Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff was appointed in the Railway Security Force, which was later converted into the Railway Protection Force. He claimed to hold the post of ‘bhisti’ during the relevant period. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, resulting in his dismissal from service following a charge-sheet. The plaintiff’s appeal against the dismissal was rejected. Subsequently, he issued a notice dated 4th December 1968 to the General Manager, N.E Railway, Gorakhpur, and filed a suit challenging the dismissal order. The suit sought a declaration that the removal order dated 28/30th August 1968 was illegal, void, and ultra vires, violating Article 311 of the Constitution of India, and claimed continuation in service with all wages and emoluments, along with a monetary claim for salary arrears. The Union of India contested the suit on multiple grounds, including the invalidity of the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C). The trial court held the dismissal order valid but found the notice under Section 80 C.P.C invalid and dismissed the suit. The appellate court agreed on the invalidity of the notice but differed on the merits, yet dismissed the appeal on the defective notice ground. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice dated 4th December 1968 given under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was valid or defective.
  2. Whether the notice under Section 80 C.P.C should be construed liberally or strictly in a pedantic manner.
  3. Whether the notice complied with the statutory requirement of stating the cause of action and relief sought to enable the Government to consider the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The notice should be construed liberally and not in a pedantic manner.
  • The notice complied with the requirements of Section 80 C.P.C and was therefore valid.

Respondent's Arguments (Union of India)

  • The notice was defective and illegal as it did not furnish the requisite basis on which the claim was founded.
  • The notice lacked the cause of action and thus the suit based on that notice was unsustainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagchand Dagdusa Gujarathi v. Secretary of State for India, AIR 1927 PC 176 Section 80 C.P.C requires strict compliance with notice requirements. Noted but qualified by later Supreme Court rulings emphasizing a non-pedantic approach.
Dhian Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274 Notice under Section 80 C.P.C should not be scrutinized pedantically but with common sense. Guided the Court to adopt a liberal construction of notices under Section 80 C.P.C.
State of Madras v. C.P Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309 Purpose of Section 80 C.P.C is to give Government/public officers sufficient notice to consider claims and decide on acceptance or resistance. Emphasized the need for notice to inform nature of suit, facts, and precise reliefs.
Dominion of India v. Babu Lal, AIR 1962 All 461 Meaning of ‘cause of action’ under Section 80 C.P.C as the reason impelling a plaintiff to sue. Applied to assess whether the notice sufficiently stated the cause of action.
Raghunath Das v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 674 Section 80 C.P.C aims to enable Governments/public officers to reconsider claims and avoid unnecessary litigation; notices should not be used as traps. Supported the principle of liberal interpretation and the objective of Section 80 C.P.C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the notice dated 4th December 1968 and the plaint in light of Section 80 C.P.C, which mandates that a notice must state the cause of action and relief sought to enable the Government or public officer to consider the claim. The Court referred to authoritative precedents emphasizing that while strict compliance with Section 80 is required, the notice should not be interpreted in a pedantic or hyper-technical manner but with common sense and a view to advancing justice.

The notice in question stated the plaintiff’s employment and asserted that the dismissal order dated 30th August 1968 was illegal and against Article 311 of the Constitution of India. However, the notice did not clarify whether the dismissal was by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, nor did it specify whether procedural safeguards like service of charge-sheet, enquiry, opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, or representation were denied. The notice was silent on the detailed grounds on which the dismissal was challenged, unlike the plaint which contained such particulars.

The Court held that the object of Section 80 notice is to furnish sufficient information about the nature of the suit, the facts on which the claim is based, and the relief sought, so the Government can decide whether to accept or resist the claim. The mere stating of the dismissal order as the cause of action without elaborating the grounds of illegality or procedural irregularity was insufficient. Therefore, the notice did not meet the statutory requirements, rendering the suit unsustainable.

Accordingly, the Court found the lower courts’ conclusions that the notice was defective and invalid to be correct.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the appeal, upholding the findings of the lower courts that the notice under Section 80 C.P.C was defective and invalid.

The effect of this decision is that the suit initiated by the plaintiff was not maintainable due to non-compliance with the statutory prerequisite under Section 80 C.P.C. No new precedent was established; the ruling reaffirmed the necessity for notices under Section 80 C.P.C to sufficiently state the cause of action and relief sought to enable the Government to consider the claim effectively.

    Qamaruddin v. Union Of India .

    1. This appeal by the plaintiff arises in the following circumstances. The plaintiff was appointed in the Railway Security Force, which was later on converted into Railway Protection Force. He claimed to be holding the post of ‘bhisti’ in the Railway Security Force at the material time. Disciplinary proceedings were taken against him and he was served with a charge-sheet, which ultimately resulted into his dismissal from his service. He preferred an appeal against that order which was also rejected. Then he gave a notice dated 4th Dec., 1968, through Sri Gopal Krishna Srivastava, Advocate, to the General Manager, N.E Railway, Gorakhpur. Thereafter he filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal.

    2. In the suit he claimed a decree for declaration that the order of “removal” from service dated 28/30th August, 1968, which Was served on him on 3rd Sept., 1968, was illegal, void and ultra vires and against Article 311 of the Constitution of India and that he should be deemed to be continuing in service with all wages and emoluments. He also claimed a decree for a sum of Rupees 2,723.57 p. towards his salary, the details of which were given in the plaint The suit was resisted by the Union of India on a variety of grounds. In para 19 of the written statement, it was pleaded by the Union of India that the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was defective and illegal. On merits as well the suit was contested. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence adduced held that the order dated 28th Aug., 1968, terminating the plaintiff's services was valid. It was also held that the notice under Section 80, C.P.C was invalid. On these findings the trial Court dismissed the suit. The matter was carried in appeal. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the trial Court that the notice given by the plaintiff under S. 80, C.P.C was illegal and invalid. However, on merits of the case, the appellate Court below recorded a contrary finding. The appeal was, however, dismissed because the notice under S. 80, C.P.C was held to be defective and invalid. The plaintiff has come up to this Court on second appeal.

    3. The sole point urged on behalf of the appellant was that the findings recorded by both the Courts below in respect of the notice under Sec. 80 C.P.C was erroneous. The submission was that the notice dated 4th Dec. 1968, Ext. A-1, should have been construed liberally and not in a pedantic manner. The notice in question Ext. A-1, did comply, if not essentially with the principles of construction of notice under S. 80, C.P.C with the requirements of Sec. 80, C.P.C and was, therefore, a valid notice. The learned counsel for the Union of India disputed this assertion and submitted that the notice was bad inasmuch as it did not furnish the requisite basis on which the claim was founded and, hence, it lacked the cause of action and, therefore, the suit founded on that notice was not sustainable.

    4. I have carefully gone through the notice, Ext. A-1 and have also perused the plaint. Section 80, C.P.C requires the giving of a notice to the Union of India before filing a suit against it. It mandates the plaintiff to state in the notice, besides other facts, the cause of action and the relief sought for. The plea questioning the validity of notice under Section 80, C.P.C in often raised by the Government of India while contesting the suit filed against it. Hence the provisions of S. 80, C.P.C have come up for construction in a number of cases from time to time. In Bhagchand Dagdusa Gujarathi v. Secretary of State for India, AIR 1927 PC 176, it was pointed out that the terms of S. 80, C.P.C should be strictly complied with. This ruling, however, was noticed by the Supreme Court in Dhian Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274, wherein it was observed (at p. 261):—

    “The privy council no doubt laid down in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State, that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense.”

    5. In the State of Madras v. C.P Agencies AIR 1960 SC 1309, it was observed (at p. 1310):—

    “The object of the Section 80 is manifestly to give the Government of the public officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. In order to enable the Government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it is necessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for.”

    6. In AIR 1962 All 461, the expression ‘cause of action’ as used in S. 80, C.P.C fell for construction. Mukherji, J. after referring to (1883) ILR 5 All 163 (FB) : AIR 1927 PC 176 : AIR 1951 Bom 72 and AIR 1958 SC 274, held that the expression ‘cause of action’ has to be given a meaning which is not technical. He further observed that the phrase ‘cause of action’ has not been defined and the words ‘cause of action’ mean nothing more than the reasons which impel a plaintiff to seek his remedy against the defendant to a suit or, in other words, that which, according to the plaintiff, gives him right to sue the defendant. He also referred to the observations in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. I, Second Edition, para 9, page 8, dealing with the meaning of the expression ‘cause of action’, which was stated as under:

    “The popular meaning of the expression ‘cause of action’ is that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint.”

    7. Learned counsel for the appellant has laid much stress on the construction of the term ‘cause of action’ as given in Halsbury's Laws of England. Again, in AIR 1969 SC 674, Raghunath Das v. Union of India, it was held that (at p. 677):

    “The object of the notice contemplated by S. 80, Civil P.C is to give to the concerned Governments and public officers opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amend or settle the claim, if so advised without litigation. The legislative intention behind that section is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigations. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provisions in S. 80 are not intended to be used as booby traps against ignorant and illiterate persons.”

    8. From these decisions it can be ruled out that a notice under S. 80, C.P.C is not to be construed in a pedantic manner and the Court should not be hyper-technical in interpreting it. The provisions of S. 80, C.P.C are not meant to scuttle justice and an illiterate litigant is not to be non-suited by taking too technical a view of the notice given by him under Sec. 80, C.P.C The notice under S. 80, C.P.C is required to be given with a view to enable the Government or the public officer concerned, to consider the position and decide as to whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or contested. This can be done if the notice furnishes sufficient information as to the nature of the suit proposed to be filed and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise relief asked for. Does the impugned notice with which we are concerned in this case furnish sufficient information as to the nature of the suit, the reliefs asked for the facts on which the claim is founded? The notice Ext. A-1, merely stated that the plaintiff was employed as a ‘Rakshak’ in the North Eastern Railway and was serving the department with utmost honesty and devotion. Paragraph 2 of the notice is material for the purpose of the case and is, therefore, extracted below:

    “That the plaintiff was removed from service by the order dated 30-8-68 illegally and without giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the principles of Article 311 of the Constitution of India.”

    9. There is a heading in the notice as ‘cause of action’. Below it, it is merely stated that the cause of action for suit arose firstly on 30-8-1968; again on 3-9-68, when the order of removal from service was served upon the plaintiff, and again, on 25-11-68 when his appeal was dismissed. Then the reliefs sought for were stated. The plaintiff stated that he would claim decree for the declaration that the order of removal of him from service by the Assistant Security Officer removing him from service was illegal, void and is against the Article 311 of the Constitution and that he should be deemed to be continuing in the service. Could it be said that by the said notice the Government of India was furnished with sufficient facts on the basis of which the reliefs mentioned in the notice were proposed to be asked for? Admittedly the plaintiff had been dismissed from service on 30th Aug., 1968. The order of dismissal was served on him on 3rd Sept., 1968. He stated in his notice that the order dated 30th August, 1968, was illegal and that he was removed from service without giving reasonable (opportunity?) or showing cause against the principle of the Article 311 of the Constitution.

    10. Article 311 of the Constitution provides that no person who is a servant of Union of India or State Govt. shall be dismissed or removed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Nor can he be dismissed or reduced in rank without holding any enquiry into the charges against him and without offering him an opportunity of making representation against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Article 311, thus, enjoins that the order of dismissal cannot be passed by an authority subordinate to that by which the employee was appointed. It also requires that the employee shall not be dismissed except after an enquiry. A charge-sheet is to be served on him and he has to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The notice in question merely shows that the order of dismissal dated 30th August, 1968 was illegal and that he was not given “reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the principles of Article 311 of the Constitution”.

    11. It was not clear as to whether the plaintiff wanted to say that he was dismissed by an authority who was subordinate to that by which he was appointed. It is also not clear as to whether he was challenging the order of dismissal on the ground that no charge-sheet was served on him or that no enquiry was made against him or that he was not given an opportunity of adducing his evidence, or cross-examining the witnesses produced against him, or making his submission or that he was not at all heard in person, or that no copies of the relevant documents were furnished to him, or that the evidence was taken behind his back. The plaint, no doubt, gives the details of those facts on which the order of dismissal was impugned. The notice was, however, silent on the point. As pointed out earlier, the object of Section 80, C.P.C notice is to enable the Government of India to consider his position and decide for itself as to whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted and this the Government could do only when it was informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed and the facts on which the claim of the plaintiff was founded.

    12. The facts on which the claim of the plaintiff was founded in the suit were not at all mentioned in the notice. The only other thing that was mentioned was that the cause of action arose to the plaintiff on the date when the order of the dismissal was passed, as also on the date when the order of dismissal was served on him and on the date on which the appeal filed by him was rejected. It was submitted on his behalf that the particular act which gave the plaintiff his cause of complaint was the order of dismissal itself and this was pointed in the notice compliance that Sec. 80 has been made (sic) ……… In Dominion of India v. Babu Lal, AIR 1962 All 461, it was stated that the expression ‘cause of action’ under Section 80, C.P.C means “the reason which impels a plaintiff to seek his remedy against the defendant to a suit, or, in other words, that which, according to the plaintiff, gives him a right to sue a defendant”. Here in the case in hand the reason which give the plaintiff the right to sue was no doubt the order of dismissal. But that by itself was not sufficient to be stated.

    13. The facts on the basis of which it was stated that the order was illegal and invalid should have been stated in the notice. The plaintiff has in a notice under S. 80, C.P.C to state the facts on which the claim is founded. No doubt, it is not the requirement of law that the plaintiff should also state the evidence to prove those facts.

    14. However unless the grounds on which the order was challenged were mentioned it would not be possible for the Government of India to reconsider the matter and to decide as to whether the claim set up by the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. The notice in the instant case did not comply with the requirements of S. 80, C.P.C In my view the Courts below were correct in holding that the suit was bad for want of a proper and valid notice.

    15. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, I make no order as to costs.

    16. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Qamaruddin v. Union Of India .
    (Jan 4, 1982)