Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Ambika Prasad and Sanker Sahai Varma- S.B.L. Gour
Judges
  • Hon'ble Mr. Prakash Narain Sapru
Acts
  • SECTION 10 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • respects.6. Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • Section 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and. Eviction Act, 1947,
  • U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • Magistrates.5. Clause (3) of Section 10 of the Code
  • Section 10(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Clause (2) of Section 10 of this Code
  • Defence of India Act, Section 2(5),
  • Indian Christian Marriage Act
  • follows:Rule 26(1)(b)
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Ambika Prasad and Sanker Sahai Varma- S.B.L. Gour
Judges
  • Hon'ble Mr. Prakash Narain Sapru
Acts
  • SECTION 10 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • respects.6. Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • Section 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and. Eviction Act, 1947,
  • U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • Magistrates.5. Clause (3) of Section 10 of the Code
  • Section 10(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Clause (2) of Section 10 of this Code
  • Defence of India Act, Section 2(5),
  • Indian Christian Marriage Act
  • follows:Rule 26(1)(b)
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary (Sapru, J.) — U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a tenant's appeal arising from a suit for ejectment concerning a shop in the city of Agra. The plaintiff (landlord) instituted the ejectment suit with the permission of an Additional District Magistrate. The tenant resisted the suit on various grounds; the principal ground relevant to this opinion was that the landlord lacked competency to bring the suit because the permission required under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, had not been granted by the District Magistrate or by a person authorised by him. Both the trial court and the court below decreed the plaintiff's suit and rejected the tenant's objection that the Additional District Magistrate was not competent to authorise institution of the suit. The defendant (tenant) appealed to this Court (High Court).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the term "the District Magistrate" as used in Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, includes an Additional District Magistrate (so that permission given by an Additional District Magistrate is sufficient), or whether it denotes the District Magistrate as a persona designate (so that permission must come from the District Magistrate or a person specifically authorised by him).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant / Tenant) Arguments

  • The plaintiff was not competent to bring the ejectment suit because the required permission under Section 3 had not been given by the District Magistrate or by a person authorised by him; instead permission was given by an Additional District Magistrate, which was said to be insufficient.

Respondent's (Plaintiff / represented by Mr. Gour) Arguments

  • It was possible that the Additional District Magistrate, the City Magistrate, or some other officer was authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise the powers under Section 3 of the Act; such delegation by the District Magistrate would make the permission valid.
  • The District Magistrate has the competence to delegate his authority; whether such delegation occurred in this case is a question of fact and cannot be resolved on the present record without framing an issue and taking evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prabhakar v. Crown, 1943 I.L.R. Nag. 154 (opinion of Vivian Bose, J.) Illustration that in special/drastic statutory schemes powers may not be exercisable by Additional District Magistrates unless they are specifically authorised; mere capacity to exercise many of the District Magistrate's powers does not necessarily mean authority to exercise every power vested in the District Magistrate. The court relied on the observations in Prabhakar v. Crown to support a narrow construction of the phrase "the District Magistrate" in Section 3 of the U.P. Act, indicating that special statutory powers should not be assumed to be exercisable by Additional District Magistrates absent clear authorisation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and contextual interpretation of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, focusing on the definite article "the" qualifying "District Magistrate." The analysis proceeded in contiguous steps:

  1. Textual observation: Section 3 states that "No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed..." The presence of the definite article "the" suggested a reference to a specific office-holder rather than any person holding like office.
  2. Statutory context: The General Clauses Act contains no definition of "District Magistrate" for this purpose. Section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) was examined: Clause (1) makes it obligatory for the Provincial Government to appoint a District Magistrate in each district as the chief magistrate; Clause (2) authorises the appointment of Additional District Magistrates and empowers the Provincial Government to vest in them "all or any of the powers" of the District Magistrate as the government may direct; Clause (3) shows that Additional District Magistrates are, for certain purposes, subordinate to the District Magistrate.
  3. Statutory definition in the U.P. Act: Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P. Act defines "District Magistrate" as including a person authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under that Act. The court noted that the U.P. legislature did not expressly state that "District Magistrate" includes an Additional District Magistrate.
  4. Inference of legislative intent: Reading these provisions together, the court concluded that the legislature intended "the District Magistrate" to be a persona designate (the specific District Magistrate of the district) and not necessarily any Additional District Magistrate. Although the Provincial Government may lawfully, under CrPC Section 10(2), confer powers on Additional District Magistrates, the specific wording of the U.P. Act — using "the District Magistrate" — indicated an intention that the power to permit suits under Section 3 be exercised by the District Magistrate (or by someone expressly authorised by him under the Act).
  5. Support from precedent: The court referred to Prabhakar v. Crown to illustrate judicial caution in allowing minor or additional officials to exercise special statutory powers, reinforcing the conclusion that a narrow construction was appropriate for the U.P. Act's authorization provision.
  6. On the notification: The court observed that a U.P. Government notification of 1 August 1947 purported to invest Additional District Magistrates with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the CrPC and other laws. The court held that such a notification could not be allowed to override the clear statutory text that conferred the power on "the District Magistrate" — i.e., the office/person designated by statute — and therefore the notification was "of no effect" to the extent that it purported to substitute Additional District Magistrates for "the District Magistrate" under the U.P. Act.
  7. Procedural/material fact issue: The court acknowledged that it had not been established on the record whether, in this particular case, the District Magistrate had in fact authorised the Additional District Magistrate or another officer to exercise his powers under Section 3 prior to institution of the suit. This is a question of fact for which there could be no presumption either way, and which the courts below had not properly investigated.
  8. Resulting conclusion on the present record: Because the factual question of authorisation had not been determined, the court declined to decide the competence question finally and framed an issue to be tried, ordering further evidence and findings to be obtained by the trial court and transmitted to this Court for final disposal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The High Court did not finally decide that permission given by an Additional District Magistrate was valid or invalid on the present record. Instead, the Court framed a factual issue and remitted the matter for further evidence and findings on the narrow question of whether the District Magistrate had authorised the Additional District Magistrate (or City Magistrate or other officer) to exercise the powers under Section 3 of the U.P. Act prior to institution of the suit.

Consequences and immediate procedural directions (as expressly ordered in the opinion):

  • Issue to be tried (as formulated by the Court): "Had the District Magistrate authorised the Additional District Magistrate or the City Magistrate before the institution of the suit to perform any or all the powers under Section 3 of the Act?"
  • Parties are allowed to adduce fresh evidence on this issue.
  • The learned judge is given three months from the date of arrival of the record to transmit his findings on this issue to the High Court; the usual 10 days are allowed for filing objections. After completion of this procedure the case will be listed for final disposal.

Broader legal implication indicated by the Court's reasoning (as stated in the opinion): The court expressed a view that, on the proper construction of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the power under Section 3 is conferred on "the District Magistrate" — a persona designate — and that a general notification purporting to equate Additional District Magistrates with the District Magistrate cannot override the statute's language; however, the Court did not finally adjudicate the competence of the plaintiff in this case because the specific fact of delegation remained undetermined.

Show full summary ...

    Kedar Nath v. Mool Chand

    Sapru, J.:— This is a tenant's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment from a shop situate in the city of Agra. The suit for ejectment was brought by the plaintiff with the permission of the Additional District Magistrate. The suit was resisted by the tenant on various grounds. But the ground with which we are concerned in the present case is that the landlord was not competent to bring the suit for ejectment inasmuch as the District Magistrate or any person authorised by him had not given the permission requisite for bringing a suit under Section 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Both the courts decreed the plaintiff's suit and held that there was no force in the objection that the Additional District Magistrate was not competent to authorise the plaintiff to institute a suit for ejectment under Section 3 of the Act. The defendant has now come up in appeal to this Court.

    2. The question for consideration is whether the District Magistrate as contemplated under Section 3 includes an Additional District Magistrate or not. Section 3 lays down that:

    “No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation,……”

    3. It will be noticed that the article which qualifies the District Magistrate is ‘the.’ There is no definition of the District Magistrate in the General Clauses Act. There is a definition of a District Magistrate in Section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Clause (1) of Section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down that:

    “In every district outside the Presidencytowns the Provincial Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the first class, who shall be called the District Magistrate.”

    4. In other words, this section makes it obligatory on the State Government to appoint in every district a Magistrate who shall be different from other Magistrates inasmuch as he shall be the chief Magistrate of the district. Clause (2) of Section 10 of this Code authorises the Provincial Government to appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code or under any other law for the time being in force, as the Provincial Government any direct. Though Additional District Magistrates can be vested with all the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under any other law for the time being in force as the State Government may direct they are not exactly District Magistrates.

    5. Clause (3) of Section 10 of the Code makes it clear that for certain purposes these Additional District Magistrates are deemed to be subordinate to the District Magistrate. What Clause (3) does is to invest the District Magistrate with powers to transfer cases pending before one Additional District Magistrate to another Additional District Magistrate or some other Magistrate or allow appeals to be heard by one or the other of the Additional District Magistrates or Magistrates in his district or withdraw cases from the court of one Additional District Magistrate or a Magistrate. Clause (3) makes it thus abundantly plain that there is a difference between the District Magistrate who is the principal executive officer in the district and Additional District Magistrates. They are not considered as exactly identical in all respects.

    6. Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, defines the District Magistrate as including a person authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act. Now it is to be noted that the legislature does not say that the District Magistrate includes an Additional District Magistrate as also an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act. In other words, reading the reference to the District Magistrate in Section 3 in the light of the definition given in Clause (d) of Section 2 of the U.P Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, I am driven to the conclusion, whether intentionally or by inadvertence, that the legislature intended the District Magistrate to be a persona designate and in this particular and special Act to mean the District Magistrate and not any Additional District Magistrate. It must be assumed that the U.P Legislature which passed the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was fully familiar with the provisions of Section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code which makes it incumbent upon the State Government to appoint in every district a District Magistrate and further authorises the State Government to confer all or any of the powers exercisable by the District Magistrate or Additional District Magistrates. Notwithstanding this provision, the U.P Legislature laid down that the powers under Section 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and. Eviction Act, 1947, shall be exercisable by the District Magistrate or by a Magistrate or officer authorised in that behalf by him. I feel, therefore, that there is no alternative for me but to came to the conclusion that the power of delegation was intended by the legislature to be exercised only by the District Magistrate. On this point I may be permitted to refer to the observations of an eminent Judge, who is now a Judge of the Supreme Court. In the case of Prabhakar v. Crown 1943 I.L.R Nag. 154. Vivian Bose, J. dealing with the question whether under the Defence of India Act, Section 2(5), the Additional District Magistrate could be authorised to pass the orders that he had passed in that particular case, observed as follows:

    “Rule 26(1)(b) gives the Provincial Government power to detain a person if it is satisfied, etc. Section 2(5) empowers the Provincial Government to direct that any power or duty which it could exercise itself under the Rules be exercised by certain other person's. The Provincial Government has authorised all District Magistrates and certain Sub-Divisional Magistrates to exercise those powers of detention by Notification No. 411-696-CPW, dated the 7th April, 1942. But the orders in the cases before us have been signed by A.G.F Farquhar, Additional District Magistrate. No Additional District Magistrate appears to have been authorised to act—at any rate no such authority was shown to us by the Crown. The action of Farquhar would therefore appear to be unauthorised and illegal.

    7. I am aware that there are other provisions which invest Additional District Magistrates with much the same powers and authority as the District Magistrate. But the Act and the Rules we are dealing with are special and in view of the importance which the House of Lords attached to the fact that in England only the Home Secretary could exercise the powers and not minor officials, I have grave doubts whether these very special and drastic powers can be exercised by those not specially authorised. As an illustration I give the fact that an Additional District Magistrate cannot marry persons under the Indian Christian Marriage Act unless specially authorised even when the District Magistrate is authorised to do so. The mere fact that he can exercise the powers of the District Magistrate for

    “a great many purposes does not necessarily invest him with authority to exercise all the District Magistrate's powers.”

    8. My attention has been drawn to the notification issued by the U.P Government on the 1st August, 1947, which invested the Additional District Magistrates in this case with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the said Code and under any other law for the time being in force. Undoubtedly had the statute not expressly laid down that the power is exercisable by ‘the District Magistrate,’ that is to say, the chief Magistrate in the District, the State Government would have been competent under Section 10(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code to delegate the powers under the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 or for the matter of any Act exercisable by a District Magistrate to Additional District Magistrates. But the position, as I see it, is that under the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the power has been conferred not on ‘a’ District Magistrate but on ‘the’ District Magistrate and there can only be, as far as I can see, one District Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code in a district. For this reason this notification is of no effect and cannot be allowed to override the written text of the law. It may be that the argument which has prevailed with me is of a technical nature but it is not for this Court to supply the defects and lacunae in a legislative enactment. Mistakes of drafting cannot be overlooked by this Court.

    9. Mr. Gour, who appears for the respondent has invited my attention to the fact that there is no finding on the point whether the Additional District Magistrate in this particular case was authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. The fact that the District Magistrate is subordinate to the Provincial Government and is bound to carry out the orders of the Provincial Government cannot, however, relieve him of the personal responsibility with which the Act has vested him. We are not concerned with political arguments or political subordination. What we have to see is what exactly the legal position of the District Magistrate is under the Act.

    10. The contention put forward by Mr. Gour is that it may well be that in this case the Additional District Magistrate, the City Magistrate, or some other officer chosen by him, was authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise the powers vested in him under Section 3 of the Act. Certainly it was competent to the District Magistrate to delegate his authority to any authority he chose. This, however, is a question of fact on which there can be no presumption one way or the other. This is a question on which it is necessary to frame an issue. If the Additional District Magistrate was authorised by the District Magistrate obviously the suit was competent. The question, however, is one of fact and has not been properly gone into by the courts below. I consider it, therefore, necessary to frame the following issue:

    “Had the District Magistrate authorised the Additional District Magistrate or the City Magistrate before the institution of the suit to perform any or all the powers under Section 3 of the Act?”

    11. Parties will be allowed to adduce fresh evidence. Three months' time from the date of the arrival of the record is given to the learned judge for transmitting his findings to this Court. The usual 10 days' time will be allowed for filing objections. After all this procedure has been gone through the case will be listed for final disposal.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Kedar Nath v. Mool Chand
    (Jul 23, 1952)