AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 28 and 33 respectively of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901". Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act
  • Section 12 (2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Act or the Rules
  • Sections 28 and 33 of the Land Revenue Act,
  • Section 232 of the Zamindari Abolition Act.
  • Clause (d) of Section 234, Land Revenue Act.
  • schedule of the Land Revenue Act, 1901." 20.
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1901,
  • Section 252, U. P. Tenancy Act. 19. Class (19)
  • Section 20 (b) (i), Zamindari Abolition Act,
  • 17. Section 234 of the Land Revenue Act
  • Order 21, Rule 300. Civil Procedure Code,
  • Section 234 of the Land Revenue Act
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Act
  • Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, (b)
  • Section 20 (b) (i). 24. Section 14
  • Section 180, U. P. Tenancy Act,
  • Section 183, U. P. Tenancy Act,
  • Section 183, Tenancy Act,
  • Zamindari Abolition Act
  • Section 20 (b) (i)
  • Section 20 (b)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 28 and 33 respectively of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901". Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act
  • Section 12 (2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Act or the Rules
  • Sections 28 and 33 of the Land Revenue Act,
  • Section 232 of the Zamindari Abolition Act.
  • Clause (d) of Section 234, Land Revenue Act.
  • schedule of the Land Revenue Act, 1901." 20.
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1901,
  • Section 252, U. P. Tenancy Act. 19. Class (19)
  • Section 20 (b) (i), Zamindari Abolition Act,
  • 17. Section 234 of the Land Revenue Act
  • Order 21, Rule 300. Civil Procedure Code,
  • Section 234 of the Land Revenue Act
  • provisions of the Land Revenue Act
  • Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, (b)
  • Section 20 (b) (i). 24. Section 14
  • Section 180, U. P. Tenancy Act,
  • Section 183, U. P. Tenancy Act,
  • Section 183, Tenancy Act,
  • Zamindari Abolition Act
  • Section 20 (b) (i)
  • Section 20 (b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns occupation and adhivasi rights in certain plots. Mustafa Khan (the appellant) was the occupancy tenant of the plots and sued for ejectment of Najib Khan under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act; the suit was decreed on October 23, 1944, and possession was restored to Mustafa Khan on August 26, 1945. Thereafter two sons of Najib Khan (Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan, respondents) filed objections under Order 21, Rule 300 CPC claiming to be in possession in their own right as donees of a mortgagee of the proprietary interest; the Execution Court allowed the objection and put them in possession on June 19, 1946.

Mustafa Khan then filed a suit under Section 183, U.P. Tenancy Act against, inter alia, those objectors; that suit was decreed on May 31, 1949, and execution restored possession to Mustafa Khan on November 13, 1949. Between June 19, 1946 and November 13, 1949 the two objectors were in possession and were recorded in the revenue papers of 1356 Fasli. On that basis they applied for restoration of possession under Section 232 of the Zamindari Abolition Act claiming adhivasi rights because they were recorded occupants in 1356 Fasli. Consolidation operations caused a stay of those proceedings, and the objectors filed objections in consolidation proceedings claiming adhivasi status; the Consolidation Officer and appellate/revisional authorities upheld their claim. The appellant's writ petition challenging those orders was dismissed, leading to the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan, being mortgagees of the proprietary interest, are "intermediaries" within the meaning of Explanation IV to Section 20 (and therefore ineligible to acquire adhivasi rights).
  2. Whether Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan were in law "recorded as occupants" in the records of 1356 Fasli within the meaning of Section 20(b)(i) of the Zamindari Abolition Act.
  3. Whether the decree in the suit under Section 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act operates to correct or alter the entry in 1356 Fasli (i.e., whether that decree should be deemed to have corrected the record under Explanation III to Section 20).
  4. Whether the consolidation proceedings and the sequence of staying earlier proceedings (initial objections under Section 12(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and later proceeding under Section 20 after publication of principles under Section 19) were void or improperly handled (a procedural contention raised late in the writ proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The objectors (Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan) were intermediaries under Explanation IV to Section 20 (i.e., mortgagees/intermediaries), and therefore could not acquire adhivasi rights.
  • In the alternative, the objectors were not, in law, "recorded as occupants" in 1356 Fasli and therefore did not become adhivasis.
  • The decree in the suit under Section 183, U.P. Tenancy Act, should be deemed to have corrected the entry of 1356 Fasli within the meaning of Explanation III to Section 20.

Respondents' Arguments

  • In the Section 183 suit the court finally held that the appellant was the occupancy tenant and that the respondents, being only mortgagees of the proprietary interest, had no right to dispossess him; as against the occupancy tenant they were in trespass. Therefore their possession in 1356 Fasli would be as trespassers and the record of their possession in the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 Fasli was effectively as an occupant within Section 20(b)(i).
  • It was argued that the civil court could investigate the true nature of occupancy and construe the entry in 1356 Fasli in the light of evidence and the findings in the Section 183 suit (relying on observations in the Supreme Court's Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman, AIR 1961 SC 143).
  • There was also a late procedural contention (raised in the writ) that earlier proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act should not have been stayed when the statement of principles under Section 19 was published, and that later proceedings under Section 20 were therefore void. (The opinion notes that this point was not taken earlier before the Consolidation authorities.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwati v. Board of Revenue, 1959 All LJ 479 Held that a mortgagee is not an intermediary within the Act: a mortgagee occupies land on behalf of the mortgagor as security and does not hold in another capacity. The Bench's conclusion is treated as binding and used to reject the appellant's contention that mortgagees are intermediaries; the Court relied on this decision to hold mortgagees do not acquire adhivasi rights as intermediaries.
Swarm Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1960 All LJ 241 Full Bench held that an "occupant" should be in possession on his own behalf and not on behalf of someone else; hence a mortgagee occupying on behalf of mortgagor is not an occupant. The Court applied this test to conclude that mortgagees recorded in 1356 Fasli were not "occupants" within the meaning of the statute.
The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman, AIR 1961 SC 143 Held that where a Theka had ended before 1356 Fasli but the Thekedar was recorded in 1356 Fasli, that record must be deemed to be as an occupant under Section 20(b)(i); also observed Section 20(b)(i) speaks only of being "recorded as occupant" and is silent on the nature of occupancy — which must be decided on other evidence; no prescribed form for entries was noted. The Court considered this authority but found it inapplicable on the facts: the present case concerned mortgagees whose mortgage had not ended prior to 1356 Fasli; the Upper Ganges ratio about Thekedar did not assist respondents.
Smt. Sonavati v. Sri Ram, AIR 1968 SC 466 Held with reference to Section 20(b) that the civil court adjudging adhivasi rights is not called upon to inquire into actual possession or status of the person; except in cases of fraud, the entry in the record alone is decisive; the entry is evidence without further enquiry. The Court relied on this decision to reject the respondents' submission that subsequent findings on evidence (in the Section 183 suit) could be used to read the entry in 1356 Fasli differently; the Court held entries cannot be read or construed in light of findings not before the patwari when entries were made.
Bachan v. Kankar, 1972 RD 219 = AIR 1972 SC 2157 Held that Section 20(b)(i) refers to Khasra/Khatauni prepared in accordance with the Land Revenue Act, 1901, and the entry must be made accordingly; discussed provisions of Chapter A-V of Land Records Manual and prescribed form for Khasra. The Court read Bachan to support the proposition that entries must follow statutory rules and the Land Records Manual, and that the form and classification in the Manual are relevant to determining whether an entry is one of an "occupant".
Radha Kishori v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P., 1972 All WR (HC) 425 Held that an entry of "Tenant of sir" is not within Section 20(b)(i) (i.e., not an entry "recorded as occupant"). The Court cited this decision to support the view that an entry of a particular tenure-class (here, mortgagee/tenant categories) is not the same as an entry "as occupant" under Section 20(b)(i).
Amba Prasad v. (reported) AIR 1965 SC 54 Entry as "Qabiz" in the remarks column (made under Para.85 of the Manual) was held to be clearly one of an occupant; Court emphasized difference between being in cultivatory possession and being "recorded as occupant". The Court relied on Amba Prasad to distinguish between ordinary occupation and being "recorded as occupant" under the Manual; it observed Amba Prasad did not hold that entries as tenant or sub-tenant would themselves amount to a record as occupant.
Chobey Sunder Lal v. Sonu, 1967 All LJ 960 = AIR 1969 All 304 Interpreted the Amba Prasad observation differently in relation to an entry of sub-tenant (Full Bench of the Court interpreted that observation). The present Court noted that although Chobey Sunder Lal offered a different interpretation in relation to sub-tenants, that question was not material in the present case and the Court declined to refer the matter to a larger bench.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured analysis driven by textual provisions and the Land Records Manual, together with binding and persuasive precedents cited in the record.

  1. Binding authority on the intermediary point: The Court began by treating the Division Bench decision in Bhagwati v. Board of Revenue (1959 All LJ 479) as binding. That decision held a mortgagee is not an intermediary because the mortgagee occupies land on behalf of the mortgagor as security and not in any other capacity. On this foundation the Court rejected the appellant's primary contention only insofar as the contention sought to classify mortgagees as "intermediaries" under Explanation IV to Section 20.
  2. Factual determination of how respondents were recorded in 1356 Fasli: The record showed that one Smt. Mashihan Bibi was a mortgagee and had gifted her mortgagee rights to Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan. The averments were admitted and the lower authorities found that in 1356 Fasli the respondents were entered in Khatauni under Clause (2-A) (meant for mortgagees or Thekedars) and in the Khasra in column 5 (for tenure-holders etc.). Thus, as a matter of the record in 1356 Fasli, the persons were mortgagees in possession and were recorded as such.
  3. Legal meaning of "recorded as occupant" under Section 20(b)(i) and Land Records framework: The Court analyzed the statutory scheme and the Land Records Manual. It emphasized that Section 20(b)(i) speaks of being "recorded as occupant" in the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 Fasli prepared under Sections 28 and 33 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. The Land Revenue Act and the Manual prescribe forms, columns and a classification of tenure-classes (e.g., classes 2-A, 10-A, 20, etc.), and direct that the Khatauni specify the nature and class of tenure. Paragraphs of the Manual specify when mortgagees are to be shown as such (for example, "Kast Murtahin" for mortgagees in possession) and detail classes that correspond to occupiers without title (10-A and 20).
  4. Application of precedent interpreting "occupant" vs "recorded as occupant": The Court considered Supreme Court and High Court authorities. Swarm Prasad supported the proposition that an occupant must be in possession on his own behalf and not on behalf of someone else (so a mortgagee is not an occupant). The Upper Ganges judgment was examined: it concerned Thekedars whose contract had ended before 1356 Fasli and held a recording in 1356 Fasli could be deemed to be as an occupant; but the Court found Upper Ganges inapplicable because here the mortgage had not ended before 1356 Fasli and the respondents were mortgagees in law in 1356 Fasli. Importantly, Smt. Sonavati v. Sri Ram established that, except in fraud cases, the entry in the record itself is decisive and a civil court is not to re-open the nature or status of the person recorded; the entry is evidence without further inquiry. The Court read these authorities together to conclude that entries must be treated according to their technical significance in the Manual and the Land Revenue Act rather than by later contradictory findings not before the patwari.
  5. Conclusion on the core statutory question: Given the recording of the respondents under class 2-A (mortgagees) in the Khatauni and in column 5 of the Khasra, the Court held that this record was not a record "as occupant" within the meaning of clause (b)(i) of Section 20. The entries were properly characterized as mortgagee entries under the statutory/manual scheme and did not fall into the occupier categories (classes 10-A or 20) contemplated for adhivasi entitlement.
  6. On the claim that the decree under Section 183 corrected the 1356 Fasli entry: The Court agreed with the Single Judge that this contention had no substance and rejected it (the opinion states agreement with the Single Judge's reasoning and conclusions on this point).
  7. On the late procedural objection to the consolidation sequence (stay of Section 12 proceedings and subsequent use of Section 20 proceedings): The Court declined to entertain this technical plea because it was not taken earlier before the consolidation authorities and the respondents had already had their opportunity to contest merits; the Court regarded the contention as belated.
  8. Outcome flowing from the analysis: The Court concluded that the respondents did not acquire adhivasi rights by virtue of the record in 1356 Fasli; the Consolidation authorities' orders upholding adhivasi status were thus unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, the orders of the Consolidation authorities are quashed, the names of the respondents are ordered to be expunged from the record, and the appellant is to be recorded as a sirdar over the plots in dispute. The appeal is allowed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondents (Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan) do not acquire adhivasi rights from the entries they had in 1356 Fasli as mortgagees; their names are to be expunged and the appellant is to be recorded as sirdar. Execution and consolidation orders in favour of the respondents are quashed.
  • Scope regarding precedent and broader law: The decision rests on application of existing precedents and the statutory/manual framework (Land Revenue Act and Land Records Manual) to distinguish entries made as mortgagees from entries "recorded as occupant" under Section 20(b)(i). The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities and the statutory scheme; it accordingly addresses the dispute on its facts and established authorities.

Note: This summary is strictly limited to the information provided in the opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions that are not contained in the text of the opinion.

    Mustafa Khan v. Deputy Director Of Consolidation And Others

    1. This appeal arises out of consolidation proceedings. Mustafa Khan the appellant was the occupancy tenant of the plots in dispute. The appellant instituted a suit under Section 180, U. P. Tenancy Act, for ejectment of one Najib Khan on the allegation that Najib Khan was a trespasser. The suit was decreed on October 23, 1944. In execution of the decree, possession was restored to the appellant on August 26, 1945.

    2. Soon thereafter, two sons of Najib Khan, namely Mahboob Khan, respondent No. 4 and Vakil Khan, father of respondents Nos. 5 (1) and (11), filed an objection under Order 21, Rule 300. Civil Procedure Code, claiming that they were in possession of the plots in their own rights and they were illegally dispossessed in execution of the decree. They claimed that they were the donees of the mortgagee of the proprietary rights in relation to the plots in dispute and were in possession as such. The objection was allowed by the Execution Court, and in consequence, the two objectors were put in possession on June 19, 1946.

    3. Mustafa Khan, the appellant, then filed a suit under Section 183, U. P. Tenancy Act, against, inter alia, the objectors. The suit was decreed on May 31, 1949. In execution of' the decree Mustafa Khan appellant was put in possession of the plots on November 13, 1949. Evidently, between 19th June, 1946 and 13th November, 1949 Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan were in possession. They were recorded in the revenue papers of 1356 Fasli. On that basis the two objectors moved an application for restoration of possession under Section 232 of the Zamindari Abolition Act. They claimed that they had acquired adhivasi rights on the grounds that they were recorded occupants in 1356 Fasli. During the pendency of this application the plots in dispute came under consolidation operations with the result that the proceedings were stayed. Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan filed an objection in, consolidation proceedings and claimed that they had become adhivasis because they were recorded as occupants in 1356 Fasli. The Consolidation Officer upheld their claim. His finding that the two objectors had become adhivasis was upheld in appeal as well as in revision. The appellant challenged these orders in a writ petition which, however, failed and was dismissed, leading to the present appeal.

    4. The principal submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan were intermediaries within meaning of Explanation IV to Section 20 and hence no adivasi rights accrued to them. In the alternative, learned counsel submitted that the objectors were not in law recorded as occupants in 1356 Fasli. They did not become adhivasis. It was also urged that the decree in the suit under Section 183, U. P. Tenancy Act, will be deemed to have corrected the entry of 1356 Fasli within meaning of Explanation III to Section 20 of the Act

    5. The first submission is concluded by a Division Bench of this Court in Bhagwati v. Board of Revenue, 1959 All LJ 479. In that case, the Bench held that a mortgagee is not an intermediary according to the definition of the word as given in the Act because he occupies the land on behalf of the mortgagor as security for the money advanced by him. He does not hold it in any other capacity. This Bench decision is binding on us.

    6. The next point is if the mortgagees were recorded as occupants in 1356 F. within meaning of Section 20 (b) (i) of the Act.

    7. It appears that one Smt. Mashihan Bibi was one of the mortgagees of proprietary rights in respect of the plots in dispute. She gifted her mortgagee rights to Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan (vide paragraph 3 of the writ petition). These averments were admitted in the counter-affidavit. The findings of the authorities below are also to that effect. In 1356 F. Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan were entered in Khatauni under Clause (2-A), which is meant for mortgagees or Thekedars. In the Khasra, they were recorded in column 5 meant for tenure-holders etc. The position is that in 1356 F., these persons were mortgagees. They claimed to be in possession as such. They were recorded in the Khasra and Khatauni as mortgagees in possession.

    8. In 1959 All LJ 479, after considering all relevant aspects, the bench held that a mortgagee in possession occupies the land on behalf of the mortgagor as security for the money advanced by him. He is not covered by the expression "occupant" occurring in Clause (a) of Section 20 of the Act. On this point, we are unable to agree with the contrary view taken in the judgment under appeal before us, which is also reported in 1965 All LJ 1013. In Swarm Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1960 All LJ 241. A full Bench held that an occupant should be in possession on his behalf and not on behalf of some one else. Applying this test, a mortgagee is not an occupant, because he holds on behalf of the mortgagor.

    9. Learned Counsel placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd v. Khalil-Ul-Rahman ., AIR 1961 SC 143. There, the Unper Ganges Mills were the Thekedars. The Theka came to an end in 1355 Fasli. Khalil-ul-Rehman, the landholder, had given notice terminating the Theka and intimating that it shall not be renewed after 1355 Fasli. But, the Sugar Mills were recorded in the revenue Papers of 1356 Fasli as Thekedars. The Supreme Court held that since in 1356 Fasli, the Mill was not a Thekedar, the record of its name in 1356 F. must be deemed to be as an occupant within meaning of clause (b) (i) of section 20. In the present case, the question does not arise in respect of a Thekedar. In the next place, Mahboob Khan and Vakil Khan were in 1356 F., in fact in law, mortgagees of the proprietary interest. The mortgage had not come to an end prior to 1356 F. The decision in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills' case is hence inapplicable.

    10. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the suit for possession filed by the appellant under Section 183, Tenancy Act, it was finally held that the appellant was the occupancy tenant and that the respondents, who were only the mortgagees of the proprietary interest, had no right to dispossess him. The possession of the respondents in 1356 F. would, in view of these findings, be as a trespasser as against the occupancy tenant. The respondents being trespassers in 1356 F., the record of their possession in the Khasra and Kha-tauni of 1356 F., was as an occupant. According to learned counsel, it was open to the court to investigate and find the true nature of the occupancy and construe the entry in the light of the findings. In support, reliance was placed on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the Upper Ganges case AIR 1961 SC 143:--

    "(a). The words in Section 20 (b) (i) only speak of a person being recorded as occupant and there is nothing in that section as to the nature of the occupancy, namely, whether it is on behalf of the person recorded or on behalf of somebody else.

    (b) That Is a matter which, in our opinion, must always be decided on other evidence.

    (c). Neither the Act nor the rules made under it prescribe the form in which the entry specified by Section 20 (b) should be made."

    11. The rigour of the observation that the Court is to decide the nature of occupancy is mitigated by a later decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sonavati v. Sri Ram, AIR 1968 SC 466. In this case, with reference to Section 20 (b), the Court held that the Civil Court in adjudging a claim of a person to the rights of an adhivasi is not called upon to make an enquiry whether the claimant was actually in possession of the land or held the right as an occupant: cases of fraud apart, the entry in the record alone is relevant (vide paragraph 3). In paragraph 9, the Court observed,

    "under Act I of 1951 the entry is made evidence without further enquiry as to his right or the status of the person who is recorded as an occupant. ....."

    This case is a direct authority for the proposition that the court is not to adjudge whether the person had the right or status as an occupant. The entry has to be taken as it is. In our opinion, the entry cannot be read or construed in the light of findings subsequently given on evidence which was not before the patwari when he made the entry.

    12. The observation in the Upper Ganges case AIR 1961 SC 143 that there is no form prescribed for making the entry specified by Section 20 (b) as to the nature of occupancy has to be read in the light of the Supreme Court decision in Bachan v. Kankar, 1972 RD 219 = (AIR 1972 SC 2157). In Bachan's case, the Court mentioned the provisions of Chapter A-V of the U. P. Land Records Manual in some detail, and held that in this contest, Section 20 (b) (i), Zamindari Abolition Act, which speaks of the recorded "as occupant" in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 F., refers to the khasra or Khatauni being prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, and the entry must be made accordingly. It was observed in this case that the form of Khasra is prescribed by paragraph A-89.

    13. It seems that by some inadvertence, the attention of the Supreme Court was invited to Chapter A-V of the Land Records Manual. This Chapter was introduced in the Manual after the Zamindari Abolition Act came into force (1359 F). For the preparation of Khasra or Khautauni of 1356 F., the relevant provisions are in Chapter V of the Manual.

    14. It appears that in Upper Ganges case, the Supreme Court's attention was not invited to the provisions of the Land Revenue Act or the Rules contained in the Land Records Manual. That is why the court observed that there was no prescribed form for making the entry or specifying the nature of the occupancy. We find that there are detailed provisions for specifying the nature and class of tenure of the persons cultivating or otherwise occupying land.

    15. Section 20 (b) (i) of the Act requires the recording as occupant in the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 Fasli "prepared under Sections 28 and 33 respectively of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901". Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act provides that the Collector shall maintain the Khasra in accordance with rules made under Section 234 of the Act. Section 33 requires the Collector to maintain the record of rights, and for that purpose to prepare annually an amended set of registers enumerated in Section 32. Clause (a) of Section 32 refers to "a register of all persons cultivating or otherwise occupying land specifying the particulars required by Section 55." This register is called the Khatauni. Section 55 provides:--

    "55. The register of persons cultivating or otherwise occupying land prescribed by clause (e) of section 32 shall specify as to each, tenant the following particulars:--

    (a) the nature and class of his tenure as determined by the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939,

    (b) the rent payable,

    (c) (omitted),

    (d) any other condition of the tenure which the Provincial Government may, by rules made under Section 234, require to be recorded."

    16. It will thus be seen that the khatauni has also to be prepared in accordance with the rules framed under Section 234. It has, inter alia, to specify the nature and class of tenure of the person cultivating or otherwise occupying land (emphasis provided).

    17. Section 234 of the Land Revenue Act conferred rule-making power on the Local Government. Clause (d) thereof, inter alia, provides for prescribing the form, contents, method of preparation etc., and maintenance of the record of rights and other records, maps, field-books, registers and lists made or kept under the Act. The Land Records Manual is a collection of rules framed under Section 234 of the Land Revenue Act as well as the instructions issued by the State Government in relation to various matters. Chapter V of Part I of the Manual relates to the map and khasra. Chapter VIII deals with the Khatauni. The preface to the Manual shows that Chapters III to XI of Part 1 of the Manual have been framed under Clause (d) of Section 234, Land Revenue Act. So, the rules contained in Chapters V and VIII of Manual are statutory rules made under Section 234. Chapter V dealing, inter alia with Khasra consists of paragraphs 55 to 102. Chapter VIII relates to Khatauni and consists of Paragraphs 121 to 160. Paragraph 60 provides that Khasra shall be prepared in form No. P-3. Form P-3 consists of 21 columns. Column No. 5 is meant for the name of the cultivator. In column No. 6 are to be entered the names of sub-tenants or tenants of Sir, or tenants of permanent tenure-holders, or rent free grantee or grantees at a favourable rate of rent, or _occupiers of land without the consent of the persons entitled to admit such subtenants with cost and rent if charged. Column No. 21 is the remarks column. Paragraph 71 provides for entry in column No. 5. in it, not only the name of the cultivator, but also the 'nature of his rights, i.e., the class of his tenure, and. where necessary, the term of cultivation have to be entered. These entries are to be made in accordance with paragraphs 72 to 86, 124 and 124-A and 126 to 129, as the case may be. Paragraphs 124 to 129 are in Chapter VIII dealing with Khatauni. It is evident that Khasra has to be in consonance with the Khatauni in this respect. Paragraph 78 deals with the cultivation of Thekedars and mortgagees of proprietor's interest. Under it, if a mortgagee is in possession, he is to be shown as Kast Murtahin Paragraph 79 provides for usufructuary mortgagees of tenants

    18. Paragraph 124 provides for the arrangement of holdings in the Khathuni in Agra, while Paragraph 124-A deals with arrangement of land in the Khatauni in Oudh. A perusal of Paragraph 124 shows that it divides land into 20 categories depending on the nature of the rights possessed by the cultivators. Class (1) is of sir of landlords. Class (2) deals with Khudkasht Class (2-A) relates to Thekedars or mortgagees' cultivation. Classes (3) to (9) refer to different kinds of tenants. Class (10) relates to land held by non-occupancy tenants. Class (10-A) provides:--

    "(10-A) Occupiers of lands without title when there is no one already recorded in column 5 of the Xhasra.

    Note-- When no rent has been fixed and any person has been admitted to the occupation of land or permitted to retain possession of land by any one having a right to admit or permit him, with the intention that a contract of tenancy should thereby be effected, he is a hereditary tenant and his proper place is under class (3). But before any person who claims to be a tenant of this description is entered as hereditary tenant, the Patwari shall record the statement of the zamindar and such person in his diary and obtain their signatures and make ths entry under class (8) only if the case is undisputed. If the zamindar denies admission to temncy or recognition of such person as tenant, such person shall be entered under class (10-A)."

    Class (11) consists of rent free grantees while class (12) deals with grove-holders. Class (16) is of tenants under permanent tenure holders. Class (17) is of tenants of Sir and tenants of Khudknsht. Class (18) deals with tenants under rent free grantees. Class (18-A) is of lessees under Section 252, U. P. Tenancy Act.

    19. Class (19) is of sub-tenants, while class (20) is:--

    "(20) Occupiers of lands without the consent of the person if any entered in column 5 of the Khasra.

    Notes -- (1) When no rent has been fixed and any person has been admitted to the occupation of land or permitted to retain possession of land by a tenant, with the intention that a contract of sub-tenancy should thereby be affected, be is a sub-tenant and his proper place is under class (19). But before any person, who claims to be a sub-tenant by virtue of such admission without rent or recognition as sub-tenant, is entered as sub-tenant, the patwari shall record the statements of the tenant and such person in his diary and obtain signatures and make he entry under class (19) only if the case is undisputed. Tf the tenant denies admission to tenancy or recognition of such person as sub-tenant, such person shall be entered under class (20).

    (2) The above classification applies to the whole of the Agra Province except the areas specified in the first schedule of the Land Revenue Act, 1901."

    20. The arrangement of land in, Oudh is similar except that class (5-A) is equivalent to class (10-A) in Agra and class (12) is equivalent to class (20) mentioned above.

    21. Paragraph 121 provides that the Khataum shall be prepared in form P-11. This form consists of 9 columns, of which column No, 2 deals with the name of the cultivator.

    22. It will be seen that there is a] detailed provision for specifying the nature of the tenure under which a person is cultivating. The classification includes 'occupiers of land'. Classes (10-A) and (20) deal with them. In the context of this classification, it is apparent that the occupiers of land mentioned in classes (10-A) and (20) are those who are not the holders of any recognised enure. Such occupiers of land without title are recoreded in the khasra either in column 6 or in ths remarks column thereof, under paragraphs 84, 85 and 87 of the Manual. These paragraphs contain detailed instructions for dealing with various kinds of situations in relation to such persons.

    23. These provisions clearly indicate that the entry as mortgagee is not intended to refer to occupants who are treated as a claw by themselves consisting of persons who are occupying land without title or without the consent of the person whose name is entered in column 5 of the Khasra. In Radha Kishori v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U. P. 1972 All WR (HC) 425 a bench held that an entry of Tenant of sir is not within Section 20 (b) (i).

    24. Section 14 deals specifically with mortgagees of proprietary interest. Section 21 provides for mortgagees of tenants. Sections 18 and 19 confer rights on different kinds of tenure-holders. Section 20 (a) confers Adivasi rights on tenants of sir and sub-tenants. All these provisions will become otiose, if it is held that record as a tenant or sub-tenant, or mortgagee etc., is to be read as a record of occupant. When Section 20 (b) (i) speaks of recorded occupant under Sections 28 and 33 of the Land Revenue Act, it refers and points to occupiers of classes (10-A) and (20) only, which are dealt with in Paragraphs 84 to 87 of the Manual

    25. In Amba Prasad's case AIR 1965 SC 54, the entry was as 'Qabiz' in the remarks column. It was held that the entry was made in accordance with Paragraph 85 of the Manual. The entry was thus clearly one of an occupant. The Court, however, observed that as between a proprietor and a tenant, the tenant, between a tenant and a sub-tenant, the sub-tenant and between a sub-tenant and a person recorded in the remarks column as 'Davedar Qabiz, the latter are the occupants That may be so But the Court did not go on to hold that the entry as tenant or sub-tenant would be a record as an occupant. The Court was emphasising the meaning and significance of the word 'occupant', and not of the phrase 'recorded as occupant'. A person in cultivatory possession may, in ordinary parlance, be an occupant of the land. But in the contest of the manual, that is a far different thing from being recorded as occupant. The phrase 'recorded as occupant' has, in view of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act and the Land Records Manual, a technical significance. We are aware that in Chobey Sunder Lal v. Sonu, 1967 All LJ 960 = (AIR 1969 All 304), a Full Bench of our Court interpreted this observation in Amba Prasad's case a little different in relation to an entry of sub-tenant. But, we are not disposed to refer the matter to a larger bench, because, in the present case, the question of interpretation of an entry as sub-tenant is not involved.

    26. The respondents were recorded in class (2-A) in the Khatauni and in column 5 of the Khasra of 1356 F., that is as mortgagees. This record was not in Jaw the record as occupant within meaning of clause (b) (i) of section 20 They did not acquire Adhivasi rights thereunder

    27. The third point that the entry should be deemed corrected by the decree in the suit under Section 183, has no substance We agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the learned Single Judge on this p int

    28. It appears that at first objections were filed under Section 12 (2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. After the publication of the statement of principles under Section 19, these proceedings were stayed, and the same question of title was taken up in proceedings under Section 20. Learned counsel urged that these provisions were void, because the earlier proceedings under Section 12 were not liable to be stayed. We are not inclined to entertain this point, because it was never taken at any earlier stage, before the Consolidation authorities. The respondents having had their innings on the merits are, in our opinion, not entitled to turn round and take this technical plea for the first time in the writ petition.

    29. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, and the orders of the Consolidation authorities are all quashed. It is directed that the names of the respondents shall be expunged, and the appellant will be recorded as a sirdar over the plots in dispute.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mustafa Khan v. Deputy Director Of Consolidation And Others
    (Sep 8, 1972)