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citation codes
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Acts
  • SECTION 123 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Sections 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 31 provides:Subject to the provisions of Section 12,
  • provision of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sec. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act
  • SECTION 49 REGISTRATION ACT
  • SECTION 17 REGISTRATION ACT
  • Sec. 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act.
  • Sec. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act
  • registered.12. Section 17(2)(v)
  • Section 17(1)(b)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 123 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Sections 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 31 provides:Subject to the provisions of Section 12,
  • provision of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Sec. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act
  • SECTION 49 REGISTRATION ACT
  • SECTION 17 REGISTRATION ACT
  • Sec. 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act.
  • Sec. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act
  • registered.12. Section 17(2)(v)
  • Section 17(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-respondent, Dungar Singh, and his wife, both elderly and without children, owned the disputed property. Seeking support and maintenance in their old age, they were persuaded by the defendants-appellants, a husband and wife, to transfer the property to them. On 23rd December 1943, two documents were executed: (1) a registered deed of gift (Exhibit P1) transferring the property to the defendants, and (2) an unregistered agreement (Exhibit P2) wherein the defendants agreed to maintain Dungar Singh and his wife and perform their obsequies. The agreement also stipulated that failure to maintain would entitle Dungar Singh to revoke the deed of gift or claim maintenance allowance. Subsequently, the parties quarreled, and the plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that the deed of gift was void due to defendants' failure to maintain him and his wife, and claimed possession of the property. The defendants admitted the agreement but denied failure to maintain and contended that the plaintiff was entitled only to maintenance, not revocation of the gift. Both courts below found that the defendants failed to maintain the plaintiff and his wife, held the unregistered agreement admissible in evidence, and ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the deed of gift and recover possession. The defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants failed to maintain the plaintiff and his wife as agreed.
  2. If so, whether the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the deed of gift and recover possession of the property.
  3. Whether the unregistered agreement could be admitted in evidence.
  4. Whether the deed of gift, not containing a revocation clause, could be revoked based on the separate agreement.
  5. Whether both documents (deed of gift and agreement) required registration or only the deed of gift.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants-Appellants' Arguments

  • The deed of agreement, though executed, was not signed by the second appellant, and thus reliance on it should be limited (conceded not open due to pleadings).
  • The defendants contended they did not fail to maintain the plaintiff and his wife.
  • The plaintiff was not entitled to revoke the deed of gift but only to recover maintenance as per the agreement.
  • In the second appeal, counsel argued that if the unregistered agreement formed part of the gift transaction, it required registration and could not be admitted in evidence.
  • The deed of gift did not contain a clause about revocation and therefore could not be revoked.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the two documents—the registered deed of gift and the unregistered agreement executed on the same day—as parts of one transaction. It held that the gift was made subject to the condition that the donor (Dungar Singh) could revoke the gift or claim maintenance if the donees failed to support him and his wife. The court referred to Sections 31, 122, 123, and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act to interpret the nature of the gift and the conditions of revocation. Section 126 allows a gift to be revoked on the happening of a specified uncertain event not dependent on the donor's will, such as failure to maintain the donor. The court rejected the argument that maintenance was merely consideration, emphasizing that a gift, by definition, is without consideration; thus, the maintenance obligation was a condition, not consideration.

The court further reasoned that the power of revocation need not be recorded in the deed of gift itself but could be contained in a separate document. Regarding registration requirements, the court examined Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act. It concluded that only the deed of gift (the transfer document) required registration, while the separate agreement setting conditions for revocation did not create or extinguish any right in immovable property by itself and thus did not require registration. The exception under Section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act was found inapplicable but did not imply that the agreement fell under Section 17(1)(b). The court upheld the admissibility of the unregistered agreement as evidence and affirmed the lower courts' findings that the defendants failed to maintain the plaintiff and his wife, entitling the plaintiff to revoke the deed of gift and recover possession.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED the defendants-appellants' appeal.

The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions that the defendants failed to maintain the plaintiff and his wife as agreed, that the unregistered agreement was admissible in evidence, and that the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the deed of gift and recover possession of the property. The ruling clarifies that a gift of immovable property made subject to a condition of maintenance can be revoked upon failure of that condition, even if the deed of gift itself does not contain a revocation clause, provided the condition is recorded in a separate document forming part of the transaction. Only the deed of gift requires registration, not the separate conditional agreement. No costs were awarded due to the respondent's absence, and leave to appeal was refused. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties was established.

    Jagat Singh Chilwal v. Dungar Singh

    Agarwala, J.:— This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for a declaration that certain deed of gift was void and for possession. The facts briefly stated are these:—

    2. Dungar Singh, the plaintiff-respondent, and his wife owned the property in dispute. Both the old persons were issueless and were in search of some one who could look after them and support and maintain them in their old age and to whom they might transfer the property which they possessed. The defendants-appellants, husband and wife, persuaded the plaintiff-respondent to transfer the property to them and promised that they would support him in his old age. Accordingly on the 23rd December, 1943, two documents were executed. (1) Exhibit P1, a registered deed by Dungar Singh in favour of the defendants-appellants, and (2) Exhibit P2, an unregistered agreement whereby it was agreed that the donees would maintain Dungar Singh and his wife till their Heath and would perform their obsequies on their deaths, and that in case they failed to do so Dungar Singh might revoke the deed of gift or, in the alternative, obtain maintenance allowance. This deed of agreement was signed by Jagat Singh, appellant No. 1, alone and not by his wife. After sometime parties quarrelled and the plaintiff-respondent filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal alleging that the defendants-appellants had failed to support him and his wife as agreed to by them and that therefore he had revoked the deed of gift and was entitled to such a declaration that the deed of gift was null and void and no longer binding upon him. He also claimed relief for possession over the property comprised in the deed of gift. In the written statement which was filed on behalf of both the appellants it was admitted that the agreement was no doubt executed but it was alleged that they had not failed to maintain the plaintiff-respondent and his wife, and that, in any case, according to the terms of the agreement the plaintiff was not entitled to revoke the deed but was entitled only to recover the amount of maintenance. In the plaint the plaintiff had stated that both the defendants had entered into the agreement. In the written statement this fact was not denied. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants-appellants has conceded that in view of the pleadings it was not open to him to place any reliance upon the fact that the agreement was not signed by the second appellant. This point, therefore, need not detain us any further. Thus two main issues arose in the case; (1) Whether the defendants had failed to maintain the plaintiff and his wife and, (2) whether, if the answer to the first issue was in the affirmative, the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the deed of gift and recover possession over the property. A subsidiary point in connection with the second issue also arose, namely, whether the agreement could be admitted in evidence as it was unregistered. Both the courts below decided that the defendants-appellants failed to maintain the plaintiff and his wife as agreed to by them in the deed of agreement Ex. P2; that the deed of agreement though unregistered, was admissible in evidence and lastly, that the plaintiff was entitled to revoke the deed of gift and therefore to recover possession over the property in suit.

    3. In this second appeal learned counsel has conceded that the deed of agreement, standing by itself did not require registration and could be received in evidence but has urged that if it was part of the transaction of the gift it required registration and could not be received in evidence. He has further urged that the deed of gift not having contained the clause about the power of revocation could not be revoked.

    4. The deed of gift recites the promise of the donees that they would support the donor and his wife. The agreement having been executed on the same day on which the deed of gift was executed it must be held that both the documents formed part of one transaction. The finding of both the courts below to the same effect is quite correct.

    5. If the deed of gift and the agreement formed part of the same transaction it must be held that the gift was made subject to the condition that the donors would be entitled to revoke the gift or, in the alternative, to claim the amount of maintenance from the donees in case the donees failed to maintain the donor and his wife. Assuming that the agreement was admissible in evidence the transaction read as a whole fell within the purview of Sections 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 31 provides:—

    “Subject to the provisions of Section 12, on a transfer of property an interest therein may be created with the condition superadded that it shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, or in a case a specified uncertain event shall not happen.”

    6. Section 126 lays down:—

    “The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in, part, at the mere will of the donor,……..

    A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded.

    Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.”

    7. Learned counsel has argued that the term of the agreement that the donees shall maintain the donor and his wife was in the nature of consideration and not a specified event on the happening of which the donor was entitled to revoke the deed of gift as contemplated in the first part of Section 126. In one sense it could certainly be said that the condition to maintain the donor is a consideration for the deed Ex. P1. But if it was consideration, the transaction cannot properly be said to be a gift because a gift is without consideration. He has admitted, however, that the deed Ex. P1 was a gift and we must consider the payment of the maintenance as a condition upon which the gift was made and not as a consideration for the same. The specified event mentioned in Section 126 need not necessarily be one particular happening. It may be a series of happenings. The omission to make the payment agreed upon would constitute the happening of the specified event mentioned in Section 126 and also the happening of the specified uncertain event as mentioned in Section 31.

    8. It is not necessary that the term relating to the power of the owner to revoke the deed of gift should be entered in the deed by which the transfer or gift is made. This condition may be recorded in a separate document just as the terms of a contract may be recorded in several documents.

    9. The question then is, whether, in a case, where there are two documents, one recording the agreement between the parties as to the condition upon which the donor is given the right to revoke the deed of gift and the other by which the donor makes the gift, is it necessary to have both the documents registered, or it is enough that the second document is registered. I think the answer to this question must be that it is enough that the deed by which the transfer is made is registered.

    10. The relevant provisions on the point are contained in Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act.

    11. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act requires a gift of immovable property to be effected by a registered instrument. Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act provides that an instrument of gift of immovable property shall be registered. Section 17(1)(b) provides that other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title, or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property shall also be registered.

    12. Section 17(2)(v) however lays down that:

    Any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest,”

    need not be registered. Section 49 of the Registration Act provides that a document which is required to be registered by Section 17 of the Registration Act or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, shall not (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property unless it is registered.

    13. A transaction of gift with a condition superadded that the donor shall be entitled to revoke it on the happening of a certain event undoubtedly consists of two parts, (1) a transfer by the donor to the donee and (2) the condition subject to which the transfer is made.

    14. The gift proper consists of the first part i.e, the transfer by the donor to the donee, as a reference to the definition of ‘gift’ in Sec. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act will show. Gift as there defined means,

    “the transfer of certain existing moveable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.”

    15. When it is laid down in Sec. 123 that a gift shall be made by a registered deed, the word ‘gift’ must be construed as having reference to the definition of that word in Sec. 122. It follows, therefore, that what is required to be registered under Sec. 123 is the first part of the transaction and not necessarily the second part. So also, I think, the second part of the transaction does not fall under Sec. 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act. It also does not fall under Sec. 17(1)(b) because the second part by itself does not purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or continent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property. It merely prescribes a condition subject to which a gift is made. The document contemplated by Sec. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act is a document which by its own force creates the interest spoken of.

    16. The exception contained-in Sec. 17(2)(v) does not apply to the present case. But because it does not apply, it should not be considered that the present case falls under Sec. 17(1)(b). The exception contained in Sec. 17(2)(v) is not exhaustive. There may be other cases not falling under Sec. 17(2)(v) and yet not falling under Sec. 17(1)(b) either. I hold that the document containing the agreement between the parties as to the condition upon which the gift made by Dungar Singh was revocable did not require registration.

    17. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal but as no one appears on behalf of the respondent it is not necessary to make any order as to costs. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.

    18. Appeal dismissed.

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    Jagat Singh Chilwal v. Dungar Singh
    (Jan 25, 1951)