Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Presumptions, Proof, and Contemporary Challenges

Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Presumptions, Proof, and Contemporary Challenges

Introduction

Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter “Evidence Act”) creates a mandatory presumption of due execution and authentication in respect of documents purporting to be powers of attorney (“POA”) executed before, and authenticated by, specified authorities. Although apparently concise, the provision sits at the intersection of private international law, corporate governance, and the law of evidence. This article critically analyses the scope, rationale, and limits of the statutory presumption, synthesising judicial exposition from the Supreme Court and several High Courts, and juxtaposing the section with allied presumptions (e.g., Sections 60, 65, 90, 90-A Evidence Act) and with recent developments concerning the authentication of electronic records under Section 65-B.

Statutory Framework

Text of Section 85

“Presumption as to powers of attorney. — The Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government, was so executed and authenticated.” (Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 85)

Essential Requirements

  • The document must purport to be a power of attorney;
  • It must on its face appear to have been executed before and authenticated by one of the specified authorities; and
  • On satisfaction of (i) and (ii), the Court shall presume regular execution and authentication, displacing the need for ordinary proof of handwriting or attestation.

Rationale and Nature of the Presumption

Section 85 is intended to facilitate commerce and litigation by obviating the practical difficulty, delay, and cost of summoning foreign or corporate executants in each case. The presumption is, however, rebuttable; an objector bears the burden of producing cogent evidence of infirmity (Wali Mohammad v. Jamal Uddin, 1950 AIR All 524). Courts have repeatedly emphasised that “authentication is not merely attestation but something more” — the authenticating officer must ascertain both the identity of the executant and the fact of execution[1].

Judicial Construction

Supreme Court

Although the Supreme Court has not yet delivered an exhaustive exposition of Section 85, it has recognised the broader principle that statutory presumptions must be balanced against safeguards to prevent fraud (Suraj Lamp v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656). The decision underlines that presumptions cannot be invoked to validate transactions contrived to defeat mandatory substantive law, e.g., clandestine conveyances of immovable property via GPA/SA/Will devices.

High Court Jurisprudence

  1. Citibank N.A. v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills, AIR 1982 Del 487 — The Delhi High Court held that once the twin requirements (purporting to be a POA and authentication before a Notary) are facially satisfied, the presumption in Section 85 arises, covering both natural and juristic persons.[2]
  2. Baker Oil Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Baker Hughes Ltd., (2011) Delhi HC — The Court extended the presumption to include an inference that the signatory had corporate authority, thereby easing proof burdens in commercial litigation.[3]
  3. Kamla Rani v. Texmaco Ltd., (2007) Delhi HC — Emphasised that authentication “means more than mere execution” and that, absent contrary evidence, Section 85 dispenses with the need to produce board resolutions or the executant.[4]
  4. Punjab National Bank v. Parmesh Knitting Works, (1985) P&H HC — Distinguished the Delhi precedent in Electric Construction and reaffirmed that contemporaneous execution and authentication satisfy Section 85.[5]
  5. Salim Badsha v. Md. Naziruddin Sk., (2016) SCC OnLine Cal 654 — Clarified that a foreign POA, though executed abroad, benefits from Section 85 if duly notarised and can be rebutted only by substantive evidence.[6]
  6. In re Mylne, (1906) ILR Cal 33 625 — An early but influential decision construing the expression “shall presume” as eliminating the need for an affidavit of identification once the statutory form is apparent on the face of the instrument.[7]

Contours of Rebuttal

Because the presumption is rebuttable, the opponent may attack:

  • Identity — Proof that the signatory is an impersonator;
  • Capacity — In corporate contexts, lack of authority despite apparent regularity (e.g., absence of board resolution);
  • Forgery or Fraud — Positive evidence that the POA is fabricated;
  • Statutory Non-compliance — E.g., contravention of the Stamp Act or Registration Act where mandatory.

The burden of adducing such evidence lies squarely on the challenger (Baker Oil Tools, supra). Mere conjecture or pleading is insufficient.

Interplay with Other Evidentiary Provisions

Section 60(2) Registration Act, 1908

While Section 85 concerns presumption of execution of a POA, Section 60(2) of the Registration Act raises a presumption of due registration of documents. The Supreme Court cautioned in Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353, that the registration presumption cannot supplant proof of execution where witnesses are available. Similarly, Section 85 does not preclude direct evidence of forgery.

Section 65 Evidence Act — Secondary Evidence

If the original POA is unavailable, parties often tender certified or notarised copies. Section 65(c) permits secondary evidence when the original is lost, subject to foundational proof. Courts have denied the benefit of Section 90 (old-documents presumption) to certified copies when the original is not produced (Patel Manilal v. Surat Municipal Corp., 1977 Guj HC). However, where the copy itself bears authentication by a notary, Section 85 may still apply, though the safer course is to prove loss of the original.

Section 65-B — Electronic Powers of Attorney

With the proliferation of digital execution platforms, questions arise whether an electronically executed POA (e.g., with digital signature under the Information Technology Act, 2000) falls within Section 85. The Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, held that electronic records are admissible only upon strict compliance with Section 65-B. In Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801, the Court relaxed the certificate requirement in certain investigative contexts. Yet, for private instruments like a POA, compliance with Section 65-B(4) remains prudent because Section 85 presumes physical authentication, not digital certificates. Consequently, a two-fold threshold emerges: (i) Section 65-B authentication of the electronic record, and (ii) proof that the digital signature corresponds to a person entitled to execute a POA. Legislative clarification would be desirable.

Corporate and Transnational Dimensions

Corporate Bodies

Courts have liberally construed Section 85 to assist corporations that litigate through authorised officers. In Baker Oil Tools, the Delhi High Court held that the presumption extends to the signatory’s competence to bind the corporation. However, the decision remains criticised for conflating evidence of execution with substantive corporate authority, which is governed by the Companies Act and the organisation’s articles. A cautious approach would treat Section 85 as sufficient for admission, while allowing the opposite party to challenge authority substantively (cf. Sharomani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee v. Ram Sarup, 2004 SCC OnLine P&H 735).

Foreign-Executed Powers of Attorney

Global mobility necessitates reliance on POAs executed abroad. Decisions such as In re Mylne and Salim Badsha confirm that foreign notarisation suffices, provided the notary is competent under the local law and the document is duly stamped when used in India (Indian Stamp Act, § 18). Courts have rejected objections based solely on absence of Indian diplomatic authentication where Section 85 conditions are otherwise met, but practitioners should nevertheless consider obtaining consular attestation to pre-empt disputes.

Policy Concerns and Reform

  • Fraud Prevention. The presumption has occasionally been invoked to mask fraudulent conveyances (e.g., the SA/GPA/Will devices condemned in Suraj Lamp). A conditional presumption, akin to Section 90(2) UP Amendment, requiring the POA not to be the sole basis of title, may be considered.
  • Digital Transformation. Neither the Evidence Act nor the IT Act expressly addresses the interface between Section 85 and digital signatures. A legislative amendment introducing an 85-A-like provision for electronic POAs could ensure coherence with Section 65-B.
  • Corporate Governance. Clarity is needed on whether Section 85 should extend to an inference of corporate authority. A balanced approach would confine the presumption to execution/authentication and leave authority to be established via corporate records on demand.

Conclusion

Section 85 serves a vital facilitative function in Indian evidence law, streamlining proof of powers of attorney in an era of increasing cross-border transactions and corporate litigation. Judicial interpretation has generally favoured a pragmatic application, insisting only on the statutory pre-requisites of facial authenticity, while preserving the right of rebuttal. Yet, emerging challenges — notably electronic execution and sophisticated fraud — necessitate doctrinal refinement. Until Parliament intervenes, courts must continue to balance the convenience envisaged by Section 85 against the imperative of preventing abuse, guided by the principle that presumptions are handmaids of justice, not its masters.

Footnotes

  1. Wali Mohammad Chaudhari v. Jamal Uddin Chaudhari, AIR 1950 All 524.
  2. Citibank N.A. v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1982 Delhi 487.
  3. Baker Oil Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Baker Hughes Ltd., Delhi High Court, 2011.
  4. Kamla Rani & Ors. v. Texmaco Ltd., Delhi High Court, 2007.
  5. Punjab National Bank v. Parmesh Knitting Works, (1985) P&H HC.
  6. Salim Badsha v. Md. Naziruddin Sk., (2016) SCC OnLine Cal 654.
  7. In re Mylne, 1906 ILR Cal 33 625.