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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of Section 5 read with Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance (thereafter Act of 1946)
  • Rule 80-B, or sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules
  • Section 2 of the Amendment Act 52 of 1950 of the Essential Supplies Act
  • Section 2(d) of the Essential Supplies Act.17. Clause (6) referred
  • Section 17 read with Section 3 of the Central Act XXIV of 1946
  • Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act
  • SECTION 24 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946.
  • Section 24 of the Central General Clauses Act
  • Section 2(d) of the Essential Supplies Act.18.
  • Section 4 of the Amendment Act 52 of 1950
  • Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act
  • Amendment Act, No. 52 of 1950,
  • ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT
  • Amendment Act of 1952
  • sub-section (1) of S. 3
  • Amending Act of 1950
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 5 read with Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance (thereafter Act of 1946)
  • Rule 80-B, or sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules
  • Section 2 of the Amendment Act 52 of 1950 of the Essential Supplies Act
  • Section 2(d) of the Essential Supplies Act.17. Clause (6) referred
  • Section 17 read with Section 3 of the Central Act XXIV of 1946
  • Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act
  • SECTION 24 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946.
  • Section 24 of the Central General Clauses Act
  • Section 2(d) of the Essential Supplies Act.18.
  • Section 4 of the Amendment Act 52 of 1950
  • Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act
  • Amendment Act, No. 52 of 1950,
  • ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT
  • Amendment Act of 1952
  • sub-section (1) of S. 3
  • Amending Act of 1950
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from a suit for recovery of Rs. 617/8/-. On 26 February 1957 the defendant firm entered into a forward contract to supply 250 bags of oil cakes at Rs. 8/5 per maund, with delivery due on 13 May 1957. No delivery was made; the plaintiff sued for damages, alleging he had to purchase oil cakes at Rs. 9/9 per maund and thereby suffered a loss. The defendant's principal defence was that the contract was wagering in nature and unenforceable because forward transactions in vegetable oils and oil cakes were prohibited by the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944.

The learned Judge, Small Causes, Aligarh, accepted the defendant's contention and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff obtained revision before the District Judge, Aligarh, who reversed that decision and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The present civil revision (filed by the defendant) challenges the District Judge's decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 continued in force by virtue of Section 5 read with Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance (and thereafter the Act of 1946), or by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act.
  2. Whether the amendment (Act No. 52 of 1950) that included oil cakes/cattle fodder within the definition of essential commodities had retrospective effect so as to continue or revive the prohibition on forward contracts in oil cakes (including whether the Oilcakes (Removal of Control) Order, 1952 maintained or revived the 1944 Prohibition Order).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendant's) Arguments — as advanced by Dr. Gyan Prakash

  • The 1944 Prohibition Order was kept alive and continued in force by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance and subsequently by the Act (Act XXIV of 1946) under Section 5, even though oil cakes were not expressly included in the initial definition of essential commodities.
  • By Amendment Act No. 52 of 1950 oil cakes (as cattle fodder) were included in the definition of essential commodities; the Oil-cakes (Removal of Control) Order of 1952 maintained the ban on forward contracts by paragraph 6 which declares the 1944 Order would continue in force.
  • Section 24 of the General Clauses Act supports continuance where there is nothing inconsistent in the later Act; therefore the 1944 Order should be held to have continued.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — as advanced by Sri V.K. Berman

  • The Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 lapsed by efflux of time on 30 September 1946 and was not kept alive by the Ordinance or the subsequent Act because oil cakes were not included in the definition of essential commodities under those instruments.
  • Although Act XXIV of 1946 was amended in 1950 to include cattle fodder, no notified order under Section 3 was issued by the Central Government with respect to oil cakes; hence there was no continuance or revival of the 1944 Prohibition Order.
  • Consequently the forward contract entered into in 1957 was valid and enforceable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Madhya Pradesh v. A.K. Jain, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 162 Interpreting the operation of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act when an earlier Act is repealed and a new Act is enacted without an express saving—Section 24 must be read with the new Act to determine whether old rules/regulations were kept alive. The Court distinguished this authority: it held that the reasoning in A.K. Jain concerned repeal and re-enactment, not an instrument that lapsed by efflux of time. Consequently Section 24 could not be applied to revive an order that had expired naturally on a temporary Act's termination.
State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand, AIR 1952 SC 335 Observation that had the Central Government re-promulgated the 1944 Order after the Ordinance or Act of 1946, the re-promulgated Order would have been valid. The Court relied on this observation to show that revival by explicit re-promulgation/notification was necessary; absent such re-promulgation the 1944 Order did not continue in force.
Ahamed Koya v. E. Murugesa Mudaliar Son & Co., AIR 1958 Kerala 195 Held that the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 was not continued in force by S.5 of Central Ordinance No. XVIII of 1946 so far as oilcakes were concerned, nor was it kept alive by provisions of the subsequent Act; the amending Act of 1950 had no retrospective effect. The Court regarded the Kerala decision as persuasive and consistent: it adopted the view that the 1944 Order was not kept alive for oilcakes by the Ordinance/Act and that the 1950 amendment did not operate retrospectively to revive the 1944 Prohibition Order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by statutory construction and application of the relevant instruments mentioned in the record:

  1. Examination of the statutory scheme: The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1946 (No. XVIII of 1946) — which came into force on 1 October 1946 — defined "essential commodity" (Section 2(a)), conferred powers in Section 3 to control production, supply and distribution of essential commodities, and contained Section 5 saving certain Defence of India Rules orders “in respect of any matter specified in Section 3” to continue until other provisions were made.
  2. The court interpreted Section 5 narrowly: the saving applied only to orders concerning matters "specified in Section 3", i.e., commodities that fell within the Ordinance's definition of essential commodities. Because oil cakes were not included in that definition under the Ordinance (nor initially in the Act), the 1944 Prohibition Order could not be said to have been kept alive by Section 5 read with Section 3.
  3. The court noted the purpose and preamble of the Ordinance (control of foodstuffs and specified articles) and concluded that the intention was not to revive or continue the 1944 Order in respect of commodities that fell outside the Ordinance's definition.
  4. As the Ordinance was replaced by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (Act XXIV of 1946) without changing the relevant saving and definitions materially, the same conclusion applied under the Act: the 1944 Order was not preserved for oil cakes.
  5. On the contention invoking Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, the court reasoned that Section 24 deals with consequences of repeal and re-enactment or with express or implied savings; it could not be used to revive an instrument that had lapsed by efflux of time (i.e., a temporary order that expired naturally). The court observed that counsel had not cited authority supporting the application of Section 24 to a case of natural expiration, and it distinguished the State of Madhya Pradesh v. A.K. Jain decision (which concerned repeal and substitution).
  6. Regarding the 1950 amendment (Act No. 52 of 1950) that included cattle fodder (including oil cakes) within the definition of essential commodities: the amendment came into force on 16 August 1950 and was not given retrospective effect. The court stated that the Central Government could then exercise its Section 3 powers by issuing a notified order, but no such notified order banning forward contracts was issued prior to 26 February 1957.
  7. The Oilcakes (Removal of Control) Order, 1952 (published 20 October 1952) contained paragraph 6 stating “Notwithstanding anything hereinto fore contained the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 shall continue to be in force.” The court held this language could not revive an order that had already expired and did not constitute a "notified order" under Section 2(d) — a notified order must be issued in exercise of the Section 3 powers and published as defined. Paragraph 6 could not be read as having the effect of re-promulgating or notifying the 1944 Order so as to make it effective again.
  8. The court relied on the Supreme Court's observation in State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand that re-promulgation by the Central Government would have made the 1944 Order valid after the Ordinance/Act; in the present case no such re-promulgation occurred.
  9. The court found the view expressed by the Kerala High Court in Ahamed Koya to be consistent with its reasoning and therefore concluded that the 1944 Prohibition Order did not continue or revive for oil cakes.
  10. On these statutory and precedential bases the court concluded the forward contract dated 26 February 1957 was valid and enforceable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision filed by the defendant is DISMISSED. The District Judge's decree in favour of the plaintiff (decreeing the recovery based on the valid forward contract) is upheld. The contract entered into on 26 February 1957 was held valid because there was no notified order in force prohibiting forward contracts in oil cakes at that time.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's decree stands and the defendant's revision fails; the defendant remains liable in accordance with the decree. The revision was dismissed with costs and the record was ordered returned to the court below.
  • Broader legal effect: The court did not treat the decision as creating a novel rule beyond applying established principles of statutory construction (i.e., the limits of savings provisions, the meaning of "notified order", the distinction between repeal and lapse by efflux of time, and the need for explicit re-promulgation/notification to revive a lapsed order). The opinion therefore resolves the dispute on the statutory text and precedent rather than announcing a new, general legal doctrine beyond the presented issues.

Other procedural dispositions in the opinion: The revision is dismissed with costs and the record to be returned to the court below.

    Hot Chand Shamdas v. Lala Sri Ram

    1. This Civil Revision filed by the defendant arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 617/8/-.

    2. On 26th February, 1957 the defendant firm entered into a contract of forward transaction for supply of 250 bags of oil cakes at the rate of Rs. 8/5/- per maund. The delivery was to take place on 13th May, 1957. No delivery of the goods was given and the plaintiff brought the suit for recovery of damages stating that he had to purchase oil cakes at Rs. 9/9/- per maund. A loss was said to have been suffered by the plaintiff. The main defence to the case was that the contract was of a wagering nature and that forward transactions in vegetable oil and oil cakes having been banned by the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944, dated 8th January, 1944 the plaintiff could neither enforce the contract, nor could he claim any damages in respect of it.

    3. The learned Judge Small Causes, Aligarh, upheld the defendant's contention and dismissed the suit. A revision was filed by the plaintiff before the learned District Judge, Aligarh, who decreed the suit. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed.

    4. The main contention of Dr. Gyan Prakash, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Vegetable Oil and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944, prohibiting forward contracts relating to the said two commodities was kept alive and continued into force by the passing of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance and thereafter an Act (Act XXIV of 1946). He has contended that even though oilcakes were not incorporated in the definition of essential commodities given in the Ordinance or the Act of 1946 yet it was a matter which continued in force by virtue of the provisions of S. 5 though oil cakes were not essential commodities. His further contention is that by the Amendment Act No. 52 of 1950 oil cakes were included in the definition of essential commodities and by an order of 1952 relating to the Oil Cakes Removal of Control Order the bad on forward contracts was maintained by para 6 of that Control Order. It is also submitted by him that under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, there being nothing inconsistent in Act XXTV of 1046 and the Vegetable Oil and Oil Cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order and the same not having been superseded it continued in force.

    5. The contention of Sri V.K Berman, learned counsel for the other side, is that the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibit; Order lapsed by efflux of time on 30th September, 1946. With effect from 1st October, 1946, an Ordinance No. 18 of 1946 was promulgated which was replaced by Act XXIV of 1946, that is, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. Under the latter Act Oil cakes was not an essential commodity and as the existing Orders were made to continue only in respect of the matters specified in S. 3 the prohibition of toward contract no more continued. It is also his contention that though an amendent was made by Act 52 of 1950 in Act XXIV of 1946 by adding cattle fodder in essential commodities yet no order having been made in exercise of the powers under S. 3 by the Central Government there was no question either of the continuance of the prohibition under the Order of 1944 nor any question of revival of the old Order nor any question of issuing any fresh order. The contract entered into was thus valid and enforceable in law.

    6. Before going into the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties it seems necessary to note the various enactments referred to by them in their arguments. There is no dispute that the Vegetable Oil and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944, was issued by the Central Government and that it expired on 30th September, 1946. There is also no dispute that the present transaction was entered into was a forward contract and if the aforesaid Order of 1944 continued it would have been invalid under Cl. 3 of that Order.

    7. The Central Government promulgated Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1946 (No. XVIII of 1946) which came into force from 1st October, 1946. Section 2(a) defines essential commodity as any of the following given thereunder. It is not disputed that under this Ordinance oil cakes were not included in the definition of essential commodity. Section 3 of the said Ordinance gave power to the Central Government to control production, supply and distribution of essential commodities, but for the exercise of those powers it was necessary that there should be a notified Order in that behalf. “Notified Order” has also been defined under S. 2(d) as “the Order notified in the Official Gazette”. Section 5 lays down that:

    “Until other provisions are made under this Ordinance, any order, whether notified or not, made by whatever authority under Rule 80-B, or sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules in respect of any matter specified in Section 3, which was in force immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance shall, notwithstanding the expiration of the said rules, continue in force so far as consistent with this Ordinance and be deemed to be an order made under S. 3;………”

    8. It is also not disputed that by an Amendment Act, No. 52 of 1950, cattle fodder was included in the definition of essential commodities given in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and an Order styled as the Oil-cakes Removal of Control Order of 1952 was issued. It was provided in para 6 of that Order that “notwithstanding anything hereinto fore contained the Vegetable Oil and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order 1944 shall continue to be in force.”

    9. The questions which require consideration in this case are: (1) Whether Vegetable Oil and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order 1944 continued to remain in force by the provisions of Section 5 read with Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance (thereafter Act of 1946) or by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. (2) Whether the amendment of Section 2 of the Amendment Act 52 of 1950 of the Essential Supplies Act had a retrospective effect so as to continue the prohibition on the forward contracts of oil cakes or had it the effect of reviving the Prohibition Order of 1944.

    10. It has been contended by Dr. Gyan Prakash that though oil cakes may not have been included in the definition of essential commodities yet the Vegetable Oils and Oil Cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 is one in respect of any matter specified in S. 3 and such a matter being in force immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance the Order continued to be in force notwithstanding its expiration on 30th September. This contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted.

    11. Section 5 of the Ordinance and thereafter of the Act kept alive the Prohibition Order of 1944 in respect of those commodities only which were included in the definition of essential commodities. The word ‘matter’ in Sec. 5 is also qualified by the expression ‘specified in S. 3’. Accordingly the Ordinance kept alive only those matters which were specified in S. 3, that is the commodities which were defined as essential commodities under the Ordinance. The very preamble of the Ordinance shows that the purpose of the Ordinance was to control the production, supply and distribution of food stuffs and certain other articles mentioned therein. Section 2 defines an essential commodity and as the definition does not include oil-cakes within its purview S. 5 read with S. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance could not keep alive the Vegetable Oils and Oil-cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944.

    12. This is further clear from a reading of sub-section (1) of S. 3 which only relates to maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. Whether we look to the provisions of S. 5 or S. 3 or the definition of the essential commodity the only inference which can be drawn is that while promulgating the Ordinance it was not the intention to keep alive the Vegetable Oils and Oil-cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944.

    13. The subsequent passing of the Act of 1946 replacing the Ordinance did not make any difference in the matter because the same provisions continued and so whether we look to the provisions of the Ordinance or the Act none of them saved the Vegetable Oils and Oil-cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944. Another argument which was advanced in this connection related to the words of Section 24 of the Central General Clauses Act and it was contended that there being nothing otherwise expressly provided in the Ordinance nor there being any provision superseding the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 nor there being any provision inconsistent with the Prohibition Order the Vegetable Oils and Oil-cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 should be deemed to have continued. This contention of the learned counsel is a little misconceived. The Vegetable Oils and Oil-cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 died its natural death by expiration on 30th September.

    14. The consequences which follow from the repeal and re-enactment or the arguments of supersession or inconsistency which would have perhaps been applicable in a case of repeal have no application as the Vegetable Oils and Oil Cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 lapsed by efflux of time on 30th September, 1946. The provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act could not apply to such a case. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to cite any authority in support of his contention that where an earlier Act lapsed by efflux of time the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act would apply. A fruitful reference may be made to the authority of State of Madhya Pradesh v. A.K Jain, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 162. That was a case of repealing an old Act and substituting it by a new Act with certain modifications. Under the new Act no express saving was made with respect to the rules and regulations enforced under the old Act. It was held that Section 24 of the General Clauses Act must be read along with the new Act in order to determine whether the old rules and regulations were kept alive. It has already been stated that the consequences of repeal do not apply to the case of temporary Acts which expire by efflux of time and so this authority, which is based on different considerations, has no application.

    15. The next point which arises in the case is whether the Amendment Act of 1952 by which oil cakes were included in the definition of essential commodity in Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act could be given retrospective effect and whether the Oilcakes (Removal of Control) Order, 1952, kept in force the Vegetable Oils and Oil-cakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944. It would appear that by Section 4 of the Amendment Act 52 of 1950 an amendment was incorporated in Section 2 of the Act of 1946 and now cattle fodder including oil-cakes for the first time was included as an essential commodity. This came into force on 16th August, 1950. This amendment of the Act of 1946 was not given any retrospective effect. The Central Government could exercise its powers under S. 3 by issuing a notified order and it has been contended that such a power was exercised while issuing the Oil-cakes (Removal of Control) Order of 1952. Reliance has been placed on Cl. (6) of that Order which reads:

    “Notwithstanding anything hereintofore contained the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944 shall continue to be in force.”

    It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the expression “shall continue to be in force” was intended to mean that the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 continued in force and in any case this should be treated to be a notified order within the meaining of S. 3 regulating and prohibiting the distribution of oilcakes. Both these contentions of the learned counsel have no force.

    16. So far as the continuance of the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 goes has already been stated that order lapsed on 30th September. It was not saved by the provisions of the Ordinance or the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946. Till this amendment was made on 16th August, 1950 the oilcakes was not an essential commodity and so there was no question of continuing any Prohibition Order in respect of such a commodity. After the Essential Commodities Act was passed the Central Government to issue a notified order regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of this commodity, but no notified order was issued and the only order which was issued was the Oilcakes (Removal of Control) Order, 1952 which was published in the Gazette of 20th October, 1952. This order cannot be deemed to be a notified order within the definition of Section 2(d) of the Essential Supplies Act.

    17. Clause (6) referred to above only speaks of continuance in force when the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 was not at all in force. It could not continue to be in force unless a proper notified order regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of oilcakes had been issued earlier. It cannot be accepted that because the expression “shall continue to be in force” was used it meant that the Oilcakes Prohibition Order of 1944 was in force and continued to be in force. It had already expired on 30th September and was not revived and it could not continue to be in force. Cl. (6) of the said. Order cannot also be taken to be a new notified Order imposing any ban on forward contracts of oilcakes with effect from that date because of the language used in the Order itself. The Central Government, if it had so chosen, could have issued a new notified order imposing a ban on the forward contracts as was in existence upto 30th September, but it not having done so the Order stating about continuance of a dead order could not be taken to mean a notified order as contemplated by Section 2(d) of the Essential Supplies Act.

    18. This view finds support from the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand, AIR 1952 SC 335 at p. 339. In that case the question was whether turmeric was a food stuff. It was found by the Supreme Court that it was so within the meaning of Act XXIV of 1946 and as such the orders were issued and the Defence of India Rules were continued to be in force. In the present case oilcakes was not at all included in the definition of essential commodity either in the Ordinance or the Act. Unless oilcakes could be brought within the definition of the essential commodity there was no question of continuance of the Prohibition order of 1944. Their Lordships observed:—

    “Now I have no doubt that had the Central Government re-promulgated the Order of 1944, 1946 after the passing of either the Ordinance or the Act of 1946, the Order would have been good.”

    19. In the present case it was not so done and so it cannot be taken that the Prohibition Order of 1944 either continued in force or was notified under the aforesaid Oilcakes Order of 1952.

    20. In a similar case the Kerala High Court in the case of Ahamed Koya v. E. Murugesa Mudaliar Son and Co., AIR 1958 Kerala 195 held that the Vegetable Oils and Oilcakes (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order of 1944 was not continued or kept in force by virtue of S. 5 of the Central Ordinance No. 18 of 1946 so far as oilcakes were concerned nor does Section 17 read with Section 3 of the Central Act XXIV of 1946 keep alive or continue in force the Order of 1944 regarding oilcakes.

    21. The Kerala case was almost similar and the view expressed by that Court was that the Prohibition Order of 1944 was neither kept alive nor it was notified nor the Amending Act of 1950 had any retrospective effect. In the present case the contract was entered into on 26th February, 1957 and there being no notified order of the Central Government under Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act the contract was valid. The learned District Judge was right in decreeing the plaintiff's suit and in holding that the contract was valid.

    22. The revision, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

    23. Let the record of the case be sent back to the Court below as early as possible.

    LF/V.S.B

    24. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Hot Chand Shamdas v. Lala Sri Ram
    (Dec 20, 1961)