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Case Number

Civil Misc. Writ No. 1058 of 1958

Attorney(S)

Shanti Bhushan
S. N. Kakkar

Judges

M.C Desai, C.J
V.G Oak
S.D Singh, JJ.

Acts

Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 (to be referred to as the Act of 1959),
Sec. 149 of the Limitation Act, provisions in the Land Acquisition Act, etc. and Art. 14
provision of Sec. 7(2) of the Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952,
Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 also.
Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959,
Act of 1953. Hence the Act of 1953 infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution
Secs. 80 and 89, Civil Procedure Code, provisions in the Land Revenue Act
Sec. 4(1) of the U.P Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953
Government Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953
Sec. 4(1) of the Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act
U.P Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953
Zamindari Abolition (Amendment) Act of 1954
U.P Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952,
RAJASTHAN PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT
sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 16 the Act of 1953
Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952,
Art. 149 of the Limitation Act
LAND ACQUISITION ACT

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion (Bench led by M.C. Desai, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition for certiorari (with alternative relief of mandamus) challenges orders of the Additional Collector, Bijnor, and the District Judge, Bijnor, that held the petitioners' possession over certain land in village Azamullah (about 343 bighas of a larger holding) to be unauthorised and ordered eviction and damages.

Relevant timeline and factual events in the opinion:

27 March 1950: Proprietors executed a registered 20-year lease in favour of Ravi Khanna and Harbans Singh; the petitioner and others joined them as partners.
September 1951: The entire village land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act by the State of U.P.; Colonisation Department took possession in November 1951.
End of June 1951: The land in dispute was said to be lying fallow though in possession of the petitioners.
2 February 1957: A notice under Sec. 4(1) of the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act, 1953 was issued alleging unauthorised occupation and requiring vacation within 30 days.
The petitioners replied asserting cultivatory possession, reliance on a compromise with the Colonisation Committee that released the land in their favour, and attacked the Act of 1953 as unconstitutional under Article 14; they also asserted statutory rights under the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952 and the Zamindari Abolition (Amendment) Act of 1954 and contended the land had been released from acquisition.
21 May 1957: Additional Collector dismissed the petitioners' objection, holding possession unauthorised.
7 June 1957: Additional Collector ordered eviction and passed a decree for damages.
December 1957: District Judge dismissed the appeal.
7 January 1958: The State took formal possession.
31 March 1958: Petition for certiorari filed in this Court seeking to quash the impugned orders and to restrain interference with possession or to restore possession.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 ("the Act of 1953") infringes Article 14 of the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional (this attack underlies the petition to quash the eviction orders).
Whether the impugned orders of eviction and damages passed under the Act of 1953 by the Additional Collector and affirmed by the District Judge are valid and should be quashed.
Whether the later enactment, the Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 ("the Act of 1959"), and its validating provisions (notably Sec. 17) affect the validity of the earlier orders or the mode of adjudication of the petition.
Whether the earlier decision of this Court in Bir Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1960 A.L.J. 52) requires reconsideration in view of subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements (e.g., Manna Lal and Nav Rattanmal).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner(s)' Arguments

They contended they were in cultivatory possession and that a compromise with the Colonisation Committee released the land in their favour, so their possession was not unauthorised.
They attacked the Act of 1953 as unconstitutional for contravening the guarantee of equal protection / equality before the law under Article 14 of the Constitution.
They asserted statutory/adhivasi rights under the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952, which allegedly matured into sirdari rights under the Zamindari Abolition (Amendment) Act of 1954.
They contended the land had been released from acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act.

Opposite Parties / State and Other Respondents' Arguments

They denied that any land had been released from acquisition in favour of the petitioners and others.
They contended that actual possession by the State was taken on 7 January 1958.
They pointed to the purpose of the Act of 1953: to provide a speedier process for eviction of persons occupying Government land without authority; they relied on Sec. 4(1)(b) and sub‑sec. (2) and on the analogy and provisions of the Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952.
Learned counsel for the petitioners (Sri Shanti Bhushan) later argued the impugned orders should be judged in the light of the Act of 1959 because the formalities required by the 1959 Act were not carried out; the Court rejected that contention on the ground that the challenge was to the constitutionality of the Act of 1953 and that the Act of 1959, by Sec. 17, validates prior actions taken under the Act of 1953.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bir Pratap Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1960 A.L.J. 52)	Held that the Act of 1953 infringed Article 14 because it treated trespassers on Government land differently from other trespassers and the preamble did not limit the Act to cases of planned public use.	The Court reconsidered and concluded that Bir Pratap Singh did not lay down the correct law and should be overruled; the bench held the Act of 1953 constitutional.
Manna Lal v. Collector of Jhalawar (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 820)	Held that the Government can legitimately be placed in a separate class; dues of the Government are dues of the people of the State and special facility for recovery does not offend Article 14.	The Court relied on this principle to cast doubt on Bir Pratap Singh and to support the proposition that Government land and Government claims may be constitutionally treated differently from private claims.
Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1704)	Upheld Art. 149 Limitation provision giving Government longer limitation period; rationale includes that loss from limitation falls on the public and governmental machinery moves slower—ground to differentiate Government claims.	The Court cited this decision to support the reasoning that distinctions favouring Government procedures can be rationally justified and do not necessarily offend Article 14.
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75)	Authority relied upon in Bir Pratap Singh to support the view that classification there offended Article 14.	Cited as the precedent relied on by Bir Pratap Singh; the present Court reviewed that reliance in the course of overturning Bir Pratap Singh.
Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co. (60 L.E. 679)	When a legislative classification can be reasonably sustained by any conceivable state of facts, that state must be assumed; supports presumption of constitutionality.	Quoted to support the principle that reasonable hypotheses sustaining classification must be assumed and so the Act of 1953 could be upheld on such a hypothesis.
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company v. Brownell (79 L.E. 1070)	Burden of establishing unconstitutionality lies on the assailant; courts should not declare legislative discrimination invalid unless classification lacks a rational basis.	Cited to reinforce the presumption of constitutionality and to justify upholding the classification in the Act of 1953.
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin (79 L.E. 281)	Supports the principle that courts should not strike down legislative classification unless it clearly lacks rational basis.	Cited in support of the Court's analysis favouring upholding the statute.
Morey v. Doud (1 L.E. 2d. 1485)	If classification can be sustained by reasonably assumed facts, courts must assume those facts.	Cited to reinforce the rule that assumed facts supportive of classification justify upholding legislation.
Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg (59 L.E. 364)	Observed that hardship or inequality in application is not enough to invalidate a law; legislature has wide choice in determining scope of laws.	Quoted to support the proposition that incidental hardships do not render a statute unconstitutional.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A.L. Grosjean (81 L.E. 1193)	Legislature is not required to make meticulous adjustments; classification need only reasonably relate to differences.	Cited to justify that the Act's classification between public and private land occupancy need not be finely tailored to every case.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Spencer Melton (54 L.E. 921)	Art. 14 restrains abuse of authority, not the normal exercise of governmental power.	Used to argue that established state practices and reasonable legislative differentiations should not be unduly hampered by Article 14.
Citizens' Telephone Company v. Oramel B. Fuller (57 L.E. 1206)	State not bound by rigid equality; limitation is to prevent hostile discrimination.	Cited in support of the view that the Act of 1953 did not evidence hostile discrimination against any class.
Interstate Consolidated Street Railway Company v. Commonwealth of Massachusetta (52 L.E. 111)	Referenced regarding accepted practices of states in differentiating Government claims and procedures.	Cited to buttress the argument that Article 14 should not overly restrict established state practices for recovery or eviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in several connected steps, based strictly on the text of the opinion:

Background to reconsideration: The bench (on the urging of Broome, J.) considered whether this Court's earlier decision in Bir Pratap Singh required reconsideration in light of Supreme Court pronouncements in Manna Lal and Nav Rattanmal.
Summary of Bir Pratap Singh: That decision had held the Act of 1953 unconstitutional under Article 14 because it created a class of trespassers on Government land who were treated less favourably, and because the preamble and the Act lacked limitations tying its application to land needed for planned public use or public interest.
Relevance of subsequent Supreme Court decisions: The Court noted Manna Lal (Government can be a separate class in recovery of public dues) and Nav Rattanmal (Government claims may be differentiated because loss falls on public and governmental machinery moves slower) and found that these authorities cast doubt on Bir Pratap Singh's strict view of classification.
Analytical comparison between money and land: The Court acknowledged differences between money and land (land varies in utility), but rejected the proposition that this distinction prevents applying the principle of Manna Lal to the present case. The Court reasoned that Government land belongs to the public and that unlawful occupation causes a public loss analogous to loss of public funds.
Public interest and delay: The Court emphasised the practical delays in ordinary civil procedure for eviction (suits, multiple appeals, delays measured in years) and observed that the public, rather than a single individual, suffers when Government land cannot be quickly reclaimed for use. This practical consideration supports legislative distinction and a speedier regime for eviction from public land.
On the significance of the preamble: The Court rejected Bir Pratap Singh's stress on the absence in the preamble of a reference to planned use or public interest, holding that a valid legislative classification need not have its factual basis spelled out in the preamble if a reasonable hypothesis can be conceived to sustain it.
Presumption of constitutionality and foreign authorities: Applying well-known principles (as illustrated by cited decisions such as Rast v. Van Deman and others), the Court held that legislative classification should be upheld if any reasonable state of facts can be imagined to justify it, and that the burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on the challenger.
Conclusion of analysis on Act of 1953: The Court found no hostile discrimination or abuse of power in the Act of 1953, concluded the Act could be rationally justified (including on grounds of public loss and need for speed), and thus held that Bir Pratap Singh's conclusion that the Act violated Article 14 was incorrect.
Interaction with Act of 1959: The bench rejected the argument that the impugned orders should be judged under the formalities of the Act of 1959 merely because the 1959 Act provided different procedures, noting that the petition specifically attacked the Act of 1953 and that Sec. 17(1)(a) of the Act of 1959 deems actions taken under the Act of 1953 to have been taken under the Act of 1959; consequently the later Act was not intended to invalidate valid prior orders.
Scope of the Court's final view: While the majority held the Act of 1953 constitutional and that Bir Pratap Singh should not be accepted as correct law, one explicit remark in the opinion clarifies that the Court did not express an opinion on whether the impugned orders were valid under the Act of 1959 (the text explicitly states that no opinion is expressed on that specific point).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court held that the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 was constitutional and that the decision in Bir Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh should be overruled.

Immediate implications (as stated in the opinion):

The opinion indicates that the case may be sent back to the bench concerned with the instruction or answer that the Act of 1953 is constitutional and that Bir Pratap Singh does not lay down the correct law.
The opinion states that the impugned orders are valid also according to the Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959, the constitutionality of which was not in question; however, at least one remark in the opinion expressly disclaims forming any view on whether the impugned orders are valid under the Act of 1959.

Note: The Court's core ruling overturns the earlier local precedent (Bir Pratap Singh) by upholding the constitutional validity of the Act of 1953. The opinion includes directions to proceed on that basis, but it also contains an explicit statement that the Court did not express an opinion on the specific validity of the impugned orders under the Act of 1959.

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Sucha Singh v. Administrative Officer, Afzalgarh Colonization Scheme And Others Opposite Parties.

M.C Desai, C.J:— This petition has been laid before this bench at the instance of our brother Broome who was of the view that the decision of this Court in Bir Pratap Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1960 A.L.J 52. required reconsideration in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Manna Lal v. Collector of Jhalawar A.I.R 1961 S.C 820. and Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R 1961 S.C 1704..

2. The petition is for certiorari to quash certain orders of the Additional Collector, Bijnor, and the District Judge, Bijnor, and mandamus requiring them and others to refrain from interfering with the possession of the petitioner and his partners over certain land in village Azamullah Nagar, or, in the alternative, to restore possession over it to them. It arises in the following circumstances. The land in dispute in the petition, measuring about 343 bighas, is a portion of land measuring about 800 acres in village Azimullah Nagar of Bijnor district in respect of which the proprietors of the village had executed a registered lease for 20 years on 27-3-1950 in favour of two persons, Ravi Khanna and Harbans Singh. The lessees took the petitioner and the proforma opposite parties, Randhir Singh etc. as their partners. In September 1951 the entire land of the village was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act by the State of U.P for settling thereon demobilised personnel and possession over it was taken by the Colonisation Department of the State in November 1951. The land in dispute is said to have been lying fallow in the end of June 1951, though in possession of the petitioner and the proforma opposite parties. On 2-2-1957 a notice under Sec. 4(1) of the U.P Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 was issued on behalf of the State alleging that possession of the petitioner (and the proforma opposite parties) over the land in dispute was unauthorised and calling upon them to vacate it within a month. The petitioner etc. replied to the notice contending that they were in cultivatory possession, that after the notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act had been issued a compromise was reached between the Colonisation Committee and the petitioner and others, that by virtue of it the land in dispute was released in their favour and that consequently their possession was not unauthorised. The Additional Collector dismissed their objection on 21-5-1957, holding that their possession was unauthorised and on 7-6-1957 ordered their eviction and passed a decree for damages against them. The petitioner and others appealed to the District Judge, who dismissed the appeal in December 1957. The State took formal possession on 7-1-1958. On 31-3-1958 the petitioner presented the petition. The orders of the Additional Collector and the District Judge referred to above are the orders sought to be quashed. The petitioner denied that he has lost actual possession, but in view of the formal delivery of possession taken by the State on 7-1-1958 claimed in the alternative the relief of possession. He attacked the Government Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 (to be referred to as ‘the Act of 1953’) as unconstitutional on account of its infringing his right to equal protection of the law and equality before the law guaranteed by Alt. 14 of the Constitution, claimed adhivasi rights under the U.P Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952, which matured into sirdari rights under the Zamindari Abolition (Amendment) Act of 1954 and contended that the land in dispute had been released from acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. The petition was opposed on behalf of the opposite parties, barring the proforma opposite parties. They denied that any land was released from acquisition proceedings in favour of the petitioner and others and contended that actual Possession was taken on 7-1-1958. The Act of 1953 was enacted to provide for speedier process for eviction from Government land of persons occupying it without authority. By Sec. 4(1)(b) the competent authority was authorised to require a person in unauthorised occupation of any Government land by a notice to vacate it within 30 days. If the person failed to comply with the requisition, the competent authority was authorised by sub-Sec. (2) to order his eviction in accordance with the provision of Sec. 7(2) of the Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952, (to be referred to as ‘the Act of 1952’) to evict him. This Act of 1952 was enacted to provide for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of Govt. buildings. By sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 7 of it the competent authority is authorised to require a person in unauthorised occupation of Government buildings to vacate within 30 days, and, on his failure, to order his eviction from them.

3. The Act of 1953 was declared unconstitutional by Gurtu and Roy, JJ. in the case of Bir Pratap Singh referred to above. The gist of the decision is as follows:—

There is a material difference between procedure for eviction of an ordinary trespasser through a suit in a regular civil court and that for eviction of a trespasser on Government land under the Act of 1953 and this difference is to the prejudice of the trespasser. The reason given by the legislature for making the distinction is the necessity for a speedier process for eviction of trespassers on Government land. Though it was stated in the prefatory note of the Bill that the existing procedure for eviction of trespassers involves delay to the detriment of public interest and continued occupation of trespassers of Government land interferes with its planned use, the preamble of the Act contains no reference to interference with planned use of Government land or the public interest and the Act contains no provision to suggest that it was meant to be applied only to land, possession over which was immediately required for planned use or in public interest. Consequently the procedure prescribed in the Act is to be applied to all land, including land immediate possession over which is not required for planned use or in public interest. The classification of trespassers into those on Government land and others, is, therefore, hit by Art. 14, as held in State Of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, A.I.R 1952, S.C 75.. The necessity of speedier eviction from Government land does not justify the division of trespassers into two classes made by the Act of 1953. Hence the Act of 1953 infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is ultra vires the Constitution.

4. In view of the above decision the legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 (to be referred to as the Act of 1959), which came into force on 5-9-1959. It is called an Act “to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public land and for certain ??? incidental matters,” and its preamble is to the effect that delay in recovery of possession of public land capable of being used for agricultural purposes and immediately required for planned use, rehabilitation of displaced persons, distribution amongst landless agricultural labourers, co-operative farming and other public purposes with a view to ensure greater food production and more equitable distribution of the land is detrimental to the achievement of the aforementioned public purposes. Sec. 3 of it provides that when the public authority is of the opinion that public land is in unauthorized occupation of any person and is required for one or more public purposes of the Act, it may, by notice in writing, require him to show cause why an order of his eviction may not be passed. By sub-Sec. (2) the notice is required to specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. Sec. 4 provides that if the person fails to show cause the public authority may order him to vacate the public land. If he fails to comply with it force may be used by the public authority to compel him to vacate. Sec. 5 gives him a right of appeal and Sec. 6, other incidental rights. If while showing cause, he alleges that the land is not public land the question is required by Sec. 7 to be referred to the Civil Judge having jurisdiction. By sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 16 the Act of 1953 is repealed. Sec. 17, which is important, lays down that notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 1953 “(a) all actions taken, orders passed, proceedings initiated in all cases….whether disposed of or pending, shall be deemed to be actions taken….under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act (b) all proceedings and appeals under the aforesaid Act….shall be continued, heard and decided, as the case may be, as proceedings under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act; as if this Act had been in force on all material dates.”

5. A doubt on the correctness of the decision in Bir Pratap Singh's case case has been cast by observations made by the Supreme Court in Manna Lal's case. In that case a notice was issued against Manna Lal under the Rajasthan. Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952, to recover from him a public demand due on account of loan taken by him from the Jhalawar State Bank. The bank was started in 1932 in Jhalawar, which was a ruling State when the present State of Rajasthan was formed. The assets of the Jhalawar State Bank vested in the State of Rajasthan and the money to be recovered from. Manna Lal became money recoverable as a public demand within the meaning of the Rajasthan Public. Demands Recovery Act. The procedure prescribed in the Act for the recovery of public demands was simpler than the procedure to be followed by a court in a suit for recovery of money. It was contended on behalf of Manna Lal that the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act was hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, because it made a distinction between money due to the State Bank and money due to other banks and persons. This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court, which, speaking through Sarkar, observed at page 831:

“the Government, even as a banker, can be legitimately put in a separate class. The dues of the Government of a State are the dues of the entire people of the State. This being the position, a law giving special facility for the recovery of such dues cannot, in any event, be said to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution.”

6. I think the same principle applies in the present case. The petitioner tried to distinguish between Manna Lal's case and the present case on the ground that Manna Lal's case case was concerned with money and there is no distinction between money and money, while the instant case is concerned with land and all lands are not of the same utility and importance. It is true that when a State receives monies from various sources, such as taxes, revenue, business carried on by it as a banker etc. they get mixed up and lose their identities and the same cannot be said about lands owned by Government, because they differ in their utility and importance. But this difference between money and land does not mean that the principle applied in Manna Lal's case cannot be applied in the instant case. The essential question before us is whether the distinction between Government carrying on banking business and private persons carrying on banking business is so different from the distinction between, persons trespassing upon Government land and persons trespassing upon private land that if the former distinction is said to be not offending against Art. 14, the latter distinction may be held to be offending against Art. 14. The ultimate value of land lies in money that it produces. If a person trespasses upon Government land, Government lose money which they would have realised otherwise from its use. Just as Government can be constitutionally differentiated from other people in respect of claim to money, so also Government can be differentiated from other people in respect of claim to recover possession over land illegally occupied. Land belonging to Government is land belonging to the entire public of the State and a law made in the interest of the entire public of the State cannot be said to be discriminatory. It cannot be discriminatory unless there is somebody against whom it is discriminated, and when it is made in the interest of all people of the State there is left nobody against whom it can be said to be discriminatory.

7. In the other case of Nav Rattanmal the constitutionality of Art. 149 of the Limitation Act prescribing a much larger period of limitation for suits to be brought by Government was attacked as offending against Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the section was not unconstitutional. Ayyangar, J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed:

“in the case of the Government if a claim becomes barred by limitation, the loss falls on the public, i.e, on the community in general and to the benefit of the private individual who derives advantage by the lapse of time. “This itself would appear to indicate a sufficient ground for differentiating between the claims of an individual and the claims of the community at large. Next, it may be mentioned that in the case of governmental machinery, it is a known fact that it does not move as quickly as in the case of individuals.” (p. 1707)

8. Same arguments can be advanced in the instant case. The ordinary procedure for evicting a trespasser is highly dilatory and it is a notorious fact that litigation remains pending for years and that a person does not really succeed in evicting a trespasser from his land until the matter has passed through several courts, each taking years to decide the dispute. With suits giving ??? first appeals, second appeals and revisions and then petitions for writs with special appeals and orders staying execution of decrees, a person would be fortunate if he succeeds in getting possession back from a trespasser in less than ten years. It would be the public that will suffer and it would be a private individual—the trespasser—who will gain. In the case of a trespasser on private land, it is only one individual who suffers on account of the delay. A distinction made by the legislature between loss caused to an individual and loss caused to the whole public by enacting a special procedure to be followed by Government in evicting trespassers upon Government or public land is a rational one.

9. In the case of Bir Pratap Singh the learned Judges stressed the fact that the preamble contained no reference to interference with planned use of Government land or public interest; but this was not essential at all. The legislature when making a rational distinction between one class and another is not required to state the basis for the distinction in the preamble, for it is well settled that a law will be held to be constitutional if on reasonable hypothesis it can be thought to be constitutional. Every presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of an Act and the onus lies upon one who assails it to show that it is unconstitutional. Mckenna, J. in Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co. 60 L.E 679 at p. 687. observed:

“It is established that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.”

10. Stone, J. observed in Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company v. Brownell 79 L.E 1070., that the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it and that courts may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid unless, viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed; it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. To the same effect are the observations of C.J Hughes in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin 79 L.E 281, 288.. Among the latest decisions of the Supreme Court of U.S.A on this point is Morey v. Doud 1 L.E 2d., 1485, 1490., where it was laid down that when the classification can be sustained by a state of facts to be reasonably assumed the state of facts must be assumed. Here the case was stronger for upholding the constitutionality of the statute because the facts stated in the prefatory note of the bill themselves made out a rational distinction between trespassers upon public land and trespassers upon private land; the basis for the distinction was not even left to be imagined. With great respect to the learned Judges cannot subscribe to the views that Government have not the same necessity for being immediately restored to possession over land of every description illegally occupied and that the legislature ought to have distinguished between land over which immediate restoration of possession was necessary and remaining land and should have applied the provisions of the statute only to land of the former class.

“That a law may work hardship and inequality is not enough. Many valid laws, from the generality of their application, necessarily do that, and the legislature must be allowed a wide field of choice in determining the subject-matter of its laws, what shall come within them, and what shall be excluded”;

11. Per Day, J. in Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg 59 L.E 364, 369..

12. As pointed out in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A.L Grosjean 81 L.E 1193. a legislature is not required to make meticulous adjustments in an effect to avoid incidental hardships, it being enough that the classification has reasonable relation to the differences. The reason is that Art. 14 restrains not the normal exercise of governmental power but only abuse in the exertion of their authority see Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Spencer Melton 54 L.E 921 at p. 938.. A state is not bound by any rigid equality and the only limitation on its power is that it must not be exercised in clear and hostile discriminations between particular persons and classes see Citizens' Telephone Company v. Oramel B. Fuller 57 L.E 1206.. I am unable to find any such abuse of power and hostile discrimination in the Act of 1953. Acquiring possession over any land amounts to acquiring money and it was conceded that in respect of acquisition of money a State Government can be discriminated from an individual. Since acquiring any land means acquiring money, there can hardly be any question of distinguishing between land and land; even if Government do not need a certain piece of land urgently for planned use, they always need it urgently for acquiring money. As there is always justification for speed in Government's acquiring money due to them, there is always justification for speed in their acquiring possession over their land illegally occupied. It has been customary to distinguish between Government and an individual, vide Secs. 80 and 89, Civil Procedure Code, provisions in the Land Revenue Act and other Acts regarding recovery of Government dues, Sec. 149 of the Limitation Act, provisions in the Land Acquisition Act, etc. and Art. 14 is not to be a greater hamper upon the established practices of the States; see Interstate Consolidated Street Railway Company v. Commonwealth of Massachusetta 52 L.E 111.. I am of opinion that the law laid down in Bir Pratap Singh's case should not be accepted as correct law.

13. Sri Shanti Bhushan contended that in this case we are no longer concerned with the constitutionality of the Act of 1953 and that the validity of the impugned orders is to be judged in the light of the provisions of the Act of 1959. This contention exposes a lurking fear in the mind of Sri Shanti Bhushan that the Act of 1953 might not be unconstitutional. He now wants the validity of the orders to be judged in the light of the Act of 1959, because the formalities prescribed by it have not been carried out in the instant case, for the simple reason that it came into force much later after the orders were passed. Not only were the orders passed but even possession was taken by Government before the Act was enacted in 1959. Even this petition was filed before the Act was enacted. The contention of the learned counsel must be rejected. The orders are impugned on the ground that the Act of 1953 was unconstitutional and not on the ground that they are not valid according to the provisions of the Act of 1959. The orders an in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1953 and, if that Act is held to be constitutional, the attack on the orders must fail, even though they may not be in accordance with the Act of 1959. If they are valid according to the Act of 1953 it is not necessary at all to go into the question whether they are valid according to the Act of 1959, because the later Act was enacted with the sole object of validating invalid orders passed under the earlier Act. Certainly it was not the object of the later Act to invalidate valid orders passed before its enactment. There is nothing in the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act of 1959 to prevent the validity of the impugned orders being judged on the basis of the provisions of the Act of 1953. Since all proceedings were complete before the Act of 1959 was enacted, the case would be governed, if at all, by clause (a) of Sec. 17 of the Act of 1959 and the only effect would be that all orders passed and all actions taken shall be deemed to be orders passed and action taken under, and in accordance, with, its provisions. The constitutionality of the Act of 1959 has not been challenged before us and once orders passed and actions taken in the instant case are deemed to be orders passed and actions taken in accordance with the provisions of it, there is nothing left on the basis of which they can be attacked.

14. Whether the formalities prescribed by it were gone through or not, they are deemed to have been gone through. In view of the provisions in Cl. (a) of Sec. 17 there cannot arise any question of non-compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1959. Cl. (b) of Sec. 17 is not applicable, because what was pending when the Act of 1959 came into force was only this petition, which is not a proceeding or appeal under the Act of 1953.

15. The case may be sent back to the bench concerned with the answer that the U.P Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 was constitutional, that Bir Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh does not lay down the correct law and that the impugned orders are valid also according to the Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959, the constitutionality of which is not in question.

S.D Singh, J.:— I agree.

V.G Oak, J.:— I agree that the U.P Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent) Act of 1953 was constitutional, and that Bir Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh should be overruled.

16. I express no opinion as to whether the impugned orders are valid under the Uttar Pradesh Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 also.

Sucha Singh v. Administrative Officer, Afzalgarh Colonization Scheme And Others Opposite Parties.

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion (Bench led by M.C. Desai, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner(s)' Arguments

Opposite Parties / State and Other Respondents' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sucha Singh v. Administrative Officer, Afzalgarh Colonization Scheme And Others Opposite Parties.

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