Victim’s Right to Appeal under Section 372 CrPC: Jurisprudential Trajectory and Contemporary Position

Victim’s Right to Appeal under Section 372 CrPC: Jurisprudential Trajectory and Contemporary Position

1. Introduction

The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) traditionally cast the State as the principal prosecuting agency, relegating the victim to the margins of criminal proceedings. Parliament’s insertion of the proviso to Section 372 by Act 5 of 2009 signalled a paradigmatic shift, conferring on “victims” a substantive right to challenge acquittals, convictions for lesser offences, or inadequate compensation. Yet, more than a decade later, the contours of this right remain the subject of vigorous judicial debate and doctrinal refinement. This article critically traces the evolution of the proviso, reconciles seemingly discordant Supreme Court pronouncements, and evaluates the continuing influence of Section 372 upon ancillary procedural mechanisms such as Sections 378 and 401 CrPC.

2. Legislative Background and Statutory Framework

2.1 Genesis of the Proviso

Recommendations of the Justice Malimath Committee (2003) and the 154th Report of the Law Commission prompted Parliament to recognise victims’ participatory rights, culminating in the 2008 Amendment Act that introduced Section 2(wa) (defining “victim”) and the crucial proviso to Section 372.[1]

2.2 Textual Scheme

Section 372 opens with a negative mandate—“No appeal shall lie…”—but the proviso carves out an exception enabling the victim to appeal against:

  • (a) an order of acquittal;
  • (b) conviction for a lesser offence; or
  • (c) inadequate compensation.

The proviso further stipulates that such appeal “shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court,” embedding a forum-deciding rule.

3. Jurisprudential Evolution

3.1 Early Fragmentation (2009-2014)

High Courts initially delivered conflicting rulings on two foundational issues: (i) whether leave under Section 378(3)/(4) was prerequisite, and (ii) whether the amendment had retrospective effect. In National Commission for Women (2010) the Supreme Court hinted, obiter, that the proviso was prospective and victim-specific,[2] but offered no decisive guidance, fuelling jurisdictional variance.

3.2 Satya Pal Singh (2015)

A two-judge Bench held that though the victim enjoys a statutory right of appeal, the main body of Chapter XXIX remains applicable; therefore, leave under Section 378(3) is mandatory.[3] The Court underscored the interpretative principle that a proviso cannot override the main enactment.

3.3 Roopendra Singh (2017)

Reiterating Satya Pal Singh, another Division Bench insisted on prior leave, rejecting the Gauhati High Court’s contrary reasoning.[4]

3.4 Mallikarjun Kodagali (2018, Three-Judge Bench)

A larger Bench effected a doctrinal pivot. Answering its own framed question, the Court unequivocally ruled that a victim “need not apply for leave” and that the right operates prospectively from the date of the judgment appealed against, not the date of the offence.[5] The decision rested on: (a) the victim-centred purpose of the amendment; (b) the substantive character of the appellate right; and (c) comparative international norms favouring victim participation.

3.5 Subsequent Developments

Despite the precedential weight of Mallikarjun Kodagali, later benches occasionally reverted to the Satya Pal Singh line—e.g., High Court decisions in Yenutai Dakhane (2023) and Vineet Kumar Singh (2023)—illustrating lingering uncertainty. However, the higher bench hierarchy established by Kodagali remains binding unless expressly overruled.

4. Key Doctrinal Controversies

4.1 Requirement of Leave

  • Position A (Leave mandatory): Satya Pal Singh treats the proviso as subordinate to Section 378; to prevent a floodgate of frivolous appeals, judicial “gate-keeping” is essential.
  • Position B (Leave not required): Mallikarjun Kodagali characterises the proviso as an independent substantive right, likening it to the State’s unqualified appeal under Section 378(1)(b). Procedural filtering is unnecessary because the victim’s stake ensures seriousness.

Given Article 141 of the Constitution and the bench-strength rule, Position B presently prevails.

4.2 Prospective or Retrospective Application

The right accrues on the date of the impugned judgment (Kodagali). Attempts to apply the proviso to appeals concluded prior to 31 December 2009 have been rejected (MAHABIR v. State of Haryana, 2025).[6]

4.3 Forum of Appeal

The phrase “Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies” ties the victim’s forum to the hierarchy applicable to State appeals:

  • If the trial was by a Magistrate on police report, appeal lies to the Sessions Court.
  • If instituted as a complaint case, the controlling precedent of Subhash Chand channels the appeal to the High Court under Section 378(4).[7]
  • Where the trial court is the Sessions itself, the appeal is to the High Court.

4.4 Scope: Acquittal, Lesser Conviction, Inadequate Compensation

The Supreme Court has refused to widen the proviso to encompass enhancement of sentence. In Parvinder Kansal (2020) the Court held that absent explicit statutory backing, a victim cannot appeal solely for harsher punishment.[8]

4.5 Revision versus Appeal

Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy (2022) emphatically warns that victims must utilise their appellate remedy under Section 372 rather than invoke the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 to convert acquittals into convictions, an act expressly barred by Section 401(3).[9]

5. Interplay with Sections 378 and 401 CrPC

Sections 378(1) & (2) empower the State to appeal against acquittals; Section 378(4) authorises complainants in complaint cases to appeal, subject to leave. The victim’s right under Section 372 operates in addition to, not in derogation of, these provisions. However, where the complainant and the victim are the same person, dual remedies raise strategic considerations. Post-Kodagali, the absence of a leave requirement renders the Section 372 route more expeditious, but only if the appellant squarely meets the definition of “victim.”

6. Policy and Comparative Perspectives

International instruments—the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime (1985) and the EU Directive on Victims’ Rights (2012)—endorse participatory and remedial rights for victims. India’s jurisprudence, particularly Kodagali, aligns with these standards, yet practical hurdles remain: informational deficits, legal aid gaps, and docket congestion in appellate courts.

7. Critical Assessment

The Supreme Court’s oscillation between procedural gate-keeping and victim empowerment reflects tension between two constitutional imperatives: protecting the accused’s presumption of innocence and fulfilling the victim’s right to meaningful remedy. While Kodagali resolves the leave controversy de jure, its under-implementation de facto dilutes victims’ access to justice. Uniform administrative protocols—automatic victim notification of acquittal, simplified appeal templates, and judicial training—are indispensable for realising the proviso’s promise.

8. Conclusion

Section 372’s proviso has undeniably recalibrated India’s criminal process, yet doctrinal clarity achieved at the apex level must percolate consistently through subordinate courts. Harmonising Kodagali with residual precedents, reaffirming the ban on revisionary circumvention (Joseph Stephen), and delineating the proviso’s precise ambit are necessary steps toward a coherent victim-centric appellate regime. Ultimately, the efficacy of Section 372 will be measured not merely by pronouncements but by the tangible empowerment of victims within the criminal justice system.

Footnotes

  1. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 2006; Law Commission of India, 154th Report (1996).
  2. National Commission for Women v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 12 SCC 599.
  3. Satya Pal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 613.
  4. Roopendra Singh v. State of Tripura, (2017) 13 SCC 612.
  5. Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752 (Three-Judge Bench).
  6. MAHABIR v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC (anticipated citation).
  7. Subhash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (2013) 2 SCC 17.
  8. Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine SC 685.
  9. Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 90.