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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision challenges an order of the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad dated 31-5-1978 that allowed an application to set aside an ex parte decree and to restore the suit to its original number, but conditioned restoration on the defendant (the present applicant) depositing Rs. 2 lacs within sixty days. The applicant had been the defendant in a suit for recovery (the judgment notes the suit involved a claimed amount of over Rs. 10 lacs), and an ex parte decree had been passed against him. The defendant applied to set aside the ex parte decree, showing cause for his absence on the date the decree was passed. The trial court found sufficient cause for absence and granted relief, but imposed the deposit condition; the present revision was filed solely attacking that condition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court, after finding sufficient cause for the defendant's absence and that the defendant (or his counsel) had not been informed of the hearing date, could lawfully impose a condition directing the deposit of Rs. 2 lacs (a portion of the decretal amount) as a term for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.
  2. Whether the condition of depositing Rs. 2 lacs was an unreasonable or onerous term constituting a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, warranting interference by the revisional court under Section 115 CPC (and the proviso to Section 115, particularly clause (b)).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (Defendant)

  • Once the court concluded the defendant had no knowledge of the date fixed in the suit (and notice was not given), no condition requiring payment into court should be imposed because the defendant was not at fault.
  • It was the court's duty to inform the applicant of the date after the record was received back from the High Court; since that duty was not discharged, the defendant should not be saddled with a deposit condition.
  • The deposit condition (Rs. 2 lacs) was onerous and unreasonable, amounting to a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction.
  • Relied upon two authorities in support: Gobardhan Ram Bisheshar Ram v. Banarsi Ram (AIR 1957 All 805) and Alimohammad v. Manaklal Ratanlal (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 234), and also cited B. Madan Mohan v. B. Kanhaiya Lal (AIR 1933 All 601).

Opposite Party's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The court setting aside an ex parte decree has power to impose terms, including payment into court, and that power is discretionary; a revisional court rarely interferes with such discretion under Section 115 CPC.
  • The trial court gave reasons for imposing the deposit (it observed dilatory tactics by the defendant), and there was material on record to support the view that the application to set aside should not have been allowed — hence no interference was warranted.
  • Challenged the finding that the defendant or his counsel had not been informed of the date; pointed to initials on the order sheet and argued that the trial court should not have rejected those initials without expert evidence. Relied (among authorities) on State v. Pali Ram ((1979) 2 SCC 158 : AIR 1979 SC 14).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gobardhan Ram Bisheshar Ram v. Banarsi Ram (AIR 1957 All 805) Duty of the trial court to inform parties of the date of hearing when a case is sent back from a superior court; if not informed, that party is not bound by proceedings. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that when the record comes back and the court fixes a date, it is the duty of the court to inform the parties; since the trial court found the defendant (or his counsel) had not been informed, the defendant was not at fault and the ex parte decree ought to be set aside without onerous conditions.
Alimohammad v. Manaklal Ratanlal (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 234) Principle that onerous conditions (such as furnishing security or payment) should not be affixed unless the defendant is at fault; if there was no due service or no blameable omission, orders under O.9 R.13 should be unconditional. Used to reinforce that where there is no fault on the part of the defendant (no due service or failure to inform), conditions for setting aside an ex parte decree should generally not be imposed; conditions must be proportionate to any omission.
B. Madan Mohan v. B. Kanhaiya Lal (AIR 1933 All 601) Illustrated that although courts have power to require payment into court as condition, a term imposing a large deposit (e.g., one-third of decretal amount) may be unreasonable and set aside. The Court cited this decision as precedent where a condition of deposit was held unreasonable; applied the same guiding principle to conclude that the Rs. 2 lac deposit (one-fifth of decretal amount) was similarly onerous in the present circumstances.
State v. Pali Ram ((1979) 2 SCC 158 : AIR 1979 SC 14) Authority cited regarding admissibility/importance of signatures/initials and expert comparison in determining whether counsel had been informed (as to procedural proof of notice). The opposite party relied on this case to criticise the trial court's comparison of initials without expert evidence; the Court, however, treated the trial court's conclusion as a factual finding and declined to disturb it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis grounded in statutory text, factual findings and prior authorities:

  1. Affirmation of factual finding on setting aside the ex parte decree: The revisional court accepted the trial court's factual conclusion that there was sufficient cause for the defendant's absence and that the defendant (or his counsel) had not been informed of the hearing date. The revisional court declined to interfere with that factual determination.
  2. Statutory framework: The Court examined Order IX Rule 13 CPC, which authorizes a court that sets aside an ex parte decree to impose "such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the suit." The Court emphasized that this gives broad discretion to impose terms but does not make imposition obligatory in every case.
  3. Principles limiting discretion: Drawing on judicial precedents, the Court explained that while the trial court can impose costs or direct payment into court (or require security), such measures should be applied by reference to the defendant's culpability and the surrounding circumstances. If a defendant is not at fault (for example, where there was no notice or due service and the court failed to inform the party of a hearing date), the normal rule is that no onerous condition should be imposed.
  4. Application to the present facts: Although the trial court found sufficient cause for absence, it nevertheless imposed a condition that the defendant deposit Rs. 2 lacs (one-fifth of the decretal amount) within 60 days. The revisional court regarded that term as onerous and unjustified given the specific factual finding that the defendant had not been informed of the hearing date; the trial court's mere expression of "some doubt" about dilatory tactics did not amount to a positive finding of blame sufficient to justify such a heavy deposit requirement.
  5. On the opposing contention about initials and expert evidence: The revisional court held that the trial court's examination of the order sheet initials and its factual conclusion that the initials were not of the defendant's counsel were findings on fact; the revisional court was not persuaded to set aside those findings, and therefore rejected the argument that expert evidence was necessary in that regard.
  6. Scope for revisional interference under Section 115 CPC: The Court considered Section 115 CPC and the proviso clause (b) (that the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury). It concluded that imposing a large deposit on a party not at fault would occasion a failure of justice and therefore the revisional court was justified in interfering because there had been a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
  7. Remedial choice: Instead of the deposit condition, the Court determined that the ex parte decree should be set aside on payment of costs only, and fixed a specific amount (Rs. 600) as reasonable costs after balancing factors such as the valuation of the suit and the plaintiff's incurred expenses in attending restoration proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: REVISION ALLOWED (in part): the term requiring deposit of Rs. 2 lacs within 60 days as a condition for setting aside the ex parte decree is set aside; instead, the defendant is directed to pay Rs. 600 as costs for setting aside the ex parte decree, payable within 15 days.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The onerous condition (deposit of Rs. 2 lacs) imposed by the trial court has been removed. The defendant is required only to pay Rs. 600 as costs related to the setting aside of the ex parte decree. The court directed procedural steps: the record will be sent back to the trial court (on the plaintiff arranging messenger expenses within a week), and the parties are to appear before the court below on 1 May 1979 for further proceedings.
  • Grounds for revisional interference: The revisional court held that imposition of onerous financial conditions when the defendant is not at fault constitutes a material irregularity and may occasion failure of justice, justifying interference under Section 115 CPC (including the proviso's clause (b)).
  • On precedent and future cases: The opinion reiterates established principles (from the cited precedents) limiting the imposition of onerous conditions where a defendant is not at fault; the decision applies those principles rather than announcing new law. The holding emphasizes proportionality of conditions and that less drastic safeguards (costs, security, or other measures) may be available to protect plaintiffs where justified by clear findings of fault or risk (e.g., disposal of property or flight from jurisdiction).
  • Costs in this revision: The opinion contains both the imposition of Rs. 600 as costs for setting aside the ex parte decree and the statement "There will be no order as to costs in this revision." The operative result imposed on the parties (as stated in the judgment) is payment of Rs. 600 as costs relating to restoration; the judgment concludes with "Revision allowed." (These are reported as they appear in the provided opinion.)

This summary is confined strictly to matters set out in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, precedents, or outcomes beyond those expressly contained in the opinion have been added.

    Raj Kumar Soni v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd.

    1. This Revision is directed against an order of the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, dated 31-5-1978, directing the applicant to deposit an amount of Rs. 2 lacs within sixty days for setting aside an ex parte decree and restoring the suit to its original number. The applicant was the defendant in the suit and an ex parte decree had been passed against him. He had made an application for setting aside the ex parte decree and had shown cause for not being present on the date when the decree was passed. The court below after considering the material on record came to the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for the absence of the applicant on the day the ex parte decree was passed. The court below allowed the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, but imposed a condition directing the defendant to deposit a sum of Rs. 2 lacs out of the decretal amount in court within 60 days. The present revision has been filed only against the imposition of this term.

    2. Learned counsel for the applicant raised two points: Firstly, he contended that once the court comes to the conclusion that the defendant had no knowledge of the date fixed in the suit and there was a failure in giving him notice of the date fixed, he could not be saddled with any term or condition for making payment into court. The reason was that he was not at fault. He further urged that it was the bounden duty of the court to have informed the applicant of the date fixed in the suit and since that had not been done, he could not be saddled with the term of depositing a part of the decretal amount. In support of this contention, he relied on two decisions: (1) Gobardhan Ram Bisheshar Ram v. Banarsi Ram (AIR 1957 All 805) and (2) Alimohammad v. Manaklal Ratanlal (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 234). The latter case has discussed the situation when the court can order making of a deposit into court. His second contention was that in any view of the matter, the term imposed by the court below was onerous. The condition for setting aside the ex parte decree on the deposit of Rs. 2 lacs was unreasonable and amounted to a material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. In support of this contention, learned counsel cited a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of B. Madan Mohan v. B. Kanhaiya Lal (AIR 1933 All 601).

    3. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, contended that the court setting aside an ex parte decree is empowered to impose terms, and the exercise of that power is purely discretionary. A revisional court exercising its power under Section 115 of the CPC rarely, if ever, interferes with the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court. The court below, contended the learned counsel, had given reasons for imposing the term of depositing Rs. 2 lacs in a suit filed for recovery of over Rs. 10 lacs. The court had stated that there were dilatory tactics adopted by the applicant, Learned counsel further contended that there was sufficient material on record to show that the court had wrongly allowed the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. He submitted that the instant case did not call for an interference.

    4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am satisfied that the court below was right in setting aside the ex parte decree. It has given adequate reasons and has, after considering the material on record, held that there was sufficient cause for the absence of the applicant on the day the ex parte decree was passed. This is a finding on a question of fact, and I do not see any reason to interfere with this part of the order. I am making this observation, for a revision has been filed by the plaintiff in this Court, which has also been dismissed by a separate order. The only question which calls for consideration is whether the term of depositing Rs. 2 lacs in cash imposed by the court below calls for an interference.

    5. The relevant part of O. 9 R. 13 of the Code reads:

    “…… the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the suit.”

    6. It is evident from the above that where the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree, but in doing so, it may impose such terms as to costs or payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit. It is, therefore, clear that the court, while setting aside an ex parte decree, can, if it thinks fit, impose costs or direct payment into court or otherwise. The word ‘otherwise’ would indicate that it was open to the court to direct furnishing of security or make any such order. The words “as it thinks fit” permits the court to pass any such order as to payment of costs or payment of money into court or furnishing of security etc. It is not incumbent on the court to pass an order imposing costs or payment of money into court or furnishing of security wherever an ex parte decree is being set aside. In a suitable case, the court may pass an order imposing costs, directing payment into court of the decretal amount or a part thereof and also furnishing of security for the balance, but such cases will depend on compelling facts so as to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff. It is also permissible for the court not to pass any order imposing any of these terms if it is satisfied that it is not necessary to do so in the interest of justice. It would, therefore, appear that the imposition of these terms would vary from case to case depending on the circumstance of each case. But, it must be borne in mind that there are judicial precedents which lay down the guidelines for the sake of uniformity in the administration of justice. It is necessary that these guidelines are followed except where it is necessary to lay down new guidelines.

    7. In the case of B. Madan Mohan v. B. Kanhaiya Lal (AIR 1933 All 601), this Court was considering in a First Appeal the question whether the setting aside of the ex parte decree on the condition of paying ⅓rd of the decretal amount and costs was reasonable or otherwise. The Court below considered the circumstances which prevented the defendant from attending the court and being satisfied, was of the opinion that the ex parte decree ought to be set aside. The court below set aside the ex parte decree on the term of depositing one third of the decretal amount and the payment of Rs. 350/- as damages by a particular date. This court held that although there was ample power in the court to order the payment of money into court as well as costs as a condition for setting aside the ex parte decree, but set aside the term of deposit into court imposed by the court below on the ground that the condition imposed was unreasonable one. Similar is the case in the present case. Here too the court below was satisfied from the material on record that the applicant had sufficient cause for not being present on the date the ex parte decree was passed, but nevertheless observed that 1/5th of the decretal amount viz. Rs. 2 lacs be deposited within 60 days as a condition for restoring the suit. The court below has made this order for payment of Rupees 2 lacs into court on the following observations in its judgement:

    “Looking into the facts and the circumstances of the case it is not free from doubt that the delaying tactics were adopted by the applicant defendant and so in ample discretion which is provided under O. 9, R. 13 of the CPC to the court in setting aside an ex parte decree the reasonable terms may be imposed on the applicant-defendant.”

    8. It is undoubted that the court has ample power to impose terms, but the question is whether the court could do so when it had given a clear finding that the applicant was not present in court because he had not been informed of the date of the suit after the record had been received back from the High Court, even though there was a direction that intimation be given to the counsel for the parties. Consequently, the observation by the court that there was a doubt about dilatory tactics being adopted by the defendant had sufficient cause for not being present on the date the suit was taken up for hearing, it would only be proper to set aside the ex parte decree (sic). In the case of Gobardhan Ram Bisheshar Ram v. Banarasi Ram (AIR 1957 All 805), the Court held that if a case comes back to a trial court after an order from the superior court, it is the duty of the court to inform the parties of the date of hearing. The learned single Judge observed:

    “But in a case where the record is received back and the case has to be heard again and a date of hearing has to be fixed, in my opinion, it is not the duty of the parties to find out the date of hearing but it is the duty of the court to inform the date.”

    9. It is further observed in that case:

    “In my opinion, whenever a date is fixed for the hearing or a date is adjourned it is bounden duty of the Court to inform parties or their counsel or their representatives of such dates. If they are not so informed, the party not informed will not be bound by the proceedings”.

    10. In the present case, there is a clear finding by the court below that the applicant or his counsel had not been informed of the date. Consequently, the ex parte decree was bound to be set aside. In the case of Alimohammad v. Manaklal Ratanlal (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 234), the Division Bench was considering the question as to when an ex parte decree can be set aside conditionally. In that case the trial court had imposed on the defendant a term of furnishing security for the amount claimed in the suit. This was said to be onerous by the defendant. The court observed:

    “But the defendant contends that on principle, the Court should not affix any condition onerous on the defendant unless it finds that he was at fault; that is to say, it can be imposed only if the defendant has been guilty, of some omission, which, however, the Courts find not serious enough to justify the maintenance of the ex parte decree.

    Stated thus, this principle is almost obvious; there is case law; but it need not be discussed, as it enunciates only the principle that no litigant should be burdened unless found to he at fault. If there has been no due service of summons, the defendant is not to blame and unless he acquiesces, the order under O. 9, R. 13 should be unconditional. Thus, in every case where the propriety of imposing a condition and its reasonableness are in issue, the question would be, is the defendant negligent in some measure at least and, is the condition proportionate to the seriousness of the omission?”

    11. It is clear from the above that unless the party is at fault normally no condition should be imposed for payment of money or furnishing of security while setting aside the ex parte decree. It is also clear that the court can always award costs to compensate the other side for the inconvenience and loss caused to the said party. It is also clear that where the court finds that the defendant is at fault or there was omission on his part or it was because of his act that there had been delay in the disposal of the case, the court may impose terms, but reasonable terms. It is not open to the court at any time to impose onerous term. An order directing a party to deposit in cash ⅓rd or 1/5th of the decretal amount is not justified when the amount claimed in the suit is large one. There are other modes of safeguarding the interest of the plaintiff. If the court finds that the defendant is disposing of his properties or moving away from the jurisdiction of the court or has been delaying the proceedings in the suit, the court would be justified in imposing terms for the payment of money into court or furnishing of security, and if need be, for the entire amount claimed in the suit. But, such is not the present case. Here the finding of the court is that the defendant has sufficient cause for being absent on the date the ex parte decree was passed. There is no clear finding that the defendant was adopting dilatory tactics. The finding that the court had some doubt in this matter is not a positive finding for imposing such terms as has been done in this case. I am, therefore, satisfied that the imposition of the term of depositing Rs. 2 lacs into court within 60 days as a condition for setting aside the ex parte decree was onerous and uncalled for. The court below has exercised its jurisdiction in this respect with material irregularity.

    12. Learned counsel for the opposite party strenuously urged that the court below was not justified in setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground that the counsel was not informed. He urged that there existed initials on the order sheet that the counsel had been informed, but the court below took upon itself the task of comparing the admitted signatures of the counsel with those on the order sheet to conclude that it was not of the counsel. It was urged that it was not open to the court below to do so without having an expert evidence on the same. He cited two decisions on the point including a latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Pali Ram ((1979) 2 SCC 158 : AIR 1979 SC 14). I am not impressed by this argument at all for the reason that the court below was called upon to consider whether the defendant applicant or his counsel had knowledge of the date fixed. After sifting the material on the record, the court below came to the conclusion that the defendant and his counsel had no knowledge of the date fixed in the suit. While coming to this conclusion the court below had occasion to look into the alleged initials of the counsel for the defendant on the order sheet and concluded that it did not purport to be that of the said counsel. This finding by the court below is a finding on a question of fact, and I am not prepared to interfere with the same.

    13. Learned counsel then contended that this Court will not exercise its powers under S. 115 of the Code to interfere with the order of the court below, as the proviso to S. 115 of the Code is not complied with Cl. (b) of the proviso to S. 115 of the Code reads as follows:

    “Cl. (b): The order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.”

    14. In my opinion, the case would be fully covered under this clause. Where a party is not at fault and is saddled with payment of a huge amount as a condition for setting aside the ex parte decree, it would occasion a failure of justice. Consequently, it is open to this court to interfere with the order of the court below if the case falls under any of the three clauses of S. 115 of the Code and one of the clauses of the proviso.

    15. I am satisfied that this is a fit case where the power under S. 115 of the Code should be exercised, for there has been a material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by the court below, an the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice.

    16. The question which remains to be considered is what order should be passed. In my opinion, the ex parte decree ought to have been set aside on payment of costs only. While assessing the costs to be imposed the court must keep in mind not only the valuation of the suit but also take note of the fact that the plaintiff had to appear in Court a number of times with his counsel and incur expenses in connection with the restoration application. Taking all these into consideration, I think interest of justice would be served if a sum of Rs. 600 were imposed as costs.

    17. In the result, therefore, the revision is allowed to the extent that the term imposing the deposit of Rs. 2 lacs within 60 days of the order passed by the Court below is set aside and instead a sum of Rs. 600 is imposed as costs for the setting aside of the ex parte decree payable within 15 days of this order. The record of the case is lying in this court.

    18. Learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party has prayed that the same may be sent back to the court below forthwith by a special messenger for which he is prepared to bear the expenses. Let the expenses be deposited within a week to enable the record to be sent back to the court below as prayed. The parties are directed to appear before the court below on 1st May, 1979 when the court below will fix a date for further proceedings before it. There will be no order as to costs in this revision.

    19. Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Raj Kumar Soni v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd.
    (Apr 16, 1979)