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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Appeal under S.110D, Motor Vehicles Act

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises under S.110D of the Motor Vehicles Act against the Motor Claims Tribunal, Nainital judgment dated 31 July 1979 which rejected the appellants' claim for Rs. 100,000 under S.110A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The claim related to an accident in which the deceased, Bachchi Singh, a passenger on Bus No. USR 2952 (owned by U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Haldwani Depot) fell into a khad and later died of injuries. The appellants are the deceased's married daughters who claimed compensation on the ground of the driver Kishan Singh's alleged rash and negligent driving. The Corporation, its insurer (Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd.), and the driver were respondents/defendants and contested the claim. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal decided in favour of the appellants on the question of their entitlement to bring the claim (issue No.1) but against them on whether the accident was attributable to rash and negligent driving (issue No.2), resulting in the rejection of the claim; the present appeal challenges that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the claimants (the two daughters) are precluded from claiming compensation because they are married women (i.e., whether they qualify as legal representatives or dependents for purposes of S.110A).
  2. Whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of Bus No. USR 2952 by its driver Kishan Singh.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants (married daughters) sought Rs. 100,000 under S.110A as compensation for the death of Bachchi Singh, alleging the accident resulted from the rash and negligent driving of the bus by Kishan Singh.
  • They produced a witness, Ummed Singh (PW 2), who claimed to have witnessed the accident and said the bus was being driven at a fast speed and the driver lost control due to rash driving.

Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments

  • The Corporation, its insurer and the driver contested liability, asserting that the accident occurred suddenly because a cow appeared on the road, and that despite the driver's best efforts (including applying brakes), the vehicle skidded (due to frost) and overturned into the khad.
  • They denied rash or careless driving and produced the conductor (DW 1) and the driver (DW 2) who gave evidence as to low speed (stated as 14 km/hr) and the presence of a cow at the scene.
  • They also argued that the appellants, being married daughters, were not entitled to compensation because they were not legal representatives or dependents who suffered pecuniary loss as defined/referenced by relevant provisions and authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Orissa v. Archana Nayak, 1987 ACJ 772 (AIR 1987 Orissa 82) Held that a widow who remarries is not a legal representative of her first husband and ceases to be a dependent; therefore not entitled to compensation for the first husband's death. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that persons who are not dependents (or who have ceased to be dependents) should not be awarded compensation; it was referenced in assessing whether the married daughters were dependents or legal representatives entitled to damages.
Gurdial Kaur v. Atma Singh, 1987 ACJ 245 (Punj & Har) Illustrated that compensation was awarded to widow and unmarried daughters, whereas major sons and married daughters were not awarded on grounds of not suffering pecuniary loss. Used to support the conclusion that married daughters and major sons do not, as a rule, suffer compensable pecuniary loss and hence should not receive compensation in the circumstances of this case.
A.P.S.R.T.C v. Narasavva, AIR 1987 Andh Pra 127 (Full Bench) Full Bench found no authority for awarding compensation for pain or mental agony suffered by dependents of the deceased; denied such awards. The court cited this Full Bench decision to reject the appellants' alternate contention that they were entitled to compensation for the pain or mental agony suffered by them due to the death.
Sri Sailam Devastanam v. Bhavani Pramilamma, AIR 1983 Andh Pra 297 Earlier decision (later overruled by the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench) which dealt with claims for pain suffered by dependents; the Full Bench disapproved such awards. The opinion notes that this decision was overruled by the Full Bench and was therefore relied upon (through the Full Bench overruling) to deny compensation for pain suffered by dependents.
Nasiruddin v. Kadir Ahmed, (1986) 1 ACJ 94 (Madhya Pradesh) Expressed the principle that there is no foundation in law for awarding compensation for pain and suffering of dependents due to accidental death of a relation. Quoted by the court to support the rejection of claims for compensation for pain and suffering of dependents.
N. Sivammal v. Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corpn., (1985) 1 SCC 18 : AIR 1985 SC 106 The Supreme Court held that no compensation can be awarded for agony suffered by dependents and affirmed the High Court's view that awards for mental agony are not legally sustainable. The court adopted this Supreme Court authority to reinforce the principle that awards for mental agony or pain to dependents are not permissible and applied it to deny such relief to the appellants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a two-part analysis corresponding to the two principal issues.

On the question of negligence (issue No. 2), the court evaluated witness testimony in detail:

  • Appellants' key witness, Ummed Singh (PW 2), claimed to have witnessed the accident and attributed it to rash and fast driving. He gave a travel time and distance (bus left Sathunga at 3:00 p.m., reached Laxmikhan at 3:15 p.m., about 3–4 miles) that did not, on its face, establish excessive speed.
  • The driver (DW 2) and conductor (DW 1) consistently stated the width of the road (15 feet), the speed (stated as 14 km/hr), and that a cow unexpectedly appeared on the road; the driver applied brakes, the road was frosty, the vehicle skidded, hit the parapet and fell.
  • The court observed agreement among witnesses on the distance and travel time, and found the driver's stated speed not to be "fast." The presence of frost and the unexpected appearance of a cow were accepted as factors that caused the accident despite the driver's attempt to avoid collision.

The court applied the ordinary legal definition of negligence — conduct judged by what a reasonable person would or would not do — and concluded that the driver did what could reasonably be expected in the circumstances and did not act with culpable carelessness. The event was classified as an "unexpected occurrence" (an accident) rather than a consequence of negligent driving. On this basis, the court agreed with the Tribunal's finding that the Corporation was not liable for damages.

On the question of entitlement of the appellants (issue No. 1), the court examined statutory definitions and precedent:

  • The court noted that "legal representative" is not defined in the Motor Vehicles Act but referred to section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure — adopted by the State amendment — which defines a legal representative as one who represents the estate of a deceased or intermeddles with it.
  • Counsel for respondents argued that compensation is assessed on loss of future pecuniary benefit (dependency) and that married daughters did not suffer such dependency; the court reviewed evidence regarding the living arrangements: one daughter (Padma Devi) lived with her husband; the other (Kamla Devi) asserted she lived with her father because her husband was unemployed, but the court regarded this as insufficient to establish a dependent relationship, treating her as a casual visitor rather than a dependent.
  • The court relied on authorities (Archana Nayak, Gurdial Kaur, and others) to hold that married daughters and persons who have ceased to be dependents are generally not entitled to compensation for loss of dependency. It also accepted precedent that there is no basis in law for awards for pain, mental agony or loss of consortium to dependents in such claims.

Concluding its analysis, the court found no legal or evidentiary basis to impute negligence to the driver and found the appellants were not entitled to damages either as dependents or for pain/mental agony or loss of consortium.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court upheld the Tribunal's finding that the accident was not caused by rash or negligent driving and that the appellants (the married daughters) were not entitled to compensation under the circumstances described.

Immediate implications and consequences:

  • The appellants' claim for Rs. 100,000 under S.110A is rejected; the Corporation and its driver are not held liable for payment of damages arising from this accident.
  • The appellants are not awarded compensation for loss of dependency, pain and suffering, or loss of consortium in this matter.
  • The court expressly applied existing statutory definitions and caselaw to the facts; it did not announce or purport to create any new legal principle beyond applying settled authorities that married daughters and persons not shown to be dependents do not generally recover dependency damages and that awards for mental agony of dependents are not legally sustainable.

No costs were awarded. No broader legal precedent beyond the application of existing authorities was created by this decision.

    Smt. Padma Devi And Another Claimant- v. U.P State Road Transport Corporation, Nainital And Others

    1. The appeal under S. 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act arises from the judgment of the Motor Claims Tribunal, Nainital dated 31st July, 1979, rejecting the claim of the appellants for recovery of Rs. 100000/- under S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act for the accident which resulted in the death of Bachchi Singh. The appellants are the married daughters of the deceased.

    2. The claim made was on the basis that the deceased Bachchi Singh was travelling by Bus No. USR 2952 owned by the U.P State, Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) of Haldwani Depot driven by Kishan Singh from Sathunga to Kathgodam, when the same met with an accident by falling in the khad. On account of the accident, Bachchi Singh received serious injuries and when taken to the hospital, he succumbed to them. The appellants asserted that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the Bus by Kishan Singh. Therefore, the appellants were entitled to receive Rs. 100000/- as compensation. The claim was contested by the Corporation as well as the Oriental Fire and General insurance Company Limited. Kishan Singh, driver impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the claim petition, also filed a written statement.

    3. The version given in the written statements was that at about 3.50 p.m when the vehicle reached at Lakhmikhan in between Ramgarh Talla and Mukteshwar 3 Kms. away from Malla Ramgarh, it met with an accident and fell into the khad. Many passengers received injuries and in that accident Bachchi Singh was seriously injured. The defendants alleged that the accident did not take place due to the rash or careless driving. It occurred suddenly due to the cow appearing on the road and that despite his best efforts, the driver could not save it.

    4. The respondents also alleged that the appellants were the married daughters of the deceased Bachchi Singh and being not his legal representatives were not entitled to get the compensation.

    5. On the pleadings, amongst others, the relevant two issues are as follows:

    1. Whether the claimants are not entitled to make the claim for reason of their being married women?

    2. Whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of Bus No. USR 2952?

    6. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal decided issue No. 1 in favour of the appellants, and issue No. 2 against them. As a result of the decision on issue No. 2 the claim was rejected.

    7. The first point to be considered is whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving by the driver. The appellants produced Ummed Singh (PW 2) who was also travelling by the same bus of which the deceased Bachchi Singh was a passenger. He stated that he was sitting on the front seat and had witnessed the entire accident. He stated that the accident took place due to the negligent driving of the bus by Kishan Singh, the driver. The road was empty. He denied that cow had appeared at the scene all of a sudden and in the attempt to save it, the accident occurred. He stated that the bus was being driven at a fast speed and as a result of rashness, the driver lost control and it fell into the khad. In the cross-examination, he admitted that the bus left Sathunga, the last station, at 3.00 P.M and reached Laxmikhan at 3.15 P.M which is at a distance of about 3-4 miles.

    8. From his statement, it cannot be found that the bus was being driven at a fast speed and the driver did not have control over it due to the same. He was not only an experienced having done several years of service but was also regularly driving the vehicle on the route in question.

    9. From the statement of Devi Datt (DW 1), conductor of the bus at the relevant time and Kishan Singh, driver (DW 2), appears that the width of the road was 15 feet and the vehicle was being driven at the speed of 14 Kms. per hour. This could not be considered to be fast. Kishan Singh stated that when he was about to turn the vehicle, a cow from the left came and in order to save her, he applied the brakes and as there was frost on the road, the vehicle skidded, collided with the parapet and fell on the road below. His statement about the speed is fully supported not only by the statement of DW 1 Devi Datt, the conductor, but also from that of Ummed Singh (PW 2) himself. All the witnesses are agreed that the distance between Sathuranga and Lakshmikhan is about 3 miles and that the bus took about 15 minutes to reach the spot where the accident occurred. According to Devi Datt (DW 1), the accident took place near the turn and he had seen a cow on the road. From the evidence of the two sides, it is clear that the accident did not occur due to the negligent driving of the bus. It was due to the cow appearing at the scene all of a sudden and in order to save the cow, the driver swerved the vehicle as a result of which the accident could not be avoided.

    10. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affair, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The general concept of reasonable foresight is the criterion of negligence. In the present case, the driver did his best to avoid the accident but he did not succeed. If the cow would have not been there, there could be no accident. In these circumstances, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view of the Tribunal that the accident did not occur due to the negligence of the driver. Unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss is an accident. That was so in the instant case and for the same, the driver could not be blamed. He was not running the vehicle at a fast speed and, as such, to impute carelessness to him would not be justified. Even Ummed Singh (PW 2), appearing for the claimants, has supported the case of the Corporation as well as its driver that the distance of 3 Kms. was covered in 15 minutes. Further, he admitted that there was some slope at the place where the accident took place. If all these things are taken together, it comes out that the Corporation is not liable to make payment of the damages.

    11. Coming to the first issue, both of the appellants were the married daughters of the deceased, Bachchi Singh. Smt. Kamla Devi, who appeared as PW 1, admitted that her sister Padma Devi was living with her husband whereas she was living with the deceased Bachchi Singh, as her husband was unemployed and was not doing any work.

    12. The relevant portion of S. 110A Motor Vehicles Act reads as under:—

    “(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident in the nature specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 110 may be made—

    (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

    (aa) by the owner of the property; or

    (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased.

    Provided that, where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.”

    13. The expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, but it has been defined under section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean “a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased.” Meaning as assigned by Civil Procedure Code has been adopted by the State amendment. This has been done in Uttar Pradesh.

    14. It was urged by the respondents' counsel that compensation is granted for loss of dependency. It is assessed with reference to the loss of future pecuniary benefit i.e the loss of the financial contribution which the deceased could have made, had he lived. Counsel urged that as both the daughters of the deceased Bachchi Singh had been married and none of them since was either dependent or receiving pecuniary benefit, hence, the claim made by them could not be maintainable.

    15. In State of Orissa v. Archana Nayak, 1987 ACJ 772 : (AIR 1987 Orissa 82), the question of dependency was considered by a Division Bench with reference to a widow who remarried after the death of her husband. The court held that a widow after her remarriage cannot be said to be a legal representative of her first husband and, as such, is not entitled to get compensation for the death of her first husband. The widow ceases to be a dependent upon remarriage. In the present case, one of the daughters was living with her husband whereas Smt. Kami a Devi asserted that she was living with her father Bachchi Singh. Merely her living with her father for sometime before his death it could not make her a dependent on him. She appears to us to be a casual visitor and not a dependent. If a daughter comes for a casual visit, that would not make her dependent. In such a case she could not be said to have suffered any pecuniary loss. In Gurdial Kaur v. Atma Singh, 1987 ACJ 245 (Punj & Har), a claim was made by two widows, two major sons, one married and four unmarried daughters. The compensation was awarded only to the widow and four unmarried daughters. Major sons and married daughters were not awarded compensation on the ground that they had not sufferred any pecuniary loss.

    16. The next argument was that the two daughters were entitled to receive compensation for pain suffered by them, even if they were not entitled on account of the fact that they had lost the bread earner for them due to the accident. In A.P.S.R.T.C v. Narasavva, AIR 1987 Andh Pra 127, which is a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh, found:

    “We have not been cited any case and we are not aware of any principle where compensation was awarded for any pain suffered by the dependent of the deceased in one case of this Court.”

    17. The case reported in Sri Sailam Devastanam v. Bhavani Pramilamma, AIR 1983 Andh Pra 297 was overruled by the Full Bench and it was held that no compensation was payable for pain suffered by the dependent. While taking that view, the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied on two decisions one of which is that of the Madhya Pradesh and the other of the Supreme Court. The Madhya Pradesh decision is reported in Nasiruddin v. Kadir Ahmed, (1986) 1 ACJ 94. The relevant portion of this decision is quoted below:—

    “His another submission is that the applicants should also have been compensated for their pain and suffering from the accidental death of Salim. So far as the latter submission of the learned counsel is concerned, suffice it to say that there is no foundation in law for advancing and basing such a claim.”

    18. The Supreme Court in a recent case in N. Sivammal v. Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corpn., (1985) 1 SCC 18 : AIR 1985 SC 106 ??? no compensation can be awarded for agony suffered by the dependents and confirmed the view of the High Court. In para 4, the High Court held that:

    “award of Rs. 5000/- under the head mental agony suffered by the claimants as a result of the death of the deceased cannot legally be sustained.”

    19. We are in respectful agreement with the, view taken in the aforesaid decisions. Nothing was cited before us by the appellants in justification of the submission propounded by them to the contrary.

    20. Section 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act defines dependents. It has not included therein a married daughter. Consequently, there is no liability to maintain the married daughter by the heirs of the deceased Hindu who inherit the properties.

    21. The next question that arises for decision is as to whether the appellants could claim any compensation for “loss of consortium”. Loss of consortium basically means loss of company or association of spouse, partner, an intimate or an associate. The word “consortium” means wife or husband and in wider perspective, it may include child or the parents but no compensation has been awarded to a married daughter for the “loss of consortium” caused to them. We are, therefore of opinion that the appellants are not entitled to claim compensation for the loss of consortium. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.

    22. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Smt. Padma Devi And Another Claimant- v. U.P State Road Transport Corporation, Nainital And Others
    (Jan 29, 1988)