Section 6, Societies Registration Act 1860 – Procedural Gateway to Litigation and its Judicial Construction

Section 6, Societies Registration Act 1860 – Procedural Gateway to Litigation and its Judicial Construction

Introduction

The Societies Registration Act, 1860 (“SRA”), enacted during the colonial era, continues to be the principal legislation governing literary, scientific, charitable and like associations in India. While the Act is modest in length, its provisions have generated sustained jurisprudence on questions of legal personality, property holding and, most crucially, the capacity of a society to litigate. Section 6 – which states that “every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society …”[1] – constitutes the procedural hinge upon which all litigation involving registered societies swings. This article critically analyses Section 6, weaving statutory text with leading judicial decisions to delineate its ambit, limitations and contemporary relevance.

Statutory Framework and Doctrinal Context

Textual Elements of Section 6

  • Representative Litigation: The section eschews corporate personality, opting instead for representative action through specified office-bearers.
  • Internal Autonomy: Primary discretion is accorded to the society’s own rules to identify the representative; statutory default applies only in default of such determination.
  • Permissive, not Mandatory: The verb “may” – emphasised in several cases – indicates an enabling provision, not a restrictive one.[11]

Underlying Doctrines

Two conceptual issues dominate debates around Section 6:

  1. Whether registration confers juristic personality. Early High Court authority tended towards a quasi-corporation theory, emphasising continuity of identity notwithstanding fluctuating membership.[2][3]
  2. The relationship between representative capacity and maintainability of proceedings. Subsequent decisions interrogate whether societies can litigate in their own name (a “name theory”) or strictly through office-bearers (a “representation theory”).

Judicial Construction of Section 6

Early Recognition of Quasi-Corporate Continuity

In Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj (1945), Beaumont C.J. stressed that although members are a fluctuating body, registration “savours of the character of a corporation,” ensuring liabilities bind successors.[2] This reasoning was elaborated in The Servants of India Society v. Charity Commissioner (1960) where Chagla C.J. held that property and obligations remain undisturbed by changes in membership, underscoring the society’s continuous identity.[3]

Permissive Nature of Section 6

Delhi High Court in T.R. Balasubramanian v. Shri Ram SIR (2006) ruled that Section 6 is “merely permissive”; a society is not divested of the right to sue in its own name if its bye-laws so authorise.[11] The court relied on earlier Allahabad and Patna precedents, rejecting any interpretation that the provision curtails litigation capacity.

Supreme Court’s Modern Refinement

  • Illachi Devi v. Jain Society (2003) (relied on in Alukkal Koya) adopted a stricter stance, declaring that a society “is not a juristic person … it must sue or be sued through a person nominated.”[6]
  • P. Nazeer v. Salafi Trust (2022) re-affirmed that a plaint must plead (i) registration details and (ii) authorisation of the person signing pleadings; absence renders the suit non-maintainable.[5]
  • Church of North India v. Lavajibhai (2005) illustrates the interplay between SRA and special statutes; when properties of a society stand vested in a public trust, litigation is channelled through authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, not civil courts.[8]

Representative Capacity and Property Litigation

Property disputes reveal the practical import of Section 6. In Nagar Wachan Mandir v. Akbaralli (1993) a rent suit filed by only two office-bearers was dismissed because the society, being a “public trust” under state law, had to comply with both Section 6 SRA and trustee-representation rules.[9] Conversely, Hyderabad Cricket Association v. Gunrock Club (2003) held that, as an enabling provision, Section 6 does not bar an unregistered association’s suit in equity, albeit registration furnishes procedural convenience.[12]

Section 6 and Procedural Rigour under the CPC

The Supreme Court’s insistence in Church of Christ Charitable Trust v. Ponniamman Trust (2012) that pleadings must disclose a complete cause of action[10] has indirect ramifications for societies: a plaint lacking averments on registration or authorisation fails not only Section 6 but also Order 7 Rule 11. High Courts (e.g., R. Muralidaran, 2007)[4] have therefore required production of registration certificates and resolutions authorising litigation at the threshold stage.

Interplay with Constitutional and Regulatory Frameworks

State Regulatory Power versus Associational Autonomy

In Katra Educational Society v. State of U.P. (1966) the Supreme Court, using the pith-and-substance test, upheld state legislation interfering with the internal management of societies running educational institutions.[7] While not a Section 6 case per se, it signals that a society’s procedural autonomy in litigation is subject to overriding statutory schemes.

Transition from Society to Public Trust

Church of North India demonstrates that once the assets of a society are subjected to a comprehensive public-trust code, civil-court suits must respect the specialised jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner.[8] Section 6 cannot be used to bypass such statutory forums.

Practical Implications and Drafting Guidelines

  1. Pleading Registration Particulars: The plaint must state registration number, date and statutory basis, accompanied by a copy of the certificate.
  2. Authorisation Resolution: A governing-body resolution appointing the named representative should be annexed to pre-empt challenge.[5]
  3. Bye-law Consistency: Litigating representative must fit the description in the bye-laws; where silent, a specific appointment is indispensable.
  4. Consider Special Statutes: Where the society’s activities fall under specialised regimes (e.g., public trusts, waqf, cooperatives), confirm jurisdictional competence before invoking Section 6.
  5. Avoidance of Misjoinder: Improper joinder of personal-capacity defendants (as corrected in ANIIDCO v. DYC S.H.G) can be prevented by adhering strictly to representative nomenclature.

Conclusion

Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 operates as a procedural gateway: it neither grants full corporate personality nor reduces societies to legal non-entities. Rather, it fashions a pragmatic compromise – permitting societies to access courts through designated human agents. Judicial trends show a movement from a permissive “name theory” toward rigorous insistence on demonstrable authorisation, spurred by concerns of locus standi and abuse of process. Given the proliferation of registered societies in sectors ranging from education to public health, meticulous compliance with Section 6 has become a sine qua non for sustainable litigation strategy. Future jurisprudence is likely to further harmonise Section 6 with specialised statutory schemes and evolving notions of associative autonomy under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.

Footnotes

  1. Societies Registration Act, 1860, s. 6.
  2. Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, AIR 1946 Bom 516.
  3. The Servants of India Society v. Charity Commissioner, AIR 1960 Bom 192.
  4. R. Muralidaran v. District Registrar, (2007) 2 MLJ 641 (Mad).
  5. P. Nazeer v. Salafi Trust, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 382.
  6. Alukkal Koya v. Marakasutharbiyathul Islamiya, (2018) SCC OnLine Ker 3760.
  7. Katra Educational Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307.
  8. Church of North India v. Lavajibhai, (2005) 10 SCC 760.
  9. Nagar Wachan Mandir v. Akbaralli, 1993 SCC OnLine Bom 101.
  10. Church of Christ Charitable Trust v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706.
  11. T.R. Balasubramanian v. Shriram Scientific & Ind. Research, 2006 (87) DRJ 616 (Del.).
  12. Hyderabad Cricket Association v. Gunrock Cricket Club, 2003 (6) ALT 241 (AP).