Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Sp. A. No. 86 of 1954

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. Chandra Bhan Agarwal
Hon'ble Sir O.H. Mootham

Acts

Sec. 7 read with Sec. 2(c) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act.
clauses (b),(c), (d) and (g) of Sec. 3 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Sec. 5(b) of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.24.
Sec. 2(c) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1953.
Sec. 6 of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
clause (b) of Sec. 3 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Sec. 3(b) of the U.P Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Para. 25
provisions of Sec. 6 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act
Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act No. XIV of 1947.
clause (b) of Sec. 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act
Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947,
Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (Central Act)
provisions of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act
U.P Industrial Disputes Act (Act No. 28 of 1947)
Secs. 3 and 6 of the Industrial Disputes Act
U.P Industrial Disputes Act (Act 28 of 1947)
Sec. 6 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
U.P Industrial Disputes Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mootham, C.J. and Agarwala, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose between Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. (the employer) and one of its former employees, Ram Nath Koeri, who was also the secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh. Koeri's services were terminated in April 1948 for alleged prolonged unauthorised absence. The Union filed an application on 16 June 1948 before the Regional Conciliation Board (Sugar), Gorakhpur, seeking reinstatement and arrears; that application lapsed and a fresh application was filed in or about July 1949 with the same prayers.

The Regional Conciliation Board issued an award on 6 July 1949 directing reinstatement with continuity of service and payment of arrears. The mills appealed to the State Industrial Court (Sugar) on 13 July 1949; the Industrial Court confirmed the Board's findings by order dated 15 September 1949. On 3 December 1949 the State Government issued a notification purportedly giving effect to the Industrial Court's findings under Secs. 3 and 6 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The mills challenged the Government's notification by writ petition.

A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in part by issuing a writ of mandamus restraining the State Government from enforcing its 3 December 1949 order (without quashing the Industrial Court's 15 September 1949 order). Against that decision, Ram Nath Koeri and the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh filed the present special appeal. Mootham C.J. recorded concurrence with Agarwala J.'s judgment; Agarwala J. delivered the principal opinion allowing the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the findings of the Industrial Court (recorded under clause 13 of the State Government notification dated 10 March 1948) amount to an "award" within the meaning of Section 6 of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore can be enforced by the State Government under that section.
Whether the State Government could lawfully enforce the Industrial Court's findings (or otherwise give them effect) by issuing an order under clause (b) of Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — specifically, whether directions for reinstatement and payment of wages fall within the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" used in Sec. 3(b).
Whether the High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction (Article 226) in respect of a Government order passed before the commencement of the Constitution (a preliminary objection raised by the appellant before the Single Judge).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Ram Nath Koeri and Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh)

The word "findings" used in the notification and the word "award" used elsewhere are equivalent; hence the Industrial Court's findings are an "award" within Section 6 and can be enforced under that section.
Where the appellate court's findings affirm the Conciliation Board's award, the Government's order enforcing the appellate court's findings effectively enforces the Board's award, which the Government could enforce under Sec. 6.
The findings of the Industrial Court could also be enforced by a Government order under Sec. 3(b) because matters such as reinstatement and payment of wages fall within "terms and conditions of employment."

Respondent's Arguments (Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. and related respondents)

The Industrial Court's "findings" did not amount to an "award" within the meaning of Sec. 6, and therefore the Government's 3 December 1949 order could not validly purport to enforce the Industrial Court's findings under Sec. 6.
Sec. 3(b) was not intended to be used to decide or implement individual disputes such as reinstatement or payment of wages; it was meant for general orders about terms and conditions of employment rather than to address individual disputes arising from application of existing terms.
A preliminary point was raised that the High Court could not exercise writ jurisdiction in respect of an order passed before the commencement of the Constitution (this point was ultimately overruled by the Single Judge and addressed by the High Court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Writ No. 7413 of 1951)	Held (in that matter) that certain medical staff were not "workmen"; the Bench expressed an obiter view that there could have been no appeal because the Industrial Court gives no "decision."	The opinion notes that the observations were obiter and distinguishable on facts; the present Court does not treat that obiter dictum as decisive on whether the Industrial Court's findings are an award under Sec. 6 of the U.P. Act.
Krishna Prasad Bhargava v. The G.G. Industrial Mazdoor Union (Agra) (Writ Petition No. 54 of 1952)	Held by the learned Single Judge in that case that no appeal lay to the Labour Appellate Tribunal against the findings of the Industrial Court (this view was approved in Lakshmi Devi case).	The present Court notes the earlier decision but distinguishes it, treating those observations as not decisive for the specific question under Sec. 6 of the U.P. Act.
Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (Federal Court)	Held that reinstatement is within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal because it is connected with "non-employment" and therefore falls within the definition of industrial dispute.	The Court cites this decision to explain that disputes as to reinstatement fall within the ambit of matters related to employment/non-employment; but it also observes that those authorities did not address the particular phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in Sec. 3(b).
India Paper Pulp Company Ltd. v. India Paper Pulp Workers Union (A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 148)	Held that a claim for compensation for wrongful dismissal is a dispute connected with non-employment.	The Court refers to this decision to support the proposition that matters of dismissal/reinstatement/compensation are within the scope of disputes connected with employment/non-employment; again noting these cases did not directly interpret "terms and conditions of employment" in Sec. 3(b).
The National Associations of Local Government Officers v. Balson Corporation (1943 A.C. 166)	Considered expression(s) related to employment disputes (the opinion notes that this case considered certain expressions but not precisely "conditions of employment").	The Court observes that the English decision dealt with related expressions but did not interpret "terms and conditions of employment" as used in Sec. 3(b), so it does not directly assist the present interpretation.
Basti Sugar Mills Company v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Full Bench, 1954 A.L.J. 452)	Held that the State Government can make an order under Sec. 3(b) of the U.P. Act to be operative retrospectively; the opinion explains the consequence that no order under Sec. 3(b) can require payment of wages that accrued before the date of the Government order.	The Court treats this Full Bench decision as binding on the point that Sec. 3(b) orders cannot validly require payment of wages accrued prior to the Government order; it applies that limitation to the present facts (so wages accruing before 3 Dec 1949 cannot be ordered under Sec. 3(b)).
Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 217)	Addressed whether certain pre-Constitution orders could be challenged under the Constitution; the present Court distinguishes that Supreme Court decision on its facts.	The Court distinguishes Janardan Reddy and rejects the preliminary objection that Article 226 cannot be invoked in respect of a pre-Constitution order where that order is ultra vires and challengeable; the Court holds that the High Court has jurisdiction to grant relief in such a case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two interrelated strands: (A) whether the Industrial Court's "findings" are an "award" under Sec. 6 of the U.P. Act; and (B) whether the Government could validly give effect to such findings by an order under Sec. 3(b) if they were not treated as an "award."

(A) On whether the Industrial Court's findings amount to an "award" under Sec. 6

The Court noted that Section 6 deals with awards and the Government's action on them, but the Act does not define the word "award." The absence of a statutory definition meant the word must bear its ordinary meaning — a judicial decision or determination (citing dictionary definitions used in the opinion).
The Government notification (10 March 1948) used the terms "findings" and "award" in closely related contexts: clause 7 requires the Conciliation Board to record "findings" and then refers to those findings as the "award" in sub-clause (3); clause 13 requires the Industrial Court after hearing an appeal "to record its findings" and forward them to the Government.
The Court reasoned that there is no reason to attribute a different meaning to "findings" in clause 13 than in clause 7; the Industrial Court's recording of findings is the decision on the appeal. Therefore, the Industrial Court's findings are a determination or decision on the matters before it and constitute an "award" within Sec. 6.
The Court rejected the emphasis placed on the Industrial Court's use of the phrase "I recommend accordingly," calling that phraseology erroneous but not dispositive; the nature of the tribunal's determination is to be judged by the notification's provisions, not by the particular words the tribunal used.
Because Sec. 6 contemplates that an award must be submitted to the State Government and that the Government may (but need not) enforce it or remit it for reconsideration, the fact that the award does not bind the parties of its own force does not prevent it from being an "award."
Consequently, the Court concluded the Industrial Court's findings are an "award" under Sec. 6, and there is nothing in the notification to prevent the Government from enforcing them under that section.

(B) On whether the Government could act under Sec. 3(b) and the scope of "terms and conditions of employment"

The Court considered the scope of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in Sec. 3(b). It analysed the ordinary meanings of "terms" and "conditions," observing that "terms" relates to contractual propositions (including payment of wages and dismissal) while "conditions" is broader and can be laid down by law or Government order, general or particular, and can apply to classes or individuals.
The Court rejected a narrow reading that Sec. 3(b) was only for general orders or for varying agreed terms in the abstract. It held that the clause could validly be used to direct that certain terms and conditions be observed in an individual case — including reinstatement and payment of wages — because those matters fall within the broad expression "terms and conditions of employment."
The Court emphasised that the various clauses of Sec. 3 should be read together and not construed as excluding the subject-matter of one clause from being the subject of orders under other clauses; the State Government's power under Sec. 3 is capacious and includes making orders in respect of matters that overlap with industrial adjudication, provided the orders are within the statutory language (i.e., concern "terms and conditions of employment").
The Court accepted that paragraph 25 of the notification contemplated enforcement under Sec. 3(b) but treated that paragraph as enabling rather than prohibitory; it does not deprive the Government of the statutory power under Sec. 6 to enforce awards.
However, the Court applied the Full Bench authority (Basti Sugar Mills) bindingly to hold that an order under Sec. 3(b) cannot validly require payment of wages accrued prior to the date of the Government order. Thus, Sec. 3(b) cannot be used to obtain retrospective payment of wages falling due before the date of the Government order, although wages accruing after the order date could be dealt with.

(C) On the preliminary objection regarding Article 226 jurisdiction

The Court rejected the preliminary objection that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain a challenge to an order made before the commencement of the Constitution where that order was ultra vires. The Court distinguished Janardan Reddy on its facts and held that where an earlier order is ultra vires, the High Court's constitutional remedy can be invoked; using the new remedy does not amount to retrospective application of the Constitution in an impermissible sense.

Drawing these strands together the Court concluded that the Industrial Court's findings are awards under Sec. 6, that the Government could lawfully enforce such awards under Sec. 6 (and could, in appropriate circumstances, effectuate similar results under Sec. 3(b)), and that the Single Judge's restraint on enforcement was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

The High Court allowed the special appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge, and dismissed the writ petition with costs (as stated by Agarwala J.). Mootham C.J. concurred in that conclusion.

Implications (direct effects on the parties and legal consequences stated in the opinion):

The Industrial Court's findings in this case amount to an "award" within the meaning of Section 6 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; the State Government may therefore enforce those findings under Sec. 6.
The State Government also has power under Sec. 3(b) to issue orders concerning "terms and conditions of employment," and the phrase includes reinstatement and payment of wages (i.e., individual disputes as to reinstatement are within the scope of Sec. 3(b)).
However, by applying the Full Bench decision in Basti Sugar Mills Company v. State of U.P., the Court recorded that an order under Sec. 3(b) cannot validly require payment of wages that accrued prior to the date of the Government order; wages accruing after the date of such an order could be addressed.
The learned Single Judge's injunction restraining the Government from enforcing its 3 December 1949 order was set aside; the writ petition is dismissed, thereby permitting the Government to proceed to give effect to the Industrial Court's findings within the statutory limits described in the opinion.
The Court did not purport to pronounce a final opinion on all collateral questions (for example, Mootham C.J. stated he did not find it necessary to express a final opinion on the validity of the Government's order under clause (b) of Sec. 3 in this particular case, while concurring with Agarwala J.'s conclusion), but the opinion establishes the interpretative positions summarised above.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and reasoning present in the provided opinion. Where the opinion itself refrained from expressing a final view on subsidiary matters, the summary records that restraint rather than extending or inferring further conclusions.

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Ram Nath Koeri And Another v. Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. And 2 Others

Mootham, C.J:— I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother; I agree with his conclusion for the reasons which he has given, and there is little that I can usefully add. The principal question is whether the findings of the Industrial Court can be enforced as an award under Sec. 6 of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That section deals with awards and the action to be taken on them, and it is to be noted that the word “award” is not defined in the Act, nor is it used elsewhere in the Act than in this section. The word must therefore bear its ordinary meaning which is defined by Murray as “A decision after examination, a judicial sentence, especially that if an arbitrator or umpire”, and in “Webster's International Dictionary as “Judgment, sentence or final decision, specially the decision of arbitration in a case submitted.” The question is therefore whether the finding of the Industrial Court under clause 13 of the Government Notification dated the 10th March, 1948, is an award as so defined.

2. That Notification refers both to “findings” and “an award”, and in my opinion both expressions are used in the same sense. Sub-clause (1) of clause 7 requires a Conciliation Board to record its findings on each issue; sub-clauses (3) and (4) of the same clause refer to these findings as an award, and clause 12 provides for an appeal from such award. The Notification by clause 13 requires the Industrial Court after hearing the appeal to do what the Board was required to do after making an enquiry, namely “to record its findings”. I see no sufficient reason why this phrase should bear a construction different in clause 13 to what it bears in clause 7; and in any case the finding of the Industrial Court is in my opinion a determination of, or a decision on, the matters before it and is therefore an award within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Act. Clause 25 of the Notification certainly contemplates an order being made by the Government under clause (b) of Sec. 3 of the Act after an appeal has been heard, for until such an order is made the appeal will, it seems, be deemed to be still pending with the consequence that under clause 23 of the Notification the employer cannot, while that state of affairs exists, discharge or dismiss any workman without the permission of the Industrial Court. I agree however with my brother that there is nothing in the Notification or the Act which is a bar to the Government making an order under clause (b) of Sec. 3 and at the same time enforcing the award under Sec. 6 of the Act.

3. In the circumstances I do not find it necessary to express a final opinion on the question whether the order made by the Government in this case under clause (b) of Sec. 3 is a valid order; but I must not be taken as dissenting from the view expressed by Agarwala, J.

4. Agarwala, J.:— This is a special appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, allowing a writ petition and directing a writ of mandamus to issue to the State Government, the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh and Ram Nath Koeri, secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh, restraining them from taking any action to enforce the order of the U.P Government dated the 3rd of December, 1949.

5. The facts of the case are as follows. The respondent Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills, Limited, is engaged in the manufacture of sugar at Chitauni in the district of Deoria. The appellant Ram Nath Koeri who is the secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh was one of the employees of the said mills. His services Were terminated in April, 1948 on the ground that he used to be deliberately absent for a long time without permission. On the 16th of June, 1948 the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh took up his cause and filed an application before the Regional Conciliation Board (Sugar) Gorakhpur, seeking his reinstatement and payment to him of arrears of salary. This application was made under the U.P Industrial Disputes Act (Act No. 28 of 1947) read with the order of the State Government contained in notification No. 781(L)/XVIII dated 10th March, 1948. This application as well as some other applications somehow became infructuous and thereafter a fresh application was made in or about the month of July, 1949 with the same prayers as before. This application was dealt with by the Regional Conciliation Board (Sugar), Gorakhpur, and as there was no reconciliation between the parties the Board gave its award on the 6th of July, 1949 directing the sugar mills to reinstate Ram Nath Koeri with continuity of service and to pay him arrears of salary for the period elapsing between the order of dismissal and his actual reinstatement.

6. On 13th of July 1949 an appeal was filed by the Sugar mills before the state Industrial Court (Sugar). The Industrial Court confirmed the findings of the Regional Conciliation Board by an order dated 15th September, 1949.

7. On 3rd December, 1949 the Government purported to give effect to the findings of the Industrial Court by issuing a notification under Secs. 3 and 6 of the Industrial Disputes Act directing that the findings of the Industrial Court (Sugar) be enforced. The sugar mills challenged this order by means of the writ petition which has given rise to this appeal.

8. The reliefs prayed for in the writ petition were that a writ in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the order dated 15th September, 1949 passed by the Industrial Court (Sugar), Lucknow, and a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued to the U.P Government commanding it to forbear from enforcing its G.O aforesaid dated 3rd December, 1949.

9. The grounds alleged in support of the petition in so far as they have been relied upon in this appeal were that the State Government's order dated 3rd December, 1949 enforcing the findings of the Industrial Court was ultra vires because the order could be made neither under the provisions of Sec. 6 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act as the findings of the Industrial Court did not amount to an award within the meaning of that section, nor could it be made under clause (b) of Sec. 3 of the aforesaid Act because the findings did not relate to a matter falling within the purview of that clause.

10. A preliminary point was raised on behalf of the appellant that the Court could not exercise its writ jurisdiction in respect of an order which was passed before the commencement of the Constitution.

11. This preliminary objection was overruled and the learned single Judge held that the order of the Industrial Court was not an award within the meaning of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act and therefore could not be enforced under Sec. 6 of the Act and further that the subject matter of the order namely the reinstatement of Ram Nath Koeri with continuity of service and payment of wages to him from the date of his dismissal up to the date of reinstatement could not be ordered under Sec. 3(b) of the Act. In the result the learned single Judge without quashing the order of the Industrial Court (sugar) dated 15th of September, 1949, issued a writ of mandamus to the State Government not to take any action to enforce the order dated the 3rd December, 1949. Against this order this special appeal has been filed by Ram Nath Koeri and the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh.

12. In order to decide the points in controversy between the parties it is necessary to state the relevant provisions of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act and the notification of the State Government dated March, 10, 1948 issued under the Act.

13. The U.P Industrial Disputes Act (Act 28 of 1947) was passed in order to provide for powers to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to settle industrial disputes and for other incidental matters. Sec. 3 so far as is material provides:—

14. Sec. 3: “If in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience, or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order, make provision—

“(a) ……………………

“(b) for requiring employers, workmen or both to observe for such period, as may be specified in the order, such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order;

“(c) for appointing industrial courts;

“(d) for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order;

“(e) …………………………

“(f)……………………

“(g) for any incidental or supplementary matters, which appear to the State Government necessary or expedient for the purposes of the order;

“Provided that no order made under clause (b)—

“(i) shall require an employer to observe terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workmen than those which were applicable to them at any time with three months preceding the date of the order;

“(ii) shall, if an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication under clause (d), be enforced after the decision of the adjudicating authority is announced by, or with the consent of, the State Government.”

15. Sec. 4 provides that “an order made under Sec. 3, referring an industrial dispute for adjudication shall specify, as far as may be practicable, the matters upon which adjudication is necessary or desired.”

16. Sec. 6 provides for awards and actions to be taken on them:—

“(1) When an authority to which an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication has completed its inquiry, it shill, within such time as may be specified, submit its award to the State Government.

“(2) The State Government may either enforce for such period as it may specify all or any of the decisions in the award; or, either of its own motion or on application made to it, remit the award for reconsideration.

“(3) The adjudicating authority shall, after reconsideration and within such period as may be specified by the State Government, submit its award; the State Government may then enforce for such period as it may specify all or any of the decisions in the award.”

17. The phrase “industrial dispute” is not specifically defined in the Act, but the Act refers to its definition in the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (Central Act) which defines the phrase as follows:—

“‘Industrial dispute’ means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.”

18. In exercise of the powers conferred upon the State Government by clauses (b),(c), (d) and (g) of Sec. 3 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Government of Ut'car Pradesh issued a notification No. 781(L)/XVIII dated 10th March, 1948 (hereafter referred to as the notification). Under this notification two sets of Industrial Courts were established and the manner in which industrial disputes should be referred for conciliation or adjudication was laid down. There were first to be Conciliation Boards consisting of three members, a Conciliation Officer as president, a representative of the employers and a representative of the workmen. Appeals from the decisions of these Boards were to lie to the Industrial Court.

19. The procedure provided for the reference and decision of disputes was as follows:—

20. An industrial dispute may be referred by an employee or a registered Trade Union of employers or workmen or by representatives not more than five in number of the workmen in an industrial concern to the Conciliation Board. The State Government may also refer an industrial dispute to the Board for enquiry (para 5). The Board was to enquire into the dispute and try to bring about a settlement (para 6). The Board was to obtain the reply of the opposite party, and then frame issues on the questions upon which the parties were at variance and to make such enquiry as appeared to the Board necessary and after the enquiry was concluded the Board was to record its findings on each issue. If the Board was successful in bringing about an amicable settlement between the parties it was to prepare a memorandum correctly setting out the terms of the settlement. Where any amicable settlement was not reached, the Board was to record an award and the reasons for such award on the issues on which the parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement. One copy of the award was to be supplied to each of the parties and one copy was to be displayed at a conspicuous place of the premises where the Board last held its enquiry (para 7). Para 7 may be quoted here.

“7. (1) The Board before which the dispute has been preferred or to which it has been referred under the last preceding clause shall, after reading the application and the reply, if any, filed by the other party ascertain upon which questions the parties are at variance and shall then frame issues, and shall make such inquiry (which shall be concluded within 10 days excluding gazetted holidays), as appear to the Board necessary for the purpose of determining the issues. After the inquiry is concluded the Board shall record its findings on each issue.

“(2) In cases where the Board is successful in bringing about an amicable settlement between the parties on all or any of the questions at issue, it shall prepare a memorandum correctly stating the terms of the settlement which shall then be signed by all the members of the Board.

“(3) Where no amicable settlement can be reached on one or more issues the Board, if all the members thereof agree or if they do not so agree the majority of the members agreeing or if no two members agree, the Chairman alone, shall record an award and the reasons for such award, on the issues on which the parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement.

“(4) The memorandum and the award shall be completed not later than twelve days from the commencement of the inquiry (excluding gazetted holidays) and one copy each, duty authenticated by the Chairman shall be supplied immediately to the parties to the inquiry and one copy shall be displayed at a conspicuous place on the premises where the Board last held the inquiry.”

21. Any party feeling aggrieved had the right to appeal against the award to the Industrial Court (para 12). The Industrial Court was to hear the appeal and record its findings and forward the same to the State Government (para 13). Para 13 may be quoted here:—

“13. The court shall then, within ten days (excluding gazetted holidays) from its being filed hear the appeal and shall within a further period of ten days (excluding gazetted holidays) record its findings and forward the same immediately to the Provincial Government.”

22. Where a settlement had been reached and a memorandum has been prepared or where no settlement had been reached and an award had been made but no appeal had been filed therefrom, the terms and conditions of the employment specified in the memorandum or the award, as the case might be, were to be observed by the employer and the workmen for at least six months (para 16). Para 16 may be quoted here.

“16. Where a settlement has been reached and a memorandum has also been prepared under sub-clause (2) of clause 7 or where no settlement has been reached but an award has been made under sub-clause (4) of clause 7 and no appeal has been filed under clause 12, both the employer and the workmen concerned shall observe the terms and conditions of employment specified in such memorandum or the award, as the case may be, for six months next following in the first instance, and thereafter until such time as either party determines the whole or any part of such settlement or award by twenty-one days notice given to the other party in writing.

“The party giving the notice shall also send a copy of the same to the Board concerned and to the Labour Commissioner.”

23. How the Government was to give effect to the findings of the appellate Court was not expressly or directly stated in the notification but para 25 contemplated that the State Government shall notify the orders passed by it in that connection under Sec. 3(b) of the U.P Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Para. 25 says:—

“For the purposes of this Order an appeal shall be deemed to have been decided on the date on which the Provincial Government shall notify the orders therein passed by it under Sec. 5(b) of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.”

24. The notification did not refer to the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act.

25. In the present case the Industrial Court after recording its findings on the issues involved in the dispute in the same terms as the Conciliation Board had done and agreeing with the latter's findings, observed, “I recommend accordingly.”

26. The learned single Judge held that the appellate Court's “findings” were not an “award” within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the principal Act as they were merely recommendations and that therefore they could not be given effect to under that section. He further held that although the words “terms and conditions of employment” mentioned in Sec. 3(b) of the Act did include the employment or reemployment or re-instatement and the payment of wages or compensation to an employee, Sec. 3(b) of the Act was “not meant for the purpose of dealing with individual disputes arising out of the application of the terms or conditions of employment.”

27. The contention of the appellants firstly is that the word “findings” used in paragraphs 7 and 13 of the notification and the word “award” used in paragraphs 7 and 16 have one and the same meaning and that the “findings” of the Industrial Court are “an award” within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Act and as such the same can be enforced under that section; secondly, that where the findings of the appellate Court are the same as the findings of the Board, the order of the Government enforcing the findings of the appellate court in fact enforces the findings of the Board; and thirdly, that the findings of the Industrial Court could be enforced by means of an order under Sec. 3(b) of the Act.

28. In my opinion the word “findings” as used in the notification and the word “award” as used in the notification and in the Act, connote the same thing and have been used to denote the same idea. The word “finding” means “the result of a judicial examination or enquiry; a verdict”, (see Webster's International Distionary). The word “award” also means the same thing, “a judgment, sentence or final decision; specially the decision of arbitrators in a case submitted” (Webster's International Distionary). It will be noticed that in clause (1) of Paragraph 7 of the notification the Board is to record its findings on each issue and these very findings on each issue are designated as an award in clause (3) of that paragraph. The award in clause (3) is not a consolidated final order of a case like a decree of a civil court, but is a decision on each issue. The appellate Court's findings are presumably on the issues referred to it in appeal. The word “findings” used in paragraph 13 cannot have different meaning from the same word used in paragraph 7.

29. It is not correct to say that the appellate court does not decide the appeal. Paragraph 13 directs the court to hear the appeal and to record its findings. The recording of the findings is the decision of the appeal. The notification itself contemplates that the appellate court shall give its decision (vide pin 25). The mere fact that the Industrial Court has to submit its findings to the State Government and it is in the power of the State Government to give effect or not to give effect to those findings does not alter the nature of the findings. Sec. 6 of the Act contemplates that the award shall not take effect of its own force but shall be given effect to by the order of the State Government. The State Government has been given power under that section to remit the award for reconsideration of the Court and it may give effect to the award or it may not. It is not bound in all cases to give effect to the award even after reconsideration by the Industrial Court concerned. It is true that under paragraph 16 of the notification the award of the Board takes effect automatically provided there has been no appeal. But this is so because the Government has chosen to give effect to the award of the Board. It need not have given to it that effect. The mere fact that certain findings of a tribunal do not become binding upon the parties of their own force does not take away from them the character of “findings” or of an “award”. Even under the Arbitration Act an award made during the pendency of a suit must be given effect to by the Court by passing a decree on its terms, and it does not bind the parties otherwise. The mere fact that the Industrial Court in the present case after giving its findings used the phrase “I recommend accordingly” should not be given undue importance because the nature of the findings recorded by the Industrial Court is to be judged by the provisions of the notification and not by the phraseology employed by the Industrial Court. As already stated the notification calls the determination of the Industrial Court on each issue as a “finding” and the disposal of the appeal as the “decision” of the appeal (vide paragraph 25). The phraseology employed by the Industrial Court in the present case was erroneous. It should have said “I find accordingly” instead of saying “I recommend accordingly” and then should have sent its decision to the State Government. I am, therefore, of opinion that the words “award” and “findings” used in the notification are interchangeable and mean the same thing, namely, verdict or determination or decision, and that the findings of the appellate Court amount to an award within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Act. The findings of the Industrial Court being an award there is nothing to prevent the Government from enforcing them under Sec. 6 of the Act.

30. The only ground upon which it was said that the findings of the Industrial Court could not be given effect to under Sec. 6 of the Act was that such findings do not amount to an award, and this was also the only ground urged before us in appeal on behalf of the respondent. It was not urged that the Industrial Court could not be an “authority to which an industrial dispute could have been referred for adjudication” or that the arguments heard by the Industrial Court could not be termed “an enquiry” within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Act. Indeed such objections could not be raised in view of the fact that when an appeal is filed against the award of the Conciliation Board the dispute is referred to the Industrial Court for adjudication and the enquiry contemplated in Sec. 6 need not necessarily consist of hearing of evidence but may also be confined to the hearing of arguments. Further, when there is an appeal and the Industrial Court confirms or alters the award of the Conciliation Board, the award of the Conciliation Board merges in the decision of the Industrial Court and that decision is the final award in the industrial dispute. There is nothing in Sec. 6 to prevent it from being given effect to by the State Government as provided in that section. Paragraph 25 of the notification does not prevent the Government from enforcing the award under Sec. 6 of the Act. It is true that the notification does not itself expressly provide for enforcing the decision of an appeal under Sec. 6 of the Act. On the contrary paragraph 25 of the Order contemplates that when there has been appeal against the award of the Board the Government may enforce the appellate Court's findings under Sec. 3(b) of the Act. But this paragraph is merely enabling and is not prohibitive. It does not place any restriction upon the Government to avail of Sec. 6 of the Act to enforce the findings of the Industrial Court. That power is given to the Government by Statute and the provisions of the notification should not be read in such a way as to deprive it of that power.

31. Reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent upon a decision of a Bench of this Court in Writ No. 7413 of 1951 (Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh). In that case the matter in dispute was whether the State Government could issue an order under clause (b) of Sec. 3 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, directing the employers to observe for a certain period such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order with respect to the medical staff and the watch and ward staff. The question was whether the doctor and the compounder attached to the medical staff could be designated ‘workmen’ for the purposes of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act. The Bench held that they were not workmen and on this ground the award of the Board and the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal were quashed. In passing, however, the Bench also expressed the opinion that there could have been no appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal because the Industrial Court gives no “decision.” It may be; noted that an appeal lies to the Labour Appellate Tribunal against “an award or a decision” under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 2(c) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act. This view of the Bench was founded upon the judgment of the learned single Judge which is in appeal before us and another judgment of the same learned Judge in Writ Petition No. 54 of 1952 (Krishna Prasad Bhargava v. The G.G Industrial Mazdoor Union, Agra) decided on the 24th February, 1955 in which the learned Judge had held that no appeal lay to the Labour Appellate Tribunal against the findings of the Industrial Court. The Bench approved of the decision in the latter case. The observations of the Bench were, however, by way of obiter dicta and are also distinguishable on facts, as in the present case we have not to consider whether the findings of the appellate Court amount to an “award or decision” within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1953. What we have to consider in the present case is whether the findings of the appellate Court amount to an award within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act. I am clearly of opinion that they do amount to an “award” within the meaning of that section.

32. The argument of Mr. Shanti Bhushan learned counsel for the appellants that the appellate Court having affirmed the award of the Board the Government order of 3rd December, 1949 though purporting to enforce the findings of the appellate Court in substance and effect enforces the findings of the Board which it admittedly could do under Sec. 6 of the Act, cannot be accepted. The Government order of 3rd of December, 1949 must be read according to its terms and as it does not purport to enforce the findings of the Board it cannot be said that in effect it enforces those findings.

33. Assuming, however, that the order of the appellate Court could not be given effect to under Sec. 6 of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, the question to be considered is whether the Government had power to make the order it did under the provisions of Sec. 3(b) of the Act. This question depends for its determination upon the scope of the Phrase “terms and conditions of employment” as used in the aforesaid section. Does the direction regarding reinstatement of a dismissed employee and payment to him of wages for a certain period fall within the purview of “terms and conditions of employment” or not? The learned single Judge has, with respect, given very good reasons for holding that the phrase “terms and conditions of employment” does include the subject matter of employment or reemployment or reinstatement and payment of wages. Besides, there are two indications in the notification of March, 10, 1948, itself in support of this view. Paragraph 16 of the notification directs both employer and workmen concerned to observe the “terms and conditions of employment” specified in the memorandum or award of the Conciliation Board and again paragraph 25 contemplates that the findings of the appellate Court shall be given effect to by an order under Sec. 3(b) of the Act. If the contention on behalf of the employers were to be accepted that although there may be an industrial dispute relating to reinstatement or payment of wages the dispute is not with regard to the “terms and conditions of employment,” the result would be that even the award of the Conciliation Board could not have been given effect to. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the findings of the Industrial Court could not be given effect to at all by the Government, would render the creation of the Industrial Court nugatory. Such a result could not have been intended by the Government when it issued the notification of the 10th of March, 1948 and unless we are forced to accept the interpretation contended for by learned counsel for the respondents, we should not readily accept it.

34. The expression “terms of employment” has reference to the propositions or promises in the contract of employment which when assented to or accepted settles the contract between the parties. The word “terms” presupposes the existence of a contract of employment. Where there is in existence a contract of employment all that can form the subject-matter of the contract, i.e, all the points of agreement between the parties relating to the employment are the “terms” of the employment. The payment of wages is one of the essential ingredients of a contract of employment. So is the dismissal of the employee.

35. The word “conditions” is a word of wider import. It means “that which must exist as the occasion or concomitant of something else; that which is requisite in order that something else should take effect; an essential qualification; stipulation; terms specified” (see Webster's International Dictionary). The word ‘conditions’ includes the idea conveyed by the word “terms” but goes beyond it and is not confined to what is included in that word. Conditions of employment may be laid down by law or by an order of Government. The conditions may be general or particular, may refer to a class or an individual. They may lay down in what circumstances and on what terms a person shall be employed or shall not be employed or reinstated.

36. The expression “terms and conditions of employment” is wider in scope than the expression “terms and conditions of labour.” The idea that matters relating to employment or non-employment are not included within the scope of the expression “terms and conditions of employment” is derived from certain authorities which had to consider not the expression “terms and conditions of employment” but altogether a different expression namely “employment” or “non-employment” or “terms of employment” or “conditions of labour” as used in the definition of an “industrial dispute” in Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act No. XIV of 1947. It will be noticed that the definition of “Industrial dispute” does not employ the phrase “conditions of employment.” The expression “conditions of labour” mentioned in the definition is very much limited in its scope as compared to the expression “conditions of employment.” The expression “conditions of labour” has reference to the amenities to be provided to the workmen and the conditions under which they will be required to work. In ‘Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal Bombay,1 the Federal Court had to consider whether a dispute as to reinstatement was outside the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In considering this matter the Court held that reinstatement was within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, as it fell within the purview of the terms “employment or non-employment.” Their Lordships observed:—

“Employment or non employment constitutes the subject-matter of one class of industrial disputes the other two classes of disputes being those connected with the terms of employment and the conditions of labour. The failure to employ or the refusal to employ are actions on the part of the employer which would be covered by the term “employment or non-employment.” Reinstatement is connected with non-employment and is therefore Within the words of the definition.”

37. This decision was followed in the India Paper Pulp Company Ltd. v. India Paper Pulp Workers Union A.I.R 1949 F.C 148. in which it was held that a claim for compensation for wrongful dismissal is a dispute in connection with non-employment.

38. It may be noticed that their Lordships had not to interpret the phrase “conditions of employment” in those two cases. Similarly in the English case. The National Associations of local Government Officers v. Balson Corporation 1943 A.C 166 at p. 169. the same expression was considered and not the phrase “conditions of employment.” These decisions, therefore, do not afford any assistance to us in interpreting the phrase “terms and conditions of employment” as used in Sec. 3(b) of the Act. In my judgment the phrase “terms and conditions of employment” as used in clause (b) of Sec. 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act includes all questions which fall within the purview of an “industrial dispute”.

39. The learned Single Judge though holding that the expression “terms and conditions of employment” was wide enough to cover the subjects of “employment, non-employment and conditions of labour” which were used in the definition of an industrial dispute, was still of opinion that the language of clause (b) of Sec. 3 denoted that the clause was “meant for the purpose of passing orders by which the Government gave directions with respect to what the terms and conditions of employment should be and not how a particular term and condition of employment already in existence should be acted upon”, and further that Sec. 3(b) was not meant for dealing with individual disputes arising out of the application of a term or condition of employment and that the provision in Sec. 3(b) was “for the purpose of enabling the State Government to vary the agreed terms and conditions of employment.”

40. With respect, I find little justification in limiting the normal connotation of the words “terms and conditions of employment” as used in Sec. 3(6). It was said that the limitation, arose from the expression “to observe for such period as may be specified.” It is not, however, clear to me how those words limit the scope of the section to general orders, and why an order cannot direct in an individual case that certain terms and conditions of employment which had been already agreed upon should be observed in their entirety or with such modifications, alterations, additions or omissions and “for such period as may be prescribed.” It was observed by the learned Single Judge that the subject-matter of an individual dispute was dealt with separately in clauses (c) and (d) of Sec. 3 and that any decision in such disputes could not be the subject matter of an order passed under Sec. 3(b). This position was not taken up by the learned counsel for the respondent who conceded that the subject-matter of an industrial dispute could also be the subject-matter of Sec. 3(b), but he urged that the order must relate to the “terms and conditions of employment” and that the subject of reinstatement did not fall within those terms. I have already pointed out that the subject of ‘reinstatement’ falls within the expression ‘terms and conditions of employment’. In my opinion (and I say so with due respect) it would not be correct to say that the subject-matter of an individual industrial dispute could not be made the subject of an order under Sec. 3(b). The various clauses of Sec. 3 of the Act should not be read as if they excluded the subject-matter covered by every other clause. They should all be read together as conferring a power upon the Government to make orders falling within one or other or all or some of the clauses. It was said that the State Government had no power of adjudicating upon an industrial dispute and that this has to be done by Industrial Courts. It is true that the State Government is not to decide the dispute in the manner in which Courts decide such disputes but there can be no doubt that after the findings of the Court had been obtained, the Act contemplates that it is the State Government which would enforce such decisions in such manner and to such an extent as it considered fit. This could be done under Sec. 6 of the Act, and I can find no adequate reason why it could not also be done by an order under Sec. 3(b) of the Act. The mere fact that an order under Sec. 3(b) enforces an order of the Industrial Court will not make the order invalid provided it is in respect of “terms and conditions of employment.” It was said that there might be industrial disputes which did not relate to the “terms and conditions of employment” at all and, to illustrate the point, reference was made to a dispute between employers and employers or between workmen and workmen and it was pointed out that such a dispute could not be a dispute relating to the “terms and conditions of employment.” With respect I may point out that according to the definition of an “industrial dispute” as given in Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, there can be a dispute between employers and employers or between workmen and workmen which may relate to the terms and conditions of employment. For instance, one of the conditions of employment may be that a person who has been dismissed for grave dereliction of duty shall not be reemployed by any other employer for a particular period. Contrary to this condition, the dismissed employee is employed by an employer. This may give rise to a dispute between the employer who had dismissed the employee and the employer who has re-employed the employee. So also there may be a dispute between workmen and workmen. One of the conditions of employment may be that no employee shall accept wages below a certain minimum. An employee who contravenes this condition may be challenged by other employees and a dispute between an employee and employees may arise.

41. It was said that a great lacuna was left in the notification of March 10, 1948. With respect, there would be no lacuna if Sec. 3(b) and the notification were interpreted as I have endeavoured to interpret them. It is well settled that a law should be so interpreted that the object of the Legislature is carried into effect rather than nullified.

42. In the Full Bench case of Basti Sugar Mills Company v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1954 A.L.J 452. it has been held that the State Government can make an order under Sec. 3(b) of the Act to be operative retrospectively. This means that no order can be made for the payment of wages that had accrued prior to the date of the order. This Bench is bound by this decision and therefore the claim for wages which had accrued due before the date of the order could not have been awarded by the State Government by an order made in exercise of the powers vested in it under Sec. 3(b) of the Act. But this does not affect the order relating to wages which have fallen due after the date of the order. If it were held that the findings of the Industrial Court are not an “Award” within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Act, the appellant would be entitled to be paid at least the wages which have become or will become due to him from the 3rd of December, 1949 up to the date on which he is reinstated. There is nothing in the Full Bench case referred to above to affect the wages for the period after the date of the order made under Sec. 3(b).

43. The preliminary objection raised by the appellant before the learned single judge that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 in respect of an order which was made before the commencement of the Constitution has to be rejected. If the order of the 3rd December, 1949 was ultra vires it was invalid in law and could be challenged by a suit. What the Constitution has done is to provide the High Court with a summary remedy to issue writs, directions or orders fo) quashing orders which are illegal or ultra vires or to prevent something being done which is illegal or ultra vires. Where an order which is ultra vires was passed before the commencement of the Constitution and the Constitution provides a new remedy in addition to an existing one for the aggrieved party, the recourse to the new remedy does not mean that the Constitution is given effect to retrospectively. The decision of the Supreme Court in Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad A.I.R 1951 S.C 217. is distinguishable. In that case the order which was passed before the commencement of the Constitution had become final and could not have been challenged in any Court of law according to the law then in force. As I am of opinion that the State Govt. has power to enforce the order of the Industrial Tribunal under Sec. 6 of the Act, I would allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the writ petition with costs throughout.

44. Appeal allowed.

Ram Nath Koeri And Another v. Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. And 2 Others

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mootham, C.J. and Agarwala, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Ram Nath Koeri and Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh)

Respondent's Arguments (Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. and related respondents)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ram Nath Koeri And Another v. Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. And 2 Others

Comments