Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant, originally a resident of Allahabad and then employed in Bombay, entered into a written contract dated 21 March 1943 to purchase the defendant's bungalow in Lukerganj, Allahabad, for Rs. 15,000. The defendant, also a government servant, had built the house after borrowing money and faced attachment proceedings by his creditors; he agreed to sell because of those liabilities. After initial agreement, some minor terms (notably brokerage) were settled by 29 April 1943 and the draft sale deed was approved by the plaintiff. The property was leasehold and required the Collector's permission for transfer.

Between 29 April and 3 May 1943 the defendant obtained funds to pay his creditors and wrote (3 May 1943) to the plaintiff asking to be released from the contract and offering compensation; he enclosed a crossed cheque for Rs. 1,000 (earnest money). The plaintiff forwarded that letter to his son in Allahabad. The son replied on 11 May 1943 (marked "without prejudice") demanding Rs. 4,000 as compensation within 48 hours, otherwise threatening specific performance; the defendant refused to pay Rs. 4,000 and offered reasonable compensation. On 22 May 1943 the plaintiff's son returned the Rs. 1,000 cheque and placed papers with a lawyer. The plaintiff filed suit for specific performance on 31 May 1943.

The Civil Judge framed three issues: (1) whether the plaintiff agreed to accept damages instead of specific performance; (2) whether the plaintiff was entitled as of right to specific performance given circumstances pleaded by the defendant; and (3) whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover claimed damages and, if so, how much. The lower court found that the plaintiff (through his conduct and suppression of a covering letter) had dispensed with performance, that damages were adequate and that specific performance would cause special hardship to the defendant; it dismissed the suit for specific performance but awarded a decree of Rs. 1,600 to the plaintiff (having assessed damages at Rs. 600). The defendant submitted to that decree and the plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Did the plaintiff agree to accept damages in lieu of specific performance of the contract, and, if so, how does that affect the case?
  2. Is the plaintiff entitled, as of right, to claim specific performance of the contract in view of the circumstances set up in the defendant's written statement (paragraphs 17 and 18)?
  3. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover the damages claimed, and if so, what is the proper amount?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The lower court was wrong to find that there was any special hardship to the defendant justifying refusal of specific performance.
  • The defendant had not led sufficient evidence to prove that damages would be an adequate relief.
  • Even if the plaintiff's covering letter to his son (relating to the defendant's rescission request) was suppressed, that would be immaterial because any willingness by the plaintiff to accept rescission, not being communicated to the defendant, had no legal effect.
  • The plaintiff challenged the award of pendente lite and future interest on the amount decreed by the lower court (seeking clarification/modification on interest entitlement).

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff had agreed not to enforce performance of the contract, invoking section 63 of the Indian Contract Act and the Judicial Committee ruling in Firm Chhunna Mal Ram Nath v. Firm Mool Chand Ram Bhagat, so there was no contract enforceable against the defendant.
  • Damages would be an adequate relief and the plaintiff's own conduct (including the correspondence and the son’s letter) showed willingness to accept damages.
  • The 11 May letter marked "without prejudice" (and the plaintiff's son's evidence about that correspondence) could be relevant and had been properly admitted by the lower court.
  • The defendant argued (before the lower court or raised on appeal) that there would be special hardship to him if specific performance were granted—sentimental attachment, retirement plans and expenditures incurred in building the house—but the court treated these as not legally decisive.
  • An additional point (not taken in the lower court) was that the property was on Nazul land and sale required the Collector's permission and approval of the transferee; because that plea was not taken below it could not be entertained on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Firm Chhunna Mal Ram Nath v. Firm Mool Chand Ram Bhagat (Chunna Mal v. Mool Chand) Interpreted section 63 of the Indian Contract Act to mean that a promisee may dispense with performance without a new agreement supported by consideration; such dispensation is a defence and need not be a separate contract. The court relied on the Judicial Committee's approval of the Lahore High Court's view to hold that the plaintiff's apparent dispensation with performance (as shown by suppressed correspondence and conduct) would operate as a defence; the court accepted that such a dispensation need not be by a new contract with consideration.
Abaji Sitaram Modak v. Trimbak Municipality Earlier Bombay High Court decision (referred to in Chunna Mal) that had held a contrary view requiring a new agreement for consideration to dispense performance under section 63. The court noted that Chunna Mal disagreed with this decision and the Judicial Committee did not follow the Abaji Sitaram Modak approach; thus the Abaji Sitaram Modak position was not followed.
Ramji Patel v. Rao Kishore Singh Illustrated that where a competent court finds damages to be an adequate relief (a factual finding), section 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act bars specific performance and instead damages should be awarded. The court applied the same principle: because the plaintiff himself at one stage offered to accept damages and the lower court found damages adequate, specific performance was barred under section 21(a) and damages (rather than specific performance) were appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, applying evidence rules and statutory principles strictly as set out in the opinion:

  1. On whether the plaintiff dispensed with performance:

    The defendant's 3 May 1943 letter asked to be released and offered compensation; the plaintiff forwarded that letter to his son. The covering letter from the plaintiff to his son (which would show the plaintiff's reaction) was not produced. The plaintiff's son testified that the father left the matter to him and that he had destroyed the covering letter. The lower court found deliberate suppression of that covering letter; the appellate court accepted that finding. Applying section 114, Illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act, the court reasoned that deliberate suppression permitted an adverse inference: the letter was likely suppressed because, if produced, it would not support the plaintiff's case. From this, the court concluded it was likely the plaintiff was willing to accept damages and had dispensed with performance of the contract.

  2. On admissibility of the "without prejudice" letter and related oral evidence:

    The court considered the 11 May 1943 letter marked "without prejudice" and the plaintiff son's testimony. It examined section 23 of the Indian Evidence Act (which excludes admissions made on an express condition that evidence of them not be given). The court assumed, for argument, that "without prejudice" might have been intended to mean evidence not to be given; however, the witness (the son) gave evidence about the negotiation and his statement that he suggested Rs. 4,000 was accepted by the defendant's son as showing the plaintiff at one stage considered Rs. 4,000 sufficient. The court accepted that evidence and relied on it as part of the factual matrix showing the plaintiff's willingness to accept damages.

  3. On adequacy of damages & Specific Relief Act principles:

    The court reviewed statutory provisions and principles: Section 12(c) and the explanation establish that specific performance is appropriate where pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief, and there is a presumption (unless contrary proved) that breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately compensated by money. Section 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act provides that where damages are adequate, specific performance shall not be granted. The appellate court held that because the plaintiff himself had at one stage indicated willingness to accept a monetary sum (the Rs. 4,000 demand by his son, and the surrounding correspondence and conduct), the lower court was justified in finding damages adequate and refusing specific performance under section 21(a).

  4. On other points raised:

    The court declined to consider the Nazul/Collector-permission submission because that plea had not been raised in the lower court. The court also held that sentimental hardship and other personal considerations of the defendant (retirement, sentimental attachment, expenditure) were not legally sufficient to defeat specific performance where the contract was otherwise unobjectionable; the discretion to grant specific performance must be exercised according to settled principles, not merely to avoid hardship.

  5. Remedy and modification:

    The appellate court agreed with the lower court that damages (rather than specific performance) were appropriate. It found the lower court's award of Rs. 1,600 should carry pendente lite and future interest at 3% from the date of the suit until payment and modified the decree accordingly. The appeal was dismissed with that modification, and the court directed that parties bear their respective costs in this Court.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED AFTER MODIFICATION.

Holding (core ruling): The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision to refuse specific performance and to award damages, with the modification that the sum decreed (Rs. 1,600) shall carry pendente lite and future interest at 3% from the date of the suit to the date of payment. The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed subject to this modification, and no party costs were allowed in this Court (each party to bear their own costs here).

Implications (direct effects on the parties):

  • The plaintiff's suit for specific performance was dismissed; instead the plaintiff is entitled to a monetary decree in the modified amount and interest as stated above.
  • The defendant had already submitted to the lower court decree; the appellate court's decision affirms the substitution of damages for specific performance in these circumstances.
  • No broader legal rule or novel precedent was announced; the decision applies existing statutory provisions and established authorities (including Firm Chhunna Mal and Ramji Patel) to the facts of this case. The court explicitly refused to entertain a point not raised below (Collector's permission) and treated sentimental hardship as not decisive in the exercise of discretion for specific performance.
Appeal dismissed after modification.

    Hari Krishna Agarwala v. K.C. Gupta

    Malik, C.J:— The plaintiff-appellant was an original resident of Allahabad. He was employed as Assistant Controller of Purchase, Cotton Textiles Directorate Government of India, Bombay, and it is his case that he was anxious to settle in Allahabad after retirement from Government service and, though he had a house in the City of Allahabad, he wanted to purchase a bungalow in the civil station and that therefore he entered into a contract with the defendant on the 21st March, 1943, to buy the defendant's house for a sum of Rs. 15,000. The defendant is also a Government servant and in the course of his employment was posted at Allahabad and had built a house in Lukerganj after borrowing money from, certain persons. He had to pay a large sum of interest on the money borrowed but was not able to clear off the liabilities. He had been transferred to Lucknow where on all the material dates he was posted. The creditors of the defendant proceeded to attach the house and the defendant ultimately was forced to agree to its sale and entered into the contract dated the 21st March, 1943, with the plaintiff. The fact that there was such a contract is not denied. Soon after the contract, there were differences between the parties about certain minor terms, specially about the payment of brokerage. Ultimately, on the 29th of April, 1943, all the terms were settled. A draft of the sale deed had already been sent by the defendant to the plaintiff for approval on the 26th and this draft was approved by the plaintiff on the 29th. One thing, however, still remained to be done and it was the obtaining of the permission of the Collector for the sale. The house was built on leasehold land and under the lease the lessee could transfer the premises only with the permission of the Collector and to a party approved by him. Between the 29th April and the 3rd May the defendant got money from a relation of his which was sufficient to clear off his liabilities and therefore the necessity for the sale no longer existed. He, therefore, wrote a letter dated the 3rd May, 1943, to the plaintiff at Bombay in which he explained the circumstances that had compelled him to agree to sell the house, the value that he and his wife attached to the house and the change in the circumstances which had enabled him to pay off all his liabilities so that there was no longer any necessity for sale and requested the plaintiff to relieve him of his obligation under the contract and to agree to take compensation instead. The relevant portion of the letter dated the 3rd May, 1943, is as follows:

    “But as I am now in a position to pay them all and clear their account fully, my prayer to you is that you will be good enough to release me from the contract and allow me to keep the house. Needless to say that I shall always remain grateful to you for it. As a gentleman and a reasonable man I hope on will have no hesitation in acceding to my request. It might cause on some pecuniary loss. I am prepared to compensate you for that loss.”

    The defendant also enclosed a crossed cheque for Rs. 1,000, the amount that he had received as earnest money. The plaintiff, who was at Bombay, sent this letter to his son who was in Allahabad, and on the 11th May, 1943, the plaintiff's son, Shri Krishna Agarwal, wrote a letter, which was marked “without prejudice”, to the defendant. In this letter he said as follows:

    “My father and I are very much touched by your letter and we want to respect your wishes so far as is reasonable. In order to keep ready money to be paid to you at a moment's notice by way of the consideration of the sale deed we had to sell our valuable shares in an unfavourable market at a loss of about Rs. 4,000 (four thousand only). The prices of the shares have risen very high now and this is an additional loss. We have thus suffered a loss of more than Rs. 4,000 on account of our entering into a contract with you for the sale of the house…. If you really wish to retain the house you can send a cheque for Rs. 4,000 as compensation for the loss that we have suffered. This must be done within 48 hours of the receipt of this letter by you. If it is not so done, the above offer will be withdrawn and the contract of sale will be specifically enforced.”

    The defendant was not willing to pay the sum of Rs. 4,000 which he considered to be an exaggerated amount and offered in his letter dated the 14th May, 1943, to pay reasonable compensation for the amount of loss suffered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's son, in his letter dated the 22nd May, 1943, replied that he was not willing to accept anything less than Rs. 4,000 and as the sum of Rs. 4,000 had not been paid he was returning the cheque for Rs. 1,000 which had been sent to his father and that he had placed the papers in the hands of his lawyer to file a suit for specific performance.

    Thereupon the suit was filed on the 31st May, 1943.

    In defence the defendant took several pleas. It is not necessary to deal with them in detail and we shall only mention such of the pleas as have been urged before us. The learned Civil Judge framed three issues which were as follows:

    (1) Did the plaintiff agree to accept damages in lieu of specific performance of the contract in suit; if so, how does the fact affect the case?

    (2) Is the plaintiff not entitled as of right to claim specific performance of the contract in suit in view of the circumstances set up in paragraphs nos. 17 and 18 of the written statement?

    (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to recover damages claimed; if so, how much?”

    The learned Civil Judge decided on issues 1 and 2 that the plaintiff had written to his son, Shri Krishna Agarwal, to settle the amount of damages and that the covering letter of the plaintiff, sent along with the defendant's letter dated the 3rd May, 1943, had been deliberately suppressed and had not been destroyed as suggested in his evidence by Mr. Shri Krishna Agarwal, the son of the plaintiff. The lower court was of the opinion that this was a case where damages would be adequate relief and that there would be special hardship to the defendant if the contract was specifically enforced. Coming to the amount of damages, the lower court assessed the sum at Rs. 600 and, while dismissing the suit for specific performance of contract, passed a decree for Rs. 1,600 in plaintiff's favour with proportionate costs.

    The defendant has submitted to the decree but the plaintiff has appealed.

    On behalf of the plaintiff learned counsel has urged that the lower court was wrong in its view that there would be any special hardship to the defendant which would justify in law the refusal of a relief for specific performance and that the defendant had not led sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that damages would be adequate relief. The learned counsel has also, urged that, even if the plaintiff's son suppressed the letter written to him by the plaintiff as the covering letter to the defendant's letter dated the 3rd May, it was of no consequence as even if the plaintiff was agreeable to accepting the defendant's proposal for a rescission of the contract, that rescission not having been communicated to the defendant, it was of no legal effect.

    The judgment of the lower court is being supported on four grounds. The first ground urged before us by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the plaintiff having agreed not to enforce performance of the contract, there was no contract in existence which could be enforced and he has relied on section 63 of the Indian Contract Act and a ruling of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Firm Chhunna Mal Ram Nath v. Firm Mool Chand Ram Bhagat. section 63 of the Indian Contract Act provides that—

    “every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.”

    The question before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee arose whether such rescission of contract should be by a subsequent contract which should fulfil all the requirements of a valid contract between the parties. Dealing with this point their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed:

    “The appellants contended that section 63 applied only where there was an agreement to dispense or a contract, supported by consideration, to do so, and that in any case it could only operate, when the party dispensing had performed his part of the contract and only something remained to be performed on the other side unless dispensed with…. They further said that, if they had been wrong in refusing in advance to accept bales, this repudiation had not been accepted by the respondents, and therefore the contract remained alive and ought to have been performed. It is evident that the alleged dispensation under section 63 is by itself a complete answer unless the absence of contract or consideration is fatal, for the appellants again and again dispensed with the performance by the respondents of their promise to deliver the goods contracted for and they cannot recover damages for the breach of a promise touching the performance of a thing they wholly dispense with.”

    Their Lordships, after holding that they had not agree with the decision of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Abaji Sitaram Modak v. Trimbak Municipality, which had laid down that a new agreement for consideration was necessary, went on to hold:

    “The language of the section does not refer to any such agreement and ought not to be enlarged by any implication of English doctrines. On this they agree with the learned Judges of the High Court.”

    In Chunna Mal v. Mool Chand(2) the relevant portion of the Judgment of the Lahore High Court is quoted which their Lordships of the Judicial Committee approved. The Lahore-High Court had held that—

    “The section is a clear departure from the English law on the subject and if we may say so, a very wise departure and specially suited to the conditions of this country. It is clear that the section is not to be used by a plaintiff as creating a cause of action and that it does not entitle the remitter to improve his own position and to enlarge time or to make a remission to the detriment of the other side, but whether the remission be accepted in so many words or not, it creates a plea which a defendant can always urge to meet an action.”

    The question for decision is whether in this case the lower-court was right in holding that the plaintiff had dispensed with the performance of the contract. The defendant had written to the plaintiff a letter on the 3rd May, 1943, the relevant portion of which has been quoted above, in which he had made the request that the plaintiff may relieve him from the performance of the contract and may accept compensation instead. What the plaintiff's reaction to this letter was, about that there is no direct evidence, but it is admitted that on receipt of this letter the plaintiff wrote a letter to his son in Allahabad and after the receipt of the letter from his father the son sent a reply to the defendant. The letter sent by the father to his son has not been produced. The defendant in his written statement had pleaded in paragraph 19 that “the plaintiff agreed to rescission and novation of the contract and demanded damages and since then there remained no contract for sale.” The plaintiff did not come into the witness box and did not say what he had written to his son. His son, Shri Krishna Agarwal, was examined as a witness for the plaintiff and according to him his father had left the discretion whether to accept damages or not and to fix the amount of damages entirely to him. His statement is that he had destroyed the covering letter as he did not consider it to be of any importance. In view of the fact that the entire correspondence has been preserved, the lower court was of the opinion that the covering letter had not been destroyed but was being suppressed and we have no reason to differ from the finding recorded by the lower court. The question arises what inference should be drawn under section 114, Illustration (g), of the Indian Evidence Act from the suppression of this letter. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has urged that the letter was never summoned from the plaintiff and that may Have been a good answer but unfortunately for the plaintiff the plaintiff's case is that the letter was destroyed soon after its receipt and therefore there was no point in the defendant summoning it from the plaintiff. We are inclined to accept the view of the lower court that the letter was deliberately suppressed and if the letter was deliberately suppressed, the only reason for the suppression would be that, if produced, it would not support the plaintiff's case. We think it is very likely that the plaintiff, who is an elderly man holding a responsible Government post, was willing, on receipt of the pitiable appeal from the defendant, to accept damages and to dispense with the performance of the contract, but the son, who was in Allahabad and within easy reach of legal advice, was not quite so generous and thought that if the performance of the contract had to be dispensed with it had better be dispensed with for a price which would be a real profit to him and his father and he therefore, suppressed the letter which his father had written to him and only produced his own correspondence with the defendant. In the absence of any evidence given by the plaintiff, we are not prepared to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the lower court that the plaintiff was willing to accept damages and had dispensed with the performance of the con treat.

    The next question urged by learned counsel is that in this case damages were adequate relief. He has cited various passages from “Banerji on Specific Relief” to show that there is no real difference between a claim for the specific performance of a contract in respect of movable property and a claim for the specific performance of a contract in respect of immovable property and that in the case of a claim for the specific performance of contract in respect of movable property of rare value a breach of contract in respect of which cannot be adequately compensated for by the award of any damages, specific performance would be granted. In the case of immovable property, as it is difficult to assess the damage the presumption is that damages would not be sufficient compensation and the courts would specifically enforce the contract unless the defendant can prove that damages would be an adequate relief. The question has been more clearly and better discussed in Pomeroy's Book on Specific Performance of Contract (Third edition). The learned author has pointed out that in cases of contracts for the purchase of lands or things that relate to realities, those being of a permanent nature were expected to have a special value, and if a person agreed to purchase them; it was on a particular liking to the land, and such contracts were different from the contracts entered into about goods in the way of trade and that was how the rule started but later it came to be assumed by the courts that in all contracts for sale of land damages were inadequate compensation for a breach of contract. The learned author has further pointed out that the situation has changed and land was offered, bought and held simply as merchandise for mere purposes of pecuniary profit. Possessing no interest in the eyes of the purchaser and owner other than its market value, but the rule having once been established has now become universal and the actual motives and design of the purchaser are never inquired into, for it is assumed in every instance that damages axe an inadequate relief for the breach of a land contract. So far as we are concerned, the law is laid down in the Specific Relief Act. Section 12 of the Act sets out the cases in which specific performance is enforceable. Clause (c) provides that the specific-performance may be granted

    “when the act agreed to be done is such that pecuniary compensation for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief”

    and the explanation to the section provides that—

    “unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money, and that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be thus relieved.”

    It has, therefore, made it a question of burden of proof, if being assumed that in cases of a breach of contract to transfer immovable property it may be possible for the defendant to prove that damages would be adequate relief. Section 21, clause (a) of the Specific Relief Act, provides that a contract cannot be specifically enforced for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief. The question is whether in this case the lower court was right in holding that the defendant had established that compensation would be an adequate relief and that the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to claim specific performance.

    A great deal of argument has been addressed to us on the question whether the letter dated the 11th May, 1943, marked “without prejudice” can be used in evidence against the plaintiff. The lower court has taken the contents of that letter into consideration and has admitted that letter in evidence. It is not necessary for us to consider this letter as the facts appear from the statements of Shri Krishna, plaintiff's son, and the defendant. Mr. Pathak has urged that as the offer contained in the letter dated the 11th May, 1943, was without prejudice, even the evidence given by the plaintiff's son in the witness box could not be relied upon. This is an argument which we cannot accept. Section 23 of the Indian Evidence Act which is the only section which has anything to do with the point under consideration—provides that—

    “in civil cases no admission is relevant, if it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given.”

    The second part of the section is not applicable. The first part provides that if an admission was made on an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, then that admission is not relevant. If the words “without prejudice” are interpreted to convey an express condition that evidence of the admission is not to be given, then the first part of the section would govern the question of the admissibility of this letter. For the purpose of this case we can assume that the words “without prejudice” were intended by Shri Krishna to convey that if the offer was not accepted, no further use was to be made of the offer contained in the letter and on this interpretation, according to the first part of Section 23 of the Indian Evidence Act, the letter may not be taken into account. But, in his examination-in-chief, Shri Krishna stated that “after the breach of the contract on the part of the defendant, his son came to me and pleaded mercy. I took pity, but I did not abandon the idea of giving (?) in for the house, as I needed the house badly. I told him that he shall have to give up the house failing which suit for specific performance shall be filed. I only said that I would be prepared to recommend to my father for a favourable consideration in case defendant was to pay the proposed amount immediately. That was not accepted. My father had valuable shares which he sold just to keep ready cash. He lost over Rs. 4,000, but in order to end all dispute, I suggested Rs. 4,000. The defendant, when he came into the witness box stated that he had sent his son to discuss the question of compensation with the plaintiff's son and his son came back and informed him that the plaintiff was not willing to accept less than Rs. 4,000 to relieve him of his liability under the contract. It would thus appear that at one stage the plaintiff considered that he could be sufficiently compensated for the breach of the contract by receipt of a sum of Rs. 4,000 as damages. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has urged that this was a matter of charity and a matter of special concession. That may be so, though we doubt very much that the plaintiff's son, if he had been, actuated by such motives, would have damanded a sum of Rs. 4,000 as damages. The fact remains, however, that this is not a case where the plaintiff took his stand upon the contract and was of the opinion that nothing less than specific performance would do, and was at one stage willing to accept compensation in lieu of specific performance. The question arises whether in such a case the court should decree specific performance. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, which we have already quoted, provides that, where damages are adequate, relief for specific performance of a contract shall not be granted. In this case it is established that at one stage the plaintiff considered that damages would be adequate compensation and in view of plaintiff's own conduct we are not in a position to differ from the finding arrived at by the lower court. If the defendant had been; willing to pay Rs. 4,000 the plaintiff could not have said that he would refuse to accept the amount as sufficient compensation for the loss of the property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this is a case where the lower court was justified in granting damages in place of specific performance.

    In Ramji Patel v. Rao Kishore Singh—the case which had come up to the High Court in second appeal—the District Judge had held that Rs. 20,000 were an adequate relief for the breach of a contract for sale of immovable property. The suit for specific performance, in spite of that finding, had been decreed by the court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee pointed out that, on that finding, that Rs. 20,000 were an adequate relief and that finding being a finding of fact recorded by the District Judge which could not be interfered with in second appeal, the jurisdiction to grant specific performance was barred by section 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act and, instead of specific performance, their Lordships passed a decree for damages. In the case before us, the plaintiff having himself at one stage offered to accept damages as adequate compensation, the principle of the decision in Ramji Patel's case, is clearly applicable.

    The third point urged by learned counsel is that the court cannot grant specific performance of the contract inasmuch as the property was such that it could only be sold under the Collector's sanction and to a person approved by the Collector, the house being on Nazul land, it was held by the plaintiff as a lessee from the Government. The plea was not taken in the lower court and we cannot, therefore, go into this matter any further and allow this point to be raised before us.

    The last argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent is that there would be special hardship caused to his client, if the contract is specifically enforced, as he too has retired, or is retiring, from Government service and wants to settle in Allahabad and that he has a sentimental attachment to the house and had spent a large sum of money in building the house and in paying off interest on the sum borrowed for the purpose and that it was only because of the fact that he was in financial, difficulties that he had been forced to agree to the sale of the house. We are of the opinion that these are considerations which are not really relevant in considering whether specific performance should or should not be granted. Whatever reason which forced the defendant to enter into the agreement, it is not suggested that the agreement was unfair or that the house was being sold for an inadequate price. Learned counsel has urged that, as the relief for specific performance is discretionary, sentimental and other considerations should also weigh with this Court. We are of the opinion that this is not possible as the discretion has to be exercised in accordance with settled and fixed principles and if the contract is unobjectionable in its nature and circumstances, specific performance, as has been observed in “Fry on Specific Performance”, sixth edition, page 20, is as much a matter of course, and therefore of right, as are damages. A mere hardship of the results will not affect the discretion of the Court.

    Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has challenged the amount of damages only on one ground. He has urged that there seems to be no reason why the plaintiff should of get pendente lite and future interest on a sum of Rs. 1,600 decreed by the lower court. Learned counsel appears to be right. No reason is given why the plaintiff should not get pendente lite and future interest. We, therefore, direct that the plaintiff shall get future and pendente lite interest at the rate of 3 per cent, on a sum of Rs. 1,600 from the date of the suit to the date of payment. With this modification, the appeal is dismissed. Having considered this matter carefully, we are of the opinion that this is a case in which we should not allow any party costs in this Court. We, therefore, direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of this Court.

    Appeal dismissed after modification.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Hari Krishna Agarwala v. K.C. Gupta
    (Nov 23, 1948)