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Acts
  • provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947),
  • section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, or(b)
  • section 161, Indian Penal Code. Section 4
  • section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 161 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 364 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 161, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 5(2) of Act II of 1947,
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
  • clause of sub-section of 5(1)
  • section 161. Section 5(1)
  • clause (d) of section 5(1)
  • section 5(1)(d)
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947),
  • section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, or(b)
  • section 161, Indian Penal Code. Section 4
  • section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 161 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 364 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 161, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 5(2) of Act II of 1947,
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
  • clause of sub-section of 5(1)
  • section 161. Section 5(1)
  • clause (d) of section 5(1)
  • section 5(1)(d)
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Mukerji, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Mahfooz Ali (appellant), a head constable posted at the Idgah Outpost, Agra, was charged under section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 for "criminal misconduct" on 11 October 1949: abusing his position to obtain Rs. 20 from one Shivlal by illegal and corrupt means. The Additional Sessions Judge, Agra convicted the appellant and sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 (with six months' further rigorous imprisonment in default). The appellant appealed against the conviction.

The factual background given by the prosecution: Shivlal had lent money to Susa by promissory notes and sought repayment. A dispute led to police and magistrate proceedings against Susa and to civil remedies; one matter was compromised and another suit was decreed. Shivlal alleged that while proceedings were pending the accused told him that Susa had complained that Shivlal had not returned a promissory note and warned Shivlal he would lose his case and be prosecuted under section 420 IPC. Shivlal alleged the accused then demanded an illegal gratification initially of Rs. 50, settled at Rs. 20.

Shivlal reported the matter to local Congress members Babulal Lodh and Babulal Mittal, who assisted in taking the complaint to the Additional District Magistrate and then to the City Magistrate (R. C. Asthana). A trap was arranged: two ten-rupee notes (numbers recorded) were passed to the accused and, on search on 11 October 1949, the notes were recovered from him in the presence of the City Magistrate, Mathur, Shivlal and Babulal. The recovery memorandum (Ex. P-2) records these facts.

The accused's defence was that the Rs. 20 were repayment from Babulal Lodh for an advance the accused had made to Babulal for procuring ghee for a circumcision ceremony. The trial court accepted the prosecution's version, rejected the defence, and convicted the accused. The appeal challenges the conviction on several legal grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the charge framed against the appellant was defective for not specifying the manner in which he abused his position and the illegal or corrupt means employed, and whether any such defect was fatal to the prosecution.
  2. Whether a conviction under section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 (Prevention of Corruption Act) could be sustained where the alleged illegal gratification was taken on a solitary occasion, i.e., whether section 5(1) requires a finding of habitual misconduct.
  3. Whether clause (d) of section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act covers obtaining cash (monetary) gratification, or whether it is limited to objects in specie or non-cash advantages.
  4. Whether the presumption available under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act could be invoked in a trial where the charge is under section 5(1) of the Act (as opposed to an offence specifically charged under section 161 IPC).
  5. Whether a statement attributed to the accused in the recovery memorandum (recorded at the time of search) was admissible in evidence (i.e., whether it amounted to an inadmissible statement under section 161 CrPC or an improperly recorded confession), and whether the trial court relied upon it.
  6. Whether the trial court was required to inform the accused of his right under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to appear as a witness in his own defence and whether failure to do so caused prejudice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's / Defence Arguments (as presented by Mr. P. C. Chaturvedi)

  • The charge was defective for not specifying how the accused abused his position and the illegal/corrupt means employed; this defect was relied on to challenge conviction.
  • Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act applies only to habitual offenders; on the facts the accused had taken a bribe on a solitary occasion, so conviction under section 5 was improper.
  • Clause (d) of section 5(1) does not cover cases of mere cash payments; it is aimed at taking objects in specie or other pecuniary advantages, not mere currency.
  • The trial court impermissibly relied on a presumption from section 4 of the Act, which, according to the defence, should be available only where the charge is under section 161 IPC.
  • The statement recorded in the recovery memorandum is inadmissible — either it is a statement under section 161 CrPC and thus not admissible as evidence, or it is an improperly recorded confession (not recorded with required formalities) and therefore not admissible.
  • The court failed to inform the accused of the right under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to appear as a witness, and this omission prejudiced the accused's defence.

Prosecution's Case

  • The prosecution relied on Shivlal's complaint and on the trap arranged by the magistrates and local persons: two marked ten-rupee notes were passed to the accused and recovered from his person in the presence of witnesses (City Magistrate, Mathur, Shivlal and Babulal).
  • The recovery memorandum (Ex. P-2) recorded an admission by the accused that he had received Rs. 20 from Babulal Lodh in relation to an application for a police enquiry.
  • The prosecution argued that even if the original application mentioned by the accused was not produced, the accused's statement to Shivlal about such an application and the surrounding facts, if believed, established the accused's use of his position to demand gratification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiva Balak Singh v. State (unreported) Authority supporting the proposition that an "admission" recorded in a recovery memorandum cannot be used in evidence against the accused. The Court relied on this unreported decision to support its view that the admission appearing in the recovery memorandum was inadmissible; however, the Court also held that the trial court had not relied upon that admission in convicting the accused.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the defence contentions in sequence and explained its reasoning:

  1. On the alleged defect in the charge: The Court observed that while specifying the manner of abuse and the illegal means in the charge might have improved clarity, their absence amounted only to a "petty irregularity" and did not cause prejudice to the accused. Therefore the defect was not fatal.
  2. On whether section 5 required habitual misconduct: The Court examined the definition of "criminal misconduct" in section 5(1) (sub-clauses (a)–(d)) and concluded that although some parts of section 5(1) address habitual conduct, clause (d) applies to cases like the present one where a public servant obtains a pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means on a solitary occasion. The Court thus rejected the contention that section 5(1) is confined to habitual offenders.
  3. On whether clause (d) covers cash payments: The Court interpreted the phrase "pecuniary advantage" to be wide enough to include cash. It held that receiving money in cash does constitute a pecuniary gain and thus falls within clause (d).
  4. On applicability of the presumption under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act: Defence argued section 4's presumption applied only where the charge was under section 161 IPC. The Court read section 4's language broadly ("Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 165...") and held the presumption is available where the gravamen of the charge is the same as that under section 161 IPC. Since section 5(1) addresses the same type of offence as section 161, the trial court was justified in invoking the presumption. The Court emphasized, however, that the conviction rested mainly on facts proving the offence independently of the statutory presumption.
  5. On the admissibility of the accused's statement in the recovery memorandum: The Court agreed with the defence that the "admission" in the recovery memorandum could not be used against the accused at trial — it might amount to a section 161 CrPC statement (inadmissible) or an improperly recorded confession. The Court relied on the unreported decision Shiva Balak Singh v. State to support this view. The Court then examined the trial judge's judgment and concluded the trial court had not relied upon that statement to convict the accused.
  6. On failure to inform the accused of the right under section 7 to appear as a witness: The Court held that section 7 confers a right but does not impose an obligation on the court to invite the accused to testify. The accused was represented by counsel who is presumed to know the law; the Court found no prejudice in the accused not having been explicitly invited to give evidence. The Court also noted that what the accused might have said as a witness had already been presented as the accused's statement and was considered by the court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed; the conviction and sentence of the appellant are maintained.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The appellant's conviction under section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 and the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 200 (and six months further imprisonment in default of fine) are affirmed.
  • The appellant, who was on bail, was ordered to immediately surrender to his bail and serve out his sentence.

Broader implications: The opinion interprets clause (d) of section 5(1) to include solitary acts of obtaining cash as "pecuniary advantage" and confirms the availability of the statutory presumption under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act where the gravamen of the charged offence is the same as under section 161 IPC. The Court did not indicate that it was establishing any broader binding precedent beyond the application to the facts before it.

Appeal dismissed.

    Mahfuz Ali v. State

    Mukerji, J.:— Mahfooz Ali, the appellant was charged under section 5(2) of Act II of 1947, for having committed “Criminal misconduct” on the 11th October, 1949, by abusing his position as a head constable, for the purpose of deriving from one Shivlal pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs. 20 for himself by illegal and corrupt means. The learned Additional Sessions Judge of Agra convicted the appellant on the aforesaid charge and sentenced him to undergo two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200, in default, of payment of fine the accused was ordered to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months. The appellant has preferred the aforesaid appeal from his conviction.

    The facts giving rise to his conviction briefly put were these:

    The appellant, Mahfooz Ali, was posted as a head constable at the Idgah Outpost in the city of Agra at the time when he is alleged to have committed the offence with which he was charged and for which he was convicted. The complainant in this case was one Shivlal.

    Shivlal is alleged to have lent a sum of Rs. 160 under two promissory notes—one of Rs. 100 and the other of Rs. 50. Shivlal wanted his money back from Susa, which Susa was not repaying and, therefore, it is said that on the 6th of September, 1949, Shivlal served a notice of demand on Susa. On the 10th of September in the evening it is said that Susa went to the shop of Shivlal and there was a quarrel between the two over this repayment of debt. Shivlal then lodged a report against Susa at the police station Rakabganj and he followed it up by filing a complaint against Susa in the court of the City Magistrate. This criminal case ended in a compromise, on Susa paying Rs. 504 being possibly the loan on one of the two promissory notes. Shivlal then filed a suit in respect of the other promissory note of Rs. 100 which was decreed against Susa. Shivlal complainant's story then is that while the complaint against Susa was pending, the accused Mahfooz Ali sent for him (Shivlal) and told him that he had received an application from Susa complaining that he (Shivlal) had not returned the promissory note, even though, he had received payment for the same. Shivlal then says that he told the accused that the allegation of Susa was absolutely false and saying so he came away from the accused. Shivial goes on further to say that, he was sent for by the accused 6 or 7 days later and was again told by the accused that he was going to lose his case and he was further going to be prosecuted under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Shivlal says that thereon he made entreaties to the accused to save him, whereupon the accused demanded a sum of Rs. 50 as illegal gratification for making a favourable report. Bargain was settled at Rs. 20 instead of Rs. 50.

    Shivlal, after his return from the accused, went and complained about this to one Babulal Lodh who was a member of the Ward Congress Committee. Babulal Lodh thereupon took Shivlal with him to Babulal Mittal, the President of the Town Congress Committee, and apprised him of the entire story. Babulal Mittal thereupon gave a letter to Shivlal addressed to the Additional District Magistrate. Shivlal went to the Additional District Magistrate with this letter of Babu Lal Mittal who, in his turn, gave him another letter for the City Magistrate, Sri R.C Asthana. Shivlal then went to the City Magistrate with the letter of the Additional District Magistrate and there the statement of Shivlal was recorded by Sri Mathur and two ten-rupee notes were taken from Shivlal, their numbers noted and the notes returned, to Shivlal. These notes were meant according to the plan, for being passed on to the accused.

    The usual trap was then laid, the notes were then passed on to the accused and on a search of the person of the accused these notes were recovered. The recovery list is Ex. P-2 on the record and it records the following facts:

    That Sri J.S Mathur along with Sri Asthana, City. Magistrate, went to Idgah Outpost at about 7.10 p.m on the 11th October, 1949, and found the accused, sitting in the room with Babulal Lodh. The accused was asked if any money had been given to him in connection with any application for police enquiry, whereupon the accused is recorded to have answered in the affirmative saying that Rs. 20 had been given to him by Babulal Lodh who was then present with him and who told him that, he was going shortly to bring an application for a police enquiry. The two currency notes of Rs. 10 each bearing nos. C/21-878216 and C/45-773757 were recovered from the pocket of the accused. The recovery memorandum further indicates that Shivlal was also present at the recovery. It is further recorded in this memorandum that Shivlal had gone, after the notes had actually been passed ter the accused, to inform the City Magistrate and Sri Mathur that the money had been passed, to a nearby place where these officers were lying in ambush.

    The accused was put up on his trial on the above facts and circumstances. The defence of the accused was that the two currency notes of Rs. 10 each had been given to him by Babulal Lodh as a repayment because the accused had advanced Rs. 20 to Babulal for the purpose of supplying him ghee which the accused required in connection with the circumcision ceremony in his family.

    From the prosecution and the defence version the following fact is beyond controversy:

    “that the notes were passed to the accused and that the notes were recovered from his person in the presence of Shivlal, Babulal, the City Magistrate and Sri Mathur on the 11th of October, 1949.”

    The controversy that arose in the case was whether these notes were given to the accused by Shivlal as a bribe for hushing up the alleged complaint made against him by Susa or these currency notes had been given to the accused through Babulal Lodh because Shivlal had received Rs. 20 from the accused earlier for supplying him ghee which Shivlal could not supply.

    The trial Judge accepted the prosecution version by believing the prosecution evidence and naturally rejecting the defence case. It was contended by Mr. P.C Chaturvedi that there was no satisfactory proof of the fact that there was any complaint by Susa to the accused which he could utilize as a lever for extracting the alleged bribe. It was said that the original application was not produced. A copy that was produced was not properly proved. The absence of the original application was explained by the prosecution to have been due to the fact that this must have been with the accused and it was not possible for the prosecution to get hold of it. In my opinion, the absence of the original application did not, in any manner, detract from the prosecution case if once, it was found that the statement which Shivlal made was reliable. Shivlal was told by the accused about an application having been made by Susa and, if the statement of Shivlal is believed, then it did not matter whether or not there was an application by Susa, for, in my view, even if the accused invented this story of an application for the purpose of extracting a bribe, even then, his complicity in the crime was quite clear. Some contradictions have been referred to and some alleged improbabilities have been pointed out by learned counsel on which he submitted that this part of the prosecution case, was not true. I do not think it necessary to notice those contradictions and alleged improbabilities inasmuch, as in my opinion, they are not of such a character as could persuade me, on the strength of those contradictions and alleged improbabilities, to disbelieve this part of the prosecution story. I am in agreement with the trial Judge that the accused did tell Shivlal about; Susa's application, whether there was, in fact, such an application or not, and that the accused did use this assertion of his to make it the basis of his demand for illegal gratification from the complainant Shivlal.

    The story of the defence, namely, that this money came from Babulal as a repayment of the advance which the accused had made to Shivlal for the purpose of ghee, in my judgment, was not true. There is nothing on the record, except the bald statement of the accused himself that there was a “circumcission” ceremony in the family of the accused and that, for the purpose of such a ceremony, ghee was required. There is further nothing on the record to indicate that Shivlal had anything to do with any ghee business and that ghee could he had through his mediation.

    Learned counsel for the defence raised certain questions of law and on the basis of such questions he argued that the conviction of the appellant under section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 was illegal.

    The first point which was raised was that the charge which was framed was defective inasmuch as it did not indicate the manner in which the accused had abused his position in order to have pecuniary advantage by illegal and corrupt means. It was further said that the illegal and corrupt means employed was also not indicated in the charge. In my opinion the inclusion of all these matters in the charge may have and possibly would have, made the charge better but their absence from the charge did not amount to anything more than a petty irregularity which could be cured, specially, when I find that by this no prejudice has been caused to the accused.

    The next submission made by learned counsel for the appellant was that on the facts found a conviction under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act could not be made. Section 5(1) of the Act defines “criminal misconduct” in the following words:

    (a) “A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, or

    (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, or

    (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do, or

    (d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.”

    Mr. Chaturvedi's contention was that what the appellant, at the worst, did was to obtain a bribe from Shivlal on a solitary occasion. There was, he said, no evidence and no finding which could indicate that the accused was a habitual offender. I agree with Mr. Chaturvedi's contention that there is no evidence nor is there finding to the effect that the appellant was a habitual offender but I do not agree with Mr. Chaturvedi's contention that section 5 applies only to the case of habitual offenders and cannot be made applicable to the case of a person who takes illegal gratification on a solitary occasion. In my judgment section 5(1)(d) makes provision for a case of the present type, namely, a case where the accused is charged with having taken illegal gratification on a solitary occasion.

    It was next contended by Mr. Chaturvedi that clause (d) of section 5(1) does not strictly cover the case of a person who obtains money from another as illegal gratification. According to him this clause of sub-section of 5(1) contemplates cases where the accused takes some object in species or gains some pecuniary advantage and not merely takes cash. I have given this argument my careful consideration and I am of pinion that the argument is not sound for, in my judgment, the words “pecuniary advantage” are wide enough to include cases of cash payment. A man when he gets some money in cash certainly makes a pecuniary gain and, therefore, has a pecuniary advantage.

    Mr. Chaturvedi's next contention was that the learned Judge has relied for convicting the accused, on a presumption which the Act, namely, the Prevention of Corruption Act, allows the courts to make under section 4 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:

    “Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted, or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said section 161, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate:

    Provided that the court may decline to draw such presumption if the gratification or thing aforesaid is in its opinion so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn.”

    Mr. Chaturvedi's contention was that the presumption which was permissible under the provisions of the Act, quoted above, could not be invoked when the court had charged the accused under section 5(1) of the Act; in his submission, the presumption permissible under section 4, was only available when the charge against the accused was under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. I do not think that this submission of Mr. Chaturvedi is right. In my judgment, the presumption available under section 4 is not confined, to those cases only where the accused is, in fact, charged under section 161, Indian Penal Code, but it is in my view also available in cases where, the accused is charged under some other section where the gravamen of the charge is the same as that under section 161, Indian Penal Code. Section 4 which has been quoted earlier in this judgment in extenso says:

    “Where in any trial of any offence punishable under section 161……….”

    It does not say where in any trial the accused is charged for an offence under section 161. Section 5(1) provides for the same type of offence—the gravamen of the charge being the same—as in section 161, Indian Penal Code; in my judgment, the trial court was fully justified in relying upon the presumption available under section 4.

    I may further state that the court has not merely relied on this presumption. It has, in my judgment, mainly relied on the facts which proved the offence independently of the presumption.

    The next “legal” argument of Mr. Chaturvedi was that the court had relied on the statement made by the accused at the time of the search, a statement recorded in the “recovery memorandum.” Mr. Chaturvedi's contention was that this statement recorded in the “recovery memorandum” could either be a statement under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under section 364 of the same Code. If, it was a statement under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code, Mr. Chaturvedi submitted it was not admissible it evidence. According to him, it could not have been a statement under section 364, Criminal Procedure Code for the simple reason that it was not an examination of the accused by a magistrate. Mr. Chaturvedi further contended that, if anything it amounted to a confession by the accused, and the same not having been recorded with the formalities required by the law for the record, of confessions, it could not be used against the accused. I must say that Mr. Chaturvedi is right in regard to this, submission, I am of the view that the “admission” of the accused which finds place in the recovery memorandum could not be used by the court against the accused at the trial. I may here mention that I am fortified in the view that I have taken by an unreported decision of a Bench of this Court, given in the case of Shiva Balak Singh v. State(1).

    The next question that arises for consideration is whether the trial court did, in fact, use this statement of the accused against him in order to arrive at its decision. I have carefully considered the judgment of the trial court and am of the opinion that the court has not relied on the statement of the accused for convicting him.

    Lastly, it was submitted by Mr. Chaturvedi that the accused has been prejudiced inasmuch as the trial court never told the accused that he was, under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947), entitled to appear as a witness on his own behalf. Section 7 gives the accused a right to appear as a witness in his own defence. Section 7 does not cast any obligation on the court to invite the accused to offer himself as a witness for himself. The accused was represented by a counsel and a counsel certainly must be presumed to know the law, and I must assume that he knew the law, and that knowing the law he did not consider it proper to advise his client in this case to offer himself as a fitness in his own defence. Section 7 has to it some provisos and, in my judgment, these provisos, clearly indicate that a court cannot ask the accused to appear as a witness for himself, nor can the court draw a presumption against the accused, if the accused has chosen not to appear as a witness for himself.

    It appears to me that section 7 never contemplated courts giving a kind of warning or offering a kind of a reminder, to the accused about the right or privilege conferred upon him by section 7. Further, in my opinion, the accused has not, in any manner, been prejudiced by not appearing as a witness for himself. What, he could say as a witness for himself he has already said in his statement as an accused. The court has considered that statement and given it due weight.

    In my judgment, therefore, this appeal has no force and I accordingly dismiss it. The conviction and the sentence of the appellant is maintained. The appellant is on bail. He will immediately surrender to his bail and serve out his sentence.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mahfuz Ali v. State
    (Sep 17, 1952)