Private), Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [1998 (2) L.L.N 493], in Paras. 5 to 8 at page 496, wherein this Court relied upon the following cases:

    (1) Airtech (Private), Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1984) 49 F.L.R 38].

    (2) V.K Raj Industries v. Labour Court [1981 (2) L.L.N 498].

    (3) Meritec India, Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 51 of 1993, decided on 21 November, 1994] (since reported current issue.)

    The ratio laid down in these cases is that initial burden lies on the workman to prove that he is not guilty of misconduct. Since the workman is challenging the termination and is pleading that he is not guilty of misconduct hence it is for him to lead evidence and explain the circumstances.

    11. Section 101 of Indian Evidence Act postulates that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. The provisions of Ss. 102, 103 and 106 of Evidence Act are also quoted with advantage:

    “102. On whom burden of proof.— The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

    103. Burden of proof as to particular fact.— The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.

    106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.”

    12. A combined reading of these provisions makes it crystal clear that if no evidence is led it is workman who will fail. The burden of proof also goes on shifting.

    13. Sri Saxena, learned counsel for the respondent, placed reliance on S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : A.I.R 1994 S.C 853], for the proposition that playing fraud by misrepresentation on the Court is a nullity and non est, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kamla Devi [(1996) 8 SCC 285 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 1733], on the point that for the abuse of process of law exemplary cost may be awarded, Dr. Shradha Nand Pandey v. Chief Secretary of Government of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1993 E.S.C 103, on the question that stoppage of increments with cumulative effect is major penalty and Chief General Manager, State Bank of India v. B.C Verma [(1994) 1 UPLBEC 290] and Scooter India, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Lucknow [1989 (1) L.L.N 303], on the point that this Court does not sit in appeal over the award of Labour Court. There are no two opinions about the proposition of law laid down in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel Sri Saxena but the principle laid down are not applicable to the facts or instant case and, therefore, the cases relied upon are of no help to the present respondent 3 on the facts and circumstances of instant case.

    14. The Labour Court has itself held that the procedure of enquiry was fair but the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. This conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court is without any basis and without any material on record and is based on misconception of law applicable to the departmental enquiries. It appears that these was clear misconception in the mind of Labour Court in respect of standard of proof in departmental enquiry and burden of proof. As stated above the standard of proof in criminal trial and departmental enquiry is different. The burden of proof lies on those who fail if evidence is not led. In the instant case once charged, it was for the delinquent employee to prove that he was not guilty of misconduct but he miserably failed to do so. In my view the conclusions arrived at by the Labour Court are perverse, baseless and unsupported by material on record and suffered from error of law on the face of record. The impugned order and award are liable to be quashed.

    15. In view of the premises aforesaid writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order and award, dated 28 November, 1996 and 4 April, 1997 respectively (Annexures 13 and 15) are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.

    Petition allowed.

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    Canara Bank, Lucknow v. Union Of India
    (Feb 11, 1998)