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  • Co-operative Societies Act.
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  • Co-operative Societies Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed by Vishnupuri Upbhokta Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Khatauli (the petitioner), a society registered under the Co‑operative Societies Act on 25 January 1974, challenging the appointment of Sandeep Kumar (respondent 3) as the distributor for L.P.G. in Khatauli district by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. The petitioner alleged that the Selection Board's appointment contravened conditions in the Corporation's advertisement/notice that gave preference to registered Co‑operative Societies and to a resident of the place where distributorship was granted. The petitioner applied in response to an advertisement dated 20 May 1983 and was called for interview by the Oil Selection Board on 1 August 1984. The petitioner learned in December 1984 that respondent 3 had been allotted the distributorship, and, following a society resolution dated 7 January 1985, filed this writ petition on 18 January 1985.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Selection Board and the Indian Oil Corporation violated the conditions of their advertisement/notice (including preference to registered Co‑operative Societies and preference to residents of the place) in appointing respondent 3 as L.P.G. distributor for Khatauli.
  2. Whether the appointment/selection of a distributor by the Corporation is amenable to challenge by writ petition on grounds of illegality or arbitrariness.
  3. Whether an unsuccessful candidate is entitled to be informed of reasons for non‑selection (i.e., whether non‑disclosure of reasons amounts to denial of natural justice in these circumstances).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • The Selection Board committed gross illegality by failing to comply with conditions in the Corporation's notice—specifically clause "Gha" on residential qualification and paragraph 4 of the note (Tippani) granting preference to registered Co‑operative Societies.
  • The petitioner, being resident of Khatauli, was entitled to the residency preference over respondent 3, who was said not to be resident of Khatauli.
  • As a registered Co‑operative Society, the petitioner was entitled to preference under the Tippani and the Board misinterpreted or disregarded that provision by not granting the preference.
  • The petitioner argued on social/community grounds (that the society was overwhelmingly comprised of Harijans) that it should have been given the distributorship to serve that section of the district.
  • The Board ought to have communicated selection results and reasons for non‑selection to the unsuccessful candidates.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented)

  • The writ petition was not maintainable because the grant of distributorship was a contractual or discretionary matter and not ordinarily subject to writ jurisdiction.
  • The selection process was proper: there was no illegality, arbitrariness, or breach of natural justice in the selection conducted by the Board.
  • The preference provisions did not apply in the petitioner's favour because the petitioner did not satisfy the primary requisites (for example, the petitioner was not among the first four candidates selected by the Board), so "preference" did not operate to give the petitioner priority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 The State or a corporation dealing with the public cannot act arbitrarily; its actions must conform to principles that meet the test of reason and relevance. The Court relied on this principle to assess whether the Selection Board's process was arbitrary; it concluded the procedure was not arbitrary or capricious and followed rational norms.
Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, (1984) 2 SCC 488 : AIR 1984 SC 898 High Courts should not reappraise facts and substitute their own findings for those of a specialized body unless there is excess of jurisdiction or an error apparent on the face of the record causing manifest injustice. Applied to hold that the High Court (and by extension this Court) should not reassess the merits of the Selection Board's choices where no excess of jurisdiction or manifest error was shown; supported refusal to disturb Board's selection.
Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company, (1984) 3 SCC 258 : AIR 1984 SC 1030 Granting of certain licences (here, liquor licence) is a discretionary matter; a court cannot direct that a licence be granted to a particular applicant. Invoked to support the proposition that selection/appointment to distributorship is discretionary or a privilege, not an enforceable right; used to reject petitioner's claim for direction to appoint it.
Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147 Where the highest bidder or rightful claimant was denied a grant in favour of another on improper grounds (e.g., secret offer), a writ may be appropriate. The Court stated this precedent's facts were wholly different and the law there was inapplicable to the present facts; it declined to treat the present case as analogous.
Ajai Kishore v. Union of India, Writ Petn. No. 9791 of 1984 (decided 22 May 1985) Selection of a dealer for an outlet is discretionary or at best a privilege; in such cases there is no enforceable right and no breach of natural justice in granting such licences/contracts. Reiterated to reinforce that selection for distributorship is discretionary and does not give rise to an enforceable right in the petitioner; used to justify dismissal.
McInes v. Onslow Fane, (1978) 3 All ER 211 (Megarry, V.C.) Authority cited (English decision) in support of the proposition that granting licences/contracts does not necessarily involve breach of natural justice when discretion is exercised. Quoted in Ajai Kishore and cited as supporting authority for the discretionary nature of grants and absence of enforceable rights; relied upon indirectly in the reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying the conditions of the Corporation's advertisement and the record of the Selection Board's proceedings to the petitioner's claims. The analysis can be distilled into the following steps, each resting on material contained in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of clause "Gha" (residential qualification): Clause Gha required residence in Muzaffarnagar district for at least three years and stated that preference would be given to a resident of the specific place where distributorship was to be granted. The Court observed respondent 3 satisfied the district residence requirement (resident of Muzaffarnagar) and explained that the "preference" to a resident of Khatauli operates only where other qualifying criteria are equal (i.e., it does not elevate a non‑selected applicant above selected candidates). Because the petitioner was not in the Board's top four, no tie existed invoking preference.
  2. Interpretation of paragraph 4 of the Tippani (preference to registered Co‑operative Societies): The Court emphasised the express caveat "other things being equal" in the Tippani. Preference to a registered Co‑operative Society would apply only when competing candidates were otherwise equal in qualification or merit. The petitioner was not placed among the panel of four selected candidates; consequently, the condition for operating the preference did not arise.
  3. Examination of the panel and comparative merit: The record (affidavit of the Board's chair, Smt. Janki Amma) showed the petitioner was not among the first four selected by the Board. The Court noted that another registered Co‑operative Society did appear on the panel, undermining any asserted unique entitlement by the petitioner.
  4. Assessment of alleged arbitrariness or breach of natural justice: The Court set out the process followed by the Corporation and the Board — public advertisement, submission of particulars, interview by a Selection Board, preparation of a panel of suitable candidates in order of merit, field investigations, and final appointment by the Corporation. The Court found this procedure equitable and not arbitrary; it also stressed that the Board being chaired by a retired High Court Judge reduced chances of arbitrariness. The Court held that non‑disclosure of reasons for non‑selection (including confidential field reports) did not amount to denial of natural justice, relying on Bishnu Ram Borah and Chingleput Bottlers for the proposition that authorities are not obliged to disclose reasons in such contexts.
  5. Reliance on precedent limiting court interference with discretionary selections: The Court applied authorities that counsel against the High Court or this Court reappraising the comparative suitability of candidates or directing that a licence be granted to a particular candidate unless there is excess of jurisdiction or an error apparent on the face of the record that causes manifest injustice. No such excess or manifest error was demonstrated in this record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISMISSED AT ADMISSION STAGE.

Implications and immediate effect:

  • The writ petition lacked merit and is dismissed; the appointment of Sandeep Kumar as L.P.G. distributor for Khatauli stands under the procedure followed.
  • The Court found the Selection Board's process to be rational, non‑arbitrary and within its discretion, and that the preference provisions in the advertisement applied only when competing candidates were otherwise equal — a condition not met here.
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced; the Court applied established authorities to confirm limited judicial interference with discretionary selections and to uphold the non‑disclosure principle for confidential reports/reasons in selection contexts. The opinion does not purport to set new precedent beyond these applications.

    Vishnupuri Upbhokta Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Khattali v. Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., New Delhi And Others

    1. This writ petition has been filed by a Co-operative Society having the name of Vishnupuri Upbhokta Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Khatauli, district Muzaffarnagar. They have challenged the appointment of Sandeep Kumar, respondent 3, Proprietor, Shyam Gas Service, Budhuna Road P.O Khatauli district Muzaffarnagar, as the distributor for L.P.G (Cooking Gas), in Khatauli district Muzaffarnagar by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. The petitioner claims that selection of respondent 3 was contrary to the conditions enumerated in the notice issued by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. One of the conditions stipulated preference being given to a Co-operative Society and another condition stipulated giving of preference to a resident of Khatauli. The petitioner was entitled to these preferences as against respondent 3 and the Oil Selection Board acted against the conditions set out in the notice.

    2. The writ petition has been contested on behalf of the respondents, who have filed counter affidavits and we have also heard their counsel. It will be necessary to state briefly the relevant facts. The petitioner claimed that it was a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. The date of registration was 25-1-1974. The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. issued an advertisement in the Hindi Daily ‘Hindustan’ dt. 20th May, 1983 published from New Delhi inviting applications from persons including registered Co-operative Societies for distributorship of L.P.G (Liquefied Petroleum Gas). The petitioner Society submitted an application filing all relevant particulars to the Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (Marketing Division) 19, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation. A notice dated 5th July, 1984 was sent to the petitioner for interview by the Oil Selection Board, New Delhi, respondent 2, hereinafter referred to as the Board. The interview was held on 1-8-1984 at New Delhi. Shri Jai Dev Singh. Secretary of the petitioner Society appeared before the Board. The petitioner thereafter waited for the result of the selection but could not know until the month of December, 1984, that respondent 3 had been allotted the distributorship for L.P.G The Society thereafter in a meeting dt. 7-1-1985 resolved that the appointment of Shri Sandeep Kumar should be challenged by way of writ petition. The petitioner thereafter filed this petition in this Court on 18-1-1985. The grounds of challenge were two fold; Firstly, the Society was entitled to get preference in the matter of appointment as distributor in view of condition contained in para 4 of the note (Tippani). This paragraph refers to preference being given to registered Co-operative Societies in the matter of grant of distributorship. The other ground on which emphasis was laid pertained to the residential qualification of the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that respondent 3 was not a resident of Khatauli and as such preference ought to have been given to the petitioner who fulfilled that requirement.

    3. The respondents have taken the stand that the writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner was not found eligible to be appointed as distributor for L.P.G The grant of distributorship by the Corporation was a matter of contract and the same could not be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Secondly, the question was one of grant of distributorship based upon selection and there was neither any illegality nor any arbitrariness nor any infringement of the rules of natural justice. Thirdly, the question of preference being given to the petitioner did not arise in the present case, for the primary requisite of granting preference did not exist in favour of the petitioner.

    4. We have heard Mr. S.N Misra, Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad, Senior Advocate on behalf of respondent Board and Mr. Swami Dayal, Senior Advocate on behalf of respondent 3.

    5. The contention of Mr. S.N Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the Board committed gross illegality in not complying with the conditions laid down by the Corporation for the grant of distributorship. Reference may be made to para Gha of the notice (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) which was issued by the Corporation by way of advertisement in the newspaper. This clause stipulates about the residential qualification. Translated into English it reads as follows:—

    “The candidate should have been a resident of district Muzaffarnagar for at least three years, but preference would be given to an applicant who was a resident of the place of which distributorship was being given.”

    6. Mr. Misra argued that the petitioner was a resident of Khatauli and as such was entitled to the preference as against respondent 3, who was hot a resident of Khatauli. Clause Gha contains one of the essential requisites that a candidate must possess. It requires him to be a resident of district Muzaffarnagar. Respondent 3 is admittedly a resident of Muzaffarnagar. The question of preference would arise only where there was a tie between respondent 3 and the petitioner. One cannot claim preference being given to him when he is otherwise not selected. It has come in the affidavit of Smt. Janki Amma, Chairman of the Board that the petitioner was not among the first four selected by the Board for the grant of distributorship at Khatauli. Her affidavit further confirms that the rest of the candidates were not found fit. We, therefore, find no misinterpretation of the provisions of clause Gha by the Board.

    7. In regard to para 4 of the note (Tippani) the argument was that the Board has misinterpreted the provisions in not granting preference to the petitioner, which was a registered Co-operative Society.

    8. In other words, this clause comes by way of foot note to the earlier conditions and states that other things being equal, preference would be given to a registered Co-operative Society for grant of distributorship. The argument of the learned counsel does not take note of “other things being equal”. This was a very relevant consideration. In our opinion, the Board has not made any mistake in not granting preference to the petitioner. This preference could only be granted if other things were the same or equal. In other words, if the petitioner had qualified for selection and was placed in the first place with another candidate, this preference would weigh in its favour. Where the petitioner was not even selected to be included in a panel of four, we fail to see how any preference could be given to the petitioner.

    9. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that being a registered Co-operative Society, it was entitled to be given preference. This argument is again untenable. The panel of four names shows that at serial No. 3 there was another registered Co-operative Society. It has nowhere been indicated in the writ petition as to how the petitioner was entitled, to the preference as against respondent 3.

    10. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that since the petitioner Society was overwhelmingly comprised of Harijans, it was in the fitness of things that this Society was given an opportunity to serve the people. Notice, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, does not indicate that any preference was to be given to a Society whose membership was overwhelmingly or mostly confined to a particular section of the residents of the district. The argument is, in our opinion, without substance. Whichever applicant applied for the distributorship had to qualify on the basis of its record principally and the interview by the Selection Board. The petitioner did not qualify to be included in the panel of four names selected by the Selection Board. Consequently, no rights accrued in its favour.

    11. As indicated earlier, the affidavit of Smt. Janki Amma, Chairman of the Board is material and clearly indicates that the petitioner was not selected to be included amongst the panel of four. In other words, it means that the petitioner was not found fit to be included in the panel. In this view of the matter, the petitioner could have no rights to claim the distributorship. The procedure followed by the Corporation was equitable and not arbitrary. The Corporation first advertised the matter inviting application and then placed the matter before the Board. The Board prepares a panel of suitable candidates after going through the documents made available and on a comparative assessment based on their performance at the time of the interview. The candidates selected are shown in order of merit. Thereafter the names are sent for field investigation by the officer of the employing Corporation. On a perusal of the field investigation report, candidate's name may be removed from the panel if found ineligible. If any complaint is received that too is enquired before a final decision. Thereafter, the names are sent to the Corporation who appoints the distributor. The above practice is a salutary one. The fact that the Board is chaired by a retired Judge of a High Court is indicative of the fact that chances of arbitrariness are practically non-existent.

    12. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised an argument that it was the duty of the Board to indicate the result of the selection and interview to the candidates and also points out the reason for their non-selection. Reference was made to the decision in the case of Ramana v. I.A Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 and in particular to para 20:—

    “The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government which we have discussed above must apply equally where such corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise, and it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person it likes at its sweet will, but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance.”

    13. Their Lordships further observed in the following para:

    “The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise, with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory.”

    14. In the present case, as noticed above, the appointment of the distributor by the Corporation was done through a Selection Board which not only considered the applications, particulars given therein but also interviewed the candidates and also subjected the empanelled candidates to field investigation. In our opinion, the procedure followed in the case does not show that it was arbitrary or capricious or does the material on the record indicate that the proceedings by the Selection Board were initiated by any arbitrariness or capriciousness.

    15. The contention that the Board ought to have mentioned the reason for non-selection of a candidate and the non-disclosure of the same caused prejudice to the party is wholly untenable. An unsuccessful candidate is not entitled, as a matter of right, to be told the reason for his failure. He may or may not pass the test and this depends on his performance. The selection Board or the body holding the test is not required to indicate the reason as to why a particular candidate failed to qualify.

    16. In the case of Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, (1984) 2 SCC 488 : AIR 1984 SC 898 their Lordships held that failure to give a copy of the report by the Deputy Commissioner, which was of a confidential nature, would not amount to denial of natural justice. Further, since the respondents never made a demand for a copy of the report and even if such a demand was made, the Board would have been fully justified in not furnishing the same. Such a refusal would not amount to denial of natural justice.

    17. A similar view has been taken in the case of Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company, (1984) 3 SCC 258 : AIR 1984 SC 1030 where their Lordships held that the granting authority of a licence is not bound to disclose the reason. There is thus a good authority for non-disclosure of the reason as to why a candidate did not qualify to be included in the panel. If there is any mistake or miscalculation of marks, the matter can be looked into, but the non-disclosure of the reason for the failure of a candidate is not a ground for challenging the selection of a successful candidate.

    18. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the case of Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1147 to urge that a writ petition was a proper remedy to challenge a lease granted by the State. The facts of that case are entirely different and the law laid down therein is, in our opinion, inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, the highest bidder had required a right to the grant of the lease, but he had not been given the same and it had been granted to another person on the basis of an offer secretly made.

    19. Reference may be made to the case of Bishnu Ram Borah v. Parag Saikia, ((1984) 2 SCC 488 : AIR 1984 SC 898) (supra), where their Lordships held that it is impermissible for the High Court to embark upon an enquiry into the fact to adjudge the suitability or otherwise of the rival pairs of claimants and upon a reappraisal of the evidence come to a finding contrary to that reached by the Board of Revenue, more so when there is nothing on record to show that the Board had acted in excess of jurisdiction or there was an error apparent on the face of the record which resulted in manifest injustice. In the present case too nothing could be shown that the Selection Board had acted in excess of jurisdiction nor is there anything to establish an error of law apparent on the face of the record which has resulted in manifest injustice.

    20. In the case of Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company ((1984) 3 SCC 258 : AIR 1984 SC 1030) (supra), their Lordships held that grant of liquor licence was discretionary matter.

    21. In the above case, the High Court had quashed the order of the Commissioner and further directed the issuance of a licence to the applicant before the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the order holding that the High Court could not direct that licence should be granted to a particular applicant.

    22. The above case was relied upon in Writ Petn. No. 9791 of 1984— Ajai Kishore v. Union of India, decided on 22nd May, 1985. We had observed therein:—

    “The selection of a dealer for the outlet would be discretionary or at best a privilege and in such a case there is no question of any enforceable right See Chingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Company, (1984) 3 SCC 258 : AIR 1984 SC 1030. Further, there is no question of breach of any principles of natural justice while granting a licence of the contract for an outlet. See Mclnes v. Onslow Fane, (1978) 3 All ER 211, Megarry, V.C”

    23. No other point was argued.

    24. We find no merits in this writ petition, which is dismissed at the admission stage.

    25. Petition dismissed.

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    Vishnupuri Upbhokta ... v. Divisional Manager, ...
    (Oct 14, 1985)