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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Malik, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter concerns a money decree originally passed by the Civil Judge, Lucknow, on 14 August 1933. Various execution efforts followed. Both the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder died. On 10 August 1945 an application was made seeking substitution of names and transmission of the decree to the Civil Judge, Bahraich, for execution. Objections to substitution/transmission were dismissed by order dated 23 November 1946, and an appeal against that dismissal was dismissed on 11 September 1950. A certificate under Section 39 of the Civil Procedure Code transferring the decree to the Bahraich court was issued on 12 December 1946 and received in Bahraich on 16 December 1946. On 30 August 1947 the decree-holder filed an application in the Bahraich court for execution, setting out a long list of immovable properties to be attached and sold and claiming an amount of Rs. 38,522/7/3 (including transfer-certificate amount and interest). The Bahraich court allowed an objection that questioned limitation under Section 48 CPC; this decision was appealed. The sole legal point for the appellate court to decide was whether the 30 August 1947 application was barred by limitation under Section 48, Civil Procedure Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application for execution filed on 30 August 1947 is barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Whether the 30 August 1947 application must be treated as a fresh application for execution (and thus subject to limitation) or as a continuance/part of the earlier 10 August 1945 application made in the Lucknow court and preserved by the certificate under Section 39 CPC and transmission.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the appellant contended that an application under Section 39 (for transmission) can in no circumstances be an application for execution: after transmission, a new/fresh application for execution must be made to the court to which the decree is transmitted.
  • Reference was made to Order 21 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code to support the view that execution must be applied for to the appropriate court, and to Rule 181 of the Oudh Civil Rules, which states that execution received from another court is to be entered in a register and that the documents required by Order XXI, Rule 6 must accompany an application for execution when made.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Respondents' counsel argued that the 10 August 1945 application was itself an application for execution of the decree and that the 30 August 1947 filing in Bahraich merely supplied a list of properties to be sold, and was not a fresh application; accordingly, the 1947 filing should be treated as a continuation of the 1945 application and within time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
B. Bandhu Singh v. K.T. Bank Ltd., Gorakhpur, A.I.R. 1931 All. 134 Holds that an application seeking attachment of fresh property after expiry of 12 years is a fresh application within the meaning of Section 48 CPC and cannot be entertained. The court relied on this authority for the proposition that adding new properties after the limitation period converts the request into a fresh application barred by Section 48.
Hayatunnessa Chowdhurani v. Achia Khatun, I.L.R. 50 Cal. 743 Holds that a decree-holder should not be allowed, by subsequent application after expiry of limitation, to add other properties to the list given in the original application presented within the limitation period. The court cited this decision as part of an almost unanimous body of authority supporting the rule that new items cannot be added after 12 years.
Jagannath Das v. Chamu Raghunath Khuntia, I.L.R. 8 Pat. 462 Explains the rationale: an amendment to a pending execution petition is permissible only if a substantive application for execution could have been entertained on the date the amendment was filed; pending application does not entitle adding new properties after limitation. The court relied on this reasoning to show that the existence of a pending application does not permit the decree-holder to seek execution against properties not included within the limitation period.
Prayagdas Shankerlal Maheshri v. Mst. Indirabai, A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 189 Affirms the view (consistent with the cited authorities) that adding new properties after the limitation period is impermissible. Used as supporting authority consistent with the line of cases rejecting post-limitation additions of property.
Jeewandas Dhanji v. Ranchoddas Chaturbhuj, I.L.R. 35 Bom. 103 Represents the Bombay High Court's position aligning with the principle that fresh properties cannot be added after the expiry of the limitation period for execution. Cited as part of the consistent judicial view across various High Courts that applications to attach new properties after 12 years are fresh applications barred by Section 48.
Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. A.H. Forbes, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 209 Privy Council affirmed that applications made after the expiry of the limitation period, seeking sale of properties not included in the last in-time application, are essentially different and barred by Section 48 CPC. The court relied on this ultimate appellate authority (Privy Council) to reinforce the conclusion that later applications seeking different properties are barred by limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based strictly on the text of the opinion:

  1. Chronology and transfer: The court noted the original decree date (14 August 1933), the 1945 application for substitution and transmission under Section 39 CPC, the issuance and receipt of the Section 39 transfer-certificate in December 1946, and the filing in Bahraich of an execution application on 30 August 1947 containing a long list of properties and a claim for Rs. 38,522/7/3.
  2. Assessment of the 1945 application: The court observed that the 10 August 1945 application did not provide a list of properties nor did it specify the manner of execution; it was an application for substitution and transmission and could not have itself been effectively executed against the property (the judgment-debtor was dead and the property was outside Lucknow jurisdiction).
  3. Statutory and rule-based requirements: The court examined Rule 181 of the Oudh Civil Rules and Order XXI rules (including Rule 10 and Rule 11(2)). Rule 181 indicates that a decree received for execution must be entered and that, upon a fresh application for execution, the documents required by Order XXI, Rule 6 must accompany the application. Order XXI, Rule 11(2) requires that an application for execution specify the mode of assistance required and, inter alia, mention the properties to be attached and sold.
  4. Conclusion that the 1947 filing was a fresh application: Given the absence of any list or execution particulars in the 1945 application and the express requirements of Order XXI, the court held that the Bahraich filing of 30 August 1947 must, in the circumstances, be deemed a fresh application for execution rather than a mere continuance of the 1945 filing.
  5. Reliance on precedent on limitation: The court reviewed authorities from several High Courts and the Privy Council, which consistently held that a decree-holder cannot, after the expiry of 12 years, add fresh items of property not included in an earlier execution application filed within time; such additions amount to fresh applications barred by Section 48 CPC. The court cited specific cases (including B. Bandhu Singh, Hayatunnessa, Jagannath Das, Prayagdas, Jeewandas Dhanji and Maharaj Bahadur Singh) to support this principle and the rationale underlying it (amendments permissible only when a substantive application could have been entertained on the amendment date).
  6. Resulting application of law to facts: Because the 10 August 1945 application did not supply the necessary list or mode of execution, the 30 August 1947 application was a fresh application made more than 12 years after the decree date (14 August 1933) and therefore barred by Section 48 CPC. Consequently, the 1947 application could not be entertained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed; the order of the lower court was set aside. The court held that the application for execution filed on 30 August 1947 is barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code and is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The 30 August 1947 execution application is dismissed as time-barred. The court stated that, in view of the facts, it did not feel disposed to grant any costs to the judgment-debtors, and ordered that the parties will bear their own costs in both courts.
  • Broader legal consequence: The decision applies existing authorities reaffirming the principle that a decree-holder may not add new properties by a post-limitation application; the court applied that established line of authority to the facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond those precedents; it applies them to conclude the 1947 application was a fresh, barred application.

    Nawab Newazish Ali Khan v. Raja Bhanu Pratap Singh

    Malik, C.J:— There was a decree for a large sum of money passed by the Civil Judge, Lucknow, on 14th August, 1933. It was a simple money decree and various attempts were made to execute the decree. Both the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder died and on 10th of August, 1945, an application was made for substitution of names and for transmission of the decree to the Bahraich Court for execution. The prayer in the application is as follows:—

    “Jinab Ali sail degreedar mustadai hai ki awallan hasb Order 21 Qaida 16 (sic) Zabta Dewani bajai Rani Manraj Kuer degreedar ke sail ka nam ba zumre degreedar quaim farmaya jawe aur hasb dafa 50 Zabta Dmvani bajai Nawab Mohammad Ali Khan Qazilbash madeeun mutwaffi ke warisan qabizan jaidad ashkhash munderja Khata No. 9 darkhuast haza ka nam qaim hokar bad hu hasb dafa 39 certificate intaqali banam Civil Judge Sahib Bahadur Bahraich bheja jawe aur mutalba munderje ijrai haza mublikh Rs. 36,043-7-3 ba izafa kharcha ijra haza wa sud ainda wasul kara diye jawen.”

    2. Certain objections were filed by the other side and these objections were dismissed by an order dated the 23rd of November, 1946. An appeal filed to the Chief Court was dismissed on 11th of September, 1950. On the 12th December, 1946, a certificate under Section 39 of the Civil Procedure Code was issued transferring the decree to the court of the Civil Judge Bahraich for execution. The certificate was received in the Bahraich court on 16th December, 1946. On 30th of August, 1947, an application for execution of the decree was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bahraich, in which the prayer was as follows:—

    The Decree-holder prays that according to Order 21 Rule 54/66 C.P.C the immoveable property, the kothis, the houses, and the village mentioned in the list attached to the application for execution of decree, be attached and sold and that Rs. 38522/7/3, the amount due under the decree as detailed below be got realized.

    The amount mentioned in the transfer certificate. Interest from 11-8-45 to 30-8-47 on Amount of interest Grand Total Rs. 36071.II/3 Rs. 20304/- at 6 p.c p.a Rs. 2450/- Rs. 38522/7/3”

    3. A long list of properties was given by the sale of which the decretal amount was to be realized. An objection was taken that the decree having been passed on the 14th of August, 1933, the application for execution filed on 30th August, 1947, was barred under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it was filed more than 12 years after the date of the decree. This objection was disallowed and the lower court held that the application for execution was within time, as it was in continuation of the previous application dated the 10th of August, 1945. This appear was filed against the decision of the lower court and the only point for consideration is whether the application filed on 30th August, 1947, was barred under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. Respondents learned counsel has urged that the application dated the 10th August, 1945, was an application for execution of the decree and by the application dated the 30th of August, 1947, merely a list of the properties to be sold was given and it was not a fresh application for execution.

    4. Section 39 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for an application to be made to the court for transfer of that execution to another court within the jurisdiction of which the judgment-debtor has property. The entire property in the possession of the judgment-debtors was outside the jurisdiction of the Lucknow court and was within the jurisdiction of the Bahraich Court. The judgment-debtors were also residing outside the jurisdiction of the Lucknow court. No list of properties were given in the application filed on the 10th of August, 1945, nor could the decree be executed against the person of the judgment-debtor's representatives as the decretal amount had to be realized from the property left by the judgment-debtor who was dead.

    5. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to Order 21 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and has urged that an application under Section 39 can in no circumstances be an application for execution and after the decree is transmitted to another court an application for execution has to be made to that Court. He has also drawn our attention to Rule 181 of the Oudh Civil Rules, which is as follows:—

    “A decree received for execution from another Court shall be entered in the Register of Non Judicial Miscellaneous Cases. As soon as an application for execution of the same is made, along with such application, the documents mentioned in Order XXI, Rule 6, shall be laid before the Court.”

    6. This rule makes it clear that a fresh application for execution has to be made to the court to which the decree is transmitted and that court would take no steps to execute the decree so long as it is not moved on that behalf by the decree-holder. Order 21 Rule 10, lays down to which court an application for execution can be made and so far as we can see, prima facie, without finally committing ourselves to that view, it does not say that if the property, against which the decree-holder wants to proceed, is situate within the jurisdiction of another court, a fresh application has to be made to that court even if an application for execution has been made to the court which passed the decree in which the properties against which the decree-holder wants to proceed have been included. In case, however, a proper application for execution had been made to the court which passed the decree along with a prayer for transmission of the decree to another court or along with a separate application under Section 39 and that court had sent the application for execution to the Bahraich Court, it might have been necessary for us to consider whether an application for execution made to the court to which the decree had been transferred in accordance with the provisions of Rule 181 of the Oudh Civil Rules was a fresh application or was a mere continuance of the previous application. It is not necessary to express any opinion on this point as in our view the application filed on 30th of August, 1947, must be in the circumstances of this case deemed to be a fresh application.

    7. We have already said that the manner in which the decree was to be executed was not given in the application of the 10th of August, 1945, nor did that application furnish any list of properties which were to be sold in execution of the decree. Order XXI, Rule 11(2) sets out what an application for execution should contain and it provides that the application should mention the mode in which the assistance of the court is required. It requires inter alia that the decree-holder should mention what properties are to be attached and sold or sold without attachment for the realization of the decretal amount. No such details, as we have already said, were furnished in the application. It cannot be said, therefore, that the application of the 30th of August, 1947, was unnecessary and it was merely to revive or to continue the previous application of the 10th of August 1945. In the application of the 30th of August, 1947, a long list of properties was mentioned by the sale of which the decretal amount was to be realized.

    8. There are a number of decisions on the point and the view appears to be almost unanimous that the decree-holder cannot after the expiry of 12 years add fresh items of property to the list of properties already given by him in his previous execution application filed within 12 years and proceed against items of property which had not been included in it. If the decree-holder had no right to add new items of property after the expiry of 12 years, it follows that he cannot give a fresh list, not having given any such list within time. The case in point is B. Bandhu Singh v. K.T Bank, Ltd., Gorakhpur A.I.R 1931 All. 134., where a Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that:

    “It seems to us that the decree-holder is now seeking to attach fresh property and his application for the attachment of this new property is a fresh application within the meaning of Sec. 48, Civil P.C, and having been made more than 12 years after the date of the decree, cannot be entertained.”

    9. The same view was taken in a number of decisions of this Court, but it is not necessary for us to give a reference to them.

    10. In Hayatunnessa Chowdhurani v. Achia Khatun I.L.R 50 Cal. 743., a Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the same view. It was held that:

    “A decree-holder should not be allowed, by subsequent application made after the expiry of the period of limitation for execution of the decree, to add other properties to the list given in his original….. application, presented within the period of limitation.”

    11. This view was followed and the reason for it was given by a Bench of the Patna High Court in Jagannath Das v. Chamu Raghunath Khuntia I.L.R 8 Pat. 462.. At page 467 the learned Judge said,

    “It is contended that the fact that a previous application for execution was pending in which an amendment was sought to be made showed that the decree was still subsisting and had not been barred; but this in my opinion does not entitle the decree-holder to apply to the Court to proceed against the other properties, and the principle upon which amendments of pending execution petitions are allowed is, in my opinion, based upon the fact that a substantive application for execution could have been entertained on the date the application for amendment was filed.”

    12. With this view the other learned Judge Macpherson agreed. A learned single Judge of the Nagpur High Court considered all these cases and took the same view in Prayagdas Shankerlal Maheshri v. Mst. Indirabai A.I.R 1948 Nag. 189.. The view of the Bombay High Court to the same effect is in Jeewandas Dhanji v. Ranchoddas Chaturbhuj I.L.R 35 Bom. 103.. Lastly, the Privy Council seems to have affirmed that view in a case that went from Patna:—Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. A.H Forbes A.I.R 1929 P.C 209.. A, money decree was passed on 10th July, 1896. The last application filed within 12 years was dated 9th May, 1908. The prayer in the application was that certain items of property mentioned therein which were Patni rights were to be sold in execution of the decree. To the sale of these properties, however, various objections were taken and the litigation remained pending for a long time with the result that the decree-holder in 1915, 1917 and 1918 made fresh applications for sale of other properties belonging to the judgment-debtors. Their Lordships held that the applications filed in 1915, 1917 and 1918 must be held to be essentially different in character from the application filed on 9th May, 1908, and these application must be deemed to be barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and the order of the lower court set aside. The application for execution filed on the 30th of August, 1947, must be deemed to be barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code and it is dismissed. In view of the facts of the case we do not feel disposed to grant any costs to the judgment-debtors. The parties will bear their own costs in both the courts.

    13. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Nawab Newazish Ali Khan v. Raja Bhanu Pratap Singh
    (Feb 6, 1952)