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Case Number

Misc. Case 201 of 1952

Attorney(S)

A.P. Pandey
S.N. Divedi

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. M.C. Desai

Acts

Section 85 of the Panchayat Raj Act,
Section 49 of the Panchayat Raj Act
Rule 84 read with Section 49(4).
Section 145, Cr. P.C
Land Revenue Act

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Desai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant initiated proceedings under the Land Revenue Act for correction of village records in a Tahsildar's Court. Because the matter was contested, it proceeded to the Sub‑Divisional Officer (SDO), who examined witnesses and then transferred the case to the Panchayati Adalat of Nagwa.

The Panchayati Adalat bench comprised five Panches including the Sarpanch. Judgment was fixed for 25 February 1951. On that date all five Panches were present. The Sarpanch invited the opinions of the four Panches: two (Baijnath Prasad and Nageshwar Ram) did not give opinions; two (Alopi Nath and Nath Singh) gave opinions in favour of the applicant. The Sarpanch agreed with the two favourable opinions and wrote the majority judgment, which was signed by Alopi Nath and Nath Singh. The two Panches who had not expressed opinions later (4 March 1951) submitted a dissenting judgment which the Sarpanch placed on the record.

The opposite‑party filed a revision application to the SDO, who allowed the revision and set aside the Panchayati Adalat's judgment as null and void. The applicant then filed this application under Article 227 of the Constitution seeking to set aside the SDO's revision order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Sub‑Divisional Officer had jurisdiction under Section 85 of the Panchayat Raj Act to quash the Panchayati Adalat's order when he did so on the ground that all five Panches had not discussed the case and two had not given opinions (i.e., whether an alleged irregularity/illegality that did not amount to a miscarriage of justice justified quashing).
Whether the Panchayati Adalat had jurisdiction to hear and decide the proceeding when the applicant was a resident of Darbhanga, Bihar (a place where the Panchayat Raj Act did not apply), and whether a special Bench under Section 49(4) read with Rule 84 ought to have been constituted by the SDO.
Whether, assuming the SDO's order was illegal, the High Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to set aside the SDO's order given (a) a jurisdictional defect in the Panchayati Adalat's proceedings, and (b) the existence of alternative remedies available to the applicant.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

The applicant contended that the SDO's order quashing the Panchayati Adalat judgment was null and void and should be set aside under Article 227.
Mr. A. P. Pandey (for the applicant) argued that because the opposite‑party did not raise a jurisdictional objection before the Panchayati Adalat, the opposite‑party should be precluded from raising it later.

Opposite‑Party's Arguments

Even if the SDO's order was illegal, the High Court should not set it aside because the Panchayati Adalat's order itself was without jurisdiction and no injustice was caused to the applicant by its being set aside even on an erroneous ground.
The opposite‑party contended that alternative adequate remedies were available to the applicant.
The opposite‑party also argued that no question of jurisdiction arose in the SDO's order (as framed by the applicant) — that is, the SDO's order did not involve a jurisdictional question that the High Court should correct under Article 227.
Before the SDO in the revision, the opposite‑party pleaded that the Panchayati Adalat's order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction (on the ground that a special Bench should have been constituted), but the SDO did not address that plea.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two distinct strands of analysis corresponding to (A) the legality of the SDO's grounds for quashing and (B) the jurisdictional validity of the Panchayati Adalat's order.

A. Whether the SDO acted within the jurisdiction conferred by Section 85

The Court examined Section 85 of the Panchayat Raj Act, which permits the SDO to quash an order of a Panchayati Adalat only where there has been a miscarriage of justice, and otherwise makes Panchayati Adalat orders final and not subject to appeal or revision.
The SDO quashed the Panchayati Adalat order on the basis that all five Panches had not discussed the merits and two had not given opinions — a finding of irregularity or supposed illegality — but the SDO did not consider or record whether there had been a miscarriage of justice.
The Court held that the SDO had no jurisdiction to quash except on the ground of miscarriage of justice; quashing for irregularity or illegality that did not amount to a miscarriage was beyond his power. Because the SDO did not address miscarriage of justice, he acted without jurisdiction in quashing the order on the grounds he relied upon.
The Court analysed the particular facts: no law required the Panches to hold a discussion among themselves; the matter had been heard by all; the Sarpanch properly invited the opinions of the other Panches; two refused to give an opinion and the remaining Panches rendered the judgment. The Court concluded that the refusal to give opinions did not prevent a majority judgment and that the later-tendered dissent did not invalidate the majority decision.

B. Jurisdictional competence of the Panchayati Adalat

Section 49 of the Panchayat Raj Act requires the Sarpanch to form a bench of five Panches with specified residency composition; where one party is resident in a place not governed by the Act (here, the applicant from Darbhanga, Bihar), the statute empowers the State Government to prescribe, and Rule 84 to require, constitution of special Benches by the SDO for such cross‑circle disputes.
Because the applicant was a resident of Bihar (where the Panchayat Raj Act did not apply), the proceeding should have been heard by a special Bench constituted by the SDO under Rule 84 read with Section 49(4). No special Bench was constituted; instead an ordinary Bench formed by the Sarpanch heard and disposed of the matter.
The Court concluded that the five Panches who disposed of the proceeding lacked jurisdiction to do so; therefore the Panchayati Adalat's order was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
The Court rejected the contention that the opposite‑party was precluded from raising the jurisdictional defect because it had not raised it before the Panchayati Adalat. The Court held that the bench had an initial lack of jurisdiction that could not be cured by consent or by failure to challenge it in the proceeding: an absence of jurisdiction cannot be validated by the parties' inaction.
Because the Panchayati Adalat's order was void for lack of jurisdiction, it properly deserved to be quashed by the SDO — even though the SDO purported to quash it for a different, erroneous reason. The Court explained that a respondent may support an order under appeal on a ground other than that relied upon by the original decision‑maker; similarly, the opposite‑party could support the SDO's quashing order on the jurisdictional defect that the SDO had not itself considered.

C. Discretionary exercise of Article 227 and availability of alternate remedies

The Court noted the availability of alternative remedies to the applicant: filing a regular suit for declaration; pursuing the dispute that was then proceeding before a Magistrate under Section 145, Cr. P.C.; or initiating a fresh proceeding under the Land Revenue Act in the Sub‑Divisional Officer's Court now that the Panchayati Adalat order has been quashed.
Given that those remedies were available and that the underlying Panchayati Adalat order lacked jurisdiction (and thus was void), the Court concluded it should not exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to set aside the SDO's order.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The application under Article 227 is dismissed.

Direct consequences:

The Court found that the SDO had acted without jurisdiction in quashing the Panchayati Adalat's order on the ground he relied upon (an irregularity not shown to cause a miscarriage of justice).
However, the Court also found that the Panchayati Adalat's order was null and void for want of jurisdiction because a special Bench under Section 49(4) and Rule 84 should have been constituted when one party (the applicant) was resident in a place not governed by the Panchayat Raj Act. On that basis the SDO's quashing of the Panchayati Adalat order was supportable despite the SDO's erroneous reasoning.
Because the underlying order was void and alternative remedies remain open to the applicant (suit for declaration, proceedings before the Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C., or a fresh Land Revenue Act proceeding before the SDO), the High Court declined to exercise Article 227 to interfere with the SDO's order and dismissed the application. No order as to costs was made.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond application of the statutory provisions relied upon; the immediate effect is limited to the parties and the available alternative remedies indicated by the Court.

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Maharajadhiraja Kameshwara Singh v. Bharat Koeri

Desai, J.:— This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution for the setting aside of an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Banaras in revision against an order of a Panchayati Adalat in a case for correction of papers. The applicant started proceedings under the Land Revenue Act for correction of village records in a Tahsildar's Court. The matter being a contested one went before the Sub-Divisional Officer who examined some witnesses and then transferred the case to the Panchayati Adalat of Nagwa. The case was heard by five Panches (including the Sarpanch) in the Panchayati Adalat. The Panchayati Adalat fixed the 25th February, 1951, for judgment. On that date all the five Panches were present and the Sarpanch invited opinions of the four Panches. Two of them, namely Sarvashri Baijnath Prasad and Nageshwar Ram did not give their opinions while the other two (Sarvashri Alopi Nath and Sri Nath Singh) gave their opinion in favour of the applicant. The Sarpanch agreed with the opinion of the latter two Panches and wrote out the judgment which was signed by Sarvashri Alopi Nath and Sri Nath Singh. The other two Panches, who belong to village Bhagwanpur where the opposite-party resides, did not sign the judgment, but on the 4th March, 1951, they wrote a dissenting judgment and handed it over to the Sarpanch who kept it on the record. The opposite-party applied in revision against the majority judgment of the Panchayati Adalat and the Sub-Divisional Officer allowed the revision and set aside the judgment of the Panchayati Adalat as null and void. It is contended by the applicant that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was null and void.

2. Under Section 85 of the Panchayat Raj Act, if there has been a miscarriage of justice in any proceeding under the Land Revenue Act the Sub-Divisional Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, quash the order passed by the Panchayati Adalat. It is further laid down in the section that, except as aforesaid, an order passed by a Panchayati Adalat shall be final and not be open to appeal or revision in any court. This is the only provision under which a Sub-Divisional Officer can quash an order of a Panchayati Adalat in a proceeding under the Land Revenue Act. The proceeding started by the applicant for the correction of village records was a proceeding under the Land Revenue Act.

3. Therefore, the Sub-Divisional Officer could quash the order passed by the Panchayati Adalat only on the ground that there had been a miscarriage of justice. He had no jurisdiction to quash it on any other ground; for instance, he had no jurisdiction to quash it on the ground of any illegality or irregularity not causing a miscarriage of justice. The Sub-Divisional Officer quashed the order not on the ground of any miscarriage of justice but simply on the ground that all the five Panches had not discussed the merits of the case with one another and that two of them had not given their opinions. The Sub-Divisional Officer did not at all consider whether there resulted any miscarriage of justice. Though he quashed the order on the ground that all the Panches had not discussed the matter with one another and that two of them had not given their opinions, he did not discuss whether, or hold that, it amounted to a miscarriage of justice. Apparently whether the case resulted in a miscarriage of justice or not did not enter into the mind of the Sub-Divisional Officer at all and he quashed the order simply on the ground of a supposed irregularity or illegality. Clearly he acted without jurisdiction in quashing the order. The Panches were not required by any law to hold a discussion among themselves about the judgment to be passed. The case was heard by all and at the end the Sarpanch had to take the opinions of the other four Panches and that was done. If two of the Panches did not give their opinions, it did not matter, because the passing of the judgment could not be stayed on that ground. It is to be noted that those Panches did not say that they wanted further time to consider over the matter; they simply refused to give their opinions. By refusing to give their opinions they could not prevent the judgment being passed in the case and the remaining Panches had every right to pass a judgment as they did. The Sub-Divisional Officer thought, without any justification, that all the five Panches should have discussed the case and then the judgment should have been written out. The other two Panches were not bound to write out a dissenting judgment. It was at their option to write it out. They could write it out immediately after the majority judgment was written. If they could write it out, say two minutes latter, they could also write it out a week later. In any case, the delay with which they wrote it out would have no effect on the validity of the majority judgment. It was not at all essential that the two judgments were written on the same day.

4. I find that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the Sub-Divisional Officer has not found out that there was any miscarriage of justice. His order of the 19th April, 1952, was illegal.

5. In reply to this application it was urged on behalf of the opposite party that even if the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was illegal this Court should not, in exercise of its powers of superintendence, set it aside because, (1) the order of the Panchayati Adalat itself was without jurisdiction, and no injustice was caused to the applicant by its being set aside even on an erroneous ground, (2) alternative adequate remedies were open to the applicant and (3) no question of jurisdiction is involved in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer.

6. Under Section 49 of the Panchayat Raj Act the Sarpanch has to form a Bench of five Panches for the trial of every proceeding and every Bench has to include one Panch who resides in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which the plaintiff resides and three Panches who reside in the area of the Gaon Sabha in which neither party resides. The applicant is a resident of Darbhanga in Bihar State. The Panchayat Raj Act cannot and does not apply in Bihar State. Therefore, it was not possible for the Sarpanch to form a Bench as laid down under Section 49. To meet such contingencies there is a provision in Section 49 empowering the State Government to prescribe the constitution of Special Benches for determining disputes arising between parties of different circles. Rule 84 deals with constitution of special Benches. According to it when a proceeding is between parties, any one of which is a resident of a place not governed by the Act, the Sub-Divisional Officer should constitute a special Bench. So the proceeding started by the applicant ought to have been heard by a special Bench constituted by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Rule 84 read with Section 49(4). But this was not done. No special Bench was constituted and the proceeding was disposed of by an ordinary Bench constituted by the Sarpanch purporting to act under Section 49. The five Panches who disposed of the proceeding had no jurisdiction to dispose it of. They had no more power than any other five men in the country to dispose of the case and pass the order. Nobody but a special Bench constituted by the Sub-Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to dispose of it. I, therefore, agree with Mr. Dwivedi that the order of the Panchayati Adalat itself was without jurisdiction and of no effect.

7. The opposite-party pleaded before the Sub-Divisional Officer, during the hearing of the revision application, that the order of the Panchayati Adalat was null and void on account of the above defect of jurisdiction but curiously enough the Sub-Divisional Officer paid no attention to that plea. As regards the Panchayati Adalat itself neither the applicant nor the opposite-party questioned its jurisdiction dispose of the proceedings. Mr. A.P Pandey urged that when the opposite-party failed to plead before the Panchayati Adalat that it had no jurisdiction to dispose of the proceedings he should not be heard now. I consider that the opposite-party is not debarred from raising the plea here. The Panchayati Adalat which disposed of the proceedings had absolutely no jurisdiction and no jurisdiction could be conferred upon it by consent of the parties. It is not that it had jurisdiction but it committed an illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The fact is that the five Panches had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings at all. The cognizance of the proceedings could be taken only by a special Bench constituted by the Sub-Divisional Officer. The initial lack of jurisdiction could not be made good by either party's failure to challenge its jurisdiction in time.

8. I find that the order of the Panchayati Adalat was null and void for want of jurisdiction. Consequently it deserved to be quashed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. When it was quashed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, though on another and erroneous ground, it would not be proper for this Court, specially when acting in the exercise of its power of superintendence, to restore it. Just as a respondent in an appeal can support the order under appeal on other grounds so also can the opposite party support the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer on other grounds.

9. I also agree with Mr. Dwivedi that other adequate remedies are open to the applicant. He can file a regular suit for declaration. The same dispute is proceeding before a Magistrate under Section 145, Cr. P.C and the applicant can have remedy from the Magistrate's Court. Moreover, as the order of the Panchayati Adalat has been quashed, it is open to the applicant to file a regular proceeding under the Land Revenue Act in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer. When these remedies are open I do not think I should act under Article 227 of the Constitution.

10. In the result, I dismiss the application. In view of the facts stated above I make no order about costs.

11. Application dismissed.

Maharajadhiraja Kameshwara Singh v. Bharat Koeri

Judgment Summary — Desai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

Opposite‑Party's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

A. Whether the SDO acted within the jurisdiction conferred by Section 85

B. Jurisdictional competence of the Panchayati Adalat

C. Discretionary exercise of Article 227 and availability of alternate remedies

Holding and Implications

Maharajadhiraja Kameshwara Singh v. Bharat Koeri

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