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citation codes
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Acts
  • 728 (A), S. 3. U.P Road Transport Act, II of 1951,
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • S. 87-A, is ultra vires. Section 47-A
  • S. 87-A (2) of the Municipalities Act.
  • S. 87-A (6) and above rule
  • point.16. Section 47-A
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 728 (A), S. 3. U.P Road Transport Act, II of 1951,
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • S. 87-A, is ultra vires. Section 47-A
  • S. 87-A (2) of the Municipalities Act.
  • S. 87-A (6) and above rule
  • point.16. Section 47-A
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Agarwala, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was elected President of the Municipal Board, Bareilly in October 1953. On 15-12-1954 twenty-seven members of the Board gave notice of intention to move a motion of non-confidence under S. 87-A(2) of the Municipalities Act to the District Magistrate, together with the motion of non-confidence. The District Magistrate issued notice convening a meeting for 17-1-1955 at 11 A.M. at the Municipal Office, but the notice was not accompanied by a full copy of the non-confidence motion. At the meeting the Presiding Officer, Mr. R.P. Saksena (Civil & Sessions Judge of Bareilly), did not initially have the motion text; it was obtained from the District Magistrate's office within five minutes and read aloud. After discussion, a vote by show of hands resulted in 32 votes for the motion out of 38 present; the Presiding Officer declared the motion carried and informed the District Magistrate and the appellant.

The appellant filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging these proceedings on multiple grounds. A learned Single Judge dismissed that petition; this special appeal challenges that dismissal. The appeal was heard by Agarwala, J., who delivered the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the meeting to consider the motion of non-confidence was properly convened where the full text of the motion was not supplied with the notice of the meeting.
  2. Whether the meeting was properly conducted and constituted, including whether a member (Om Prakash) was improperly prevented from replying a second time during debate.
  3. Whether non-members were permitted to sit among members and thereby improperly participate in the vote, affecting the validity of the vote taken by show of hands.
  4. Whether a demand for a poll at the meeting was improperly refused, affecting the validity of the voting process.
  5. Whether sub-section (3) of S. 47-A (the procedure after a non-confidence motion is carried) is ultra vires (i.e., an unconstitutional or invalid delegation of power to the State Government).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The meeting was not properly convened because the full text of the non-confidence motion was not supplied to members along with the notice of the meeting.
  • The meeting was not properly conducted because a member (Om Prakash) who wanted to reply to allegations against the President was not allowed to speak again; this vitiated the discussion.
  • Non-members were allowed to sit among Board members so it was impossible to distinguish members from non-members during the show-of-hands vote, making the vote unreliable.
  • When the result was declared by show of hands, Om Prakash demanded a poll which was refused.
  • Sub-section (3) of S. 47-A is ultra vires because it vests an unbridled discretion in the State Government to either ask the President to resign or dissolve the Board without rules guiding that discretion.

Respondent / Presiding Officer and State Arguments

  • The law (S. 87-A and S. 87-A(3)) does not require that the full text of the motion be sent with the notice; it is sufficient that the substance be communicated, and in any event the motion text was read at the meeting and no member raised an objection there and then.
  • The Presiding Officer (Mr. R.P. Saksena) filed an affidavit denying that Om Prakash was improperly stopped; even if Om Prakash had already spoken, it was within the Presiding Officer's discretion (and reasonable given the three-hour time limit under S. 87-A) to refuse a second speech.
  • The Presiding Officer swore that non-members were seated separately and were distinguishable, so there was no difficulty in ascertaining that only members voted.
  • The Presiding Officer denied that a lawful demand for a poll was made and stated that contradictory affidavits existed from both sides; the Presiding Officer's account was to be believed.
  • As to S. 47-A, the State (implicitly) contended that the statutory choice given to the President and the limited options given to the State Government do not amount to an arbitrary delegation of power; the State Government must consider the President's reasons and act reasonably.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 Illustrates that a statutory provision giving an unregulated discretion may offend Article 14 if the discretion allows choosing any person without guiding rules; in that case discretion was held not ultra vires because it was regulated by other statutory provisions (Motor Vehicles Act). The Court distinguished Saghir Ahmad on the facts: unlike that case, the discretion conferred by S. 47-A is constrained (limited to two courses) and must be exercised after considering reasons, so it is not comparable to an unregulated discretion that would offend Article 14.
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 224 Holds that a provision granting an absolute or unfettered power to a licensing authority (with only a requirement to record reasons) is ultra vires because it vests unrestrained will in a single individual and lacks checks to prevent injustice. The Court held the present statutory scheme different: the State Government's power under S. 47-A is not unfettered; it must weigh reasons given by the President and choose between specified alternatives, so it is not the sort of unrestrained delegation condemned in Dwarka Prasad.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined each contention in turn and applied statutory text and facts to reach conclusions:

  1. Notice and sufficiency of motion text:

    The Court observed that S. 87-A(3) requires the District Magistrate to convene the meeting and send notice of date and time by registered post to every member. It held that the law does not require the full text of the motion to be sent with the notice; it is sufficient that the substance of the motion be communicated. The Court noted a rule under S. 297(1) in the Municipalities Act that normally requires notices to "specify every motion", but doubted whether that rule applies to motions under S. 87-A because S. 87-A provides a special procedure (including S. 87-A(6)). Even if the full text should have been sent, the Court found that here the text was read at the meeting, no member objected at the time that they were unprepared, and no prejudice resulted. Therefore any omission did not vitiate the meeting.

  2. Restriction on speaking by Om Prakash:

    The Court relied on the Presiding Officer's affidavit and on the statutory three-hour time limit under S. 87-A. With 45 members potentially entitled to speak, strict time management and the practice of allowing members to speak once (with the mover having the privilege to reply) is reasonable. The Court found the Presiding Officer's refusal to allow a second speech by Om Prakash to be proper and not vitiating.

  3. Presence of non-members and integrity of voting:

    The Presiding Officer swore that non-members sat separately and were clearly distinguishable. The Court accepted this account and held there was no difficulty in ascertaining whether only members voted. Accordingly, this allegation lacked force.

  4. Demand for a poll:

    The Presiding Officer denied that a valid demand for a poll was made; affidavits were contradictory. The Court saw no reason to disbelieve the Presiding Officer's statement and rejected the contention.

  5. Validity of S. 47-A(3) (ultra vires challenge):

    The Court analysed the statutory scheme: S. 47-A requires a President, upon communication that a non-confidence motion has been passed, within ten days either to resign or to represent to the State Government to dissolve the Board stating reasons. If representation is made, S. 47-A(2) permits the State Government to either ask the President to resign or dissolve the Board. The Court held that this gives the President an option and requires the State Government to consider the reasons and make a reasoned decision. That discretion is limited (only two courses) and must be exercised reasonably. The Court concluded that such a discretion is not arbitrary or uncontrolled and that it would be impracticable to lay down exhaustive rules to guide the State Government in weighing varied reasons. The Court distinguished the two Supreme Court decisions cited by learned counsel (Saghir Ahmad and Dwarka Prasad) on their facts and held those authorities did not render S. 47-A invalid in this context.

  6. Credibility and evidential findings:

    Where facts depended on affidavit evidence (e.g., seating of non-members, demand for poll, conduct of the Presiding Officer), the Court accepted the affidavit of the Presiding Officer, R.P. Saksena, over contradictory affidavits for the appellant, finding no reason to disbelieve him.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and orders given by the Court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Single Judge's dismissal of the appellant's petition under Article 226.
  • The Court directed that the costs of the State Counsel be taxed at Rs. 160/-. (The opinion records this as the costs order.)

Implications noted by the Court:

  • The Court concluded that the procedural omissions alleged (non-supply of the full text with the notice, refusal to allow a second speech by a member, seating of non-members, refusal of a poll) did not vitiate the meeting in the circumstances of this case because either the statute did not require the full text to be sent, the text was read at the meeting and no objection was raised, or the Presiding Officer's conduct was lawful and reasonable.
  • The Court held that S. 47-A does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power; the State Government's discretion under that section is limited and must be exercised reasonably after considering the President's reasons. The Court expressly distinguished the cited Supreme Court authorities on their facts.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond the factual and statutory conclusions reached; it confined its analysis to the applicability of statutory provisions and the absence of prejudice to members from the procedural steps taken.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." (Costs taxed as above.)

    Abdul Wajid v. State Of U.P And Others

    Agarwala, J.:— This is a special appeal against the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the appellant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The facts briefly are as follows:

    2. In October 1953, the appellant was elected a President of the Municipal Board, Bareilly. On 15-12-1954, a notice of intention to move a non-confidence motion was given by twenty-seven members of the Board to the District Magistrate along with the motion of non-confidence. This was under S. 87-A (2) of the Municipalities Act. Thereupon the District Magistrate issued notice to the members of the Board that a meeting to consider the non-confidence motion would be held on 17-1-1955, at 11 A.M in the Municipal Office. The notice, however, was not accompanied with a full copy of the non-confidence motion. On 17-1-1955 a meeting was held and the Chairman of the meeting was Mr. R.P Saksena, Civil & Sessions Judge of Bareilly. He had no copy of the non-confidence motion with him. It was sent for from the office of the District Magistrate within five minutes and the proceedings were commenced by reading out the text of the motion of non-confidence. Thereafter discussions took place, and after discussions votes taken, and 32 persons are said to have voted for the motion, out of 38 that were present. The Presiding Officer thereupon declared the motion to be carried and sent intimation of the same to the District Magistrate and the appellant.

    3. These proceedings are challenged by the appellant on several grounds. It is alleged that the meeting was neither properly convened, nor properly conducted, nor properly constituted. The appellant alleges that as the full text of the motion of non-confidence was not supplied to the members along with notice of the meeting, the meeting was not properly convened. It is further alleged that at the meeting one Om Prakash, a member of the Board, wanted to reply to the allegations made against the President, i.e, the appellant, but he was not allowed to speak by the Presiding Officer on the ground that he had already spoken once. It is alleged that as the discussion could he had for full three hours, and there was enough time and as every member had a right to reply to what had been stated by the other side, the meeting was vitiated because Om Prakash was stopped from replying. Then it is stated that the members of the public were allowed to sit amongst the members of the Board with the result that it was impossible to distinguish as to who was the member of the Board and who was a non-member, and when the recording of the votes was taken by show of hands it was not possible to say whether nonmembers had raised their hands or not. It was next alleged that when the result of the show of hands was declared by the Presiding Officer ‘Om Prakash demanded a poll’ which was, however, refused.

    4. So far as the allegation that the full text of the motion for non-confidence was not supplied to the members of the Board along with the notice of holding the meeting is concerned, the law does not require that the full text of the motion should be sent along with the notice. It is enough that the substance of the motion is made known to the members in the notice cilnculated to them for the meeting to be held to consider the same. S. 87-A(3) requires that

    “the District Magistrate shall convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion to be held at the office of the Municipal Board on the date and at the time appointed by him and he shall send by registered post a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefor, to every member of the Board.”

    5. Thus it would appear that under this section it would be quite in order if the substance of the motion is communicated to the members in the notice sent to the members.

    6. At page 630 of the Municipalities Act are given rules for the manner of convening meetings and of giving notice thereof. Reliance is placed upon a rule made under S. 297(1) of the Act for the manner of convening the meeting and of giving notice thereof. A model is printed at page 630 of the Act and it is alleged that this rule has been adopted by the Municipal Board of Bareilly. The rule provides:

    “(1) Not less than three days before a meeting a notice to attend the meeting, signed by the secretary, or, in his absence, by the president or a vice-president, shall be circulated to each member of the Board.

    (2) A notice to attend a meeting shall specify every motion or proposition to be brought forward at the meeting along with the case referred to in sub-s. (6) of S. 94 of the Act, the further particulars required by that sub-section and shall state generally any other business to be transacted thereat.”

    7. This rule certainly does require that the motion or proposition to be brought forward at the meeting shall be “specified”, which means that the full text thereof shall be given in the notice circulated to members. It is, however, doubtful whether this rule applies to the procedure prescribed for motions of non-confidence against the President. S. 87-A(1) says, that subject to the provisions of this section, a motion expressing non-confidence in the President shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down below. The procedure to be followed for the form of notice is the procedure laid down in S. 87-A (6) and above rule does not appear to apply to notices issued under S. 87-A.

    8. At the same time, however, it must be stated that it is highly desirable that the full text of the non-confidence motion is mentioned in the notice.

    9. But even if we were of the opinion that the full text of the notice should have been sent to the members, we would have been unable to hold that, in the present case, the meeting was vitiated because of the omission to do so. It is not alleged that the text of the motion was not read at the meeting as stated on behalf of the opposite party. Therefore all the members knew of the text at the commencement of the meeting. But nobody raised any objection that because the text of the motion had not been supplied to them they were not prepared to discuss the motion. The defect in the notice not having been pointed out by any member at the meeting, it would be too late for any one of them to make it a ground of attack against the validity of the meeting. It seems to us that every one knew what the motion was and whoever wanted to say anything had enough opportunity of ventilating his views. No harm was caused by the omission. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the meeting was not properly or legally convened.

    10. The allegation that Om Prakash, member of the Board, was stopped from replying to the allegations made against the President by the speakers who spoke in favour of the motion of non-confidence is controverted in the affidavit of the Presiding Officer, Mr. R.P Saksena, filed before us. Even assuming that Om Prakash asked for an opportunity to reply after he had already once spoken at the meeting, it does not appear to us that the action of the Presiding Officer in refusing an opportunity to him to speak a second time was, in anyway, improper. It may be noted that the time limit for such meetings under S. 87-A is only three hours. There were 45 members of the Board and if everyone wanted to speak no member could be given more than four minutes. It would certainly be a wise procedure that so far as possible, a member was allowed to speak only once except the mover of the motion who would, in ordinary circumstances, be given an opportunity to reply to the debate. Om Prakash was not a mover of the motion. Ordinarily it is the privilege of the mover to reply to the debate and no other member can speak, as of right, twice except with the permission of the Presiding Officer. We, therefore, do not consider that there is any force in the allegation made by the appellant on this point.

    11. The allegation, that non-members were allowed to sit along with the members and that it was not possible to distinguish the members from the non-members, with the result that nobody could say whether the members alone participated in the voting, is also denied in the affidavit sworn by the Presiding Officer. He has clearly stated that the non-members were sitting separately from the members and they were clearly distinguishable and there was no difficulty in ascertaining whether the members alone were voting or somebody else was also participating in the vote. There is, therefore, no force in this allegation.

    12. It was then urged that when the result of the voting by show of hands was announced by the Presiding Officer, Om Prakash at once demanded a poll. This allegation also is denied by the Presiding Officer in his affidavit. Affidavits of some other persons have been filed on behalf of both the parties in which contradictory allegations have been made on this point. We see no reason, however, to disbelieve the statement of the Presiding Officer.

    13. Lastly it was urged that sub-s. (3) of S. 47-A, which prescribes the procedure after the motion of non-confidence has been carried out in the meeting held under S. 87-A, is ‘ultra vires’. Section 47-A lays down that:

    “If a motion of non-confidence in the President has been passed by the board and submitted to the State Government and communicated to the President in accordance with the provisions of S. 87-A the President shall within ten days of such communication either resign or represent to the State Government to dissolve the Board, stating the reasons therefor.”

    14. If such a representation is made the State Government “may after considering the same ‘either ask the president to resign or dissolve the Board including the President’”. (S. 47-A (2)). It is argued that this sub-section gives an unbriddled power to the State Government either to ask the President to resign or to dissolve the Board and that no rule has been laid down to guide the discretion of the State Government in this respect.

    15. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in — ‘Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P’, AIR 1954 SC 728 (A); and — ‘Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P’, AIR 1954 SC 224 (B). We are of the opinion that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel on this point.

    16. Section 47-A gives the President a choice, either to resign at once when a motion of non-confidence has been passed against him or to ask the State Government to dissolve the Board. When he takes recourse to the latter alternative he has to give reasons why the Board should be dissolved. The reasons may be multifarious. The State Government has been given power to consider those reasons and then to decide whether to act upon the advice of the President by dissolving the Board or to ask the President to resign. The State Government has to consider the reasons given, and to weigh the pros and cons of the request made, by the President and has to come to a decision either in favour of the request or against it. Obviously in such a case the State Government has to act reasonably as the circumstances of the case may require.

    17. In such matters a discretion limited only to the two courses pointed out in the section is a discretion which cannot be said to be arbitrary or uncontrolled. It is controlled because the discretion is limited to the two courses pointed in the section; and no further rules for the guidance of that discretion are feasible because the reasons given by the President may be, as already stated, many and varied. It would be an impossible task to lay down rules in such matters as these. It is best to leave such matters to the State Government. The giving of such a discretion, in these circumstances, to the State Government cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be called the vesting of arbitrary power in the hands of the State Government.

    18. The facts of the two cases cited by the learned counsel were quite different. In ‘AIR 1954 SC 728 (A)’, S. 3. U.P Road Transport Act, II of 1951, authorised the State Government to declare that the road transport service in general or on particular routes should be run and operated by the State Government exclusively or by the State Government in conjunction with a railway or partly by the State Government and partly by others in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The whole question was how was the last part of that section to be implemented and carried out? The Supreme Court observed:

    “If the State can choose any and every person it likes for the purpose of being associated with the transport service and there are no rules to guide its discretion, plainly the provision would offend against Article 14 of the Constitution.”

    19. But the provision was held not to be ‘ultra vires’ because the discretion was to be regulated by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. What was urged by the learned counsel was that in the present case the discretion is not to be regulated by any other provision.

    20. In ‘AIR 1954 SC 224 (B)’, the provisions of Cl. 4(3), U.P Coal Control Order, which related to the granting and refusing of licence were held to be ‘ultra vires’ on the ground that the licensing authority had been given an absolute power to grant, renew or refuse to renew a licence, suspend, cancel, revoke or modify any licence under this Order and the only thing he had to do was to record a reason of the action taken by him; and further that the power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Controller might chose to delegate the same, and the choice could be made in favour of any or every person. In these circumstances it was held that the Order committed to the unrestrained will of a single individual the power to grant, withhold or cancel licence in any way he chose and there was nothing in the order which could ensure a proper execution of the power or operate as a check upon injustice that might result from improper execution of the same.

    21. The State Government in the present case has not been given such unfettered power. It has to weigh the reasons stated by the President for his request of dissolving the board and it is only then that the State Government is expected to come to the conclusion whether to grant the request or not grant it. We are not prepared to hold that these provisions can be termed to be discriminatory or uncontrolled delegation of power. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. We direct that the costs of the State Counsel shall be taxed at Rs. 160/-.

    D.S.P

    22. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Abdul Wajid v. State Of U.P And Others
    (Mar 30, 1955)