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  • SECTION 83 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • Section 57 of the English Representation of the People Act, 1949.
  • provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117
  • sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 152; and(d)
  • sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 152
  • provisions of sub-section (2),
  • Order 19, Rule 3 of the CPC,
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 84
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 93
  • Rule 93 of the Rules
  • Section 83(1)(b)
  • sub-rule (1),
  • sub-rule (3),
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 83 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • Section 57 of the English Representation of the People Act, 1949.
  • provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117
  • sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 152; and(d)
  • sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 152
  • provisions of sub-section (2),
  • Order 19, Rule 3 of the CPC,
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 84
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 93
  • Rule 93 of the Rules
  • Section 83(1)(b)
  • sub-rule (1),
  • sub-rule (3),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal is from an order of the Election Tribunal, Lucknow dated 2 March 1963 dismissing the election petition of Kidwai Husain Kamil (the appellant). The parliamentary constituency (Bara Banki No. 30) comprised five U.P. Assembly constituencies: Nawabganj, Kursi, Bhitauli, Sarju and Tarabganj.

In the general election the appellant contested on a Congress ticket. The declared result showed Yadav Ram Sewak (Socialist) elected with 76,545 votes, the appellant securing 76,224 votes. Other candidates and their vote tallies are recorded in the petition.

The appellant filed an election petition (dated 6 April 1962, presented 10 April 1962 and published 5 May 1962) alleging, inter alia, (a) corrupt practices by the respondent, and (b) wrongful rejection of a large number of ballot papers and incorrect acceptance of tendered votes — that many votes properly cast for the appellant were either rejected or counted for the respondent. Discrepancies in forms (Form No. 16 / Form No. 20) and totalling mistakes in the certified copy of the return were also alleged.

The Election Commission constituted a Single Member Tribunal (Sri S. Malik). The appellant repeatedly sought inspection and scrutiny of ballot papers (multiple applications and affidavits filed); the Tribunal refused inspection and ultimately decided six issues (relating to reception/rejection of votes, discrepancies in forms, tendered votes, polling station irregularities, counting conditions, and whether appellant had majority of valid votes). The Tribunal decided the issues against the appellant, dismissed the petition and awarded costs of Rs. 1,000 to respondent No. 1.

The appellant appealed to the High Court. At the hearing in this Court, counsel for both parties argued points on maintainability under Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the proper exercise of discretion under Rule 93 (production and inspection of election papers), and the correctness of the Tribunal's refusal to permit inspection/scrutiny of ballot papers and returns.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Election Tribunal was correct in treating Rule 93 (production and inspection of election papers) as requiring that inspection of ballot papers be "ordinarily refused" and thereby refusing inspection in the circumstances of this case.
  2. Whether the petition complied with Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (in particular the requirements as to concise statement of material facts and required affidavit when corrupt practice is alleged), and whether any defect in the affidavit supporting corrupt-practice allegations was fatal to the petition's maintainability.
  3. Whether the appellant had placed prima facie evidence or material before the Tribunal which justified inspection/scrutiny of the ballot papers (or, alternatively, whether the Tribunal reasonably exercised its discretion in refusing inspection).
  4. Whether the Tribunal erred in law in refusing to inspect original returns and ballot papers which had been summoned and were in the Court's custody.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Tribunal was wrong in construing Rule 93 as implying that inspection should be "ordinarily refused"; the discretion conferred by Rule 93 is wide and must be exercised judicially to further the cause of justice.
  • The appellant had given prima facie evidence and had produced all material reasonably available to him; specifically, he tendered all ballot papers in evidence and produced a certified copy of the return showing totalling mistakes — therefore inspection and scrutiny were necessary and justified.

Contesting Respondent's Arguments

  • An objection to maintainability: the election petition did not comply with Section 83 because allegations of corrupt practice were not accompanied by the prescribed affidavit (the proviso to Section 83), rendering the petition liable to dismissal.
  • Objection to the form/verification of the affidavit filed in support of the inspection application — the verification clause did not specify the source of knowledge or information for many paragraphs, thus the affidavit was defective and inspection should be refused.
  • Submission that decisions and principles from past authorities supported refusal of inspection (relied on various English and Indian cases and other material).
  • Submission that the petition's allegations were vague and did not set out full particulars required for certain allegations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Julius v. Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214 Illustration that the use of words like "may" or "shall" is not conclusive on whether a provision is directory or mandatory. Cited as part of a group of authorities to support the proposition that the language of a statute must be read with its scheme to determine mandatory vs. directory effect; used to conclude proviso to Section 83 is not mandatory.
H.V. Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 Authority on interpretation of mandatory/directory statutory language. Grouped with other cases to demonstrate established principles about interpreting "shall"/"may"; court relied on these authorities in concluding the proviso to Section 83 was not mandatory.
Narayan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 737 Authority on statutory interpretation concerning mandatory/directory distinction. Used in the same cluster of authorities informing the Court's view that non-compliance with the proviso need not entail summary dismissal.
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 Authority on interpretation of procedural words in statutes. Cited with others to support the conclusion on the character of proviso to Section 83.
K.S. Srinivasan v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 419 Authority on statutory interpretation and consequences of non-compliance with procedural provisions. Grouped in the Court's reasoning on whether proviso to Section 83 is mandatory or directory.
Drigraj Kuer v. Amar Krishna Narain Singh, AIR 1950 SC 444 Another authority on interpretation of "shall"/"may" and directory vs. mandatory rules. Used as part of the jurisprudential background for concluding the proviso to Section 83 is not necessarily mandatory.
Banwari Lal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 849 Principle that context, scheme and purpose determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. Relied upon to underline that "shall" alone is inconclusive and that other factors must be examined.
Collector of Monghyr v. Kesnav Prasad, AIR 1952 SC 1694 Authority that auxiliary verbs are inconclusive; need to consider statute scheme. Used to support the Court's methodology for determining mandatory/directory nature of the proviso to Section 83.
Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa, 14 ELR 296 : AIR 1958 SC 698 Held the Representation of the People Act is a self-contained code governing trial of election petitions. Applied to hold that Form 25 in the Rules governs verification in election petitions and that local amendments to the CPC cannot override form 25; the affidavit was held in substantial compliance with form 25.
State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog, AIR 1952 SC 317 Comments on affidavit verification and the desirability of following Order 19, Rule 3 CPC format for verification. Distinguished: Court observed that the present affidavit conformed substantially to Form 25 and that the cited passage did not mandate rejecting an affidavit which had been admitted without objection at trial.
Bhim Sen v. Gopali, 22 ELR 288 (SC) Rule (then Rule 138, now Rule 93) providing for production and inspection of election papers; particulars about wrong inclusion/exclusion of votes can often be supplied only after inspection. Quoted and applied to support the proposition that full particulars concerning alleged wrongly counted/uncounted votes may only be supplied after ballot papers are inspected; supports allowing inspection in this case.
Abdul Majeed v. Bhargavan, AIR 1963 Ker 18 Considered recount/recount refusal where allegations related to impartiality of counting assistants and margin of difference. Distinguished: Court said that Abdul Majeed did not deal with interim inspection to substantiate allegations of wrong inclusion/exclusion of votes and therefore did not assist the respondent's case.
Basaviah v. Bachiah, 17 ELR 293 (Mys) Principle that a recount is not an absolute right; it will be allowed if a prima facie case is shown. Referred to for the proposition that recount/inspection requires a prima facie showing; the Court read it as consistent with allowing inspection where prima facie material exists.
Stowe v. Jolliffe, (1874) 9 C.P. 446 English authority on election materials/inspection referenced by respondent. Court examined it and concluded it did not assist in deciding the present case.
The Queen v. Beardsall, (1876) 1 QBD 452 English authority cited on inspection/ballot matters. Court found it not to be an authority for refusing inspection where the petition specifically alleged wrongful inclusion/exclusion of votes.
Ghazanfar Ali v. Choudhaiy Bahawal Bux (Case No. LXXIV Punjab North (M) 1924) — Election Cases India and Burma (1920–35) Listed by the Tribunal in its judgment as drawn to its attention. Court noted the Tribunal mentioned but did not analyze or apply these authorities in its reasons.
Hammond's Election Cases (including K.V. Krishnaswami Nayakar v. A. Ramaswami Mudaliyar; V.P.P. Pillai v. R.B. Venkatarama Ayyar) Election law authorities referenced by the Tribunal. Observed that the Tribunal listed such authorities at the end of its judgment but did not explain their relevance or how they were applied.
R. Swaminatha Mercondsr v. S. Ramlingam, (1952–53) 2 ELR 51 Another election case cited by the Tribunal. Court pointed out the Tribunal did not engage with the authorities it listed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing preliminary objections before reaching the substantive question of inspection of ballot papers:

  1. Maintainability under Section 83:
    • The Court distinguished clause (a) and clause (b) of Section 83. Clause (a) requires "a concise statement of the material facts" while clause (b) requires "full particulars" of corrupt practice. The Court held that allegations of wrongful inclusion/exclusion of votes fall under clause (a) and need only a concise statement; therefore the petition complied with clause (a) as presented.
    • As to allegations of corrupt practice, Clause (b) did require full particulars and an affidavit in the prescribed form; but during trial such allegations were withdrawn by the petitioner and no issue was framed on corrupt practice. The Court therefore examined whether initial non-compliance with the proviso (affidavit) rendered the petition summarily non-maintainable.
    • The Court reviewed Sections 85 and 90(3) (which provide for summary dismissal in specific circumstances) and concluded that summary dismissal by the Election Commission or Tribunal is limited to the contingencies listed in those sections (non-compliance with Sections 81, 82 or 117). The absence of an affidavit in respect of corrupt-practice allegations was not among those contingencies and thus was not a standalone ground for summary dismissal.
    • Relying on authorities about statutory interpretation (including the mandatory/directory distinction), the Court concluded the proviso to Section 83 was not mandatory in the sense that its non-compliance must automatically lead to dismissal; the statute's scheme and absence of penal consequences for non-compliance supported a non-fatal view of the omission.
  2. Rule 93 and the discretion to allow inspection:
    • Rule 93 (production and inspection of election papers) divides election papers into three categories: (1) packets of unused and used ballot papers and certain marked electoral materials (inspection only by order of a competent court/tribunal); (2) all other papers (open to public inspection subject to conditions); (3) copies of returns (to be supplied on payment).
    • The Tribunal interpreted Rule 93 to mean inspection should "ordinarily be refused" and that discretion was to be exercised in a manner tending to deny inspection except for very strong reasons. The High Court rejected this interpretation: nothing in Rule 93 or the Act mandates that inspection be ordinarily refused. The discretion is unfettered and must be exercised judicially to advance justice.
    • The Court emphasized that allegations of wrongful inclusion/exclusion of votes are often only provable by inspection of the ballot papers themselves. Therefore, refusal to permit inspection when ballot papers were in the Tribunal's custody and the petitioner had tendered them and produced evidence (certified copy of the return showing totalling mistakes) was an erroneous exercise of discretion.
  3. Affidavit form and verification objections:
    • The Court examined the verification clause of the affidavit filed to support the inspection application. Although the affidavit's verification was "not very happily worded" (it used "true on knowledge", "true on information received and believed" and "true on legal advice received" for different paragraphs), no objection to its acceptance was taken in the Tribunal at the time it was filed.
    • The Court held that the affidavit was intended to support an application for inspection (not to be substantive evidence) and that, in any event, the Rules provide Form 25 for verification in election petitions. The affidavit substantially complied with Form 25. Local amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure (Order 19 rules as amended locally) cannot override the Act and its Rules; Section 92 made the Code applicable excluding local amendments.
    • Therefore the objection to the affidavit's verification could not be entertained for the first time on appeal and did not justify refusal of inspection.
  4. Misapplication of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Tribunal:
    • The Tribunal held that inspection could not be allowed under the Code (Order 11 rules) because the ballot papers were not in the possession of a party but of the returning officer. The High Court found this reasoning wrong: the ballot papers had been summoned and were in the Tribunal's custody. Discovery/inspection provisions did not bar inspection of documents in the custody of the Court/Tribunal.
  5. Overall evaluation:
    • The Court found the Tribunal had committed a manifest error of law by refusing inspection of ballot papers and by erroneously construing Rule 93 as prescribing an "ordinary" refusal. Given that inspection was the best (indeed often the only) way to prove allegations of wrongful inclusion/exclusion of votes, refusal was unjustified here.
    • The Court also criticized the Tribunal for mentioning a few authorities without discussing how they supported or distinguished the Tribunal's view.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The High Court set aside the Election Tribunal's order dismissing the election petition and remanded the matter to the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, for retrial.
  • The Tribunal on retrial was directed to give reasonable opportunity to both parties to inspect the ballot papers and connected documents subject to specific procedural directions provided by the Court (timing, supervision by Munsarim, sealing procedures, single-bundle opening, restriction on handling, inspection confined to ballot papers and Form No. 16, etc.).
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs. The substance of the decision was to be communicated to the Election Commission and the Speaker of the House of the People and a copy of the order to be sent to both the Election Commission and the Election Tribunal, Lucknow.

Broader legal implications highlighted by the Court (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The proviso to Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (requiring an affidavit when corrupt practice is alleged) was construed as not mandatory in the sense that its non-compliance does not automatically warrant summary dismissal of a petition, particularly where the defect can be cured before final hearing.
  • Rule 93 (production and inspection of election papers) confers a discretion on the Tribunal but does not require that inspection of ballot-papers be "ordinarily refused"; the discretion must be exercised judicially and in the interest of justice, especially where inspection is necessary to establish allegations of wrong inclusion or rejection of votes.
  • Election petitions form a self-contained code; the verification required by the Representation of the People Act and its Rules (Form 25) governs over local amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure.

Note: These implications are stated as part of the Court's reasoning and directions in the opinion. The direct operational effect for the parties is the remand for retrial with mandated inspection procedures; the Court also articulated interpretive principles about Section 83 and Rule 93 which guided its decision.


This summary has been produced strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in that opinion.

    Kidwai Husain Kamil v. Yadav Ram Sewak And Others

    Jagdish Sahai, J.:— This is an appeal directed against the order passed by the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, on the 2nd of March, 1963, dismissing the election petition filed by the appellant, Kidwai Husain Kamil (Husain Kamil Kidwai). The Bara Bank) Parliamentary Constituency No. 30 (hereinafter referred to as the Constituency) consists of the following five U.P Legislative Assembly Constituencies:—

    1. 148 Nawabganj. 2. 149 Kursi. 3. 150 Bhitauli, 4. 170 Sarju. 5. 171 Tarabganj.

    2. In the last general election the appellant Kidwai was a candidate from the constituency on Congress ticket. Opposed to him were Yadav Ram Sewak (Ram Sewak Yadav) on the Socialist Party ticket, Sri Kishna Das on the Jan Sangn ticket, Krishna Behari on the Swatantra Party ticket, and Autar on the Communist Party ticket. The counting of the votes took place between the 26th of February and 28th of February, 1962. Yadav Ram Sewak wasi declared elected. The number of votes secured by each of the candidates is as follows:

    (1) Kidai Husain Kamil (Congress-Petitioner) 76,224. (2) Yadav Ram Sewak (Socialist-respondent No. 1) 76,545. (3) Sri Krishna Das (Jan Sangh-respondent No. 2) 38,602. (4) Krishna Behari (Swatantra Party respondent No. 3) 18,971. (5) Autar (Communist-respondent No. 4) 13,134.

    3. The petitioner Kidwai presented the election petition giving rise to this appeal before the Election Commission on 10th of April, 1962. The Election Commission constituted a Single Member Tribunal presided over by Sri S. Malik for deciding this petition. The election petition which is dated the 6th of April, 1962, was published in the Gazette of India dated the 5th of May, 1962. On the 1st of June, 1962, it was received by Sri S. Malik, (at present District Judge, Lucknow) for decision. Several grounds were taken in the petition including those relating to corrupt practice on the part of Yadav Ram Sewak, the respondent No. 1. The main ground however, was that a large number of Dailol papers had been declared to be invalid by the returning officer, though, in fact, they were valid and that the returning officer committed an error in not accepting a large number of tendered votes which should have been accepted. It was also alleged in the petition that there was a discrepancy in the total number of votes in form No. 20 prepared by the presiding officer and form No. 20 prepared by the returning office, that there were glaring mistakes in totalling up of the figures and that a large number of votes, which were polled in his favour, were not so counted and many of them were counted erroneously in favour or the respondent No. 1.

    4. A written statement was filed on behalf of Yaaaw Ram Sewak (hereinafter referred to as the contesting respondent) in which all the allegations of the petitioner, including those relating to corrupt practice, wrong inclusion of votes in favour of the contesting respondent and wrong exclusion from those of the petitioner were controverted. Inter alia, an objection was also taken that the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and that the allegations made in the petition were vague and the petition was liable to be dismissed.

    5. On the 8th of August, 1962, an application was made on behalf of Kidwai for permission to inspect the ballot papers by eleven persons whose names were given hit the application. This application was supported by att affidavit. This affidavit was verified on solemn affirmation in the following manner:

    “Contents of Paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 7 were verified to be “true on knowledge”, those of paragraphs 4(a) to 4(b) and those of paragraphs 5, 6, 6(i) to 6(iii) and 8, 9, 10 and 12 were verified to be “true on information received and believed to be true” while the contents of paragraphs 13 and 14 were verified to be “true on legal advice received.”

    6. An objection to this application was taken on behalf of the contesting respondent in writing on the 18th of August, 1962. One of the prayers contained in this objection, which was in the form of an application, was that the preliminary issues be first decided so that the parties may not be put to unnecessary expenses and the Tribunal's time be also saved. It was also prayed that the application for Inspection of the ballot papers be rejected, paragraph 4 of this objection stated the election petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of want of proper verification and also because no affidavit was filed along with it as required by the proviso to S. 83 of the Act. Sri Malik after, hearing the counsel for the parties dismissed the application of the petitioner for permission to inspect the ballot papers, even though the same were available in Court, having been summoned by him earlier and in spite of the certified copy of the Return clearly disclosing mistakes in totalling having been shown to him.

    7. The petitioner made another application on the 8th of September, 1982 praying that

    “issues arising out of the positive averments contained in the election petition be framed, and in due course scrutiny of the ballot papers be made and, at the proper stage, Inspection of the ballot papers by the petitioner and his counsel be allowed as observed by this Tribunal in its order dated August 25, 1962.”

    8. This application was founded mainly on an observation made by the Tribunl in its earlier order which reads as follows:

    “If in future from facts that may be brought to the notice of the Tribunal, it appears that in the interest of Justice, an Inspection should be allowed, necessary orders allowing an inspection could always be passed.”

    9. This application was also contested and the prayer for permission to inspect the ballot papers was rejected, but the learned member of the Tribunal again observed as follows:

    “It may also be pointed out that while rejecting the Petitioner's application for inspection of ballot papers, the Tribunal observed that if from the evidence that may be adduced by the petitioner, it appears that an inspection should be allowed for a just decision of the petition, the inspection shall be allowed. If all the grounds regarding reception and rejection of ballot papers and wrong counting are struck off, the petitioner would be deprived of an opportunity of showing to the Tribunal that there is substance in the grounds taken by the petitioner justifying an inspection or general scrutiny and recount. Under the circumstances, the objections put forward, on behalf of the respondent are hereby rejected.

    Let an early date be fixed for framing of issues.”

    10. The petitioner repeated his effort for an inspection of the ballot-papers and made an application dated the 16th of November, 1962, in which he prayed for either of the two following reliefs:

    “(a) allow the petitioner assisted by his counsel, subject to such conditions and terms as appear to it to be reasonable, to inspect the ballot papers and the said forms and to put the result of that inspection in a concise ane tabulated form before this Hon'ble Tribunal for its scrutiny, (b) This Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased itself to inspect and scrutinise the ballot papers in the presence of the counsel of both the parties, and record the result of such examination and scrutiny and then pronounce its decision accordingly. This application was also opposed on behalf of the contesting respondent by means of a written reply dated the 26th on November, 1962, with the result that the prayer for the inspection of the ballot papers either by the parties or to the scrutiny of the same by the Tribunal was refused though the Tribunal permitted the parties to file such documents as they liked. The same day i.e on 26th of Nov., 1962, the learned counsel for the petitioner made a statement that he did not wish to produce any documents and that the prayer of the petitioner-appellant for the inspection of the ballot papers be reconsidered. The learned member of the Tribunal fixed the 3rd of December 1962, for arguments or the question as to whether in view of the statement made by the petitioner, the question of inspection of ballot papers by him should be reconsidered and in case the inspection be not allowed, whether the Tribunal should itself make scrutiny of the ballot papers as prayed for.

    11. It seems that no orders were passed on the 3rd of December, 1962, and the matter was taken up by the presiding officer on the 17th of December, 1962. On that date the learned counsel for the appellant formally tendered in evidence all the ballot papers by means of an application of the same date and withdrew all allegations relating to corrupt practice on the part of the contesting respondent, mo exact words used in the application made on behalf of the appellant are as follows:

    “3 of the issues, viz., issues 3, 4 and 5 do not now require decision in view of the statement made by the petitioner's counsel. As regards the surviving issues, viz. issues 1, 2 and 6 it is impossible for the petitioner to produce any oral evidence and the only evidence decisive of those issues can be the ballot papers themselves. The petitioner, to set all controversy at rest, does hereby formally tender in evidence all the ballot papers. That being so, the ballot papers have to be opened, inspected or scrutinised. It may be noted here that all the ballot papers were summoned by an order of the Tribunal dated 6-7-1962 and are present in the record room of the Tribunal.”

    12. To this application, the contesting respondent gave a written reply, opposing the opening of the ballot papers on the ground that no prima facie case had been made out for their inspection. With regard to the allegation of the appellant that the certified copy of the return issued to him by the returning officer clearly disclosed totalling mistakes which affected the result of the election, the reply of behalf of the contesting respondent was that “the alleges mistake in the certified copies of the return, can be tested with the original”. It was also stated in the written reply that in fact there was no mistake in the original and the factual position was that some mistake had been committee in the certified copy issued to the appellant. The Tribunal dismissed the election petition without allowing Inspection by the parties or scrutinising the ballot papers itself.

    13. in all the following six issues were framed in the case:

    (1) Whether there was improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes at the time of counting and if so, whether the result of the election was materially attested due to the same?

    (2) is there any discrepancy between the total number of votes mentioned in Form No. 16 and Form No. 20 as alleged in paragraph 6(C) and (D)? If so, its effect?

    (3) Whether the tendered votes were wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer and if so, was the result of the election materially affected due to the same?

    (4) Whether at the polling station No. 29, Majgawan, in Bhitauli Unit and Kursi, Polling Station in Kursi Assembly Unit, the Polling Officers did not give ballot papers to the voters as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the petition? If so its effect?

    (5) Whether counting of votes of Bhitauli Assembly Unit went upto 8.30 P.M in the night and after 5-30 P.M it was done in failing and insufficient light in spite of protests as alleged in paragraph 11 of the petition? If so, its effect?

    (6) Whether the petitioner received a majority of valid votes and is entitled to be declared duly elected?

    14. The Tribunal decided issues Nos. 3, 4 and 5 against the appellant and in favour of the contesting respondent, on the finding that a heavy burden lay on the appellant which he had failed to discharge. On issue No. 2 it recorded the finding that “there is nothing before the Tribunal to snow that the allegations made by the petitioner regarding these forms in paragraphs 6(C) and (D) are correct” and decided that issue against the appellant and in favour of the contesting respondent. On issues Nos. 1 and 6 it recorded the finding that the “petitioner has failed to prove any fact justifying inspection of the ballot papers and there is nothing on the record to show that the respondent No. 1 was wrongly declared to have been elected”. Having thus disposed of the six issues in the case, he dismissed the petition and awarded a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as costs to the respondent No. 1.

    15. Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellant has filed the present appeal in this Court.

    16. We have heard Sarvasri Iqbal Ahmad and Bishan Singh for the appellant and Sarvasri Hargovind Dayal and Umesh Chandra Srivastava for the contesting respondent.

    17. Two submissions have been made on behalf of the appellant. They are as follows:

    (1) That the Tribunal was in error in having supposed that the effect of Rule 93 of the Rules framed under the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was that the policy of the law was to reject an application for the inspection of ballot papers except for very strong reasons.

    (2) That in any case the petitioner had given prima facie evidence and placed before the Tribunal all the material that any person in his position could have placed in support of the request for the inspection of the ballot-papers and corrected documents.

    18. On behalf of the contesting respondent not only these submissions have been opposed, but an objection has been taken to the maintainability of the appeal as also or the petition on the ground that the petition did not fultil the requirements of Section 83 of the Act and consequently was not maintainable. It urged that even through no cross appeal or cross-objection has been filed, this ground is being taken in order to support the order or the decree passed by the Election Tribunal on principles analogous to those enshrined in O. 41, R. 22 of the CPC, which permits a respondent to raise such pleas in support of the decree of the Court below which would sustain the decree.

    19. With a view to appreciate fully the submissions made at the bar it is necessary to consider some provisions, of the Act. Section 80 of the Act reads as follows:

    “80. Election petitions, — No election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part.”

    20. Section 81 of the Act deals with the manner in which an election petition is to be presented. Section 82 provides, as to who would be the parties in the petition. Section of the Act deals with the contents of the petition. That provision reads as follows:

    “83. Contents of petition.— (1) An election petition—

    (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material, facts on which the petitioner relies;

    (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place os the commission of each such practice; and

    (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (??? of 1908), for the verification of pleadings.

    (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also, be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition:

    Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.”

    21. Section 100 of the Act provides the grounds for declaring an election to be void.

    22. Before we come to the merits of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we would like to dispose of the submission made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 with regard to the maintainability of the election petition and the appeal before us. It was strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent that the petition was not maintainable on account of the vagueness of allegations made therein and also because it was not properly presented. The submission is founded on two contentions. The first contention is that in the petition charges had been made with regard to corrupt practice on the part of the contesting respondent and inasmuch as there was no affidavit in support of those charges, the petition could not have been received. The second contention is that in any case the details of the manner in which the votes were allegedly counted in favour of the contesting respondent and allegedly wrongly excluded from that of the appellant that not been given. We are unable to accept either of these contentions.

    23. We have already reproduced Section 83 of the Act earlier. It would be noticed that so far as clause (a) or Section 83 is concerned, unlike clause (b) it does not require “full particulars”. On the other hand, all that it requires is “a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies.” When the petition was filed, it was founded on the ground of wrong inclusion and wrong exclusion of votes as also on the ground of corrupt practice. Therefore, so far as the charge of corrupt practice was concerned, full particulars of the same had to be given without which the petition was obviously defective. But so far as the allegation relating to the wrong inclusion and wrong exclusion of the votes is concerned, that did not a all require full particulars being given and the requirement of clause (a) of Section 83 of the Act would have been completely satisfied if what was given amounted to a “concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies.”

    24. A bare perusal of these provisions reveals that the legislature has worded the clauses in distinctly different phraseology. Whereas the law requires emphatically that the particulars of any corrupt practice should be disclosed in the petition, it does not require similar particulars to be given in respect of other matters. We have looked into the Shorter Oxford Dictionary in order to find out the meaning of the word ‘concise’. Amongst others, the following meanings have been given: “Brief in expression (of speech, style person)”. In short all that ‘concise’ means is a brief though definite statement of the facts on which the petitioner relies. We cannot equate the requirements of clause (a) “with those of clause (b) of Section 33 of the Act because the words used in one are so different from the words used in the other. Having carefully perused the allegations of the appellant contained in the petition relating to the wrong inclusion of votes in the count of the contesting respondent and wrong exclusion of votes from those of the appellant, we are of the opinion that proper compliance with the law has been made in this case and a concise statement of facts relied upon by the appellant has been given. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the petition as presented was defective, in respect of wrong inclusion and wrong exclusion of votes and other connected matters.

    25. So far as the charge of corrupt practice on the part of the contesting respondent is concerned, we have already said earlier that during the course of the trial the same was withdrawn with the result that no issue was even framed in respect of the same. The question, therefore, that remains to be considered is whether the mere fact that at the time of the presentation of the petition, charges relating to corrupt practices were also included and there was no affidavit filed in support of it, would justify the conclusion that the petition was improperly presented and is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone even after those charges have been withdrawn. Section 83 of the Act does not provide for the dismissal of the petition for want of an affidavit to support the allegations relating to corrupt practice.

    26. There are two provisions which deal with the summary dismissal of an election petition. These are Sections 85 and 90(3) of the Act. Section 85 deals with the powers of the Election Commission to dismiss an election petition while Section 90(3) deals with the powers of the Tribunal. Section 85 reads as follows:

    “85. Procedure on receiving petition: If the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 have not been complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition:

    Provided that the petition shall not be dismissed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard.”

    27. Having carefully considered the provisions of Section 85 of the Act, we are of the opinion that it is exhaustive of the grounds on which an election petition can be dismissed by the Election Commission. The result is that the petition could have been dismissed by the Election commission only on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81 or 82 or 117. Admittedly, the circumstance that in support of the allegations relating to the corrupt practice made by the appellant, there is no affidavit, is not a ground which is covered by any of the Sections 81, 82 and 117 of the Act. Consequently, the Election commission could not have dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not supported by an affidavit in respect of the charges relating to corrupt practice. Similarly, the Election Tribunal could dismiss a petition only on the ground that it did not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 of the Act. None of the contingencies contemplated by this provision are to be found in the present case. No other provision has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the parties and we are not ourselves aware of any under which a petition could have been dismissed, otherwise than on merits, by the Tribunal.

    28. Consequently, we are satisfied that the defect of the charges relating to corrupt practice not being supported by an affidavit was not fatal to the maintainability of the election petition and even though its effect could be considered at the time of the final hearing of the petition, the same could not be dismissed summarily on that ground either by the Election Commission or by the Election Tribunal. The argument of the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, therefore, that the petition could not have been received or was liable to be summarily dismissed on the ground of want of an affidavit or full particulars cannot be accepted.

    29. Having given our anxious consideration to the relevant provisions of the Act, specially of the proviso to Section 83 of the Act, we are of the opinion that the proviso is not in the nature of a mandatory provision the non-compliance of which would result in the summary dismissal of the petition. It is not necessary to go into the various cases which deal with the question as to what meaning should be given to the words ‘shall’ or ‘may’ occurring in a particular provision and whether the use of the former is conclusive of the mandatory nature of the provision and that of the latter only of directory. It is well established that nothing depends upon the use of the word ‘may’ or ‘shall’ and an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory, (see Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 AC 214, H.V Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, (S) AIR 1955 SC 233, Narayan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (S) AIR 1957 SC 737, State Of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (S) AIR 1957 SC 912, K.S Srinivasan v. Union Of India, AIR 1958 SC 419 and Drigraj Kuer v. Amar Krishna Narain Singh, (AIR 1950 SC 444).

    30. It is also settled that in order to decide whether a provision is directory or mandatory, not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention or the same have got to be seen, see Banwari Lal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 849. in Collector of Monghyr v. Kesnav Prasad, AIR 1952 SC 1694, it was held that the employment of the auxiliary verb ‘shall’ is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either. In order to determine whether a provision is directory or mandatory, it has got to be seen whether any consequences are provided for the omission to observe the requirement and what is the purpose for which the requirement has been indicated, having special regard to the context in which it has been provided, the other provisions of the Act as also the general scheme thereof.

    31. In AIR 1960 SC 444 (supra) it was held that even a directory provision is intended to be obeyed but failure to obey does not render a thing, duly done, in disobedience or it, a nullity and that in every case the intention of the Legislature has got to be gathered from the whole of the statute. Judging the provisions of Section 83 by the test given above, it appears to us that the proviso to Section 83 of the Act is not mandatory. There is no provision in the Act providing for a penalty for the non-obedience of the proviso. The scheme of the Act lays insistence on giving full details of corrupt practices and on filing an affidavit in support thereof to give greater solemnity to the allegations made in the petition and to ensure that the same were not lightly and cursorily made. If the Legislature intended the non-observance of the proviso as fatal either to the entertainment or to she maintainability of the petition, it would have provided either for the dismissal of the petition on that ground or for any other penal consequence.

    32. It is well settled that plaints not properly verified, when presented, do not entail their dismissal even if the defect is removed after the expiry of the period of limitation. On principle, we see no difference between a plaint and an election petition and are of the opinion that, if, before the hearing of a case is concluded, an affidavit is filed as required by the proviso to Section 83, the Election Tribunal would not be justified in rejecting the petition on that ground.

    33. Having thus disposed of the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, we proceed to deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. Rule 93 deals with matters relating to inspections and leads as follows:

    “93. Production and inspection of election papers.— (1) While in the custody of the returning officer—

    (a) the packets of unused ballot papers;

    (b) the packets of used ballot papers whether valid, tendered or rejected,

    (c) the packets of the marked copy of the electoral noil or, as the case may be, the list maintained under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 152; and

    (d) the packets of the declarations by electors and the attestation of their signatures;

    shall not be opened and their contents shall not be inspected by, or produced before, any person or authority except under the order of a competent Court or tribunal.

    (2) All other papers relating to the election shall be open to public inspection subject to such conditions and to the payment of such fee, if any, as the Election Commission may direct.

    (3) Copies of the returns by the returning officer forwarded under Rule 64 or as the case may be, under sub-rule (3) of Rule 84 shall be furnished by the Chief Electoral Officer of the State concerned on payment of a fee of two rupees for each such copy.”

    34. It is trite that the provision is based upon a rule of public policy, the same being that the secrecy of the ballot must be maintained. The rule is divided in three parts: the first part deals with packets of unused ballot-papers, packets of used ballot-papers, packets of marked copy or electoral roll, the list maintained under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 152 and packets of declaration by electors and attestation of their signatures. The second part deals with all other papers relating to elections. The third part deals with copies of the return by the returning officer. So far as the documents mentioned in sub-rule (1), i.e, the first part of Rule 93 are concerned, it has been clearly provided that nobody shall be entitled to open or look into them except under the order of a competent Court or tribunal.

    35. Papers mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 93 are open to public inspection. Copies of returns provided for in sub-rule (3), i.e, the third part of Rule 93, have got to be furnished by the Chief Electoral Officer on payment of a fee of Rs. 2/-. The petitioner wanted the inspection of the papers mentioned in sub-rule (1) also. The question for consideration is whether in the circumstances of the present case, the Election Tribunal should have permitted their inspection. The Tribunal observed as follows in this connection:

    “Thus the question as to whether inspection of ballot-paper should be allowed has been left to the discretion of the Tribunal. If the intention of the Legislature had been to allow scrutiny or inspection of ballot papers easily, a rule would definitely have been framed allowing such inspection on certain conditions. The fact that it has been left to the discretion of the Tribunal shows that inspection should ordinarily be refused unless the Tribunal considers such inspection necessary in the interest of justice.”

    36. We are unable to share the view of the Tribunal that the law is that inspection should ordinarily be refused. There is nothing in Rule 93 which warrants such a conclusion. There is no other provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder which can lead to a similar result. Rule 93 is very widely worded. The powers of the Court or the Tribunal have no fetters appended and the mere fact that the tribunal has been given a discretion in the matter does not mean, as has been wrongly assumed by the Tribunal, that it should ordinarily be refused. The principles on which a Judicial Officer is to exercise his discretion are so well known and there cannot be any controversy about them, in, substance the principle is that discretion should always bi exercised in order to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the same. Whenever discretion is vested in a Court or a Judicial Officer, it has got to be exercised judicially.

    37. Having considered the facts of the case, the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on the record, we are of the opinion that in the present case, the Tribunal exercised its discretion wrongly. The learned Member of the Tribunal was led into this error because he thought that the circumstance that the matter had been left to the discretion of the Tribunal indicated that normally inspection should be refused. We have already said above that there is nothing in the Act or the Rules which can justify such a conclusion. We have found it difficult to see as to what better method could there be of proving that votes cast in favour of the appellant were excluded from his count and a large number of votes had been wrongly included in the count of the contesting respondent than allowing Inspection of the ballot-papers and enabling counsel to point out on the ballot-papers which he thought have been wrongly excluded from the count of the appellant or wrongly included in the count of the contesting respondent.

    38. The appellant not only made repeated applications for inspection being allowed but also tendered all the ballot-papers solemnly and formally as evidence on his behalf. Admittedly, the ballot-papers were before the Tribunal. Under these circumstances, we have found it extremely difficult to appreciate the objection of the Tribunal either to inspection being allowed or to himself looking into the ballot-papers. Mr. Har Govind Dayal, who appeared for the respondents had to admit that no restrictions had been placed on the powers of the Tribunal and it committed a manifest error of law in assuming that the scheme of the Rules was to normally refuse inspection, but he has contended that the affidavit filed in support of the first application for the inspection of the ballot-papers was not in proper form and has not been verified in accordance with the law. It is contended that it has not been shown in the verification clause as to on whose knowledge paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the affidavit have been sworn to be true.

    39. It is also complained that it has not been mentioned in the verification clause as to on whose information the deponent of the affidavit believed the contents of paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b), 5, 6(i) to 6(iii), 8, 9, 10 and 12 to do true. It, is true that the verification clause is not very happily worded, but it must also be remembered that at the time when the affidavit was filed, neither the Tribunal nor the contesting respondent nor his counsel objected to the acceptance of the same. It was open to the contesting respondent or the Tribunal to object to the affidavit and in that case another affidavit could have been filed by the appellant. No prayer was also made for the cross-examination of the deponent of the affidavit by the contesting respondent. The affidavit was not intended to be a piece of evidence in the case but was required only to support an application made for the inspection of the ballot papers and other connected documents. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the objection not having been raised in the trial Court, it cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time before us.

    40. Apart from it, the Rules provide the form in which an affidavit is to be verified in connection with election petitions. Form 25 reads as follows;

    “1.…..the petitioner in the accompanying election petition calling in question the election of Shri/Shrimati…. …..(respondent No. ……in the said petition) mane solemn affirmation/oath and say—

    (a) that the statements made in paragraphs… of the accompanying election petition about the commission of the Corrupt pracice of………and the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs……of the same petition and in paragraphs……of the Schedule annexed hereto are true to my knowledge;

    (b) that the statements made in paragraphs…..of the said petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of…….and the particulars of such corrupt practice given in paragraphs……..of the said petition and in paragraphs……..of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my information;…….”

    41. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the form for verification to be adopted in matters relating to election petitions should be one in conformity with form 25 of the Rules and that the rules of the High Court contained in Chapter VI of the Rules of this Court are not applicable to election petitions and connected proceedings. In our judgment, there is substance in this submission. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent has invited our attention to O. 19, R. 3 of the CPC as amended by this Court also and has made a reference to Rules 8 to 15 added by this Court.

    42. In our opinion, the amendment made by this Court to the Code of Civil Procedure cannot govern a matter relating to the conduct of election petitions in derogation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In the first place when S. 92 of the Act made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before the Election Tribunal, it contemplated the Civil Procedure as passed by the Legislature and not inclusive of local amendments. The Act is an all India statute and an election petition from whatever State it may arise, can be sent for trial by the Election Commission before any Tribunal situated in any part of India. Consequently, it cannot be said that if an election petition is tried in Allahabad, the Code with local amendments would apply but if the same petition was to be tried in Madras or in Bombay or in Punjab, the local amendments of Allahabad would not apply. There has got to be a uniform law and practice for the whole of the country in a matter like this. Consequently, we are of the commion that when Section 92 of the Act made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings in an election petition, it only made the provisions of the Code, exclusive of the local amendments, applicable.

    43. But quite apart from it, there is nothing in the Code or any local amendments which can apply in derogation of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. In Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa, 14 ELR 296 : (AIR 1958 SC 698) the Supreme Court clearly held that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act as a whole constitute a self-contained Code governing the trial of election petitions. The Allahabad amendments cannot override form No. 25. The affidavit filed by the petitioner is in substantial compliance with form No. 25 and even though it is not in strict conformity with Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules added by this Court to O. 19 of the CPC, it cannot be said that the defect is vital and the prayer for inspection was rightly refused.

    44. In the end, the learned counsel for the respondents cited State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog, AIR 1952 SC 317, and invited our attention to the following passage in the judgment:

    “We wish, however, to observe that the verification of the affidavits produced here is defective. The body of the affidavit discloses that certain matters were known to the Secretary who made the affidavit personally. The verification however states that everything was true to the best of his information and belief. We point this out as slipshod verification of this type might well in a given case lead to a rejection of the affidavit. Verification should nvarlably be modelled on the lines of Order 19, Rule 3 of the CPC, whether the Code apples in terms or not. And when the matter deposed to is not based on personal knowledge the sources of information should be clearly disclosed.”

    45. This decision is distinguishable firstly on the ground that in the present case we have held that the affidavit is in conformity with form 25 and consequently not defective and secondly because the decision is no authority for the proposition that even though an affidavit is admitted, without objection, in the trial Court, not as a piece of evidence in the case but only in connection with an application made for the inspection of the records, it should be rejected on the objection made in the appellate Court long after it had been admitted. This case, therefore, does not advance the case of the contesting respondent.

    46. For the reasons mentioned above, we see no force in the submission of the learned counsel that inspection of the ballot-papers should be refused on the ground that the affidavit was not properly verified and that the Tribunal was justified in refusing to permit inspection of the ballot papers.

    47. In this connection, we would like to point out that the learned counsel for the appellant had, before the Tribunal, produced a certified copy of the return from which it clearly appeared that there was a mistake in totalling. With regard to this certified copy, the learned counsel for the respondent in his written application had not only not objected to the original return being seen but had actually stated that “the alleged mistake in the certified copy of the return can be tested with the original.” Even though both the parties agreed that it was proper to see the original return, Sri S. Malik, surprisingly enough refused to do so on the ground that the original return had not been summoned. We have found it difficult to comprehend what the learned member of the Tribunal meant by the words that the “original return had not been summoned.” The entire papers including the original return had not only been summoned by him but were also before the Tribunal. Besides, he should have appreciated that the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the application and production of the certified copy of the return clearly showed that the inspection was required not to harass the contesting respondent but in the interest of justice and with a view to prove the case of the appellant. We are constrained to say that the Tribunal erred grievously on not allowing the inspection even under these circumstances.

    48. We have again not been able to understand as to what did the learned member of the Tribunal mean by saying that he did not see the original return because nobody had applied for its inspection. Under the provisions of Section 92(a) of the Act, discovery and inspection is permitted. It was contended that this provision gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to permit inspection of the ballot-papers. The Tribunal, however, observed as follows in this connection:

    “Order 11, Rules 15 to 18 lay down under what circumstances inspection can be allowed. It is apparent that under the Code of Civil Procedure inspection could be allowed only of documents referred to in the pleadings and in the possession of any of the parties to the suit in this case, the ballot-papers are not documents in the possession of any of the parties to the petition. They obviously were in the possession of the returning officer who is not a party to the case. Therefore, the inspection prayed for cannot be allowed under Section 30 read with O. 11 of the CPC.”

    49. We have already said earlier that it is a fact which is admitted by both the parties before us that the ballot-papers and the returns were in the custody of the Tribunal, having been summoned from the returning officer in our opinion, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not bar the inspection of the papers in the custody of the Court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Tribunal rejected the application for inspection of the ballot papers and the returns without any adequate reason for doing so.

    50. Both Sarvasri Iqbal Ahmad and Har Govind Dayal, learned counsel for the parties, who appeared also before the Tribunal, stated that most of the authorities on which they were placing reliance before us were also cited before the Tribunal but the Tribunal did not notice them. All that the Tribunal did was to mention the following three cases at the fag end of the judgment saying that its attention was drawn to them:

    (1) Case No. LXXIV Punjab North (M) 1924 Ghazanfar Ali v. Choudhaiy Bahawal Bux. — Election cases India and Burma (1920-35).

    (2) Hammond's Election Cases 1920-35 at D. 307 (K.V Krishnaswami Nayakar v. A. Ramaswami Mudaliyar) at p. 671 — V.P.P Pillai v. R.B Venkatarama Ayyar at p. 137 (Bareilly city case).

    (3) (1952-53) 2 ELR 51 — R. Swaminatha Mercondsr v. S. Ramlingam.

    51. In the first place, the Tribunal did not even notice the other cases which were placed before it. Secondly it did not say as to what the three cases mentioned above laid down and whether it was following them or distinguishing them.

    52. On behalf of the appellant Bhim Sen v. Gopali, 22 ELR 288 at p. 296 (SC), was cited before us and the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court placed for our consideration:

    “Thus construed, the averment in the said paragraph also indicates that according to the plea of the appellant, respondent I could get void votes because of the failure of the returning officer to discharge his duty in the context “could receive” really meant “did receive” and not “might have received”. In this connection it must be borne in mind that particulars in regard to the allegation of this kind could be more definitely supplied only after the ballot box is opened and not till then. Rule 138 provides for the production and inspection of election papers. Until the said papers are produced and inspected as provided by the said rule it would be difficult, if not impossible, for any party to allege affirmatively how many void votes had been counted in favour of the candidate declared to be duly elected. Considerations which apply to the allegations of misconduct specified in Section 83(1)(b) would, not be relevant in the case of the present allegations; and so, reading the original petition itself, we are satisfied that the material allegations had been made with sufficient clarity by the appellant.”

    53. Rule 138 referred to by their Lordships is Rule 93 now without there being any change in the language. Their Lordships were also considering a case relating to wrong inclusion and wrong exclusion of votes. The Supreme Court clearly held that full details could be given only after the inspection of all the ballot-papers — a conclusion to which we ourselves have arrived at. The election petition was mainly founded on the allegation relating to wrong exclusion of votes from the count of the petitioner and wrong inclusion of votes in the count of the contesting respondent. That being so, we are of the opinion that it was imminently just to have allowed the inspection of the ballot papers and connected documents. We have already said earlier that the appellant even formally tendered all the ballot-papers and asked the Tribunal to took into such of them as were to be pointed out to it. The Tribunal, however, refused to do even that.

    54. in this connection we would like to reproduce the provisions of Section 100(1)(d) of the Act which read as follows:

    “100. — Grounds for declaring an election to be void. — (1) subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the Tribunal is of opinion—

    (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected—

    (iii) by the Improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or…….

    the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.”

    55. The law, therefore, is that an election petition can be presented on the ground that votes had been wrongly received or wrongly rejected, or that any vote was void in other words, when such allegations are made, the matter is justiciable and it is the duty of the Tribunal to adjudicate in respect of that matter. Allegations like these can best be proved by placing the particular ballot-papers which, according to a party, have been wrongly received or wrongly rejected or which are void. It is not possible to do so unless an Inspection is allowed. Consequently, we see no justification on the part of the Tribunal to have refused the inspection of the ballot-papers and the return.

    56. Learned counsel for the respondent placed before us a large number of cases, both English and Indian in England the relevant provision relating to inspection of ballot-papers and other election papers is Section 57 of the English Representation of the People Act, 1949. It is not necessary to reproduce that provision. Suffice it to say that the law in England is that the ballot-papers can be opened at two stages, i.e, in the pre-election petition stage and the post-election petition stage. Before the election petition is filed, they can be opened only with the permission of the House of Commons. After the petition has been filed, the same can be opened with the permission of the Election Tribunal in our country, the law does not permit inspection at pre-election petition stage and no such power has been conferred either on the Parliament or the local Legislatures.

    57. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon, Stowe v. Jolliffe, (1874) 9 C.P 446. We have carefully seen that judgment in cur opinion, it does not provide us any assistance in deciding the case before us.

    58. The next case on which reliance was placed is The Queen v. Beardsall, (1876) 1 QBD 452. This case is also not an authority for the proposition that inspection of ballot-papers should not be allowed even though one of the grounds or the sole ground in the petition is that votes had been wrongly excluded from the count of the petitioner and had wrongly been included in the count of the respondent.

    59. These are two English cases that have been cited before us.

    60. So far as Indian cases are concerned the first one relied upon is Abdul Majeed v. Bhargavan, AIR 1963 Ker 18 at p. 25. The following passage from that judgment was placed before us by the learned counsel for the respondent:

    “It remains to dispose of the third end the last contention advanced for the appellant, that the prayer in the election petition for a recount of the ballot papers ought to have been allowed by the Tribunal. Of course, the margin of difference in the votes secured by the appellant and the respondent was only 122, in the election petition the chief ground relied on for recount was that a large number of counting assistants employed by the Returning Officer were sympathisers of the Communist Party and since the candidates were allowed only one counting agent for three tables to supervise the sorting and counting of ballot papers, manipulation by interested counting assistants was not impossible.

    61. The allegation against the counting assistants has not been sustained. On the evidence of the Returning Officer, it is seen that for every two counting assistants, to a table there was a supervisor, and the Officer himself seated on a platform facing the counting assistants. The seating arrangement was according to a plan or diagram supplied with instruction by the Election Commissioner. On the same day, the same counting assistants had been engaged in the counting of ballot papers in the Kottarakara constituency where, as sworn to by P.W 6, a P.S.P candidate had contested. What was pressed before us chiafly, was that the total number of counting agents sanctioned to a candidate was inadequate. Section 47 of the Act provides, that a contesting candidate may appoint one or more persons but not exceeding such number as may be prescribed, to be present as his counting agent or agents at the counting of votes.”

    62. This case is clearly distinguishable in the first place, it does not deal with an application made for the inspection of the ballot papers with a view to substantiate the allegations contained in the petition that some votes were wrongly excluded from those polled by the appellant and some others were wrongly included in those received by the contesting respondent. It was not a case where inspection was required in order to substantiate the allegations made in the election petition and give proof in respect of the facts in issue in that case a prayer was made for the disposal of the petition on the ground that inasmuch as the number of counting agents of the petitioner were few and the counting agents belonged to a different political party, chances of the results having been manipulated could not be excluded. The Kerala High Court was considering whether in view of the material on the record it should declare the election void, and not whether it should permit inspection before the hearing. Secondly, it was not a case where it had been definitely alleged that the result had been manipulated. All that had been alleged was that the possibility of its being manipulated could not be excluded. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this case too is of no assistance to us in deciding the one before us.

    63. Learned counsel then placed before us the case of Basaviah v. Bachiah, 17 ELR 293 (Mys). This case is only an authority for the proposition that a person challenging the result of the election on the ground of wrong inclusion or wrong exclusion of votes is not entitled to have a recount of the votes as a matter of absolute right. He would be entitled to it only if he makes out a prima facie case that the votes were wrongly excluded and wrongly included in this case also, their Lordships were not concerned with an interim application made during the trial of the election petition for the inspection of the ballot papers in order to substantiate the allegations contained in the petition that votes had been wrongly excluded from those of the appellant and wrongly included in those of the respondent but were dealing with the question as to whether on the basis of the evidence on the record the petitioner was entitled to get the election declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) of the Act. We reproduce below the exact words used in the judgment:

    “The main complaint of the petitioner is that the returning officer did not allow him to appoint more than one counting agent, while under Section 47 of the Act read with Rule 54 of the Rules, he is entitled to appoint as many as 12 counting agents……. It is not the case of the petitioner that he appointed more that one counting agent and the Returning Officer refused them access to the place of counting.”

    64. While dealing with the question of recount, the learned Judges observed as follows:

    “It is next urged that the margin of difference between the petitioner and the first respondent is very narrow, being only 42 votes; and that the petitioner feels that if the votes are recounted he will be able to establish that he had obtained more votes (valid) than the first respondent. The petition does not disclose the reason why the petitioner feels that he is likely to have obtained more votes than the first respondent, nor does the evidence adduced by him disclose any prima facie case, to indicate that the petitioner is likely to have obtained more votes than the first respondent. It may be noted that neither the petitioner nor his agent raised any objection to any of the votes at the time of the counting. It is further necessary to notice that at the request of the petitioner the returning Officer re totalled the votes before he declared the result. We have not been shown any reason why there should be a recounting, which term includes scrutiny of the votes polled. It appears as if the petitioner wants to try one more chance. But it is urged on behalf of the appellant that he has a right to demand a recount, is he has claimed the seat in his petition, irrespective of the fact whether he has made out a prima facie case or not …….. ‘It is well established law that a recount will only be granted in cases which are substantiated by specific instances and by reliable prima facie evidence. Where, therefore, the application for recount rested on a nebulous allegation of the agent about the counting of batches of votes twice over, the application was refused”’ (Underlined (here in) by us).

    65. It would be noticed that in the above mentioned case there was no definite allegation with regard to wrong exclusion or wrong inclusion of votes. All that was contended was that the margin between the votes of the parties being so thin it may be that a recount may disclose that the petitioner had secured the majority of votes polled in other words, all that was contended was that since there was a difference of only 42 votes, the possibility of a wrong counting could not be excluded. Their Lordships after pointing out the circumstance that at the request of the petitioner in that case the returning officer had already recounted the votes before declaring the result of the election, there could be no justification for revealing the request specially when the petitioner was unable to show as to why he thought that there had been a wrong counting. Actually this case clearly contemplates the possibility of a recount if there is prima facie evidence justifying such a course.

    66. No case has been brought to our notice, decided by any of the Indian High Courts, or by the Supreme Court where an inspection was prayed for in order to substantiate the allegations made in the petition and was refused on the ground that no oral evidence had been led in order to show that some votes had really been wrongly excluded or Included. It is trite that in all judicial proceedings only the best evidence on a point should be given. Whether or not a vote has been wrongly excluded or wrongly included can best be proved by a look at the ballot paper itself. To require a party to first bring in parole evidence to prove what can best be demonstrated by a look at the ballot paper itself, in our opinion, is neither required by the law nor rules of practice. All inspections must precede the hearing of the case. Inspections should not normally follow the hearing.

    67. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the request made by the learned counsel for the appellant for the inspection of the ballot papers for the lawful purpose of placing before the Tribunal such of the ballot papers which in his opinion had wrongly been included in the votes of the contesting respondent and had wrongly been excluded from those of the appellant should not have been refused.

    68. We have already said above that the Tribunal neither permitted the appellant's counsel to inspect the ballot papers and connected documents nor looked into them itself even though all of them were tendered in evidence before it and were available in the Court. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow the appeal, set aside, the order passed by the Election Tribunal dismissing the election petition filed by the appellant and remand the case to the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, for retrial. The Tribunal shall give a reasonable opportunity to both the parties to inspect the ballot papers and other connected documents subject to the directions which are given below:

    (1) The inspection must be made only between the notified hours of which prior notice has been given to the parties' counsel.

    (2) The inspection must be made in the presence of the Munsarim and no other junior officer.

    (3) At the time of making the inspection neither party should be allowed to handle any ballot-papers.

    (4) At one time only one bundle of ballot papers-should be opened.

    (5) As soon as one bundle has been inspected. It should be sealed by the Munsarim, in the presence of the parties' counsel such as are present and if both the parties' counsel are not present, the Munsarim will make a note? as regards the party which is not represented. Further, the parties' counsel should also be asked to put their seals on the same bundle.

    (6) As a further precaution all the bundles or the ballot-boxes, i.e outsider-containers must be sealed evert before inspection by the Munsarim and the parties' counsel if they are present. If any parties' counsel is not present, a note to that effect should be made by the Munsarim at the time of sealing.

    (7) The inspection will be confined only to the ballot papers and form No. 16.

    69. The parties will be entitled to produce such evidence as they consider necessary in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. A substance of our decision shall be communicated to the Election Commission and the Speaker of the House of the People immediately and a copy of the order shall also be sent to the Election Commission and the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, as soon as it is ready.

    JG/V.S.B

    70. Appeal allowed.

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    Kidwai Husain Kamil v. Yadav Ram Sewak And Others
    (Jul 23, 1963)