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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Marriage Act by the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976
  • sub-section (1-A) of S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act 1976,
  • S. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act.6.
  • Sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • (i), (ii) of sub-section (1-A) of S. 13
  • S. 39 of the Amendment Act
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Marriage Act by the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976
  • sub-section (1-A) of S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act 1976,
  • S. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act.6.
  • Sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • (i), (ii) of sub-section (1-A) of S. 13
  • S. 39 of the Amendment Act
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties were married on 26-4-1959 when the appellant husband was about 17 years of age and the respondent wife about 14. They cohabited at their village home until about 10-10-1969. The husband's petition alleged that the respondent was short-tempered, occasionally violent, used abusive language, hurled a Belen, beat nephews, and abused the petitioner's mother and brother's wife. He further alleged that the respondent had accused him of illicit relations with his sister-in-law (his "Bhabhi"), causing humiliation, indignity and mental torture; that he became impotent towards her; and that she ultimately left the husband's house for her father's house in or about February 1970 and had not returned. A child born on 12-5-1970 died on 22-5-1970.

The husband filed a petition for divorce on 11-10-1969; an ex parte decree for divorce was passed on 23-4-1970 but was later set aside, and the suit was dismissed for default of parties on 14-2-1974. The respondent filed a written statement and the matter proceeded to trial on several issues (see below).

The trial court found that (a) the respondent was not guilty of cruelty such as to create apprehension of harm from cohabitation (issue No. 1); (b) a false charge of adultery had been made by the respondent and caused the petitioner mental agony and amounted to cruelty within S.10(1)(b) (issue No. 2); (c) the petitioner was not impotent (issue No. 3); (d) the petitioner himself was to be blamed for causing the respondent's desertion (issue No. 5); and (e) the petitioner was entitled to a decree for judicial separation (issue No. 4), with maintenance of Rs. 190 per month during the statutory period of separation.

On appeal by the respondent, the lower appellate court set aside the trial court's judgment and dismissed the petition in its entirety, holding among other things that the false charge of unchastity did not amount to cruelty warranting judicial separation and that the charge had been condoned.

This second appeal was admitted for hearing under Order 41, Rule 11 C.P.C.; the Court issued notice on the question whether the respondent's consistent accusation of illicit relations with the sister-in-law amounted to "cruelty" within Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The judgment discusses also procedural applications to amend pleadings in light of the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 and related statutory provisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent's consistent accusation that the appellant had illicit relations with his sister-in-law amounted to "cruelty" within the meaning of Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
  2. Whether the petitioner could amend his pleadings to seek dissolution by divorce under sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (as amended by the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976) where the decree for judicial separation previously passed by the trial court had been set aside by the appellate court (i.e., whether a subsisting decree of judicial separation existed to found the new ground).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant husband alleged a course of conduct by the respondent amounting to cruelty and desertion: verbal and physical abuse, false accusations of illicit relations with his Bhabhi, conduct causing humiliation and mental torture, and eventual departure from the matrimonial home.
  • He sought relief by decree of divorce and, in the alternative, judicial separation. He relied on the facts of alleged cruelty and desertion stated in his original petition.
  • The appellant subsequently sought to amend his petition (after the 1976 amendments) to rely on sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 — claiming a ground for divorce based on non-resumption of cohabitation for one year after a decree of judicial separation — and made applications for amendment of pleadings and for expenses of the appeal under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The opinion does not set out a detailed, separate list of the respondent's litigating arguments in the trial or appellate courts beyond references to her written statement and to the lower appellate court's findings and conclusions.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, keeping closely to the facts and statutory framework presented:

  1. Statutory amendments and opportunity to amend pleadings: The Court observed that the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 made retrospective amendments to the Hindu Marriage Act and that Section 39 of the Amendment Act required courts to give parties an opportunity to amend pleadings in light of the amendments. The Court afforded opportunities to the parties to apply for amendment but rejected the initial application as "plainly misconceived" and later described subsequent amendment applications as also misconceived.
  2. On the proposed amendment under Section 13(1-A): The Court explained that the ground for divorce in Section 13(1-A) (as amended) requires a subsisting decree of judicial separation after which cohabitation has not resumed for the statutory period. The Court held that a decree for judicial separation must be subsisting (i.e., in force) to be the basis for the Section 13(1-A) ground. In the present case the trial court's decree for judicial separation had been set aside by the lower appellate court, so there was no subsisting decree that could form the basis of a Section 13(1-A) claim. The Court further noted the point that a decree for judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights, if relied upon as a basis for dissolution, must be final in an earlier proceeding and a fresh suit would be required for dissolution where appropriate; one cannot obtain dissolution in the same proceeding where the decree giving rise to Section 13(1-A) relief is under challenge or not subsisting.
  3. On the core factual allegations and cruelty: The Court reviewed the allegations in the husband's original petition and agreed with the lower appellate court's assessment that, on the facts preceding the presentation of the petition, none of them amounted to cruelty as a ground for judicial separation or divorce. The Court emphasised that any allegation made by the wife in her written statement could not give rise to a cause of action for the husband's petition because a fact that affords a cause of action must precede initiation of the action; therefore, statements in the respondent's written statement could not be treated as facts supporting relief for the husband.
  4. On the specific allegation of illicit relations and condonation: The Court accepted the lower appellate court's finding that the allegation of illicit relations between the husband and his Bhabhi, which the wife had hurled, must be deemed to have been condoned by the cohabitation between the parties in 1969, which resulted in the birth of a child on or about 12-5-1970. In short, subsequent cohabitation operated to condone the earlier accusation for the purposes relevant to the petition.
  5. On desertion: The Court noted that the point of desertion did not appear to have been argued before the lower appellate court, apparently because the trial court had found for the wife on that point. The Court did not overturn that procedural posture.
  6. Procedural and interlocutory matters: The Court dealt with an application under Section 24 for expenses of the appeal that was pending (seeking Rs. 3,000) and noted procedural occurrences (payments of Rs.185 per month to the wife under the trial court decree, attempts to procure the wife's attendance, the wife's non-attendance, and correspondence). The Court declined to further adjourn the hearing to put the respondent into funds for contesting the appeal, finding that such an adjournment was unnecessary under the circumstances.
  7. Conclusion on merits: After hearing counsel, the Court concluded the appeal had no merit. It reiterated that even accepting the appellant's pleaded facts at face value, no ground for cruelty or desertion was established that could sustain judicial separation or divorce, and thus the appeal was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Implications:

  • The immediate legal effect is that the appellant's second appeal is dismissed with costs; the reliefs sought by the husband (dissolution of marriage by divorce or judicial separation) were not sustained by the Court on the facts and law presented.
  • The Court held that allegations contained in a respondent's written statement cannot create a cause of action for the petitioner because facts giving rise to a cause of action must precede initiation of the action; thus statements in pleadings cannot be retroactively relied upon as pre-existing grounds for relief.
  • The Court ruled that condonation may be found where cohabitation follows earlier complaints (here, cohabitation in 1969 producing a child was held to condone the earlier accusation of illicit relations). This meant that the alleged false accusation did not, in the Court's view, sustain cruelty as a ground for judicial separation or divorce in this case.
  • The Court clarified a procedural limitation under the amended law (Section 13(1-A) as amended by the 1976 Act): a ground for divorce based on non-resumption of cohabitation after judicial separation requires a subsisting decree of judicial separation; where an earlier decree has been set aside there is no subsisting decree that can be relied upon in the same proceeding to obtain dissolution under that provision — a fresh proceeding is required where appropriate.
  • No new legal precedent beyond the application of the statutory provisions and the facts of the case is announced; the decision's principal consequence is the dismissal of the appellant's appeal and the attendant costs order.

End of summary.

    Sadan Singh v. Smt. Resham .

    1. This is a husband's second appeal in a suit for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent, by a decree of divorce and in the alternative for judicial separation.

    2. The appellant is captain now a major in the army. His case was that the parties were married on 26-4-1959 when he was about 17 years of age and the respondent was only 14. They lived and cohabited together at their village home where they last resided together upto 10-10-1969. The respondent wife is then described as short-tempered who sometimes becomes violent and who is said to use abusive language. She was alleged to be short-statured and hard of hearing. It was then said that one day the respondent wife hurled a Belen and used to beat his nephews and abused the petitioner's mother as also his brother's wife. This is followed by the complaint that the respondent wife falsely accused the husband of “complicity with his Bhabhi who is about 18 years older than him” and has 8 issues, the eldest of them being 27 years old and whom petitioner “respects like his mother.” The husband had to suffer indignity and humiliation before his family and neighbours. His life became very miserable so that “he became impotent towards her”. This is followed by the allegation that “he could not associate with her in the advanced society to which the petitioner belongs as a commissioned officer of Indian army.” Lastly he alleged that the respondent wife collected people, defamed the petitioner and ultimately left the petitioner's house and went to her father's house in or about February 1970 and had not returned to the petitioner thereafter. A son was said to have been born on 12-5-1970, but died ten days thereafter on 22-5-1970. On these facts, the husband alleged that the respondent wife had “deserted the petitioner now for 5 years”; that “she has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of petitioner that it will be harmful and injurious for the petitioner to live with her”; and that “she had almost disrupted the joint family life of the petitioner with his parents, brother and his sons and has thus caused incalculable mental torture to petitioner”. A petition for divorce was said to have been filed by the husband on 11-10-1969 on which an ex parte decree for divorce was passed on 23-4-1970, but was set aside and thereafter the suit was dismissed for default of parties on 14-2-1974. The petitioner Stated that he came to know about it only a few days before from leave (sic). Having stated the facts narrated in the petition, I must observe that even if all the facts that the petitioner has stated were accepted at their face, no case, whether of cruelty or desertion, could be said to be made out against the respondent and the petition was liable to the dismissed. Be that as it may, the respondent filed a written statement and the matter went to trial on the following issues:—

    “1. Whether cruelty was committed by the respondent on the petitioner?

    2. Whether the respondent malignantly blamed the petitioner to have illicit relations with his Bhabhi and thus brought him to disrepute, if so its effect?

    3. Whether the petitioner has become impotent towards her on account of her continuous maltreatment?

    4. To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled?

    5. Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner without any reasonable and probable cause?”

    3. On an appraisal of the evidence, the trial court found on issue No. 1 that the respondent is not guilty of having committed cruelty or of such conduct as to give rise to an apprehension in the petitioner's mind that co-habitation with her would be injurious or harmful; on issue No. 2, that a false charge of adultery was made by the respondent against the petitioner which caused him mental agony and that amounted to cruelty within the meaning of S. 10(1)(b); on issue No. 3, that the petitioner was not impotent and was capable of sexual intercourse with the respondent when she left the village in October, 1969 or thereafter on issue No. 5, that the petitioner himself was to be blaimed “for causing desertion of the respondent and accordingly………the respondent is not at all guilty of desertion”; and on issue No. 4, that in view of the findings arrived at on issue No. 2 the petitioner was entitled to a decree for judicial separation, as no ground for dissolution of the marriage by divorce had been made out. In the result, the learned Civil Judge who tried the case originally, passed a decree for judicial separation but at the same time awarded a sum of Rs. 190/- per month as maintenance allowance to the respondent “during the statutory period of judicial separation.”

    4. On appeal by the respondent wife the lower appellate court corrected the errors into which the trial court fell and set aside its judgment, and dismissed the petition in its entirety. The lower appellate court held that the petitioner husband was residing “in such an atmosphere where false charge of unchastity” of women members of the family was not unknown and that “in view of the proved habits of the petitioner the false charge of unchastity between him and his wife does not constitute such cruelty so as to warrant a decree of judicial separation.” The lower appellate court further held that the charge made by the wife against the husband had been condoned by the latter, and lastly that even if the wife's charge against the husband of adultery between him and his Bhabhi was false, that did not amount to cruelty.

    5. The question of law on which notice was issued by the Court after hearing under O. 41, R. 11 C.P.C, was:—

    “Whether the fact that the respondent consistently accused the appellant of having illicit relations with his sister-in-law amounted to ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of S. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act.”

    6. This case had been, before me off and on, for some months now. One of the reasons was that no notice was taken of the amendments made in the Hindu Marriage Act by the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 either in the trial court nor in the lower appellate court, nor even in this Court when the appeal was heard under O. 41, R. 11 C.P.C The amendments made are retrospective and S. 39 of the Amendment Act required that the court should give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings in the light of the amendments made in the Hindu Marriage Act. I gave that opportunity to the parties. An application dated 19-10-1980 for amendment was consequently made. That was rejected by my order dated 14-11-1980 as “plainly misconceived”. I gave the petitioner-appellant another opportunity to make a proper application. An application dated 12-11-1980 was made for expenses of the appeal on which notice was issued to the husband for filing objections. Efforts were also made to have the parties before me. The husband appeared on a few occasions, but the wife persistently refrained from appearing in Court, and from her attitude it was clear that marriage tie at any costs, even at the cost of having to live as a grass widow at her parents' house for the rest of her life.

    7. Another application for amendment of the petition was made on 18-11-1980. In the meanwhile, repeated attempts were made to enable the wife to appear in Court to bring about a settlement between the parties, but they failed.

    8. The application for amendment of the petition, which was filed on 18-11-1980, is also wholly misconceived. By the proposed amendment, a divorce is sought on the ground that a period of more than one year had elapsed between the decree of judicial separation granted by the trial court and the decree of the lower appellate court, whereby it was set aside. The petitioner has purported to base the plea on sub-section (1-A) of S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as amended by the Matrimonial Laws (Amendment) Act 1976, which reduced the period of waiting from two years to one year. The ground for divorce, prescribed thereby, is that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of the decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties. The decree for judicial separation, which could be the basis for divorce, must be a subsisting decree, even if it is assumed that where a decree of judicial separation has been passed by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court or courts it is the date of the decree of the trial court from which the period of one year is to be reckoned, unless of course, the operation of the decree was stayed by the appellate court. In the present case, the decree for judicial separation, that was passed by the trial court, was set aside by the lower appellate court. There was no decree for judicial separation when the application for amendment of the original petition was made and none at all when the original petition was filed. Indeed, the relief of dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, specified by either of the cls. (i), (ii) of sub-section (1-A) of S. 13 cannot be obtained in the same proceedings in which the decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights has been passed. A fresh suit has to be instituted for obtaining relief on either of the said grounds after the decree for judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights has become final in an earlier proceeding. It was for these reasons that before proceeding on to hear the appeal on merits, I had indicated to the counsel for the parties that the application dated 18-11-1980, for amendment of the petition, would be dismissed.

    9. The application under Sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, that had been filed by the wife for a direction to pay her the sum of Rs. 3,000/- towards the expenses of the appeal on 12-11-1980, was pending when the hearing commenced, after a counter-affidavit had been filed in that application on 18-11-1980, I had permitted the respondent wife to file a rejoinder affidavit by 18-12-1980, to which date the hearing of the appeal was adjourned. Some money was thereafter paid or sent to the wife in order to enable her to appear in Court. But, as indicated above, she avoided appearing in Court on one pretext or the other and instead sent letters by post which showed that she was receiving a sum of Rs. 185/- per month through court, obviously under the decree that had been passed by the trial court. Mr. V.K Gupta, learned counsel, who was appearing for the respondent wife in this Court, did not express his inability to continue appearing for her or in pleading her case for any want of instructions. Under the circumstances, I did not consider it proper to further adjourn the hearing of the appeal on merits in order to put the respondent wife into funds for contesting it, as the doing so appeared to be unnecessary. As regards the costs incurred by the wife so far, they shall obviously abide the result. It was for these reasons that I had indicated to the parties' learned counsel that application would also be rejected.

    10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties on the merits of he appeal. I find that it has none. I have already recited in some detail the allegations made by the husband in his original petition and even indicated that even if all the facts, stated by the petitioner in his original petition, were accepted on their face, no case whether of cruelty or desertion, for judicial separation or divorce could be said to be made out against the respondent. The lower appellate court has recited certain statements, made by the respondent wife in her written statement, while discussing the point whether the allegations made by the wife regarding the husband's intimacy with his Bhabhi are false and whether they amount to cruelty in law.

    11. Now, I must observe, at the very outset, that a fact in order to afford a cause of action for any relief, must precede the initiation of the action. Consequently any allegation made by the wife in her written statement could afford no cause of action for any relief on the husband's petition. Therefore, I do not think that the statements, made by the wife in her written statement, could afford any ground for granting relief to the husband in the present case and need not have been discussed by the lower appellate court. With regard to the facts preceding the presentation of the petition, I agree with the finding reached on assessment of the evidence by the lower appellate court that none of them could amount to cruelty and, at any rate, the allegation of illicit relations between the husband and his Bhabhi, which is said to have been hurled by the wife at him, must be deemed to have been condoned by the co-habitation between the husband and the wife in the year 1969, which resulted in the birth of a child on or about 12-5-1970, after which the parties did not live together.

    12. As to desertion, the point does not seem to have been raised before the lower appellate court, obviously because the finding of the trial court on this point was in favour of the wife.

    13. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    14. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Sadan Singh v. Smt. Resham .
    (Jul 27, 1981)