Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sub-clause (2) of Clause (g) of Section Ill of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947).7.
  • Clause (f) of Section 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act:The section
  • SECTION 111 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Clause (g) of Section Ill of the Transfer of Property Act
  • SECTION 105 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sub-clause (2) of Clause (g) of Section Ill of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947).7.
  • Clause (f) of Section 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act:The section
  • SECTION 111 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Clause (g) of Section Ill of the Transfer of Property Act
  • SECTION 105 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Abdul Hameed owned three shops and a hall, which after his death were rented by Saghir Ahmad and Fazal Ahmad from his heirs. These tenants executed a Qabuliyat in their favor. Hashmat Husain, the plaintiff, purchased these properties from Abdul Hameed's heirs on 7-8-1941 and informed the tenants. He incorporated a portion of the hall into his house with their consent and reduced the rent. Subsequently, he filed Suit No. 591 of 1943 for recovery of rent against the tenants, who contested by alleging that Fayyaz Alam was a co-sharer in the proprietary right as his father was a co-owner of the property. During the suit, Fazal Ahmad died and his heirs were added as parties. Fayyaz Alam filed Suit No. 33 of 1944 claiming title to half the property, which was dismissed as untenable.

In 1945, Hashmat Husain filed the present suit for ejectment and arrears of rent, alleging that the shops had fallen and he had taken possession and rebuilt, with the defendants remaining only in possession of the hall. The defendants contested ownership and validity of the ejectment notice, also relying on the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The trial court dismissed the suit for ejectment, but the appellate court reversed and decreed ejectment. The defendants filed a second appeal, which a learned Single Judge allowed, dismissing the suit on the basis that the defendants' prior denial of full ownership did not amount to forfeiture of tenancy under Clause (g) of Section III of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff filed this special appeal against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' allegation in their written statement denying the plaintiff's sole ownership by asserting a co-owner's title amounted to a denial of the plaintiff's title sufficient to constitute renunciation of tenancy and forfeiture under Clause (g) of Section III of the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. Whether, in view of Section 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947), a decree for ejectment could be passed against the defendants in a suit pending before the Act came into force.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The allegation in the defendants' written statement that the plaintiff was not the sole owner but shared title with Fayyaz Alam amounted to a denial of the plaintiff's title.
  • This denial constituted renunciation of their character as tenants, thus terminating the lease by forfeiture under Clause (g) of Section III of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendants.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The learned Single Judge's decree dismissing the suit was correct because the defendants' statement did not amount to a disclaimer under Clause (g) of Section III of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Additionally, no decree for ejectment could be passed due to protections under Section 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mallika Dassi v. Makhan Lal, 9 Cal WN 928 Whether questioning extent of landlord's interest amounts to repudiation of tenancy. Held that questioning extent of interest does not amount to a distinct renunciation of tenancy; the court distinguished this case as not amounting to denial of lessor's title.
Abbakk Shetthi v. Seshamma, AIR 1915 Mad 85 Follows Mallika Dassi on repudiation of landlord's title. Used to support that mere questioning of landlord's title extent is insufficient to constitute disclaimer.
Vivian v. Moat, (1881) 16 Ch D 730 What constitutes sufficient repudiation of landlord and tenant relationship to forfeit lease. Adopted principle that a distinct claim inconsistent with tenancy relationship amounts to renunciation and forfeiture.
Kali Kishen Tagore v. Golam, ILR 13 Cal 3 Applicability of English landlord-tenant principles in Indian tenure system. Held that denial of landlord's right to increase rent does not necessarily amount to renunciation of tenancy in India.
Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi, AIR 1919 PC 1 Doctrine of Vivian v. Moat does not apply to Indian tenures with special provisions. Clarified that questioning landlord's right to enhance rent is not repudiation of title.
Krishna Prosad Lal v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd., AIR 1937 PC 251 Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act and tenancy continuity. Supports that tenancy continues unless tenant denies relationship to particular lessor.
Shiam Behari v. Madan Singh, AIR 1945 All 293 Distinguishing repudiation of landlord's title by tenant. Held prior statements questioning ownership of part of land do not amount to repudiation of landlord's title.
Rukmani v. Ravaji, ILR 48 Bom 541 (AIR 1924 Bom 454) Distinguishing repudiation of landlord's title by tenant. Held that readiness to pay rent to either of two claimants does not amount to repudiation of landlord's title.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined Clause (g) of Section III of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that a lease of immovable property is determined by forfeiture when the lessee renounces his character by either setting up a title in a third person or claiming title in himself. The defendants did not claim title in themselves but alleged a co-ownership by Fayyaz Alam, thereby setting up a title in a third person. This assertion renounced their character as lessees under the plaintiff, as they claimed tenancy under both the plaintiff and Fayyaz Alam.

The court clarified that renouncing tenancy does not require denying being a tenant altogether, but rather denying tenancy under the particular lessor. The defendants' allegation that the plaintiff was not the sole owner and that they were tenants of both the plaintiff and Fayyaz Alam amounted to repudiation of the landlord-lessee relationship with the plaintiff, thereby terminating the lease by forfeiture.

The court distinguished precedents where mere questioning of the extent of the landlord's interest was held insufficient to amount to disclaimer, emphasizing that here the defendants set up an independent title in a third party, which is sufficient for forfeiture.

Regarding the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947), the court noted that the suit was pending when the Act came into force, and Section 15 prohibits ejectment except on grounds enumerated in Section 3. Clause (f) of Section 3 allows ejectment where the tenant has renounced his character or denied the landlord's title. The court found that the defendants’ conduct satisfied this ground, and thus ejectment could be ordered under the Act.

Accordingly, the court held that the lease was terminated by forfeiture and the plaintiff was entitled to ejectment under both the Transfer of Property Act and the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and confirmed the decree of the first appellate court ordering the ejectment of the defendants from the premises.

The direct effect of this decision is the eviction of the defendants based on their renunciation of tenancy by setting up a title in a third person. No new precedent beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and established principles was created.

    Hashmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmad

    R. Dayal, J.:— This is a special appeal by a plaintiff against an order of a learned Single judge allowing the second, appeal of the defendants and dismissing his suit for ejectment.

    2. One Abdul Hameed owned the three shops and hall in suit. On his death Saghir Ahmad and Fazal Ahmad took them on rent from his heirs. They executed a Qabuliyat in their favour. Hashmat Husain, the plaintiff, purchased these shops and hall along with another house from the heirs of Abdul Hameed on 7-8-1941, informed the two tenants about. It and subsequently included a portion of the hall with their consent in his house and reduced the monthly rent. He filed a suit for recovery of rent against Fazal Ahmad and Saghir Ahmad Suit No. 591 of 1943. They contested the suit and alleged in the written statement that one Fayyaz Alam was also a co-sharer in the proprietary right as his father Shaukat Husain was the co-owner of Abdul Hameed in respect of the shops and hall in dispute and that the plaintiff had purchased only the rights of the heirs of Abdul Hameed. During the pendency of the suit Fazal Ahmad died and his heirs were brought on the record. Fayyaz Alam then filed a suit (No. 33 of 1944) claiming a declaration of his title to a half share of the property. This suit was filed against Hashmat Husain, the heir of Abdul Hameed, and the tenant Saghir Ahmad and others. The tenants tried to support Fayyaz Alam in that suit but it was dismissed and Fayyaz Alam's claim as a co-owner of the property was found to be untenable.

    3. Basing his cause of action on the denial of the plaintiff's full ownership of the shops and hall under the tenancy of the defendants, Hashmat Husain instituted the present suit in 1945 for ejectment and arrears of rent. It was alleged in the plaint that the shops had fallen down due to rains and the plaintiff had taken over possession and built a room in their place and that the defendants were thereafter in possession of the hall only.

    4. The defendants contested the suit on the grounds that the plaintiff was not the sole owner of the hall in dispute, that the notice of ejectment was bad and that the defendants were not liable to be ejected. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to evict the defendants owing to the Rent Control Order.

    5. The trial Court dismissed the suit for ejectment holding that the notice to quit was not a valid notice and that the tenancy had not been determined by any forfeiture as the alleged defendants' contention in suit No. 591 of 1943 did not amount to a denial of the plaintiff's tide. The plaintiff appealed and the appellate Court allowed the appeal & decreed the suit for ejectment. Some of the defendants then filed a second appeal in this Court. The learned Single Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that the alleged statement of the defendants in their written statement in the previous suit for the recovery of arrears of rent was not a disclaimer as contemplated by Clause (g) of Section Ill of the Transfer of Property Act and that there had been no forfeiture of tenancy. The plaintiff has therefore filed this special appeal.

    6. It is now no more in dispute that the plaintiff is the sole owner. The only question raised by the appellant in this special appeal is that the allegation in the written statement of the rent suit to the effect that the plaintiff was not the sole owner of the property in suit but had only a share in it, the other share being owned by Fayyaz Alam, did amount to a denial of the plaintiff's title by setting up a title in another as well and entitled the plaintiff to eject the defendants from the hall. It is contended that the view of the learned Single Judge that such an allegation of the defendants did not amount to a denial of the plaintiff's tide is wrong. For the respondents the decree of the learned Single Judge is tried to be supported on another ground too and it is that no decree for ejectment could be passed in view of Section 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947).

    7. The relevant portion of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act is:

    “A lease of immoveable property determines —

    (g) by forfeiture; that is to say—

    (1) ……………………….;or

    (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, or

    (3) …………………….”

    8. A lease of immoveable property is therefore determined on proof of the following facts:

    (1) the lessee's renouncing his character as such;

    (2) such renouncement can be

    (a) by setting, up a title in a third person; or

    (b) by claiming title in himself.

    9. The defendants did not in their written statement in suit No. 591 of 1943 set up a title in themselves. They did set up a title in a third person, namely, Fayyaz Alam, whom they alleged to be a co-owner of the property in suit. They also renounced their character as a lessee of the plaintiff when they alleged that they were not his tenants but were tenants of the plaintiff & Fayyaz Alam. The tenancy admitted by them was different from their actual tenancy under Hashmat Husain, the successor-in-interest of the heirs of Abdul Hameed from whom they had taken the tenancy of the shops and the hall.

    10. It does not appear to us to be necessary for a lessee to deny that he was a lessee before the provisions of sub-clause (2) of Clause (g) of Section Ill of the Transfer of Property Act would come in play. It is not the denying of his being a tenant or a lessee which is an ingredient of this provision; it is the denial of the relationship of a particular lessee to a particular lessor with respect to a particular property which forms an ingredient of the aforesaid provision determining the lease. The terms ‘lease’, ‘lessor’ and ‘lessee’ are defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act thus:

    “A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered, periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.

    The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee……………”

    11. It follows from these definitions that the terms ‘lease’, ‘lessor’ and ‘lessee’ go together and in connection with a particular transaction would have reference only to the parbcular property covered by the lease, the particular person who transfers the right to enjoy the property and the person who accepts the transfer fro such a transferor. In view of these definitions, a lesse would be said to renounce his character as such ??? he denies either that he holds that property as a lesse or states that he though a lessee of that particula property is not a lessee from the person who let ??? out to him. We are therefore of opinion that the lease in favour of the defendants was determined ??? forfeiture when the defendants alleged in their writ ten statement in suit No. 591 of 1943 that the plaintiff was not their lessor, he having only a partial proprietary right in that property on account of another per son, Fayyaz Alam also being a co-sharer thereof.

    12. It has been strenuously urged that an allegation that the plaintiff is not the full owner of the property leased out does not come within the expression ‘setting up a title in a third person’. The expression, it is pointed out, really means ‘setting up full title in a third person’, or “asserting that the plain” had no title to the property at all”. Reliance is place in this connection on the case of Mallika Dassi v. Makhan Lal, 9 Cal WN 928 (A) and that of Abbakk Shetthi v. Seshamma, AIR 1915 Mad 85 (B), which just follow the former case. In the Calcutta case, the plaintiffs sued for a declaration of their title to a ??? of land and for a decree for ejectment alleging the they derived title from the sole owner of the property in suit.

    13. They had sued the defendant-appellant previous for rent. She had resisted that claim for rent by ??? them to the proof of their title by purchase an by denying that their predecessor-in-interest had an thing more than a share in the property, the ??? being owned by the members of the joint ??? family to which Tara Prasad Roy belonged. Tara Prasad Roy had sold the property to the vendor of ??? plaintiffs of that suit. This suit was dismissed as ??? plaintiffs were held to have failed to prove that Tara Persad alone used to receive the entire rent. It ??? therefore contended in the later suit that the defedant had forfeited her rights as a tenant by disclaim of the title of the plaintiffs and of their predecess and that she was on that account liable to be eject as a trespasser.

    14. It was contended in reply on behalf of the defendants that there had been no disclaimer of the ??? of the plaintiffs simply because the extent of the in rest which their predecessor possessed in the ??? had been questioned. This contention was upheld. ??? Court considered the question to he of some nice and of first impression. It was observed at page 93

    “As we have already pointed out, in order make a disclaimer sufficient, it must amount to direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant, a renunciation by the party of his character as tenant. It is difficult to see upon what principle it can be contended that a tenant disclaims the title of his landlord when he admits his title as such, but only questions the extent of his interest; in a case of this description, the tenant does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, repudiate the tenancy or advance a claim to hold possession of the estate upon a ground inconsistent with the existence of the relations of landlord and tenant……………. To constitute a disclaimer, there must be a distinct and unequivocal renunciation of the tenancy, and we are not prepared to extend the application of the doctrine to a case in which the tenant does not set up a title to the whole in himself or a title to the whole in others, but, merely questions to the extent of the interest of the plaintiff and his title to receive the entire rent.”

    15. Their Lordships did not refer to the provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which does not speak: of forfeiture of a lease on a tenant's disclaiming the title of his landlord but speaks of the determining of the lease by forfeiture when a tenant sets up a title in a third person. The moment the tenant sets ??? title in a third person, whether to the extent of the whole or to the extent of a part, he does set up a ??? in a third person and therefore he becomes liable to ejectment as a result of the determination of the case by forfeiture on account of his renouncing his character as a lessee.

    16. In Vivian v. Moat, (1881) 16 Ch D 730 (C) ??? question arose whether the defendants had so ??? or repudiated the title of the plaintiffs as andlords of the property as to enable the plaintiffs ??? maintain the action for ejectment without giving ??? valid notice to quit. Prior to this case the defendants ??? not questioned the proprietary title of the plaintiffs but had only asserted that the plaintiffs had no ??? to raise the rent. Fry J. held that such a contention of the defendants suggested that the plaintiffs vere not ordinary landlords of the estate but either ??? of the manor or owners of some other right which gave them a title only to a customary rent, which alone they could demand and nothing more. In that such a suggestion was sufficient renuncia-Eon; and in support of his view referred to the observation of Mr. Baron Parke in the case of Deo v. Station, (1836) 1 M and W 695 (D) :

    “In order to make a verbal or written disclaimer ufficient it must amount to a direct repudiation of ??? relation of landlord and tenant or to a distinct ??? to hold possession of the estate upon a ground holly inconsistent with the existence of that relation, Which by necessary implication is a repudiation of it.”

    ??? it had been observed by Mr. Baron Parke:

    “A disavowal by the tenant of the holding under he particular landlord, by words only, is sufficient.”

    17. The contention of the defendants in suit No. 591 of 943 was certainly a distinct claim to hold possession the shops and hall on the ground that the plaintiff tone could not eject them a ground which was consistent with the relationship of a lessor and lessee between them and therefore, in view of the above nervations of Mr. Baron Parke, amounted to reputation of that relationship and consequently to the nunciation of their character as lessees of the plain.

    18. In the case of Kali Kishen Tagore v. Golam ???, ILR 13 Cal 3 (E), Field J. observed with reference the case of Vivian v. Moat (C).

    “We think that the ground of this decision rests ??? upon the relation of landlord and tenant, as exists in England, where such relation depends upon mtract, and that the principle of this case is not applicable to this country, where a different state of things prevails. In this country there are numerous tenures the rent of which cannot be raised, and the denial of the landlord's right to raise the rent is not necessarily a renunciation or disclaimer of his title as landlord.”

    19. The contention of a defendant that the lessor cannot increase the rent of the lessee may not amount to the lessee's renouncing his character as such in view of some legal provisions limiting the right of the landlord to increase the rent or giving a right to the defendant to contest such a claim of the landlord. But in case there are no such legal provisions, the ordinary relationship of landlord and tenant in this country also gives the landlord a right to ask the tenant to agree to pay enhanced rent-or to quit.

    20. The case of Vivian v. Moat (C) may not be an authority in this country on the question of a landlord's right to enhance the rent as the system of land tenures here is different; but the principle enunciated therein as to what can be considered to be sufficient renunciation of the landlord's title so as to amount to forfeiture appears to be of universal application and there appears to be no reason why it should not be followed here. According to that principle such a repudiation is to be inferred whenever something is alleged which is inconsistent with the existence of that relationship according to the law in force.

    21. In the case of ILR 13 Cal 248 (F) there was no repudiation of the title of the landlord. The dispute had been about the nature of the tenancy.

    22. In Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi, AIR 1919 PC 1 (G), their Lordships of the Privy Council observed at page 4:

    “The doctrine of Vivian v. Moat (C) does not apply to Indian tenures such as the present.” This only means that a tenant's questioning the right of the landlord to enhance rent does not amount to the repudiation of the landlord's title. Their Lordships referred to the cases of ILR 13 Cal 3 (E), ILR 13 Cal 248 (F) and Vithu v. Dhondi, ILR 15 Bom 407 (H), which related to agricultural land for which special provisions existed.

    23. In Krishna Prosad Lal v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd., AIR 1937 PC 251 (I), their Lordships of the Privy Council observed in connection with the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act:

    “The section postulates that there is a tenancy still continuing, that it had its beginning at a given date from a given landlord. It provides that neither a tenant nor anyone claiming through a tenant shall be heard to deny that particular landlord had at that date a title to the property.”

    24. This supports our view that the character of a lessee is renounced the moment he denies that he is not a lessee from a particular lessor.

    25. The cases of Shiam Behari v. Madan Singh AIR 1945 All 293 (J) and Rukmani v. Ravaji, ILR 48 Bom 541 : (AIR 1924 Bom 454 (K)), are distinguishable. In the Allahabad case a portion of the land in suit was included in plot No. 2129. The rest of that plot belonged to Government. An earlier statement made by the tenant to the effect that, the plot belonged to Government was not held to be a sufficient repudiation of the landlord's title with respect to the land in suit. In the Bombay case, the defendant had merely alleged that two persons claimed rent and the defendant did not know who was rightfully entitled and that he was prepared to pay rent to either of them as the Court directed. Such a contention was not held to amount to a repudiation of the landlord's title.

    26. We are therefore of opinion that the lease in favour of the defendants was determined by forfeiture on account of their renouncing their character as lessees of the plaintiff by setting up a title in Fay-yaz Alam, a third person.

    27. The suit was instituted sometime in 1945, as it is suit No. 234 of 1945 of the Court of Munsif of Sambhal; but was pending when the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947) is deemed to have come into force i.e on the first day of October 1946. Under Section 15 of the Act in a pending suit no decree for ejectment can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 3. The clause of that section under which the plaintiff seeks to bring his suit is Cl. (f) which is this:

    “No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds:………

    (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant.”

    28. It is contended for the defendants that they had not renounced their character as tenants and had not denied the title of the plaintiff landlord and therefore they cannot be evicted under this clause. We do not agree with this contention. The defendants renounced their character as such when they asserted that they were not the tenants of the plaintiff whose tenants they really were. They set up a different itenancy under the plaintiff and Fayyaz Alam. They also denied the title of the plaintiff inasmuch as they did not admit him to be the sole proprietor of the accommodation they were occupying.

    29. The word ‘title’ in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act must refer to the title of the landlord on the basis of which he can claim to eject the tenant and cannot be taken to refer only to proprietary rights in the accommodation which may be entirely immaterial so far as the right of ejectment is concerned. A person may be landlord even if the proprietary title to the accommodation does not vest in him. We are, therefore, of opinion that the ground mentioned in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the said Act exists in the present case and the ejectment of the defendants from the property in suit can be ordered on its basis. In view of the above, we allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and confirm the decree passed by the first appellate Court ordering the ejectment of the defendants from the premises detailed in the plaint.

    D.R.R

    30. Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Hashmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmad
    (Sep 27, 1957)