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  • Sec. 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended. Sec. 116 of Act No. XXVI of 1955
  • DELHI SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT ACT 1946
  • Sec. 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955
  • Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Sec. 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended. Sec. 116 of Act No. XXVI of 1955
  • DELHI SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT ACT 1946
  • Sec. 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955
  • Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dayal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns applications under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) as amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (No. XXVI of 1955), with reference to Central Government Notification dated 1 December 1955 (published 10 December 1955) and the enforcement date 1 January 1956.

Two applications were before the Bench after being referred by a learned Single Judge for decision of a common point:

  • Dulan Dayal Singh: His private complaint had led to an acquittal by a Magistrate, I class, Faizabad on 31 October 1955. He filed an application for leave to appeal on 25 January 1956 under Section 417(3) Cr. P.C.
  • Kedar Nath Bhargava: He sought leave to appeal under Section 417(3) Cr. P.C. against an order of acquittal dated 17 January 1956 in a case instituted on his complaint prior to 1 January 1956. His application was also referred to this Bench.

The Single Judge formulated the referred point as whether the right under Section 417(3), Cr. P.C., applies to cases where proceedings in Magistrate's Courts were started before the Amending Act came into force or only to cases initiated after the coming into force of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the right given by Section 417(3) Cr. P.C. (as amended) applies to cases in which proceedings in the Magistrate's Courts were started before the Amending Act (No. XXVI of 1955) came into force, or only to cases instituted after the coming into force of that Act.
  2. Whether a complainant whose complaint was instituted prior to the enforcement of the Amending Act but in which acquittal occurred after the enforcement of the Act can avail of the right under Section 417(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Dulan Dayal Singh's Arguments

  • He contended that because his application for leave to appeal was instituted after the enforcement of the Amending Act (Act No. XXVI of 1955), the amended provisions (including Section 417(3)) apply to his application — invoking Section 116 of the Amending Act which provides that amendments apply to proceedings instituted after commencement and to proceedings pending on the date of commencement.
  • He additionally argued that he was not exercising a new personal right under Section 417(3) but was acting as an agent on behalf of the State, and therefore his application should be permissible because the State has a right to appeal under Section 417(1).

Other Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced by other parties (for example, detailed arguments from the respondents or State counsel are not recorded in the provided text).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi (Privy Council) Authorities on retrospectivity: procedural provisions may be given retrospective effect unless textually inadmissible; provisions that touch existing rights (and would deprive existing finality of orders) are not to be applied retrospectively absent clear provision. The Court relied on this Privy Council decision to support the view that statutory provisions which would affect the finality of existing acquittals are not to be applied retrospectively unless clearly provided for; used it to hold that Section 417(3) does not apply to cases where acquittal was final before the Amending Act came into force.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, 1905 A.C. 369 (Privy Council) Principle that procedural provisions may be retrospective but provisions affecting existing rights require express enactment or necessary intendment to operate retrospectively. The Court cited this authority (through the Delhi Cloth decision's reliance on it) as the foundational rule governing whether statutory amendments can be applied to final orders existing at the date of commencement.
Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Supreme Court) Principles regarding application of amendments to pending proceedings and the exceptions to the general rule against retrospective operation where the statute expressly applies to pending matters. The Court invoked the principles from this Supreme Court decision to support the conclusion that where the Amending Act expressly applies to proceedings pending on the date of commencement (per Section 116), the rights conferred by the amendment are available to parties in pending proceedings whose cases end after commencement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analyzing the interplay between:

  • The substantive right to apply for leave to appeal as provided by Section 417(3) Cr. P.C. (which confers that right on a complainant where an acquittal is passed in a case instituted upon complaint), and
  • The saving and application provision in Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act No. XXVI of 1955), which states that, save as provided, the provisions of the amended Act apply to proceedings instituted after commencement and also to proceedings pending in any criminal court on the date of commencement.

Key steps in the Court's analysis (as expressed in the opinion):

  1. The Court rejected Dulan Dayal Singh's primary contention that his application should be governed by the amended Act simply because the application was instituted after the enforcement date. The Court reasoned that Section 116 does not itself create a new substantive right to file an application under Section 417(3) for complainants in private-complaint cases. The right to institute such an application is derived from Section 417(3) itself.
  2. The Court emphasized the distinction between (a) proceedings instituted after the commencement of the Amending Act (where the amended provisions operate normally) and (b) proceedings that were already finally disposed of prior to commencement. A complainant whose complaint had culminated in an acquittal before the Amending Act came into force had no vested right to appeal at that earlier date; the acquittal was final subject only to certain contingencies (State appeal or revision), and the Amending Act did not create a right to appeal for such complainants unless there was clear indication that it was to apply to orders final before commencement.
  3. The Court applied the principle (from Colonial Sugar and the Privy Council decision in Delhi Cloth) that statutory provisions which would disturb existing final rights or final orders are not to be given retrospective effect absent clear or express words to that effect. Finding no such indication in Section 417(3), the Court held that the provision could not be applied to acquittals that were final before the Amending Act came into force (as in Dulan Dayal Singh's case where acquittal was on 31 October 1955).
  4. The Court rejected Dulan Dayal Singh's alternate argument that he was merely acting as the State's agent. It noted that Section 417(1) preserves the State's power to direct appeals but Section 417(5) blocks the State from appealing under that subsection where a private complainant's application under Section 417(3) has been refused. Thus the right under Section 417(3) is not a mere procedural device by which a complainant simply stands in the place of the State.
  5. Turning to Kedar Nath Bhargava's situation, the Court found that where a complaint was instituted prior to the enforcement of the Amending Act but remained pending and ended in acquittal after the Amending Act came into force, Section 116's saving of amendments to pending proceedings operates to bring the amended Section 417 into play. Consequently, the complainant in such a pending case (disposed after commencement) may avail himself of the right under Section 417(3). The Court relied on the express provision in Section 116 and principles from the cited authorities to support this distinction.
  6. The Court thus answered the referred question by distinguishing between cases where the acquittal was final before commencement (no right under Section 417(3) created by the Amending Act) and cases that were pending on commencement and disposed after it (the amended rights are available).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's dispositive ruling is stated as follows:

The right given by Section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended can be availed of by a complainant whose complaint, though filed prior to the commencement of Act No. XXVI of 1955, ended in acquittal subsequent to the enforcement of that Act; but it is not available to a complainant whose complaint had ended in acquittal prior to the enforcement of that Act.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • Dulan Dayal Singh, whose case resulted in acquittal on 31 October 1955 (prior to enforcement of the Amending Act), cannot apply for leave to appeal under Section 417(3) as amended.
  • A complainant in the position of Kedar Nath Bhargava — whose complaint was instituted before commencement but in which acquittal was recorded after the Amending Act commenced — has the right to apply for leave to appeal under Section 417(3) as amended.
  • The Court directed that the two applications be laid before the learned Single Judge for further orders (i.e., procedural furtherance before the referring judge).

The opinion's reasoning is grounded in established authorities regarding retrospectivity of procedural statutes and the express saving clause of the Amending Act; the Court framed a temporal distinction for application of Section 417(3) without purporting to lay down a new general precedent beyond the resolution of the referred question.

    Dulan Dayal Singh v. Prasadi

    Dayal, J.:— This is an application under Sec. 417, sub-sec. (3) of the code of Criminal Procedure as in force from the 1st of January, 1956, in view of the Central Government Notification No. 1/11/55-Judl. (R) dated the 1st of December, 1955, published in India Gazette dated the 10th of December, 1955.

    2. Dulan Dayal Singh's complaint was dismissed and the accused were acquitted of the various offences by a Magistrate, I class, Faizabad, on the 31st of October, 1955. He filed this application for leave to appeal on the 25th of January, 1956. The application would be in time in case the applicant was given the benefit of Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned Single Judge referred a point for decision to this Bench, and the point formulated by him is:

    “Whether the right given by Sec. 417(3), Cr. P.C, would apply to cases filed in which the proceedings in the Magistrate's Courts are started before the Act came into force or would apply only to those cases which are initiated after the coming in of this Act.”

    3. Another application under Sec. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure instituted by Kedar Nath Bhargava has also been referred to this Bench by the learned Single Judge. Kedar Nath Bhargava seeks leave to appeal against an order of acquittal, dated the 17th of January, 1956, in the case instituted on his complaint prior to the 1st of January, 1956.

    4. Sec. 417, Criminal Procedure Code, as amended, is:

    “417. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.

    (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal”.

    (3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

    (4) No application under sub-sec. (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal.

    (5) If, in any case, the application under sub-sec. (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-sec. (1).”

    5. The relevant portions of Sec. 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 [No. XXVI of 1955] are:

    “Notwithstanding that all or any of the provisions of this Act have come into force in any State,—

    (a) ………………………….

    (b) ………………………….

    (c) ………………………….

    (d) ………………………….

    but, save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act and the amendments made thereby shall apply to all proceedings instituted after the commencement of this Act and also to all proceedings pending in any Criminal Court on the date of such commencement.”

    6. The contention for Dulan Dayal Singh is that he has instituted the application for leave to appeal subsequent to the enforcement of the Amending Act and that therefore the amended Act would apply to it as it applies to all proceedings instituted after the commencement of that Act. The contention does not appeal to us as sound. Proceedings instituted by a person who is entitled to institute them will be governed by the provisions of the Amending Act in case they are instituted subsequent to its enforcement. It is a condition precedent for the institution of a proceeding that the person concerned should have a right to institute it. Sec. 116 of Act XXVI of 1955 does not give any right to file an application for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal in cases instituted on private complaint. Dulan Dayal Singh cannot, therefore, rely on the provisions of Sec. 116 of Act XXVI of 1955 for establishing a right to apply for leave to appeal against the order of acquittal. The right to institute such an application is given by Sec. 417, sub-sec. (3). Ordinarily that right will be available to such complainants whose cases were instituted after the enforcement of Act XXVI of 1955. Such a right can also be available to such complainants whose complaints were instituted prior to the enforcement of Act XXVI of 1955 but were disposed of by the trial court subsequent to the enforcement of that Act in view of the provisions of Sec. 116 of that Act providing for the application of the amendments to proceedings pending in any criminal court on the date of the commencement of that Act. The accused proceeded against on Dulan Dayal Singh's complaint were acquitted in October 1955. They had a right to the non-disturbance of that acquittal order subject to orders passed on a State appeal against that acquittal or to orders passed in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court. The complainant had no vested right to appeal against the order of acquittal on the 31st of October, 1955, when the acquittal order was passed. The Amending Act does not provide this right to apply for leave to appeal for such complainants also whose complaints had ended in acquittal of the accused prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act XXVI of 1955. The case is fully covered by the Privy Council decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi.1 In that case appeals were sought to be filed by virtue of the provisions of an Act which came into force on the 1st of April, 1926, though the orders appealed against had been passed in January 1926. Their Lordship observed at page 244:

    “The principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in the ‘Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving 1905 A.C 369. where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders, which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided. Their Lordships cannot find in the section even an indication to that effect.”

    7. There is no indication in Sec. 417, sub-sec. (3) that such a right is given to a complainant who had no such right when the order of acquittal had been passed. We have already indicated that the order of acquittal was final subject to orders passed in two contingencies which did not include the contingency of an appeal by the complainant. We are, therefore, of opinion that Dulan Dayal Singh cannot apply for leave to appeal.

    8. It was urged for Dulan Dayal Singh that he is not exercising any new right which could be said to have been given to him under Sec. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but he was filing this appeal just as an agent on behalf of the State which certainly had a right to appeal against the order of acquittal. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 417, Criminal Procedure Code, retains the right of the State to file an appeal against any acquittal subject to the provisions of Sub-sec. (5) of that section, and sub-sec. (5) provides that in an application for permission to appeal instituted by a private complainant is refused no appeal from that order of acquittal would lie under Sub-Sec. (1) on behalf of the State. We do not think that the right given to the complainant under sub-sec. (3) is a mere procedural right in so far that the complainant is just acting on behalf of the State.

    9. Coming to the question actually referred and pertinent to the other application by Kedar Nath Bhargava we are of opinion that a complainant whose complaint is instituted prior to the enforcement of the Amending Act, No. XXVI of 1955, but ends in acquittal after the enforcement of that Act, has a right to apply for leave to appeal under Sec. 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended. Sec. 116 of Act No. XXVI of 1955 provides that the amendments made by that Act would apply to all proceedings pending in any criminal court on the date of commencement of that Act. This means that the amended Sec. 417 applies to the cases which were pending on the enforcement of that Act and that, therefore, any right which is conferred under the amendments would be available to the parties concerned even though such a right was not available to them prior to the amendments, that is, on the date of the institution of the complaint. The Amending Act, in our opinion, expressly provides for the applicability of the provisions of the amended Act to pending proceedings and therefore the application of Kedar Nath Bhargava comes within the exceptions contemplated in the Privy Council case already referred to and the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh.3 Our answer to the question referred is: The right given by Sec. 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended can be availed of by a complainant whose complaint, though filed prior to the commencement of Act No. XXVI of 1955, ended in acquittal subsequent to the enforcement of that Act, but is not available to a complainant whose complaint had ended in acquittal prior to the enforcement of that Act.

    10. We direct that the two applications be laid before the learned Single Judge for further orders.

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    Comments

    Dulan Dayal Singh v. Prasadi
    (Feb 7, 1956)